Summary Of Epicurus's Response To The Problem Of Evil

Our point of view is that there could be a response to the problem of Evil that was set by the Greece philosopher Epicurus if we reviewed it from the prospective of the Islamic philosophy, which means that we can justify the existence of evil in the presence of Allah without falling into any contradictions between both existences according to what Epicurus sat in his problem. If we examine the concept of “Allah” in the Islamic Prospective we can understand that “Allah” has all these discretions not only “Merciful, or able to do anything” but “Allah” has also too many other descriptions more than “Merciful, or able to do anything”, we can by then give an overall respond to the problem of evil that was sat by Epicurus.
One of the real contentions

Then we can explain that most of the intellectuals acknowledged the presence of evil but diverged in its interpretation. Some of them use it as an evidence for the existence of Allah; some others consider it as a divine test for humans in their life. We can also discuss some designations that can be taken to the evil whether religious or atheist and to explain that both designations acknowledges the existence of evil but the religious designations is more interpretative as well as neglecting the evil and describing the human trial as a random

It is essential here to bring up that the great that is being alluded to is 'moral great.' That is, it is great that is a consequence of the cognizant activities of individuals. This is particular from 'characteristic great' or 'common abhorrence' which perhaps come about because of non-human reasons. The unrestrained choice resistance (FWD) scholar brings up that with the goal man should be in a position to benefit 'moral' he must be 'sans altogether.' That is, he must be in a position to settle on a decision between making an ethically decent and underhandedness activity. Given that in the present (World-1) human operators are given this flexibility; a certain level of good wickedness is unavoidable. This world would in any case be more desirable over a conceivable World-2 in which there were no free activities (therefore no flexibility) however all activities performed were totally great. The critical inquiry is, can Allah can make any world?, Alvin Plantinga endeavors to answer this inquiry. To begin with, he brings up that Leibniz was mixed up in imagining that Allah would need to, and consequently did, make the best conceivable world. Plantinga contends that there can be no such thing as the best conceivable world, since to any world one more unit of delight or goodness can be added to