When the Allies emerged on the winning side during late 1942 and early 1943, Japan’s leaders adopted a strategy of wearing out their opponents’ fighting spirit through delay and attrition. In February 1943, when the liaison conference conducted a ‘Review of the World Situation’, Sugiyama declared that, since the tide had turned against the Axis powers on all fronts, forcing Britain’s surrender was a lost cause. (Akagi, 2004, 61-62) While Japan’s leaders acknowledged their declining fortunes, they held onto their hopes of breaking Allied morale. In September, IGHQ ordered the IJA to construct an ‘Absolute National Defense
Sphere’, comprising the islands of the western Pacific, the East Indies and Burma.
(Hayashi, 1959, 72-73) The army was to
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The Americans have military bases in Asia and most of the territorial waters are paraded by war ships that belong to most of the superpower-nations. Unlike before, Japan is still regarded as a superpower. This war between 1941-1945, i think was inevitable, because the japanese attacked the United States first- the Pearls Harbor issue, after fighting and winning several wars against its neighbours. The arrogance of superiorioty due to the fact that Japan had a good military strength led to this action. I feel that the same arrogance led them to attack the United States before the US army intelligence fought back and conquered Japan with the help of its allied forces. The military commanders in this Japanese empire, in the forties were so much power drunk for attacks until they were subdued and the history recorded it that they surrendered at …show more content…
The Imperial Army was defeated because the bulk of its divisions were tied down in a drawn-out conflict in mainland China, and the Allies, particularly the Americans, had vastly superior industrial prowess, which enabled them to deploy greater numbers of troops, equipment, aircraft and ships against Japan’s forces in the Pacific. However, misperceptions of Allied capabilities led Japan to embark on a war effort for which it was ill-prepared, and adhere to methods which entailed crippling losses of scarce manpower and raw materials.
In the final analysis, the Japanese wartime experience illustrates how a stagnant military culture, which insists upon an adherence to set beliefs and practices, tends to have detrimental effects on the intelligence process. The Imperial Japanese Army was imbued with a conservatism which hindered any significant transformation, even when wartime experiences proved beyond doubt that its ways were not adequate. A combination of historical factors ranging from an extended period of isolation from the outside world, a centuries’ old belief in selfsuperiority to a contempt for foreign cultures combined to create a situation