Legal Insights: Rape Charges and Court Rulings in the Philippines
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Polytechnic University of the Philippines**We aren't endorsed by this school
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JURIS DOCT 123
Subject
Law
Date
Dec 10, 2024
Pages
34
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G.R. No. 88724 April 3, 1990 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CEILITO ORITA alias "Lito," defendant-appellant. FACTS: Ceilito Orita, also known as "Lito," faced charges of rape against Cristina S. Abayan on March 20, 1983, in Eastern Samar, Philippines. Orita, a soldier in the Philippine Constabulary, allegedly perpetrated the assault by employing threats and a knife, resulting in non-consensual sexual intercourse. The legal proceedings commenced in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch II, Borongan, where the court found Orita guilty of "Frustrated Rape," taking into account two aggravating factors: the crime occurring in a dwelling and at night. Consequently, Orita was sentenced to imprisonment for a term ranging from ten years and one day to twelve years and was mandated to compensate Abayan with P4,000.00. Dissatisfied with the ruling of the RTC, Orita appealed to the Court of Appeals, which altered the sentence to "Reclusion Perpetua" and raised the indemnity to P30,000.00. However, the appellate court subsequently vacated this ruling and referred the case to the Supreme Court, citing jurisdictional issues. Upon review, the Supreme Court deemed the inconsistencies in the testimonies of Abayan and Pat. Donceras, a police officer, to be minor and not detrimental to their overall credibility. The Court placed significant weight on Abayan’s candid and earnest testimony, highlighting the tender and erythematous condition of the vulva as evidence of the rape. Issues: 1. Whether or not the inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution’s witnesses discredit their testimonies.2. Whether or not there is a crime of frustrated rape under Philippine law. Court’s Decision:The Court held the discrepancies to be minor and, in fact, indicative of the testimonies’ truthfulness. They maintained that Abayan’s testimony complemented by medical findings and the condition of her genital organ suggested sexual assault. On the second issue, the Court ruled that the frustrated stage of rape does not exist under Philippine law since rape becomes consummated at the moment of penetration, as further elucidated by jurisprudence and the provisions of the Revised Penal Code. Doctrine: In the commission of rape, any penetration of the female organ by the male organ is sufficient for consummation of the crime. Perfect or full penetration is not required. The elements necessary for rape to be consummated are force or intimidation and carnal knowledge of a woman without her consent. Additionally, the Supreme Court clarified that there is no frustrated stage in the crime of rape; it is either attempted if no penetration occurs or consummated upon the slightest penetration.
G.R. No. 129433 March 30, 2000 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, vs. PRIMO CAMPUHAN Y BELLO accused. FACTS: On the afternoon of April 25, 1996, Ma. Corazon P. Pamintuan was in the process of preparing Milo chocolate drinks for her two children on the ground floor of their residence. At that time, Primo Campuhan, an employee of Corazon’s brother, was present in the house filling plastic bags with water. When Corazon heard her daughter Crysthel cry out, she hurried upstairs and discovered Campuhan kneeling in front of Crysthel, who was partially undressed, with his shorts lowered to his knees. Corazon alleged that she witnessed Campuhan attempting to assault her daughter and responded by striking him multiple times. Campuhan managed to evade her attempts to stop him, pushed her aside, and fled the premises. Local residents, alerted by Corazon's cries for assistance, apprehended him and held him at the compound until they were instructed to take him to the barangay officials. A medical examination of Crysthel showed no visible signs of extragenital injury, an intact hymen, and a hymenal orifice measuring only 0.5 cm in diameter. In his defense, Campuhan challenged the reliability of Corazon’s account, suggesting an alternative narrative that depicted innocent play with the child, which he claimed was misinterpreted by Corazon. On May 27, 1997, the trial court convicted Campuhan of statutory rape, imposing the death penalty and mandating him to pay moral and exemplary damages. The case was subsequently submitted to the Supreme Court for automatic review in accordance with Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659. 