Inaccuracies Of Manning Case

On July 20, 1958, an elderly couple in Christian County, Kentucky were beaten to death in their home by intruders with a tire iron. Two suspects, Silas Manning and Willie Barker were arrested shortly after the murders and indicted by the grand jury on September 15, 1958. The prosecution believed the case against Manning was stronger; therefore, chose to try Manning first in hopes that once convicted, he would testify against Barker. Manning, of course, was not willing to incriminate himself. At the start of of Manning’s trial on October 23, 1958, the prosecution requested and obtained the first of what would amount to be 16 continuances in Barker’s trial. Due to numerous difficulties, it was not until December1962 that Manning was convicted

While the Manning cases were ongoing, each term the prosecution sought a continuance in the Barker case. Barker, through his counsel, made no objection to the first eleven continuances; however, on the twelfth continuance (02/1962), his counsel filed a motion to dismiss which was rejected. Barkers counsel filed no objections to the 13th or 14th continuances but did object to the 15th and 16th to no avail. The final trial commenced on October 9, 1963, with Manning as the primary witness for the prosecution. Barker was convicted and received a life sentence.

Barker appealed his conviction with the state Court of Appeals claiming he had not received a speedy trial. His conviction was upheld. Barker then petitioned the District Court of Appeals who ruled that Barker had waived his speedy trial claim for the entire period prior to the date on which he had first objected to the delay (2/1962); therefore, it appeared he did not desire a speedy trial. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals on June 22, 1972.

Overall, this case focused on the defendant, Barker’s, sixth amendment constitutional right to a speedy trial and whether or not that right was

The reasoning used as a factor in determining whether the speedy trial right had been denied was whether or not Barker had asserted his right; however, a waiver of that right could not be presumed, except as to delay caused by the petitioner. In its opinion, the Court utilized a four factor balancing test approach in which to determine if the right to a speedy trial had been denied: length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant; whereas the conduct of both the prosecution and petitioner were to be balanced. The Court considered the 5 year length of delay to be extraordinary; however, felt the counterbalancing factors to this were the fact that Barker had not wanted a speedy trial and the prejudice was minimal; therefore, his rights had not been