John Locke's Direct Memory View Of Personal Identity

The purpose of this essay is to show that John Locke’s direct memory view of personal identity results in a person to be and not to be the same person at the same time. I will salvage Locke’s direct memory view of personal identity to avoid this contradiction. First, I will state Locke’s direct memory view of personal identity. Second, I will state Reid’s objection to Locke’s direct memory view of personal identity. Third, I will state an indirect memory view of personal identity. Fourth, I will show that Reid’s objection does not hold against the indirect memory view of personal identity. Fifth, I will apply both memory views of personal identity to a murder case in which a drunk driver cannot remember the act of killing a pedestrian and

For instance, a boy decides to steal a toy, but is caught and punished for his misdeed. In his mid-twenties, the boy enlists in the military as a young officer. The young officer accomplishes many feats during his career. Eventually, the young officer reaches the rank of general at an old age. The young officer is the same person as the boy, because the young officer can remember himself as the boy. The general is the same person as the young officer, because the general can remember himself as the young officer. Since the general is the young officer at a different time and place and the young officer is the boy at a different time and place, it must follow by transitive relation that the general is the young officer and the boy but at a later time. However, based on Locke’s direct memory view of personal identity, the general is not the same person as the boy, because the general cannot remember himself as the boy. Therefore, the general is and is not the same person as the boy at the same time. This is a manifest contradiction that results from Locke’s direct memory view of personal identity. I will present an indirect memory view of personal identity that is more align with our intuitions that does not result in a

Person B-at-t2 is responsible for all the actions of person B-at-t3, persons B-at-t4, and person C-at-t5, since person B-at-t2 is the same person as persons B-at-t3, person B-at-t4 and person C-at-t5 over time. Persons A-at-t1 is the same person as person C-at-t5 over time, because person A-at-t1 can remember himself as persons C-at-t5; hence, person A-at-t1 is responsible for all the actions of person C-at-t5. Person A-at-t1 is not responsible for any of the actions of person B-at-t2, person B-at-t3, and person B-at-t4, because person A-at-t1 cannot remember himself as person B-at-t2, person B-at-t3, and person B-at-t4. In other words, the sober person A-at-t1 is not responsible for killing the pedestrian, because person A-at-t1 cannot remember himself as person B-at-t2 who killed the pedestrian. Even though person