Why Did America Drop The Atomic Bombs On Hiroshima And Nagasaki?

Why did America drop the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki?

One of the most controversial events in the history of warfare was the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of World War II. Did the means justify the end, especially when one considers the immense loss of life? This essay will examine the two different schools of thought commonly associated with the question: “Why did America drop the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki?” The first of these arguments is that America dropped the atomic bombs in order to end the war against Japan, without mass loss of American lives (Truman, n.d.). The other argument is that Truman already knew that Japan would surrender, and ordered the dropping of the atomic bombs in order to gain

dropped the two atomic bombs on Japanese cities to force the Japanese into submission, and to bring a sudden end to a war that was fought on a gargantuan scale. His claim was that “We have used it in order to shorten the agony of war, in order to save the lives of thousands and thousands of young Americans” (Truman, n.d.). It was worth dropping the bombs as it would save thousands of American lives that would otherwise be lost had the Japanese home islands been invaded. A full-scale assault of Japan would have required precise military planning, and an extreme amount of supplies and soldiers, to batter down the resolute Japanese army. The bushido moral code, instilled into the Japanese people told them that it was better to die that to surrender. This mantra is what kept them fighting even when facing an inevitable defeat. The American military had already suffered heavy casualties and losses of equipment in the taking of Okinawa, and they feared that an invasion of Japan would be extremely costly. Bringing about an unconditional surrender of Japan was one of America’s main

It is that the Truman led U.S. government decided to use atomic weaponry on Japan in order to send a message to the Soviet Union, despite already knowing that Japan were planning to surrender. This theory is supported by the fact that on the 22nd of June 1945, Emperor Hirohito informed his Supreme War Council that “Japan must find a way to end the war” (Potter, Fredland and Adams, 1981). The Japanese had repeatedly approached the Soviets as they wanted to negotiate peace. The Americans also knew of Japan’s intentions for surrender as they had broken the “purple” code. Despite this, at the conclusion of Potsdam, America, along with Britain and China issued their declaration, an ultimatum demanding an unconditional surrender from Japan, promising “prompt and utter destruction” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1966) if they did not comply. With certain aspects of the terms of surrender left unclear, such as not defining the future of the Japanese Emperor, Japan’s rejection was made predictable. This was then used as a legitimate excuse to demonstrate Japan’s unwillingness to end the war, thus creating a catalyst to detonate the