1. Whether or Not the Supreme Court should uphold the trial court’s ruling of Campuhan’s guilt for statutory rape.2. Whether or Not the evidence presented was sufficient to prove consummated rape. 3. Whether or Not the actions of Campuhan constituted consummated rape or merely attempted rape. Court’s Decision:The Supreme Court, in a detailed analysis and considering the requisites for consummated rape, found that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Campuhan’s penis penetrated or even touched the labias of Crysthel’s vagina. The Court determined that Campuhan did not perform all the acts of execution necessary to accomplish the crime of rape, as elements for consummated rape, such as penetration or at least touching of the labias of the female organ by the male organ, were not substantiated. Therefore, the Court modified the ruling of the trial court, finding Campuhan guilty of only attempted rape. Campuhan was thus sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of eight years, four months, and ten days of prision mayor as minimum, to fourteen years, ten months, and twenty days of reclusion temporal as maximum, replacing the death penalty initially imposed by the trial court. Doctrine: The Supreme Court reiterated the doctrine that mere touching of the external genitalia by a penis capable of consummating the sexual act does not constitute consummated rape. Full penetration of the vaginal orifice or touching of the labias is required to consummate the crime. Moreover, attempted rape occurs when there are overt acts commencing the commission of rape, but not all acts of execution are performed due to some cause or accident other than the offender’s spontaneousdesistance.
G.R. No. L-14128 December 10, 1918 THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SEVERINO VALDES Y GUILGAN, defendant-appellant FACTS: On the morning of April 28, 1918, Mary Lewin, who lived with her family at No. 328 San Rafael Street in San Miguel, was alerted by her neighbor, Mrs. Auckback, about smoke rising from the lower level of her residence. An investigation conducted by the servant, Paulino Banal, revealed that a jute sack and a rag, both soaked in kerosene, had been ignited between a post and a partition in the entresol. At that time, Severino Valdes was engaged in cleaning activities in the entresol, while his co-defendant, Hugo Labarro, was occupied with the horses. Subsequent to the incident, both Valdes and Labarro were apprehended by law enforcement. During police questioning, Valdes confessed to starting the fire and mentioned previous attempts at arson in the same location, allegedly influenced by Labarro's suggestion and a promise of financial reward. During the trial at the Court of First Instance, Valdes retracted his earlier confession, asserting instead that it was Paulino who had placed the incendiary materials. The prosecution brought charges of arson against both individuals. However, due to a lack of sufficient evidence against Labarro and following a request from his legal counsel, the case against him was dismissed. As a result, Valdes was convicted of attempted arson and sentenced to six years and one day of presidio mayor, along with the obligation to pay half of the costs. Issues: 1. Whether or Not Valdes’ confession at the police station is credible anWhether or Not the act committed constitutes consummated or frustrated arson? Court’s DecisionThe Supreme Court upheld Valdes’ initial confession given at the police station. Despite his subsequent denial and inconsistent statements at trial, the Court found the confession credible as Valdes admitted to attempting arson under Labarro’s incitement. The conflicting accounts provided by Valdes diminished his credibility. The Court classified the act as frustrated arson, noting that while all actions to set the house on fire had been undertaken, the fire did not spread to the building due to the timely intervention. Article 549, in conjunction with Articles 3(2) and 65, of the Penal Code were applied to classify the crime, indicating that despite the intent and effort, the adverse result (full burning of the house) was not achieved. The Court concurred with the lower court’s finding that no aggravating or mitigating circumstances were present. However, they decided the penalty should be the medium degree of presidio mayor, set at eight years and one day, along with the accessory penalties under Article 57 of the Penal Code. Valdes was also ordered to pay the costs of both instances.
