Summary Of What Experience Teach By David Lewis

What Experience Teaches - David Lewis Explanation In ‘What Experience Teaches,’ David Lewis is arguing in defense of physicalism and in opposition to Jackson’s knowledge argument. As a physicalist, he conceives that the world is made of physical content and everything is reducible to purely physical objects and processes. Lewis bases his argument on a thought experiment originally created by Frank Jackson which was used to support the knowledge argument, as well as the hypothesis of phenomenal information. The hypothesis of phenomenal information concerns the idea that there is another type of stuff in the world that is not physical, but rather phenomenal in the sense that these things cannot be explained by physical means. Things like emotions,

She has knowledge about the exact ways in which her brain will fire when experiencing a certain color and which processes occur in response to colour vision. Jackson responds to this thought experiment by stating that although Mary knows all the physical facts before leaving the room, but when she leaves the room there is still more to be learned from her experience with the colors that cannot be taught from physical information, therefore there has to be more “stuff” in this world that cannot be explained by physicalism. If physicalism is unable to provide a complete analysis of the world through physical terms, physicalism is false, according to Jackson. Jackson's argument would be an example of the knowledge argument which would state that since the hypothesis of phenomenal information can fill in the blanks and fully explain the experiences related to the phenomenal nature of color where physicalism fails to, it would be the more correct

Specifically, I reject his conception of the ability hypothesis. Although I agree with the fact that when Mary leaves the room, she gains the ability to exercise her knowledge about color vision, I do not believe that the ability hypothesis argument can deny the hypothesis of phenomenal information or defend physicalism. In fact, I believe that the ability hypothesis can defend the hypothesis of phenomenal information as its premises precede the conclusion that there is phenomenal “stuff” in the world. According to the ability hypothesis, when Mary leaves the room, she gains the ability to characterize, manipulate and remember the experience of color vision, but she gains no new knowledge about it because all the information she had previously learned would constitute her having the experience already as having the knowledge of the neural state is that same thing as having the experience. But the point still stands: when Mary leaves the room, there is some content that needs to be present for her to be able to manipulate, remember, and label the experience. Without her being able to “see” the things that cause her neural state to fire in a certain way, she is still missing a piece of the puzzle that will complete her idea of “red” or “blue.” Mary gaining knowledge about the processes through physical lessons will not cause Mary’s own neural state to fire in the same way. If Mary’s retina has never