Induction Undermines The Objectivity Of Human Experience

Science is popularly viewed as an objective field of study, yet philosophers have frequently questioned the objectivity of theory choice, underdetermination, and induction. I contend that these concerns are valid, and should be viewed not as distinct and isolated theories, but as specific demonstrations of a general truth: that science is inherently subjective. In arguing this, I will proceed from the top down, demonstrating that science is subjective at all levels because it is based on human experience. Pierre Duhem and Thomas Kuhn provide explanations for theory choice that implicitly and explicitly recognize the importance of extra-scientific factors. In his seminal work, Duhem (1954) concludes that “the sound experimental criticism of

David Hume (1748) famously argues that “causes and effects are discoverable, not by reason but by experience” (435). While Hume’s principal argument is that induction cannot accurately predict the future, his emphasis on experience has significant implications that should not be overlooked. Although the notion of human experience as the basis for knowledge raises a host of metaphysical and epistemological questions which are unanswerable in a paper of this size, one thing is clear: human experience is inherently subjective in that it varies from person to person. As Hume elaborates, “all inferences from experience, therefore, are effects of custom, not of reasoning” (439). In other words, scientific knowledge stems not from purely objective reason, but from subjective personal experiences. Quine (1951) takes this premise to its logical conclusion, arguing that “the totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs… is a man-made fabric which impinges on experience only along the edges. Or to change the figure, total science is like a field of force whose boundary conditions are experience” (282). Therefore, in defining scientific knowledge as socially constructed and dependent on experience, Quine implicitly recognizes that science cannot be purely objective, since it is bound to an inherently subjective human experience. Thus, the primary method of scientific knowledge building rests upon the highly

While this stands in stark contrast to the traditional conception of science as objective, it does not negate the practical significance of science. The methods that we use to create, negotiate, and choose relevant scientific knowledge are all that we have available; as humans, we are inherently bound to subjectivity, and science is no exception. In the absence of better alternatives, we must proceed as best we can with the tools at our disposal. Hume (1748) quips that “none but a fool or madman will ever pretend to dispute the authority of experience, or to reject that great guide of human life” (436). Hume is correct that we should not dispute the authority of experience. But we must take care not to imbue it with an objective authority that it does not possess; to do so also grants science an authority that it does not, and cannot, possess. Rather, it is clear that the inescapable influence of subjectivity pervades all levels of the scientific scaffolding, from theory choice and underdetermination to observation; just like a faulty hypothesis, the origins of this subjectivity cannot be discovered or isolated, because it is inherent in all aspects of the creation of scientific knowledge, and therefore must be accepted by any scientist who conducts