G.R. No. 209464 July 1, 2015 DANDY L. DUNGO and GREGORIO A. SIBAL, JR., Petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. FACTS: The prosecution presented a total of twenty witnesses whose testimonies collectively established the sequence of events. On January 14, 2006, at approximately 3:20 a.m., Marlon Villanueva was admitted to JP Rizal Hospital, showing no vital signs. Dr. Masilungan attempted to resuscitate him but was unsuccessful. Upon examination, Dr. Masilungan observed contusions on Villanueva’s face, arms, and legs, along with significant bruising on his thighs, which he attributed to hazing activities. Two individuals claimed to have transported Villanueva to the hospital, stating they found him in Pansol, Calamba City; however, discrepancies in their account raised doubts. Dr. Camarillo, the Medico-Legal Officer, conducted an autopsy and identified thirty-three external injuries, concluding that Villanueva's death resulted from a subdural hemorrhage caused by a head injury. Additionally, two matchsticks marked with APO insignia were found on the body, suggesting a connection to hazing perpetrated by the APO Fraternity. On the evening of January 13, between 8:30 and 9:00 p.m., witness Susan Ignacio observed a group arriving at Villa Novaliches Resort. She recognized Dungo as one of the attendees and later identified Sibal from photographs. Ignacio also noted the group's activities at the resort, indicating they were likely gathered for initiation rites. Tricycle driver Donato Magat transported four individuals, including an unconscious Villanueva, to JP Rizal Hospital in the early hours of January 14. Hospital security guards, Natividad and Espina, confirmed that Dungo and Sibal were the two men who brought Villanueva to the facility. The prosecution successfully linked Villanueva to the APO Fraternity, established that Dungo and Sibal were members, and demonstrated their significant involvement in the initiation rites that resulted in Villanueva’s death due to hazing-related injuries. In contrast, the defense called seven witnesses to assert the petitioners' innocence. Dungo, along with his girlfriend and other APO members, provided alibi testimonies, claiming that Dungo was not present during the initiation and only arrived at the resort after Villanueva had lost consciousness. Sibal claimed he was not involved in harming Villanueva, became irritated with Castillo upon seeing Villanueva injured, and remained at the resort as instructed by APO. Issues: 1. Whether or not the petitioners Dungo and Sibal were lawfully charged for their roles in the hazing death of Marlon Villanueva. 2. Whether or not the presence of petitioners during the hazing events was sufficient to establish prima facie evidence of participation as principals. 3. Whether or not conspiracy to commit hazing was adequately demonstrated by the prosecution. 4. Whether or not petitioners’ defenses sufficiently rebutted the prosecution’s claims.Court’s Decision:The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ ruling. It found that the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the petitioners were involved in hazing Marlon Villanueva. Their presence, combined with other substantive evidence, was seen as active participation in the hazing rites. The Court recognized that R.A. No. 8049 defines hazing and establishes the significant roles of petitioners in inducing the victim to attend the rites, and their presence during the incident was prima facie evidence of participation, unless evidence could show their efforts to prevent it. Doctrine: Under R.A. No. 8049 or the Anti-Hazing Law of 1995, the presence of any person during the hazing is prima facie evidence of participation as a principal, unless they can demonstrate actions taken to prevent the occurrence of the hazing acts
G.R. No. 187536 August 10, 2011 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. MICHAEL BOKINGO alias "MICHAEL BOKINGCO" and REYNANTE COL, Accused-Appellants. FACTS: Michael Bokingco admitted guilt, while Col maintained his innocence. The path to the Supreme Court involved comprehensive legal proceedings, from the initial arraignment to subsequent appeals. Both defendants were charged with murder, and evidence was presented from various witnesses, including the victim's wife and brother-in-law, alongside police investigations and forensic analyses. Bokingco's confession during the police inquiry suggested a premeditated act, although this statement was later challenged on the grounds of lacking legal counsel. The trial court convicted both individuals, initially imposing death sentences, which were later commuted to reclusion perpetua by the Court of Appeals due to changes in legislation. Further appeals raised concerns regarding the evidence supporting the conspiracy charge and the classification of the crime as murder in light of purported aggravating factors. Issues: 1. Whether or not the qualifying circumstances were correctly applied in convicting Bokingco of murder. 2. Whether or Not the validity of Col’s conviction as a co-conspirator beyond reasonable doubt. 3. Whether or Not the admissibility and impact of Bokingco’s uncounselled confession on the case’s outcome.Court’s Decision: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of modifying the Court of Appeals’ decision. Bokingco’s conviction was reduced from murder to homicide due to a lack of clear evidence proving treachery or evident premeditation, thereby nullifying the aggravating circumstances previously considered. Col was acquitted due to insufficient evidence to establish his participation in a conspiracy to commit murder, with the Supreme Court emphasizing the fundamental legal principles regarding the admissibility of evidence and the requirements for proving conspiracy.
