The Procedural Republic And The Unencumbered Self Analysis

There have been many discussions over whether or not justice can or does come from neutral principles, which have led to many disputes over the necessity of a state and legitimate justification of one. I aim to explain what kind of neutrality we can achieve, how the state plays into the role of justice, and its legitimacy. More specifically, I will argue that a sort of “artificial” neutrality can be put into place, and that the state is not necessary but the optimal way to uphold justice. First, the concept of neutrality is important to the idea of justice. John Rawls presents the theory that principles of justice are initially agreed to in a fair situation (“A Theory,” 212). He holds that all outcomes will be just if we can agree on the principles

Many objections to the achievability of neutrality in justice argue that one cannot actually detach themselves from their personal beliefs and concepts of the good, such as Michael Sandel in his work, “The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self” (Sandel, 248-249). He argues that in philosophies like Rawls’, which support the difference principle that personal assets do not belong to the individual, presuppose previous moral ties, which is the morality of sharing (Sandel, 248). Sandel asserts, “we cannot be persons for whom justice is primary, and also be persons for whom the difference principle is a principle of justice” (249). Moral ties are inseparable from our individual selves, which do not allow us to look through the veil of ignorance that Rawls proposes when approaching justice neutrally (Sandel,

Taylor does not assert a solution to these problems and believes that we are far away from the answer (73). However, I think that regardless of the position on the judgment of cultural worth without homogenization, embracing equality politics does less harm than would politics in which specific groups are allowed to pursue goals that trump other groups. This plays into the overlapping consensus of Rawlsian doctrine and allows for a sort of pseudo-neutrality in the public sphere. It is unlikely that citizens can divide up their private and public beliefs so cleanly, but at least a focus on the procedural moral commitment in the public arena is likely possible (Taylor,