Summary Of A Better War By Lewis Sorley

The novel, A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam, written by Lewis Sorley, is an important and influential book that sheds light on the often neglected final years in Vietnam from 1968 to 1975 and revises our knowledge of the war and its conclusion. Lewis Sorley is an American intelligence analyst and military historian. Sorley spent much time interviewing those who have served in Vietnam so that he could gain information on their experiences and how the war truly was for them. This novel includes live stories from those willing enough to share their experiences. Sorely explains throughout the novel that Vietnam may not be as we thought it to be, but actually much more. Sorley highlights

Sorley argued that the United States won the war militarily, but lost the war due to domestic reasons. In January of 1964, General William C. Westmoreland became a successor in command of U.S. forces in Vietnam (1). Westmoreland went by a search-and-destroy tactic. With a large amount of failure on the battlefield, a new commander was brought in. On April 10th of 1968, General Creighton Abrams was announced as the commander-designate in Vietnam. Creighton Abrams formally assumed command of U.S. forces in Vietnam that following June (16-17). Before Abrams succession, the U.S. had failed to attain the goal of weakening the Vietnamese communists enough, so they could not continue their struggle to take over South Vietnam. Abrams shifted the tactics in the direction of small unit operations in attempt to keep pressure on Vietcong and North Vietnamese Army forces while avoiding the heavy American casualties that often resulted from Westmoreland’s search-and-destroy sweeps. The battlefield was on a concept of attrition. This resulted in an unnecessary number of casualties. The U.S. had run out of men, or at least found it very difficult to deploy more forces in the face of

Abrams differed from Westmoreland more in emphasis than in substance. Westmoreland’s tactics focused on the concept of attrition and the General squandered four years of public and congressional support for the war. Westmoreland took a search-and-destroy approach. Abrams adopted a strategy that made protecting people and villages the first priority, instead of trying to hunt down the elusive enemy forces. With this policy change, a military failure was turned into success that could have been permanent if U.S. support had been more steadfast. Abrams also stressed a “one war” concept that put equal emphasis on military operations, improvement of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces, and pacification – all of which are codependent so that the better we do in one, the more our chance of progress in others (18). The changes in tactics under Abrams, and in the concept of the nature of the war, and even the enemy reaction to battlefield reserves, by no means meant an end to fierce combat, or even to large-scale military operations (138). America’s principal national objective became peace. Abrams policy proved to be better than the policy of attrition. The policy of attrition simply meant, under those circumstances, a very prolonged type of warfare, whereas the U.S. can clear and hold, and keep an area secure, and keep the enemy out. From a military point of view, the U.S. had a better situation. The U.S. shifted