Analysis Of Jason Kalef's 'Promising To Try'

In “Promising to Try”, Jason D’Cruz and Justin Kalef claim that though we take no comfort in the idea of ‘promising to try’, all one is capable of doing is just that and anything more would be deemed irresponsible. D’Cruz and Kalef theorize that, “... promising to try can genuinely restrict a promise in a way that is responsible and morally significant” due to uncontrollable factors that one might face externally and internally. They briefly reference Marusic, who is against the idea of promising to try and mention that an evidentialist would be faced with a dilemma of promising and not promising where there is some evidential uncertainty of not following through with a promise. Responsible promisers are keenly aware of the implications of promising to do something under conditions that might cause one to not follow through with their promise. In circumstances like these, there are reasons why promising to try would be significant. It is a responsible way of letting the other party know that there might be some circumstance where the agent will not be able to follow through with their

To some extent, I do believe this claim has some circumstances that are justifiable under D’Cruz and Kalef’s understanding of promising to try, but I don’t think it can be applied towards every type of promise made. Such things as external motivators and internal factors, such as mental health and will power, do certify the idea of promising to try instead of promising. When an agent is aware of some of the complications that could arise, it’s on the promiser to let their promisee be aware of these complications and are given the opportunity to possibly make other arrangements. On the other hand, promising to try in a situation where one is fully aware that they lack the motivation to fulfill that promise, is not a genuine promise to