Commerce Clause Research Paper

The Commerce Clause, found in Article 1, Section 8 of the United States Constitution is a provision that has generated great controversy because of its broad implications. The court has interpreted the clause to provide a broad blanket of potential applications, and it has also gone against that view in order to limit the power of Congress. While the precedents do not seem very helpful because of their indecisive nature, they do reveal helpful jurisprudence principles that can be applied to cases to come. The debate can be boiled down to three questions: 1) what activities constitute “commerce,” 2) if the power to regulate commercial activities is divided between the national and state governments, what portion of these activities can Congress

Article 1, Section 8, subsection 3 states, “[The Congress shall have Power] to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” While commerce with foreign nations and Indian tribes are important aspects of the clause, the main point of contention resides in the statement, “Congress shall have power… to regulate Commerce… among the several States.” As alluded to earlier, this seemingly straight forward power of Congress, has very broad implications that have been tested over the years through numerous Supreme Court cases. Chief Justice Marshall was the first to articulate this in Gibbons v. Ogden, stating the commerce power is the “power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed.” He goes on to say, “this power, like all others vested in congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution.” This statement sets the stage for the interpretations in the cases to

v. E.C. Knight Company does make an effort to answer the key questions surrounding the Commerce Clause, the case primarily focuses on the question: what is commerce? In this case, the American Sugar Refining Company purchased four Philadelphia sugar refineries, gaining 98 percent of the sugar-refining business. Charged with violating the Sherman Anti-trust Act, the court rendered the decision constitutional on the basis of the Commerce Clause; the Supreme Court later heard this case. To begin, the court made a clear distinction between police power and commerce power, answering the second and third commerce questions regarding federalism and the activities that Congress can regulate. Justice Fuller writes, “That which belongs to commerce is within the jurisdiction of the United States, but that which does not belong to commerce is within the jurisdiction of the police power of the state.” He goes on to further emphasize that “the regulation of commerce applies to the subjects of commerce and not to matters of internal police.” The court is trying to make the point that the Sherman Anti-trust Act is a policing matter, and therefore does not apply directly to the Commerce Clause. The main question the court seeks to answer is the question of what is or is not considered commerce. The court concludes that the manufacturing process is not part of commerce because “it does not control it and affects it only incidentally and indirectly.” Justice Fuller further states,