Examples Of Time Space Synaesthesia

Introduction

Attempts to identify what word meaning is have been at the forefront of the philosophy of language for decades. The dominant theories put forward can generally be separated into two schools of thought, internalism and externalism. Internalists, such as Noam Chomsky, argue that the meaning of any given word exists in the form of an internal word concept that is present in every individual’s mind for every word they know. Furthermore, in her prototype theory, Eleanor Rosch argues that these concepts can be broken down into a list of features that can be present for any given object to be considered a real-world example of a particular word. Conversely, the externalist school of thought holds that meaning cannot be solely internal.

Time-space synaesthesia is a phenomenon in which individuals perceive time-related words (months of the year, days of the week etc.) as having physical, spatial locations. The experience of time-space synaesthesia would be compatible with the idea that meaning is use if it influenced the ways in which all individuals with time-space synaesthesia used time-related words. However, if all time-space synaesthetes experienced an additional part of meaning in virtue of their perceptual experience, regardless of whether or not the experience influenced language use, then current understandings of the ways in which internal concepts influence meaning would not account for the phenomenon. This is because such a fact would mean that time-space synaesthesia affects word meaning in ways that are unique in comparison to most other internal concepts. I will argue that time-space synaesthesia does influence the meaning of time-related words and phrases without influencing the ways in which the words or phrases are used. Therefore, an explanation, by way of comparison to the ways in which ordinary internal word concepts influence meaning, will be

words that do not refer to any physical object). Frege argues that concepts for words (or intensions as he calls them) are neither internal nor external, but exist in a different state altogether. Further, Frege argues that because thoughts, or concepts, can be ‘grasped’ (understood) by any person they are independent of individuals and are therefore not internal (Frege 1997, pp. 336-342). Frege also argues that the intension of a word (the concept) constitutes the meaning of the word, and that this then determines the word’s extension (what it refers to) (Frege 1997, pp. 152-153). For example, the intension of the word book is the same across all languages (that it contains a series of printed, written, or electronic text). The way in which the word book is expressed may be different in a different language, although the intension of the word remains the same. Further, a person uses the word book correctly when they have ‘grasped’ the intension of the word correctly. This intension then determines the extension of the word (what exactly it refers to or how it is used). This view would not be problematic for words that do not have a referent, as the extension of a word is not determined solely by a physical referent. Nor would the view be problematic for the Twin Earth problem, as the intension of a word is not considered to be internal. This means that the intension of