Semyon Reshenin
The Euthyphro problem for ideal observer theories of ethics
The Euthypro dilemma presents a challenge for ideal observer theories of ethics: they have to either accept independence of moral facts, or, provided that they rely only on non-moral knowledge, deal with inability to guarantee that constructed values are genuine. David Lewis in his dispositional theory of value proposes the way to deal with Euthypro problem by acknowledging arbitrariness even of ideal observer’s responses.
In the first section I will clarify some terms and concepts used in this paper. The second section will contain brief presentation of Lewis’s dispositional theory of value. Finally, in the third section I will address relations between contingency of our psychology and presumptive necessity of values which, eventually, will lead us to dealing with Euthyphro problem.
Clarification of terms
Some terms need to be clarified before we proceed. First, we should define the exact place of ideal observer theory in relation to its neighbouring theories. I will rely on the classification proposed by Russ Shafer-Landau (Shafer-Landau, 39-40). Ideal observer theory belongs to cognitivism; in other words it assumes that there are moral facts, our ethical judgments are propositions about these facts, and as such they can be
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According to this theory «something of the appropriate category is a value if and only if we would be disposed, under ideal conditions, to value it» (Lewis, 113). To value – for Lewis – means «to desire to desire». He stresses that only intrinsic (non-instrumental) desiring to desire can be valuing. By using such second-order desires we can easily describe situation when someone desires something which he assesses as morally wrong. In that case, he also intrinsically desires to not desire this