The Cocoanut Grove Fire

The Cocoanut Grove fire was one of the deadliest nightclub fires in the United States I will be using this as an event that serves as a catalyst for change in the fire community, And I also believe it had a major impact and many positive changes when it came to the fire service and how we implement are regulations, codes, overall fire prevention and firefighting. But first I am really going to tell you what happened that night at the Cocoanut grove and how all these changes happened and what changes were done to the betterment of the fire service. Over 490 people were killed and hundreds injured at the night club. This massive inferno happened a little over 10:00 p.m. on November 28, 1942. The death toll was attributed to locked exit doors,

As you know the exit doors where lock so that nobody could walk out the door without paying for meals, drinks, and shows, etc.… this problem exceeding allowed occupants loads, insufficient complying exits from delineated exit paths, have been the exact problem and contributing factors in at least three of the five most deadly nightclub fire in the United States. A great example In the Cocoanut Grove nightclub fire the occupancy limit of the club exceeded safe at an occupant load max of 400 people. What the occupant load determines the minimum number of and width of requires exits based on calculations of the type of assembly occupancy structures, buildings or a portion of each. What these guidelines help do is give fire officials a fundamental basis for their inspection programs. Exiting is the most critical of all requirements for any assembly occupancy, it provides easy identifiable exit paths so fires or collapsing structures do not easily block people from leaving any building in a tragedy like this one. Most guidelines are developed by the NFPA but in general terms occupancies require to have a minimum of at least two exits from the main entrance/exit and able to accommodate at least half of the occupant load. And all doors much swing in the direction of the path traveled and have panic hardware. Which the Cocoanut Grove club had none of these actions in to

Speed of the fire and the air that choked the club was the main devil in the tragic event. In the Cocoanut Grove incident the fire started when the artificial coconut palm tree was ignited. The NFPA actually reported and stated "The interior, with its low ceilings, combustible wall and ceiling finish and flammable decorations was actually a death trap, but the building structure itself was 'fire proof'." But todays codes require that most interior materials be all fire tested to determine their flame spread and smoke development. If walls or ceilings are required to have any noncombustible construction, then the finish materials must be applied directly to the fire assembly and all voids must be filled with fire-resistant materials to prevent the fire from spreading in concealed spaces. Also all interior decorations are required to be treated with flame-retardants. Even with these standards, most of which have been in effect even before the 1942 Cocoanut Grove fire. Have served a purpose for fires how they are spread. Most people at that time didn’t put these codes into effect at that time because of the cost and economy and most couldn’t offered it because of world war two. But the main over view and what changes were made for future fires and how it changed and served as a catalyst for the fire service profession in a positive way