reconciliation until the middle portion of the speech, Eisenhower is able dramatically to juxtapose the failures of the past with his visionary plan for the future. The rhetorical disposition adopted adds argumentative force to the atomsforpeace proposal by highlighting the significant departure from previous plans represented by the new proposal for an international pool of fissionable materials dedicated to peaceful purposes. If the past was characterized by suspicions leading to fear, the future is presented as an opportunity leading to hope. The speech was also used by the Eisenhower Administration to display the atomic strength of the United States. In the introductory paragraphs, the term “dream” or another form of the word is used …show more content…
The writers of the speech and Eisenhower went through many developmental processes draft the perfect speech. The speech drafts leading up to the December 8 address make it abundantly clear that the writers, principally Jackson and Strauss, are attempting to retain the threat of retaliation while, at the same moment, hiding that threat in language that becomes successively less confrontative(Dwight D Eisenhower). In other words, the rhetoric of the drafts proceeds from bold, outright threats to implied warnings hiding in the language of peaceful intentions. By comparing the last "Operation Candor" draft completed on or about October 1, 1953, by presidential speechwriter Emmet Hughes, with the final draft delivered by President Eisenhower on December 8, 1953, the movement from explicit to the implicit argument can be clearly observed(Document 155). The speeches developed at the beginning of the writing process started as straightforward assertion then as the speech involved it became an implicative argumentaton. The best way to see the difference is to compare the October 1, 1953, draft with the implicit arguments found in the December 8 address.That the Soviets are likely to have understood the argumentative implications in ways roughly similar to the reconstructions above is a function both of timing and access. For four months prior to the December 8 address, the American media ran a story after story about governmental, military, and scientific concerns about a possible nuclear confrontation. Not only were such concerns easily picked up through environmental cues, but the Soviets were also given advanced warning about the December 8 speech and instructed to pay close attention and to take seriously what the President said. The speech was used as a direct threat against the Soviets, but the speech was also used to