Sextus And Nagarjuna

Chapter eight of Scharfstein’s A Comparative History of World Philosophy: From the Upanishads to Kant, Introduces the reader to four different philosophers which are categorized as skeptics. Out of the four, I will be focusing on his assessment of Sextus and Nagarjuna. Scharfstein asserts that skeptics in general demand for the same things, which cannot be obtained. Furthermore, he suggests that all four skeptics argue that there is always something more to know about everything, and as long as the skeptic can prove this, he wins. I believe that Scharfstein’s assertions on Sextus and Nagarjuna are flawed, since he mis-interprets Sextus’s methodology when responding to those that question his statements.

Scharfstein begins the chapter by providing

Again, we see a connection between Pyrrhonism, and Indian skepticism, but Scharfstein only mentions that the ending sounds conspicuously Indian. He does not provide any information or evidence on why it sounds Indian. I believe that the author should have expanded on this because not only would he strengthen the argument that there is a connection between Indian skepticism and Greek skepticism, but he would also make the similarity between Sextus and Nagarjuna clearer to the reader. Scharfstein continues giving the reader information about Sextus, by stating why Sextus does not adhere to appearances. He explains:

By adhering to appearances as appearances, says Sextus, the skeptic can live in undogmatic accord with the usual rules of life, without dogma, and accept the guidance of nature of emotions, hunger, and thirst as well the guidance of customs, laws, the arts, and ordinary morality… To believe that something is by nature good is to be unreasonably, and immoderately elated by having it and disturbed by the thought of losing it. But to abstain from thinking that things are naturally good or bad or abstain from pursuing or avoiding anything eagerly is to remain untroubled (Scharfstein,

He explains:

The answer seems to compound his habits of medical dosage with his dry sense of humor: Because the skeptic loves humankind, he wants to use his verbal cures for dogmatism with a considerate selectivity. So, like a doctor who uses remedies to fit the severity of the disease he treats, the skeptic uses strong, stringent arguments for severe attacks of dogmatic conceit, but only mild arguments for those whose conceit is superficial and easily cured (Scharfstein, 240).

Firstly, Scharfstein states, “because the skeptic loves humankind”. As a factor of the skeptic’s reasoning for giving bad arguments. This would directly contradict Pyrrho’s account of why the skeptic suspends judgement, since the skeptic should not trust his senses, inclinations, or societal conventions. Since Scharfstein is aware of Pyrrho’s account on why the skeptic suspends judgement, it is very odd that he would state that the skeptic loves humankind as a reasoning for giving equipollent