G.R. No. 145927 August 24, 2007 SIMON FERNAN, JR. and EXPEDITO TORREVILAS,1 Petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. FACTS: This case pertains to 119 criminal charges brought before the Sandiganbayan (SB) against 36 former officials and employees of the Ministry of Public Highways (MPH), along with several suppliers, in connection with the 1977 Cebu First Highway Engineering District scandal, commonly referred to as the “86 million highway scam.” Petitioners Simon Fernan, Jr. and Expedito Torrevillas have sought to overturn the SB’s Decision dated December 4, 1997, and its Resolution dated August 29, 2000, which found them guilty of multiple counts of estafa through the falsification of public documents. An intricate scheme aimed at defrauding the government was revealed, involving the manipulation and falsification of public documents, such as Letters of Advice of Allotments (LAAs). This fraudulent activity enabled the conspirators to misappropriate substantial amounts of government funds under the pretense of road construction and maintenance projects within the engineering district. Fernan, Jr. and Torrevillas were accused of endorsing false tally sheets and other documents, which served as the foundation for the creation of corresponding general vouchers, leading to the disbursement of funds to suppliers for non-existent or “ghost” deliveries of construction materials.The SB, relying on both direct and circumstantial evidence, identified a consistent pattern of fraud across various highway engineering districts. It concluded that legitimate government transactions were duplicated using counterfeit LAAs and documents, facilitating the diversion of funds into the hands of the conspirators. The scheme involved the fabrication of fictitious projects or the inflation of costs for legitimate ones, resulting in significant financial losses to the government. Issues: 1. Whether or not the presumption of innocence of the petitioners was disregarded by the SB. 2. Whether or not the SB erred in convicting the petitioners as co-conspirators despite the alleged absence of concrete evidence implicating them in the conspiracy. Court’s Decision:The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the SB’s decision, stating that the prosecution sufficiently established the guilt of the petitioners beyond a reasonable doubt. It held that: 1. The conspiracy was established through the cohesive actions and roles played by the accused, including the petitioners, pointing to a common objective—the illegal disbursement of public funds through the use of falsified documents. 2. The participation of the petitioners, through signing fake documents essential for the execution of the fraudulent scheme, constituted intentional acts contributing to the common illegal purpose.
G.R. No. 220598 GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, Petitioner, vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division), Respondents. FACTS: The case pertains to Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174, filed against Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, the former President of the Philippines, and Benigno B. Aguas, among others, for the offense of plunder as delineated in Republic Act No. 7080. The allegations are associated with the purported misappropriation of PHP 365,997,915.00 from the funds of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO). The case progressed to the Supreme Court following the submission of a petition for certiorari by Arroyo and Aguas, which contested the Sandiganbayan's rejection of their respective demurrers to evidence. A demurrer is a legal motion that challenges the adequacy of the evidence provided by the prosecution, and it was filed subsequent to the conclusion of the prosecution's case. The Sandiganbayan, in its resolutions dated April 6, 2015, and September 10, 2015, dismissed the petitions, thereby requiring Arroyo and Aguas to move forward with the presentation of their evidence. Nonetheless, the defendants opted to take a different route by bringing the issue before the Supreme Court, citing grave abuse of discretion by the Sandiganbayan. Issues: 1. Whether or not the denial of the demurrers to evidence by the Sandiganbayan constitutes grave abuse of discretion. 2. Whether or not the Supreme Court can take cognizance of a petition for certiorari against an interlocutory order, such as the denial of a demurrer to evidence, prior to judgment. 3. Whether or not additional elements in the prosecution of plunder, such as identification of a main plunderer and personal benefit to him/her, are required by law. 4. Whether or not the prosecution’s evidence was insufficient to establish the crime of plunder beyond reasonable doubt.5. Whether or not double jeopardy applies to the reconsideration of the Supreme Court’s decisionto dismiss the case against the petitioners. Court’s Decision:The Supreme Court granted the petitions for certiorari, annulling and setting aside the resolutions issued by the Sandiganbayan. It ruled in favor of the petitioners’ demurrers to evidence, dismissing the criminal case for insufficiency of evidence and ordering the immediate release of the detained petitioners. The decision underscored several legal