The Local Problem Of Evil By Peter Van Inwagen

“The Problem of Evil” by Peter van Inwagen, is a series of lectures that that presents van Inwagen’s various responses to problem of evil. In this essay, I will present “the local problem of evil” (from chapter 6 of the book), the solution van Inwagen proposes for this problem, and my critique of his solution. “The local problem of evil,” according to van Inwagen, is the hypothetical response an atheist would have towards van Inwagen’s solution of “the global problem of evil” which is, “If god existed, then why is there so much evil in the world?” The argument of “the local problem of evil” is “If god existed then why are there specific horrors that occur in the world, like children dying in a horrific car crash?” The argument that is drawn

A specific horror has occurred. (For an example an entire bus filled with children drove off a cliff and everyone was crushed to death).

2. If the specific horror had not occurred then, the world would not be any worse off (Unless one of the children grew up to be a person responsible for mass genocide, to which van Inwagen responds that there still could have been a less horrific way of getting rid of the evil individual).

3. If a morally perfect creator (like God), created the world and had the ability to leave out particular horrors from the world, while leaving the world he created no worse for wear, then the morally perfect creator would leave out those horrors.

4. If an omnipotent being is the creator of the world, then he would be able to leave out particular horrors from the

This is van Inwagen’s reasoning as to why the principle and the third premise are false. But wait, why is the official not obligated to release the criminal a day early? The official is not required to set the criminal free a day early because that one-day of time is an arbitrary amount of time according to van Inwagen, because there are various other portions of time the criminal could have chosen to be set free. What if instead of asking the official to let him out a day early, the criminal asks the official to let him out two days early. If 9 years 364 days were more or less “equal” to 10 years, then wouldn’t it make it so that 9 years and 363 days is the “same” as 9 years and 364 days, and therefore it could be argued that 9 years 363 days is “equal” to 10 years. This type of logic can be used over and over again until it can be said that the criminal spending no time in prison is equal to spending 10 years in prison, which is absurd. So, the official has to draw a line, an arbitrary line, that allows him/her to distinguish a proper portion of time the criminal spends in prison and an improper amount of time the criminal spends in prison. But how does the official determine such a time. The official doesn’t because, as van Inwagen states, the principle “forbids the drawing of morally arbitrary lines.” (pg.102) If the official cannot draw the “arbitrary lines” then it can be logically argued that the