Keith Ward's The Evil God Challenge: A Response

Evaluation of Keith Ward's reply "The Evil God Challenge — A Response" (2015) When examining the monotheistic belief, the foundational aspect of it is the description of an omniscient, omnipotent, and "good" God. Throughout Stephen Law’s paper, “The Evil God Challenge”, this supreme being is hypothesized to be all-powerful, all-knowing, and benevolent, a theory he refers to as the "good-god hypothesis". Regarding God’s morality, Law also poses an alternate view, stating that, assuming the existence of God, it is just as reasonable to believe that God is malevolent, despite this view being dismissed by the majority of theists. Keith Ward argues, in his response, that the monotheistic God can only be benevolent. I believe he was able to prove

He states, "Any rational being knows that a principle that applies to being X in situation S, will apply to any being of type X in situations relevantly like S" (Ward, 47). He goes on to say that God, being the perfectly rational being, would likely find no reason to cause harm to others, as God would find it undesirable to have pain inflicted upon itself. Ward states that if God's pleasure could be increased by others' pleasure, as shown through the previous argument, God would ensure minimal suffering is inflicted upon others, allowing everyone in God's creation to increase their happiness. He uses the Kantian argument to frame this as God, being the most rational being, would ensure that God acts on a principle of benevolence and doing good to others as long as this increases the happiness of rational beings within God's creation. Furthermore, Ward addresses the "problem of good" mentioned within Stephen Law's paper by stating that Law misinterpreted it in his analysis. Ward states that doing “good” includes more than pleasure. It includes moral obligations and objective intrinsic values to do right by others and ensure pleasure for oneself. With an omnipotent and omniscient being like the monotheistic God, Ward argues that these values and obligations would be grounded within God. Thus, an "evil God would have to

As Law describes, the dilemma looks at the arbitrary nature of what is considered "good ." He states that this dilemma creates the possibility of an objective and non-natural standard of morality alongside an evil God. The dilemma's ambiguity is shown by the following: "Does God decree this because He recognizes that stealing and murder are, independently, wrong, or are they wrong only because he decrees them to be so?" (Law, 365). In his paper, however, he does state that this argument is one that he foresees as being a potential line of attack for those rejecting his symmetry thesis. Ward does so by analyzing the Christian definition of "good." This definition of "good" consists of anything worthwhile or of intrinsic value and, as such, is part of the divine nature. He continues by stating that "God is the Good itself" (Ward, 46), describing God as the instantiation of intrinsic value. This allows him to dispute the symmetry thesis further, as there is likely no argument for the existence of a Supreme Evil. Through God's mentioned characteristics, He is the instantiation of everything of intrinsic value, regardless of what God may will. If considering a Supreme Evil, God would need to be the maximal of intrinsic disvalue, as that is what evil provides, according to Ward. An evil God would therefore have to realize any