grounds: The Court asserted its jurisdiction to review the Sandiganbayan’s denial of the demurrers to evidence, emphasizing its duty to correct grave abuses of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, regardless of the interlocutory nature of such orders. The Supreme Court clarified that the requirement for identifying a main plunderer and establishing personal benefit as part of the elements of plunder is embedded within Republic Act No. 7080 and pertinent jurisprudence. The failure of the prosecution to establish these elements led to the finding of insufficiency of evidence. The Court found the evidence presented by the prosecution insufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt the commission of plunder by the accused. Granting the prosecution’s motion for reconsideration, according to the petitioners, would violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy, as they have been acquitted by the dismissal of the case due to insufficiency of evidence.
G.R. No. 168852 September 30, 2008 SHARICA MARI L. GO-TAN, Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES PERFECTO C. TAN and JUANITA L. TAN, Respondents. FACTS: Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan, the petitioner, entered into marriage with Steven L. Tan on April 18, 1999, resulting in the birth of two children from their union. On January 12, 2005, citing instances of verbal, psychological, and economic abuse allegedly perpetrated by Steven and his parents (the respondents), Sharica submitted a petition seeking a Temporary Protective Order (TPO) in accordance with the “Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004” (R.A. No. 9262). The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 94, granted the TPO on January 25, 2005. Subsequently, on February 7, 2005, the respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss, contending that R.A. No. 9262 was inapplicable to them as they were not the petitioner’s spouse. In response, Sharica opposed the motion, advocating for a broader interpretation of R.A. No. 9262. However, on March 7, 2005, the RTC dismissed the petition against the respondents, interpreting R.A. No. 9262 in a manner that excluded parents-in-law. The RTC subsequently denied a Verified Motion for Reconsideration on July 11, 2005. Issues: –Whether or not the respondents-spouses, as parents-in-law, may be included in the petition for the issuance of a protective order, under R.A. No. 9262. Court’s Decision: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioner, reversing and setting aside the RTC’s resolutions. The Court highlighted that Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly allows for the supplemental application of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), including the principle of conspiracy. Considering this, and given the law’s intent for liberal construction to protect victims, the Court found that parents-in-law could be involved in perpetrating violence and thus could be covered under R.A. No. 9262 via the principle of conspiracy.
G.R. No. 121828 June 27, 2003 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. EDMAR AGUILOS, ODILON LAGLIBA Y ABREGON and RENE GAYOT PILOLA, accused, RENE GAYOT PILOLA, Appellant. FACTS: On February 5, 1988, in Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, Philippines, the murder of Joselito Capa y Rulloda occurred. The individuals accused in this case included Edmar Aguilos, Odilon Lagliba y Abregon, and Rene Gayot Pilola, along with Ronnie Diamante, who was not apprehended at the time. Odilon Lagliba was the first to be captured and subsequently convicted. Edmar Aguilos remained a fugitive, while Ronnie Diamante reportedly passed away a month following the incident. Rene Gayot Pilola was later taken into custody and, during his arraignment on March 9, 1994, entered a plea of not guilty. Throughout the trial, the prosecution called upon witnesses such as Elisa Rolan and Dr. Bienvenido Muñoz. The defense presented an alibi and included testimony from Julian Cadion. Ultimately, the trial court found Pilola guilty, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and mandating that he compensate the victim’s heirs. Pilola subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court, contesting issues related to conspiracy, the credibility of witness Elisa Rolan, and the legitimacy of his conviction. Issues: 1. Whether or not the trial court erred in concluding there was a conspiracy in the incident. 2. Whether or not the trial court erred in crediting the testimony of Elisa Rolan over the evidence presented by Pilola. 3. Whether or not Pilola’s guilt was proven beyond a reasonable doubt.Court’s Decision:The Supreme Court affirmed Pilola’s conviction with modifications, upholding the findings of conspiracy among the accused. The Court found no compelling reason to doubt the credibility of Elisa Rolan, whose testimony was consistent and corroborated by physical evidence and other witnesses. The Court also rejected Pilola’s defense of alibi and noted his inability to provide a credible contrary testimony. The Court’s decision emphasized the principles defining conspiracy and direct participation in a crime, highlighting the joint responsibility for the act’s outcomes.
