Nietzsche On Morality Analysis

Both within Deontological and Utilitarian Ethics, the regulatory ideal implies an objective inherent value which justifies the possibility of making moral judgements. Nietzsche marks a shift in paradigm by reframing the regulatory ideal and implicitly the fundaments of its justification.

To better understand what Nietzsche’s Moral Philosophy is, we must also take a brief overview of his Philosophical paradigm. For the purposes of this paper I will only use and highlight particular aspects, as a full, in-depth description would risk a deviation from the point which needs to be made.

Nietzsche’s shift is a radical one, in the sense that he rejects both „Ancient” and „Modern Morality”. His rejection is structured as a criticism of „moralities”,

For Nietzsche „Each person has a fixed psycho-physical constitution, which defines him as a particular type of person”, in this sense, substance must be understood and as consequence, people’s actions are determined by their non-conscious-type facts. On this basis, he argues the issue of free will. The „moralities” which he criticises, admit the presupposition that the agent is morally responsible because he/she has free will, but Nietzsche argues that for this to be valid, he/she would have to be causa sui (self-caused, or the cause of itself – see Kant). As each person is a type, and his/her type is predetermined, it cannot be self- caused; therefore free will does not exist. Will, for Nietzsche, is basically a raw impulse, the effect of type-facts, an impulse of life underscored by Eros, which is reaffirming and which he calls Will to Power, a concept which I will contextualize later on in this

Suffering to Nietzsche is necessary for cultivating excellence, but not to be understood as a value in itself . In this sense, a universal morality is detrimental precisely because it stifles the potential of those who can cultivate excellence by their internalising the norms of such a morality. The „revaluation of values” is aimed at the practical impact and origin of the virtues and moralities which they found. Those who adopt such „moralities”, that devalue suffering and value happiness, nurture a ressentiment not only for their lives, but for those who rise above it, who have the power to will so. For example, envy is deemed to be bad, and consequently, a form of eliminating the fact that one has more than the other is manifested through a norm which demands that all are equal (e.g in the eyes of