Nuclear Deterrence Essay

III - The Origin of Nuclear Deterrence

Presidents, Secretaries of Defense, Generals and scholars alike have studied and debated deterrence theory extensively since the birth of the atomic bomb. From 1945 until 1949, the U.S. was the only country to possess nuclear weapons, but the Soviet Union was significantly stronger from a conventional weaponry and force structure standpoint. In 1949, the Soviets detonated their first nuclear device. This was the first evolution in deterrence as it made the battlefield more evenly matched. It was the beginning of what would be later termed as “a stable balance of power” and it also presented “the threat that leaves something to chance” for both sides as stated in Thomas Schelling’s book Arms and Influence. James Schlesinger, a former Secretary of both Defense and Energy, wrote, “The goal for the military might of the United States and its allies since the late forties has been to create an effective structure of deterrence that will preclude outright military assault.” Prominent theorists such as Thomas Schelling and Herman Khan have contributed significantly to the deterrence debate and have had a major impact by deliberating different

Schelling, for example, set forth the definition of – and recommended as a U.S. policy goal – a “stable” balance of terror with the Soviet Union. “Stable deterrence could be orchestrated to proceed from mutual prudence born of mutual vulnerability.” Schelling defined deterrence as understanding “intentions – not just estimating the enemy’s intentions – but influencing them. Schelling postulated that his stable balance of terror deterrence model came from the “threat to leave something to chance. Schelling’s school of thought provided the dominant compass for U.S. thinking and policy. While Schelling held onto the views of the balance of terror, Herman Khan advocated on the idea of a dominant