From the beginning, Washington had a clear idea of the type of war he had to fight and the political goals he must achieve. While facing the severe constraints of a small and fragile army, he forged a military strategy tailored to attain these goals. This strategy showed an appreciation for the importance of centers of gravity (CoG), of decisive battles, and for the “Clausewitzian trinity.” Since Washington viewed his military efforts as a political instrument of the Continental Congress, the degree of success of his strategy can assess the validity of Clausewitz’ principle that war must be subordinated to policy. Another Clausewitzian principle relevant to Washington’s military approach is that of centers of gravity. Washington perceived that …show more content…
The industrial war-making capability of the colonies could not be destroyed because there was little – most munitions were imported through an imperfect British blockade. Indeed, the only plausible CoG was the Continental Army. Washington understood this and, consequently, a major element of his strategy was to protect the sheer existence of the army. Additionally, George Washington preferred a strategy of decisive battle. Much of Washington’s colonial victory was due to his strategic and operational leadership, his mastery of weaponry, and his ability to make ethical decisions. Washington typically employed a Fabian strategy, avoiding large high stakes battles in favor of tiring out the British Army. This strategy required Washington and his army to stay on the defense for most of the war, but it allowed the Continental Army to survive. Specifically for Washington’s actions in the 1776 campaign in New York and New Jersey, the British knew the United States’ weaknesses. They knew New York was an up-and-coming CoG for the United States and had seen in action the inexperienced troops and their lacking