More pressure came from military generals and their decisions. One example is about limiting mobilization, in which case military decisions were weighed more than medical decisions. Acting Army Surgeon General Charles Richard advised Army Chief of Staff Peyton March not to send troops from infected camps to the battlefield in France until the Spanish Flu was over in that area. March accepted the advice, but at first, he only enforced it in a few training camps. Later as the epidemic worsened and spread, Richard became more worried. He recommended that all the draft calls that were heading for infected camps should be halted and at the same time transfers between training camps should be reduced. Richard warned March that “Epidemic influenza …show more content…
They both did not want to interfere and slow down army’s urgent drive to France. Fortunately, by mid-October, the infection rate on troopships and in the A.E.F dropped because those soldiers being transferred had mostly survived one wave of the epidemic and had developed immunity against this virus. Medical and military decisions conflicted with each other during Spanish Flu. Medical suggestions were considered less significant and sometimes they were neglected. According to medical officers, the general commands and line commanders didn’t seek or neglected their advice on critical issues concerning soldier’s health, such as the location of the camps and the need for healthcare. Vaughan once called for higher military rank for medical professions so that they can be granted enough power and authority to provide soldiers with healthy conditions. But the War Department rejected this