Appendix To Petition For Writ Of Cert (ADA)

I. AN APPLICANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO COMPENSATORY OR PUNITIVE DAMAGES UNDER A RELIGIOUS ACCOMODATION CLAIM

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits an employer to “fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). “Religion” includes “all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s or prospective employee’s religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s

Under the ADA, an employee must sufficiently request an accommodation before any duty to accommodate is imposed on the employer. [Appendix to Petition for Writ of Cert., at 69a–70a (July 25, 2014) (“Pet. App.”) (citing cases).] Employers are already familiar with the level of knowledge required to impose liability for failure to accommodate under the ADA. As discussed, the ADA and Title VII contain similar language regarding accommodation. See Thomas, 225 F.3d at 1155. Requiring an employee or applicant to sufficient request religious accommodation in a Title VII case would place both parties on notice and provide consistency between the two statutes. See Northcross v. Bd. Of Educ. of Memphis City Schs., 412 U.S. 427, 428 (1973) (similarity of language between statutes “is, of course, a strong indication that the two statutes should be interpreted pari passu”); see also H.R. Rep. No. 102-40, pt.2 at 47 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 697 (“A number of other laws banning discrimination, including the [ADA] and the [ADEA] are modeled after, and have been interpreted in a manner consistent with, Title VII. The Committee intends that these other laws modeled after Title VII be interpreted consistently in a manner consistent with Title VII.”). These considerations are critical, as “laws which regulate persons or entities must give fair notice of conduct

Manhart, 435 U.S. at 707 (regarding gender stereotypes). Prior to the present case, the EEOC has typically discouraged probing into potential religious conflicts with company policies. See EEOC, Pre-Employment Inquiries and Religious Affiliation or Beliefs (available at http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/practices/inquiries_religious.cfm) (last visited June 7, 2015) (“Questions about an applicant’s religious affiliation or beliefs… are generally viewed as non job-related and problematic under federal law.”). In fact, the EEOC has categorically decried basing employment decisions on stereotypes. See, e.g., EEOC, Best Practices for Eradicating Religious Discrimination in the Workplace (July 23, 2006) (available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/best_practices_religion.html) (“avoid assumptions or stereotypes about what constitutes a religious belief;” train managers “not to engage in stereotyping based on religious dress and grooming