Allied Strategic Bombing

Allied strategic bombing of Germany during the Second World War was in the main significant. The key themes to be looked at in this essay are the effects that allied strategic bombing had on the dislocation and demoralisation of German civilians; Germany’s economic ability to produce and transport goods for the war effort; other key aspects of the German war effort and, finally, other theatres of the War. The evidence of the effectiveness of allied strategic bombing of Germany strongly suggests that it became more significant throughout the war, especially after the first one thousand bomber raid on Cologne in May 1942, and although not decisive on its own, was significant in the final outcome of the Second World War.
One element of the allied

The Nazi government had accumulated adequate supplies of clothing that could be given to those whose houses had been destroyed and food was in good supply despite being rationed. This ability to cope meant the majority of German civilians felt the effects of allied strategic bombing mildly and the hoped-for loss of confidence in the Nazis failed to materialise. Through failing to achieve its objective of causing a dislocation and demoralisation of the German people in the early stages of the war Allied Strategic Bombing was largely insignificant in this effect. This changed, however, after the first one thousand bomber raid on Cologne in May 1942. Planes such as the Avro Lancaster with its four engines became capable of carrying much larger bomb loads than had ever previously been possible. Allied escort fighters such as the P-51 Mustang were fitted with extra fuel tanks under their wings, drastically increasing their range from 500 to 2000 miles. The number of bombs capable of being dropped over the target area increased substantially. The destruction wrought on German cities scaled up dramatically. The result of this for German civilians was, ‘their morale, their belief in

The attacks on the railways and waterways, as mentioned above, not only affected the German economy but also the German army. The equipment that had been produced was difficult to move from the factory to the front line and there was also limited space on the trains to move the men themselves. Whilst not entirely as a result of Allied Strategic Bombing, 80% of the German army was horse-drawn. This lack of transportation hindered the army from reaching its full capabilities thereby limiting their performance in the war and as such it seems that allied strategic bombing of the transport infrastructure was highly successful in achieving its objective of impacting and hindering other areas of the German war effort. The bombing also delayed the use of Hitler’s Vergeltungswaffe rockets. Operation Hydra was an allied strategic bombing raid on the Peenemünde Army Research Centre on the 17th/18th August 1943. These raids, according to Joseph Goebbels, caused a setback of ‘six to eight weeks’ in terms of the testing of the revolutionary weapon. This setback meant that the development of the V-2 Rocket occurred too late to become a significant factor in the outcome of the war and hence Allied Strategic Bombing was greatly significant in these regards. Allied Strategic Bombing also