In describing the nature of the mind, physicalist theories seem to be the least satisfying in providing comprehensive explanation. Out of the physicalist theories discussed in class, I find functionalism to be the most logical and thus would like to make a few assertions in negation to this theory. I contend that functionalism fails to explain epiphenomena in mental states that can otherwise be explained more logically in other theories (i.e. property dualism), and thus we must reject it. I will begin by explaining a functionalist perspective on the mind. Then, I will present arguments on epiphenomena that necessarily make the premises of functionalism false. Lastly, I want to present my opinions on another preferable theory that would explain …show more content…
The basic claim of this theory was really meant to explain the identical mind/mental states and behaviors of other organisms that may not have the same “hardware” or experience identical physical states as humans. This theory appears practical because it allows us not only to study mental states across species, but mental states in general by determining identical functional roles that different physical states play in different organisms. This is also attractive as it helps understand the mystery of our minds more specifically. Functionalism ultimately seeks to create a science of the mind that can answer certain questions for us such as: what is mental state or brain identity X, what sorts of things cause mental state or brain identity X, and what affects (mental and behavioral) does X have? For functionalists, all these questions, again, can be answered by concluding what functional role a physical state is playing, how that defines the present mental state, and then observing the output of the functional role in order to draw conclusions and generalizations. Although, by linking causation of mental states and behavior to only functions in an organism, functionalists do run into some …show more content…
This is a question of the differences between producing behavior versus understanding or making sense of behavior. Rationalization about our intentional thoughts- beliefs, perspectives, desires, etc.- is a mechanism of thought that is epiphenomenal; it doesn’t seem to necessarily present causation of output or behavior. I can easily create mental states in which I rationalize and reason my thoughts in accordance to certain norms and values, simply just understanding how they fit into relative frameworks. I can produce mental states in which I reason with my own thought on what I believe to be rational thoughts, perspectives, actions and so forth. None of these states have to produce any sort of behavior or output whatsoever. This is where I believe functionalists have the most trouble, as they do not account for the epiphenomenal and fail at using empirical theory to explain mental states of that nature. Of course some responses consist of the idea that no such mental states exist; that mental states which do seem to be about making sense of behavior actually causally explain what someone would do in regards to behavior, not just what someone reasonably ought to do without behavioral output. Again, I find this to be narrow and illogical as I do believe you can rationalize about any number of invoked concepts without ever having to act or produce behavior in