G.R. No. 81563 December 19, 1989 AMADO C. ARIAS, petitioner, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent. G.R. No. 82512 December 19, 1989 CRESENCIO D. DATA, petitioner, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent. FACTS: In 1975, the Bureau of Public Works launched the Mangahan Floodway Project to mitigate flooding issues in Marikina and Pasig, located in Metro Manila. This initiative necessitated the procurement of private properties, including a 19,004 square meter parcel of riceland in Pasig owned by Benjamin Agleham. This land was reclassified as residential and acquired at a rate of P80.00 per square meter in 1978, a substantial increase from its tax assessment value of P5.00 per square meter in 1973. Despite recommendations from the solicitor general and a special prosecutor for acquittal, the Sandiganbayan found Amado C. Arias, the auditor who sanctioned the transaction, and Cresencio D. Data, the district engineer overseeing the project, guilty of conspiracy and negligence that resulted in excessive government spending. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court examined the procedural history from the initial land acquisition to the subsequent convictions. The Court investigated the negotiations, the formal sale and registration of the property to the government, the pre-audit processes, and the disbursement of funds for the purchase. Importantly, the Supreme Court assessed the discrepancies in valuation and the actions and responsibilities of the defendants throughout these proceedings, which ultimately contributed to their conviction by the Sandiganbayan. Issues: 1.Whether or not the petitioners Arias and Data were involved in a conspiracy leading to the overpricing of the land purchased for the Mangahan Floodway Project? Court’s Decision: The Supreme Court acquitted Arias and Data on grounds of reasonable doubt. It held that the evidence presented was insufficient to sustain a conviction and stressed the importance of discerning personal and deliberate participation in alleged conspiratorial activities. The Court deemed the valuation adopted by the Sandiganbayan for convicting the petitioners as unrealistic and arbitrary. Emphasizing reliance on subordinates’ due diligence does notequate to negligence or conspiracy, the court disagreed with holding heads of offices automatically responsible for every fraudulent act committed by their subordinates without clear, direct involvement or proof of conspiracy.
G.R. No. 172193, September 13, 2017 CELERINO S. CHUA, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLES OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. FACTS: Celerino Chua, also known as Suntay, was found guilty by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 81, for the offenses of carnapping and robbery. The Court of Appeals (CA) upheld this ruling on October 20, 2005. The events in question took place on October 24, 1993, in Bocaue, Bulacan. Chua, along with his co-defendants Leonardo Reyes, known as Leo, and Arnold Lato y Baniel, also referred to as Arnold or Rodel, faced charges related to the theft of a stainless owner-type jeep and various household items belonging to Reynaldo and Teresa Ravago. During the course of the robbery, Reynaldo sustained multiple stab wounds but managed to survive. The stolen vehicle was subsequently discovered in a motor shop in Bani, Pangasinan, where Chua had attempted to sell it. He was identified as the principal orchestrator of the crimes, having introduced his co-accused to their employer and facilitated the sale of the stolen jeep. The RTC imposed an indeterminate sentence on Chua for both offenses, a decision that was later modified by the CA. Chua subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court, contending that the circumstantial evidence presented was inadequate to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. ISSUE: Whether or not there conspiracy where Chua could be held liable as a principal by inducement? RULING: Yes, Chua conspired with the two other accused which renders him liable for the crimes of robbery and violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972. For an accused to be validly held to conspire with his co-accused in committing the crimes, his overt acts must tend to execute the offense agreed upon, for the merely passive conspirator cannot be held to be still part of the conspiracy without such overt acts, unless such passive conspirator is the mastermind. Chua was found to be the mastermind in the commission of the crimes. Chua eavesdropped Reynaldo’s conversation with his compadre about the commission he received in the sale of a fishpond. He told this information to the two other accused. He was able to induce the others to commit the crime –without said inducement, the crimes would not have been committed. As such, Chua is liable as a principal by inducement in the crimes committed by the two other accused.
