In his essay The Model of Rules I, Professor Ronald Dworkin argues against a certain theory of law he attributes to H.L.A Hart called “positivism.” While Dworkin argues against many tenets of the positivist theory, I will focus this essay on critical reasons against Dworkin’s argument against the legal positivist thesis that the law consist of nothing but rules. To do so, I will explain the necessary components of Hart’s theory of law required to understand Dworkin’s rebuttal. Then, I will reconstruct Dworkin’s argument against what I will classify “nothing but rules” claim, and I will ultimate claim Dworkin’s argument fails because his premise that states principles are extra-legal and cannot be explained as part of the categories is false. In particular, I indicate how principles can be legally binding like legal rules are, and I pick apart his reasons for believing that there are clear distinctions between laws and principles.I will interpret the cases Dworkin uses to support his thesis to show the limitations of his argument. Finally, woven within the points I stated above, I will be sure to anticipate potential counterarguments and weigh them against my thesis.
To better understand Dworkin’s arguments, I will first explain tenets that a legal positivist theory such as Hart’s must accept by nature of a positivist theory. Firstly, a legal system is a set of rules used by authorities to maintain order within the society, and these rules are distinguishable by their