If you have flown in the past 13 years, then you understand the hoops you must jump through to go through security. You understand the long lines, the strict regulations, and you have heard the horror stories from the news about someone’s grandma who was hassled because of some liquid bottle being too big to be allowed past the checkpoint. What if it turns out this has all been a waste of time and money, and the only thing gained amounts to hours of hassle and inconvenience on the behalf of the traveler? In a 2012 debate published on The Economists website, the question “Have the post 9/11 airport security changes done more harm than good?” is presented to Mr. Bruce Schneier, a senior security analyst, and Mr. Kip Hawley, the former head of …show more content…
Overall, the intention of the debate was to address the question, “Have the post 9/11 airport security changes done more harm than good?” By security changes, the website refers to the operations regulated by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). According to TSA.gov, the TSA was created in the wake of the September 11 attacks, as a means of deterring any further terrorist attacks on American soil. Signed into law on November 19, 2001, the completion of over 30 mandates, which included full screening of baggage and passengers, accompanied the birth of the Administration. Current procedures practiced by the TSA span from metal detectors and pat-downs to Advanced Imaging and behavior detection specialists. The regulations enforced by the TSA span a vast spectrum as well. Everything from food to liquids to pets and prosthetics are covered. (Transportation Security Administration) Needless to say, most of the regulations in place are likely to cover any situation encountered by the traveler. The same is true for most procedures. The issue with the overall system, and with many travelers, is the general inconvenience associated with the security …show more content…
Given the comments from the opening section, whose theme saw current security measures as madness and facades, and Hawley had three days to see these comments and respond, it appears as if he simply does not care much for the audience. Instead, he starts with an anecdote of a terrorist who the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) caught in 2006. The issue is that it was not shoe removal, three ounce liquid containers, or x-ray machines that caught him; instead, the terrorist was tracked for years and finally arrested in a raid. Hawley then attempts to connect this anecdote to the usage of three ounce bottles and quart size baggies as a key to deterring Al-Qaeda. “The plastic baggie may be unpopular,” Hawley states, “but since 2006, it has bought precious time for intelligence and law enforcement agencies to disrupt Al-Qaeda cells.” (Economist Debates: Airport Security) His connection is lacking, in the sense that he is vague in how the baggies have helped protect the U.S. In particular, what evidence is there to prove that under certain circumstances, the lives of many have been saved by the requirement to distribute liquids into small containers? Even Schneier points out that a weapon which requires six ounces of liquid can pass