An Argument In Support Of Rawls Maximin Rule

An Argument in Support of Rawls’ Maximin Rule In §26 of A Theory of Justice, John Rawls presents “three chief features of situations” that support his argument that his “maximin” rule would lead the party in the “original position” to adopt his principles of justice. The preliminary task of this essay is to explain why people would use the “maximin” rule to adopt Rawls' principles of justice. In order to accomplish this task, an explanation of Rawls principles of justice, and its associated terms, such as, “original position” and “veil of ignorance,” must be forwarded. Through this explanation, it is my intention to show why people would use the “maximin” rule to adopt Rawls' principles of justice. Moreover, it is my contention that an

It is a foundational belief of egoistic philosophies that self-interest is what people are concerned with in their formulations of ethical beliefs. On the other hand, a mutually disinterested person has no interest in another person’s

This principle, commonly referred to as the “Liberty Principle,” indicates that, “[E]ach person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others.” Rawls suggests that if people would choose a different principle to regulate liberty, such as from a position of self-interest, then the result would be discrimination against some people viz., those who are not like yourself. The resultant situation would then be an acceptance of a reduced liberty for everyone. Therefore, by using the veil of ignorance, and explaining that the people in the original position are “rational and mutually disinterested,” Rawls is able to answer the objection of self-interest. The original position indicates that no “rational and mutually disinterested” person would ever agree to discrimination, or potential loss of liberty, if his or her own particular social position, psychological motive, etc. were