The counterinsurgency in Iraq began after the regime change after the invasion of 2003 that sparked the outbreak of insurgents. The COIN in Iraq was successful in someways but mostly unsuccessful especially after the withdrawal of troops in 2011. The United States failed to recognize the internal division between Sunni, Shi’ites and Kurds. As COIN is defined as “comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes” (U.S government Counterinsurgency Guide, 2009),it was important in successfully defeating the insurgents because sometimes military action is not always helpful. It is all about the distribution of power that these groups were fighting for. The United States failed to address its root causes.Most importantly, the U.S government failed to deployed special forces who were not just trained in conventional warfare. Once the U.S realized their inadequacy forces, they began to Iraqi forces while they lacked special forces. …show more content…
With different groups attempting to gain power in governing Iraq after the regime change, they held deep values that traditional tactics were not going to be enough. However, the U.S forces, “They prevailed in most traditional tactical engagements, but the insurgency continued unabated because the insurgents continued to regenerate and replace their losses from within Iraq and outside Iraq.” (Pirnie, 2012,37). One principle of counterinsurgency is understanding and adapting to the environment and understanding that sometimes, doing nothing is the best reaction and the best weapons are non-military. The more the U.S engaged in traditional military tactics such as “kick-down the door” the more hostile the insurgents grew against the U.S forces and escalated the