G.R. No. 150723 July 11, 2006 RAMONITO MANABAN, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. FACTS: On the evening of October 11, 1996, Joselito Bautista, a member of the UP Police Force, went to the BPI Kalayaan Branch to withdraw cash from an ATM after his daughter, Frinzi, expressed concerns about respiratory issues that required medication. Upon his arrival at the bank, Bautista encountered difficulties using the ATM, which led him to strike the machine in frustration. Ramonito Manaban, the security guard on duty, intervened and informed Bautista that he had entered an incorrect PIN, suggesting that he return the following morning. Bautista, who appeared to be under the influence and visibly agitated, persisted in his aggressive actions towards the ATM, prompting Manaban to contact customer service for assistance. The situation intensified when Bautista refused to vacate the premises, resulting in Manaban discharging a warning shot. This led to a physical confrontation between the two, during which Manaban ultimately shot Bautista, who succumbed to his injuries from the gunshot. Manaban faced murder charges but was subsequently convicted of homicide by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Quezon City. The Court of Appeals (CA) upheld the RTC's ruling but later modified the amount of damages awarded to Bautista's family. Issues: 1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s conviction of Manaban for homicide instead of recognizing self-defense. 2. Whether or not the CA erred in its assessment of unlawful aggression and Manaban’s perception of threat.**Court’s Decision:**The Supreme Court ruled that Manaban failed to prove the elements of self-defense, particularly the necessity of unlawful aggression by Bautista. The court emphasized that: –Bautista was shot in the back, contradicting Manaban’s claim of self-defense. –Bautista’s firearm was still inside a locked holster, and he had not drawn his gun when he turned his back on Manaban. –Manaban held his firearm at Bautista when he shot him, reinforcing the absence of imminent threat necessitating deadly force. Resolution on Issues: -Self-Defense Claim: Denied due to lack of unlawful aggression and disproportional response by Manaban. -Unlawful Aggression: Rejected Manaban’s claims of a threatening posture by Bautista, citing evidence of Bautista being shot in the back.
