Sir Redf Buller

To assess fully how much Sir Redvers Buller was responsible for the poor performance of the British Army during the early months of the Second Boer War it is key to identify areas to which Buller can be held accountable. As such it is sensible to discuss his performance as commander in chief until being replaced by Roberts in January 1900, lasting from late October 1899. Intrinsically, this involves defeats at Stromberg, Magersfontein and Colenso. However it is also key to converse his performance at the battle of Spion Kop which he actively participated in as commander. There are arguments that factors including the failures of Buller’s subordinates, Boer leadership and equipment and the change in the nature of war through technological advancements

General Warren tasked by Buller to turn over the Boer right flank spent six days upon arrival and neglected early attacks on the intended objective of Rangeworthy hills by Dundonald’s cavalry and instead insisted on an assault on Spion Kop itself. This was an error that otherwise could of provided the British with an suitable axis of attack, as Lt. C.A Calvert of the Royal Dragoons suggests that under Dundonald, “the Boers themselves say that our flank march had quite taken them by surprise”. Symons suggests that this failure of Warren “shows clearly the abilities and the limitations of Warren”. Further inference on this matter is supported by Bailes, who argues that Spion Kop was a death trap due to the exposed plateau which if warren used “intelligent scouting might have shown”. The attack on Spion Kop itself can be argued to be riddled with blunders by Warren, which led to the eventual withdrawal of British Troops from the summit of Spion Kop. As Nasson suggests that no attempt was made by Warren to simultaneously attack the Twin Peaks to relieve Boer pressure on the attack on Spion Kop. Furthermore Major General Maurice argues that Boer positions on the Twin Peaks to the right of Spion Kop inflicted deadly enfolding fire into British troops on Spion Kop. An eventual assault by Lyttelton’s troops on the twin peaks had a severe impact by forcing the Boers on the twin Peaks to retreat as well reinforcing British forces on Spion Kop, thus showing the potential Warren had not exploited. As well as this communication between Warren and the British troops on Spion Kop was very restricted, to the extent that Warren knew little of what was happening on the Plateau of Spion Kop . As a result supporting artillery fire on Spion Kop was called off by Warren in his belief that