Perception And Phenomenalism

Title : Phenomenalism and Philosophy of Perception

Name : Sargam Jain

Roll No : 13110109

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Phenomenalism and Philosophy of Perception

Phenomenalism is a philosophical theory of perception. The theory proposes that we cannot experience anything beyond the phenomena of our perceptions i.e. if we cannot have experience of an object then we are not able to describe about that anything. Phenomenalism makes a logical link between our experience and the world of physical objects. Similarly, idealism states that our knowledge of reality must be based on what we actually perceive. Idealism holds that objects exist only insofar as they are perceived while phenomenalism holds that

He says that our claims about physical objects were justified in reference to such sensory experience. He also claims that the function of philosophy is to give ‘definitions in use’, showing how the sentences in which a symbol or type of symbol (“table”) occurs can be translated into equivalent sentences which don’t contain it or its synonyms. According to him, all propositions about material objects can be translated without loss into propositions about sense-data and therefore material objects are logical constructions. He doesn’t claim that material objects are constructed, made out, of sense data; but that propositions about material objects are in fact entirely concerned with features and relations of sense-data. I order to say that a material object exists is equivalent to say that certain sorts of sense data have been, are being, and would be experienced under certain conditions. So according to him, there is no logical gap between appearance and

Second, when Kant’s theory is interpreted as two object interpretation it seemed that the theory implies a radical form of skepticism that traps each of us within the contents of our own mind and cuts us off from reality. According to Kant’s, things in themselves are real while appearances are not, and hence we cannot have experience or knowledge of reality. But Kant denies that appearances are unreal: they are just as real as things in themselves but are in a different metaphysical