Analyse The Origin And Development Of The Privilege Against Self Incrimination

The privilege against self-incrimination allows a person to refrain from answering questions or producing documents which may result if, in the opinion of the trial judge, in the exposure of said person to a criminal or civil charge. The privilege can be relied upon at any stage prior to or within proceedings when/if incriminating evidence is sought from them. With the introduction of the Criminal Justice Act 2007 (2007 Act), the privilege of self-incrimination has been somewhat placed under threat. Part 4 of the 2007 Act has created a number of reforms relevant to the privilege of self-incrimination/right to silence. These reforms will allow a jury/court, dependent on the case, to draw inferences from the accused’s silence during the investigation

It is widely believed that the privilege against self-incrimination originally developed from abuses by the English ecclesiastical courts, in where all suspects had to take an oath of compurgation, which outlined that the accused must answer all questions honestly. The issue with said oath was that it was not preceded with any presentation of charges which the suspect has been accused off. Therefore, a person could be called before the courts, and be subject to an invasive line of questioning under oath without any actual notice of the charges he faced. During the 17th century, in connection with both the Lilburn Trial and the elimination of the Courts of Star Chamber and High Commission, the law began to noticeable evolve in that a person was no longer bound to incriminate himself/herself in any court. The case of R. v Director of Serious Fraud Office, ex p Smith was one of the first cases in which we witness an outline of the immunities of the privilege of self-incrimination/right to silence. However, it is important to note that the privilege of self-incrimination has significantly developed into a near constitutional right as witnessed in both Heaney v Ireland and Rock v