Self-Relational Identity Gap

them and one among all four frames (Jung & Hecht, 2004, p. 268). Personal-enacted identity gaps and personal-relational identity gaps have been the focus of most empirical studies. The personal-relational identity gap can be defined as inconsistencies in how an individual sees him/herself and how they perceive others view them. Jung and Hecht convey, “It is certainly not unusual for an individual 's self-view to differ from the ways in which others see him or her” (2004, p. 268). The concept of an individual and how they see themselves through others has been proposed in other theories, as with Charles Horton Cooley (1902) and the looking-glass self and George Herbert Mead (1934), as discussed earlier, in symbolic interaction and the self, “me,” and “I”, which stimulates the question once again, “Which you is who?” (Adkins, 2015). Jung and Hecht point to more recent theories, such as Self-Verification Theory; “the idea that self has two aspects: the target 's self-concepts or self-views and others ' appraisals” (2004, p. 268). However, they express that Cooley and Mead’s theoretical research did not separate identity into the two parts (personal and relational), consider the nature of the relationships between the two identity frames or negotiate the differences when they occurred. This is where identity gaps give

• Looking through northern Exposure at Jewish American identity and the communication theory of identity (Hecht et al, 2002). Fortner (2007) brings exceptional light to the topic of communication theory for the Christian asking such questions such as, “What one question should a Christian theory of communication address?” and “What did God mean for communication to do?” conceding that He vested humanity with the necessary capacity to communicate (Fortner, 2007, p. 29). This essay contends that Hecht’s CTI does have the potential to aid the probing believer into a fuller experience in identity gratification through the lens of the four