Reagan and Carter certainly had their differences in terms of tax reform, but concerning foreign policy, especially Afghanistan, they were both on the exact same page. If Carter brought up the Operation through its adolescence, Reagan certainly brought it to its maturity. Since Reagan absolutely insisted on the notion of Whatever Carter had done to successfully deploy Operation Cyclone, Reagan took and expanded upon greatly. Upon entering office in 1981, Reagan nearly doubled the Operation’s Budget : most of the money the CIA donated was given to them under the direction of Wilson. In the years after 1983, Wilson was reported to have given the CIA as much as $300 million over the planned budget, under the excuse of “allowing the fighters …show more content…
The mujahedeen were actually better equipped than the Afghan Army they were fighting against. On 27th March 1985, Reagan passed Presidential Directive 166, in which he clearly outlined his objective for the war in Afghanistan: “to drive the Soviets out of Afghanistan, by all means available.” He also stated in the Directive that “Our support of the Afghanistan resistance demonstrates our commitment to resisting Soviet aggression.” Not only that, but also that the US government would co-operate with the ISI: “[Relations will include] responding to Pakistani security requirements arising from the support to the resistance.” Before continuing further into the topic, it is important to understand that although US foreign policy was clearly despicable on the part of Reagan, that it was the Pakistan army that originally set up ISI cells within Afghanistan (aid to terrorists) in the 1960s on order of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, longer before any Soviet soldier had crossed the Amu Darya …show more content…
It is also true that the Pakistan army has to this date not stopped meddling with terrorist activities in Afghanistan , perhaps to break the India-Afghanistan Alliance. It is no surprise that General Zia ul-Haq ordered the training of over 90,000 Afghan rebels, many of who later formed the Taliban. By 1985, the budget of Operation Cyclone was raised to $250 million dollars. President Reagan was clearly pro-Taliban and pro ISI: “The Mujahedin are increasingly convinced that, in addition to weapons, and the solution to logistic problems, this requires more cooperation at the tactical and the political levels.” Dr. Najibullah had only one hope: Soviet aid. However, this was falling fast: in Saudi Arabia radical oil policy was introduced, “increasing its production fourfold”, while price dropped. Due to this the Soviet Union lost approximately $20 billion per year. And the war in Afghanistan was only costing them more money. Not only did it make Mikhail Gorbachev consider pulling out of Afghanistan, it was the start of the crumbling of a great empire. By 1987, the CIA/Reagan were funding the Mujahedeen more than $630 million per year; rather than lose more money in a hopeless war, Gorbachev finally decided to pull out of