Air Force leaders, at the unit level, have a requirement to evaluate their organizations for risk that would negatively impact their mission. Unfortunately, previous iterations of the Air Force Inspection System (AFIS) focused on compliance with developed guidance instead of encouraging a constant evaluation of risk. During this version of AFIS, it was noted that though an organization may be compliant with guidance, there may be considerable unmitigated risk to the unit’s airman or execution of its mission. This began to present itself in remarkable fashion as nuclear assets were mistakenly transported, gaping holes were discovered in Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) operations and maintenance procedures and retention rates dropped due to unit moral. At the direction of the Secretary of the Air Force and Chief of Staff, a concerted effort was made to develop a system that would identify and prioritize mission risk while still ensuring the compliance of Air Force Wings. This study evaluated the new AFIS system to determine if it does indeed identify those …show more content…
TIG found “the system to be wasteful, inadequate and unsustainable in the current and future resource environment. Over time, Air Force organizations had created over 100 inspections requiring 350+ inspection days over a five-year span for most wings.”1. Of these inspections, only 20% were conducted by the Major Command (MAJCOM) Inspector General (IG) teams leaving 80% created by different Functional Managers. The TIG also identified that the current system was not providing the AF senior leaders with the appropriate performance data that they required. Lastly, the system at the time did not meet United States Code Title 10 requirements for commanders and IG’s to evaluate and report on the discipline and readiness of their assigned
The class identified the capabilities and shortfall each service. Additionally, Title 10 requirements of each service were discussed. Along with which military service is responsible to fill the shortfalls and gaps. In conclusion, C300 was instructions pertaining to a Joint environment. If I my next assignment was a joint headquarter, I would study the logistical requirements, capabilities, and shortfalls of each joint services.
Which may not sound like much, but they went from being responsible for a group of officers during the hours of a patrol shift, to becoming responsible for an entire section of the city 24/7. This case study indicates that the lieutenants struggled with this change in roles, but even more, the sergeants who inherited the soldiers ' former watch commander duties struggled. The case suggests that they were not well informed about the changes or their rationale and had not been given much training or support for their new responsibilities. It can become assumed that the sergeants felt they already had full-time jobs and then were suddenly saddled with additional work without much explanation or preparation. The Chief indicated that, in retrospect, he should have had the sergeants more involved in the change process.
Although the command structure addressed many of the command authority issues, there were still a few issues that caused confusion with the unity of command during the execution phase of Anaconda. The Special Operation Forces and inter-agency organizations had a completely different command chain than the rest of the units conducting the operation. Black SOF had different priorities than CJTF Mountain and they had the authority to request for and receive support from many of the same support assets that CJTF Mountain was using such as the use of the AC-130s. During the execution phase of the operation, since both CJTF Mountain and Black SOF were using the same assets, but had different command structures, it caused confusion and frustration.
In 2009, the United States civilian leadership made the appropriate decision to reduce F22 Raptor procurement quantities from 339 aircraft to 187 aircraft. Although a contentious one, this decision resulted from an accurate assessment of the current and future airpower requirements within the US Air Force. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) considered the current and future strategic environment, required capabilities, cost, schedule, and performance problems coupled with budgetary constraints, as well as the need for other competing programs in its analysis. Following this assessment, the JROC appropriately determined that a reduced F22 program best supported national security needs as the country moved out of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. This paper briefly addresses these factors as a part of the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) process.
The Effective Military Leader Warrant Officer Romero, Philip T. SPC: Captain Dearth, 1st Platoon The book “Black Hearts One Platoons Descent into Madness in Iraq’s Triangle of Death” by Jim Frederick is a true story about multiple leadership failures and six United States Soldiers from 1st Platoon, Bravo Company, 1st Battalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne Division who were convicted for their involvement in horrible crimes while deployed to Iraq. The horrific acts including rape as well as murder committed by the soldiers of 1st platoon were a direct result of poor military leadership. Bad leadership will corrupt any military unit.
Shortly after 11 September 2001, Brigadier General James Mattis successfully commanded a Marine unit called Task Force 58 which conducted operations throughout southern Afghanistan. The success of his command is correlated to the six principals of mission command listed in Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-0. Although General Mattis used all the principals at some point during his command, he mostly built cohesive teams through mutual trust, created a shared understanding, exercised discipline initiative, and accepted prudent risk. This paper will explain how General Mattis applied these four principals during his command of Task Force 58. However, first, a summary of events leading up to the formation of Task Force 58 and its significant
Before coming here a was a cadet in the Civil Air Patrol for several years, and throughout my time there I was able to observe many different leaders, good and bad. However, one of the squadron commanders still stands out in my mind. His name was Sam, and only fifteen years old when he became the squadron commander. He was perhaps the best leader the squadron had while I was in it. Before he took over the previous commander lacked the motivation to do anything, therefore the squad was in disarray, and no one else had the drive to try to fix the problems that keep arising either.
SUBJECT: Developing Warrant Officers for the Future 1) Purpose: To provide information on developing Warrant Officers utilizing the Warrant Officer 2025 Strategy. 2) Facts: a. The Warrant Officer 2025 Strategy seeks to produce a capable warrant officer cohort of trusted professionals who are technologically agile, adaptive, and are innovative leaders for the Army’s Force 2025 and beyond. Through optimized accessions, leader development, and world class professional military education (PME) warrant officers can continue to be relied upon to maintain a depth of knowledge and provide expedient solutions to increasingly complex problems now and in the future. The Warrant Officer 2025 Strategy aims to develop cohort centric best practices
Additionally, he supervised 17 personnel in the safe removal and re-installation of 10 antennas during typhoon Tropical Cyclone Conditions of Readiness (TCCOR), ensuring prompt and speedy mission critical circuits’ restoration upon reinstatement of “All Clear” conditions. - Spearheaded the self-assessment Inspection General (IG) checklist for TSCOMM site, ensuring that all discrepancies were documented and a Plan of Action and Milestones developed and implemented, highly contributing to the Detachment 's grade of "Satisfactory" during the 2016 IG inspection. - As Alternate Electronic Key Management System (EKMS) Manager, he meticulously supported the maintenance and management of a 1,887 line item account and 18 Local Elements to include the change-over of eight squadrons and four Mobile Tactical Operation
he/she were already serving or have any kind of supervision (Clear, Reisig, and Cole,
Use tools to keep track of inspections There are so many tools available for you to keep track of inspections. All you have do is to find the right tool for your fleet, from ordinar spreadsheets to complicated programs. It is your decision completely. What kind of inspections are recommended? The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) recommends the inspection of various vehicle parts for safe fleet operation.
The action by the first team will be taken into action in the event of the disaster. The team needs to evaluate the disaster and should determine what steps need to be taken so that the industry gets the organization back to business as usual. The key performance indicator or the key risk indicator suggests that organizations increasingly acknowledge the need to manage the significant types of risks and from all the proactive sources. There is department needs go recognise the risks that can be managed using the variety of tools.
Risk Analysis in Military Systems using Machine Learning By Chetan B Shetty (1ms11cs032) Vijay kumar Tangadagi (1ms11cs128) Sudarshan Rai (1ms11cs112) Department of Computer Science and Engineering M.S.Ramaiah institute of Technology Bangalore-560054
Introduction A risk assessment framework (RAF) is an approach for prioritizing and sharing information about the security risks posed to an information technology. The information should be presented in a way that both non-technical and technical personnel in the group can understand. The view on the RAF provides assistance to organizations in identifying and locating both low and high-risk areas in the system that may be susceptible to abuse or attack.