An Analysis Of Operation Rolling Thunder And The Jus Ad Bellum Of The Persian Gulf War

Operation Rolling Thunder was a widely criticized air campaign designed to deter the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) from supporting the National Liberation Front, in South Vietnam. In contrast, Operation Instant Thunder, named to distinguish itself from the former, was an incredibly effective air campaign that successfully destroyed Iraq’s war making capability. While the Jus En Bello of each campaign can be analyzed independently, they cannot fairly be evaluated without further inspection of the Jus Ad Bellum. The aim of such analysis is not solely for a determination of the ethics of each conflict, but also to examine how and if the morality of the Jus En Bello is influenced by the Jus Ad Bellum. After examining the ethics of the decision

If one assumes that all aspects of the Jus Ad Bellum must be wholly satisfied as absolute responsibilities, the case for using force in Vietnam would be hard, but not impossible, to make. A more plausible method to apply Jus Ad Bellum to Vietnam is to consider the responsibilities similar to Prima Facie responsibilities where the strength of one can overcome the weakness of another. The Persian Gulf War, however, would pass the Jus Ad Bellum if every aspect were considered an absolute responsibility.

Jus En Bello

The Planning Stage

Michael Walzer wrote “soldiers and statesmen ought to know the dangers of cruelty and injustice and worry about them and take steps to avoid them.” This begins in the planning phase and carries through to the execution. The development of the CONOPs is specifically when the Jus Ad Bellum ends and the Jus En Bello begins. It is also where the first effects of the uncertain authority and cause of the Vietnam War were felt. In a March 24th 1965 Memo by Assistant Secretary of Defense McNaughton the objectives of Operation Rolling Thunder were ;

1. To reduce DRV/VC activities by affecting DRV will.

2. To improve the GVN/VC relative balance of morale.

3. To provide the US/GVN with a bargaining

The bombing campaign in 1965 Vietnam can more aptly be called coercive diplomacy then proper use of military force as “target selection had been completely dominated by political and psychological considerations.” The stated goal of taking human life in order to offer a cessation during negotiations blurs the lines of proportionality as indiscriminate bombing neglects non-combatant