General Mitchell Advantages

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Warfare is an ever-evolving process that has grown from the rudimentary and modest weaponry such as bows and arrows with diminutive to no strategy, to complex operations with multiple joint forces and weapons that can be deployed from thousands of miles away. Today’s military leaders are continuously analyzing strategies to win wars just as General William “Billy” Mitchell did many years ago. Regarded as the “Father of Military Flight/Father of the United States Air Force”, General Mitchell was a strong advocate for the use of air power. During a time when the majority of battles were fought on the ground, Mitchell was a visionary who focused on the benefits of air warfare to be successful. His innovations brought a whole new level of warfare …show more content…

Regardless of the era, public support can be difficult to obtain during the war, but providing a way of an attack that lessened the bloodshed of troops and seemed more glamorous was a great ploy to get the public involved. The overall cost was another public appeal that Mitchell argued as thousands of bombers could be built for the cost of one battleship. Nonetheless, the public, United States Government, and the military all needed convincing of the need for Air Power so Mitchell continued to voice his belief that the United States needed to strengthen its power in the air. He amenably criticized the Army, Navy, and the White House by pointing out the fact that the United States was nowhere near that of other countries regarding aerial …show more content…

Although Mitchell’s strong advocacy for aerial warfare led to his Court Marshall he publicly criticized the United States Army and Navy up until his death, Mitchell paved the way for the Air Force as he understood the importance of the war in the skies. It is clear why he is viewed as “the father of the Air Force”.
Modern warfare such as the air campaign of the Gulf War, also known as the 1991 bombing of Iraq, was an all-embracing aerial campaign that only lasted from the month of January to February, further illustrates Mitchells point. Coalition forces flew over 100,000 sorties dropping 88,500 tons of bombs, extensively destroying vital military targets and civilian infrastructure.
The priority for Coalition forces was the destruction of Iraqi C2 nodes, Scud missile launch pads and storage areas, telecommunications and radio facilities, and airfields. To prevent counter /chemical attacks on coalition forces and the country of Israel, a third of the Coalition air-power was devoted to attacking Scuds, some of which were on trucks and therefore difficult to locate. At least half of Iraq's major power stations and substations were demolished; while a further six major, power stations were