Ratification Of Constitution

The ratification of the Constitution was written in time of opposition and argument, ranging from majority rule to checks and balances. This paper will explore how the conflict between federal versus national represents the central problem in the ratification of the Constitution.
The views of the Federalists are expressed in Federalist Papers 39, 45 and 46. In Federalist Paper 39, Madison discusses the characteristics and implementation of a republican form of government. He argues that a republican form of government is the only form of government “reconcilable with the genius of the people of America” (Federalist Paper 39). The republican form of government is one in which representatives derive their power from individuals who vote them

Some offices, such as senators and the President, may be chosen by indirect appointment. Of course, this idea faced opposition from the Antifederalists. Even though the Constitution is national in nature, it still has federal points and allows states to retain certain rights. In conclusion, Madison states that “the proposed Constitution is neither a national nor a federal Constitution, but a composition of both” (Federalist Paper 39). Federalist Paper 45 supports the idea of the Constitution being both a national and federal document. The Articles of Confederation gave more powers to the states and left the federal government weak. Madison argues that the Constitution does not give the central government more powers, but rather seeks to protect the government from the numerous state governments. In addition, Madison notes how a union is only created when state and federal government rely on another. Lastly, in Federalist 46, Madison writes that both governments are subject to the judgement of the people. In addition, even with Constitution in place, the states still have key advantages over their federal counterparts. State authorities are more involved in the life

Specially, the paper discusses the appointment of senators. Under the new Constitution, the state legislatures were given the power to appoint senators. However, they lacked the ability to control senators after their appointment. The paper argues that the exercise of sovereignty lies in “in the power of dismissing, impeaching, or the like, those to whom authority is delegated” (Antifederalist 39). This allows the senators to make decisions that may not be in the best interest of their respective state. In addition, the Senate has the power to control elections and dictate when and what manner they are to be held. The paper moves on to highlight the futility which accompany the rights provided to the states. The rights given to the states, such as appointing and training the military, do not allow the states to protect their own citizens or “enable a State to exist within itself if the general government should cease” (Antifederalist 39). The biggest grievance against the states is the loss of revenue. Under the new Constitution, states do not have sole control over property. Instead, any revenue earned by the states must go to the central government. In addition, the general government has the right to repel any taxation policy that hinders the taxation policy of the central government. The federal government also reserves the right to cease these building projects, even if