& Quoting People V. Miller (1996) 44 Cal

However, Bell cannot be read as suggesting that it is a requirement that a plaintiff plead they requested the return of property taken through theft by false pretenses. (See Bell, supra, 212 1049.) Indeed, as Bell concerned “an appeal from a default judgment,” the court did not address the plaintiff’s pleading in the civil case. (See id. at pp. 1048–1049.) While the evidence introduced at the default prove-up hearing in that case may have shown that fact, the court’s opinion cannot be read to impose an additional element of theft by false pretenses applicable in the civil context. (See id. Cf. People v. Miller (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1427, 1441 [stating the elements of theft by false pretenses, which do not include a request for the return of stolen property] [quoting People v. Wooten (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1834, 1842–43].)
Given that consideration, Respondents have not demonstrated that Appellants failed to allege a cause of action for violation of Penal Code section 496. Appellants’ complaint sufficiently pled are “(1) … a false pretense or representation to the owner of property; (2) … intent to defraud the owner of that property; and (3) the owner transfer[ing] the property to the defendant in reliance on the representation.” (Miller, supra¸81 Cal.App.4th at p. 1441. See AA 5, 11–12, 14–17.) Accordingly, Appellants cause of action for

Indeed, had Respondents’ conduct comported with their representations, Appellants would have a straightforward claim against DPR to foreclose on their collateral under the Commercial Code. However, Respondents’ conduct has forced Appellants to seek redress against RQ Inc., RQ LLC, and DPR in tort and under the theory of successor