In the Meno, Socrates gives an argument in favor of the view that, if to be virtuous is to desire good things, then everyone is virtuous. The purpose of this argument is not to define virtue as desiring good things, but to point out that this is clearly not how virtue is defined. I will object to the idea that harm always leads to misery and make the claim that it is inconsistent that someone would desire bad things, knowing they’re bad and knowing they’re harmful, on the basis that it is possible for someone to desire harmful things. I will claim that it is possible for someone to desire harmful things because they know that harm will not lead to a permanent state of misery. Socrates’ argument supposes that to be virtuous is to “desire good …show more content…
This claim is in no way objecting to the idea that no one desires misery. Socrates has already established that harm and misery affected the soul in the same way, but that misery is a consequence of some amount of harm or that people are only miserable “to the extent that they’re harmed” (78a). We’ve established that different amounts of harm lead to misery (78a), but because misery is permanent and, in other words, unalterable, it’s reasonable to conclude that the soul could endure a certain amount of harm without that harm leading to a permanent state of misery. I accept that harm is also referring to something bad that harms the soul, but surely harm has a lesser effect on one’s soul than misery because misery is permanent and harm is less permanent. Harm might be reconciled in a way that misery cannot be. In other words, the soul might have a way of recovering from harm, whereas if misery is so permanent and long term, as we’ve established it is, the individual would be unable to recover from misery. Let’s say that someone does desire harm, knowing that it is a bad thing, but recognizing that harm is less permanent than misery. One might desire a certain amount of harm, perhaps because they felt that they deserved harm or felt that it might help someone