What Is Kant's View On Psychology

Kant on Psychology and Science

Abstract: In this paper I will address a general problem in Kant's philosophy which has drawn little attention from the philosophical community. The problem is roughly what Kant’s own views on psychology and the possibility of neuroscience is. The aim of this paper is to dissolve this rather unnoticed puzzle on Kant’s assessment on psychology and science. While a superficial reading of the relevant texts reveals an apparent conflict in Kant's position with respect to the scientific status of psychology, one can vindicate Kant by giving him a suitable and interesting reading. In the course of this discussion I try to account for Kant's apparent pessimism about the prospects for a successful neuroscience. I address

Kantian moral framework can be appealed to consider these issues more carefully. Moreover, it is about morality. As Neuroscience cannot undermine the concept that rational beings are morally responsible for their actions. And neuroscientific research has not only proved to be vital in our increasing understanding of human nature, but has also led to much normative discourse revolving around morality and law. There has been much work done regarding how neuroscience should inform us on issues regarding moral responsibility. There are many reasons why we may rightly sequester or even incarcerate people whom we believe to be dangerous to others in society even though we do not think that they are morally culpable for their actions. 2 Kantian moral philosophy is premised on the capacity of rational beings for pure practical reason is proved to be a fruitful foundation on which to base critical analysis of psychological srinence. Kant first points out that if we take nature to be the totality of things insofar as they can be objects of our senses, then the doctrine of nature will contain two parts corresponding to the two forms of our sensibility: a doctrine of body and a doctrine of mind. But an "historical doctrine of nature comprising nothing but systematically ordered facts" (i.e., classificatory and descriptive natural history) must be distinguished from natural science

In this section of the essay, I will focus on how Kant’s Psychology is met challenges, as we analyzed above neuroscience as a causal explanation for behavior, can provide evidence of the presence of a genuine excusing condition for moral responsibility in certain individuals based on Kantian principles. A case of how neuroscience is a priori unable to provide proof of an excusing condition for moral responsibility. In cases where neuroscience can establish the lack of consciousness when acting, incapability to utilize pure practical reason, or when there is a total loss of impulse inhibition, we can conclude that individuals suffering from these problems cannot be morally responsible for their actions apriori of any behavioral evidence. However, when neuroscience can only show these various conditions to a certain degree, the issue is whether neuroscience can help to establish the presence of an excusing condition for immoral action. Thick concepts challenge one of the theoretical backbones of much moral psychology and neuroscience; they challenge the conception of a hardwired and universal moral capacity in a way that thin concept do not. This is due to two key features of thick concepts, discuss at some length