G.R. No. 160341 October 19, 2004 EXEQUIEL SENOJA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. FACTS: On April 16, 1997, Exequiel Senoja was consuming gin alongside Fidel Senoja, Jose Calica, and Miguel Lumasac in the hut of Crisanto Reguyal, located in Barangay Zarah, San Luis, Aurora. The gathering was abruptly interrupted by Leon Lumasac, who, wielding a bolo, expressed his anger while searching for his brother Miguel. Both the petitioner and Jose made efforts to calm Leon, ultimately resulting in the petitioner embracing him while Jose managed to take possession of Leon's bolo. This led to a temporary reconciliation. After leaving the hut, Leon was pursued by Exequiel Senoja. Approximately ten meters away from the hut, Senoja stabbed Leon in the back. Upon turning around, Leon was subjected to multiple stabs from Senoja, which ultimately resulted in his death at the scene. Dr. Pura Uy conducted an examination of Leon and recorded several fatal stab wounds to his chest, along with a non-fatal wound on his left buttock. On August 13, 1997, Senoja faced homicide charges. He acknowledged the act of killing but contended that it was in self-defense, claiming that Leon had attacked him twice, and he acted in defense during the second confrontation outside the hut. The Regional Trial Court of Baler, Aurora, Branch 96, convicted Exequiel Senoja of homicide, imposing a sentence of 12 to 17 years of imprisonment. The Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the RTC with minor adjustments. Dissatisfied with this ruling, Senoja sought relief from the Supreme Court, arguing that the CA overlooked significant facts that supported his self-defense argument. Issues: 1. Whether or not the CA erred in rejecting Exequiel Senoja’s claim of self-defense. 2. Whether or not the CA and the RTC correctly assessed the sequence of events and respective aggressions. Court’s Decision:The Supreme Court denied Senoja’s petition, agreeing with the CA that Senoja’s self-defense claim lacked credibility. The Court noted: -Unlawful Aggression: The Court found no continuous aggression from Leon after the parties reconciled inside the hut and during the second confrontation outside. The aggression from the first phase inside the hut had ceased. -Reasonable Necessity: Senoja’s actions were considered excessive and not proportionate to any immediate threat post the first altercation. -Lack of Provocation: The Court emphasized that Senoja’s decision to follow Leon outside after being threatened showed a proactive confrontational intent rather than defensive behavior.
G.R. No. 107874 August 4, 1994 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GEORGE DECENA y ROCABERTE, accused-appellant. FACTS: On Christmas Day in 1990, at approximately 4:00 P.M., Luzviminda, the 14-year-old daughter of the deceased, recounted that she was engaged in play with her siblings at their residence when her mother requested her to retrieve her father, Jaime Ballesteros, who was watching a basketball game nearby. As Luzviminda proceeded, she encountered her father returning home inebriated. In a sudden turn of events, she observed the accused approaching her father wielding a long-bladed weapon, which prompted her to urgently warn her father to flee for his safety. However, Jaime merely raised his hand, which allowed the assailant to stab him in the right chest. Jaime was promptly transported to the hospital, where he was pronounced dead upon arrival. The defense presented an alternative narrative regarding the incident. According to the defense, at around 4:00 P.M., the accused was watching a basketball game. The victim, Jaime Ballesteros, was seen staggering around the court due to his intoxication. He approached the area where the accused was seated and, for reasons unknown, grabbed the accused by the neck with one arm while simultaneously threatening him with a fork in the other. Barangay Tanod Romeo Decena, who was also present at the game, intervened by taking the fork from Jaime and advising the accused to leave. The accused complied and was later followed by Jaime. Additionally, Fernando Biala, an uncle of the accused, testified that while walking along the barangay road, he witnessed Jaime assaulting the accused with a balisong. He asserted that during the altercation, the accused managed to overpower Jaime, twisting the victim's wrist and subsequently plunging the knife into his body. ISSUE: Whether or not appellant acted in complete self-defense in killing Jaime Ballesteros, as claimed, thus absolving him from criminal liability? Court’s DecisionThe Court rejected George’s claim of self-defense, stating that unlawful aggression began at the basketball court but had ceased when both parties left. George’s act of stabbing Jaime was deemed retaliatory, as there was no continued aggression. The Court appreciated the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. Evidence showed George voluntarily surrendered the morning after the incident and before his arrest. The Court found that the prosecution failed to establish treachery. Thus, George was guilty of homicide, not murder. The Court did not find any specific evidence showing deliberate intent to insult Jaime’s age. Jaime was 43 years old, and the age disparity between him and George (25 years old) was not significant enough to constitute this aggravating circumstance.
G.R. No. 128359 December 6, 2000 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROBERTO E. DELA CRUZ, accused-appellant. FACTS: Daniel Macapagal, a married individual, had been cohabiting with Ma. Luz Perla San Antonio for approximately two to three years before she entered into a relationship with Roberto dela Cruz, with whom she began living in a residence rented by her in Cabanatuan City. On the evening of May 27, 1996, at approximately 6:00 PM, while resting in their bedroom, San Antonio and dela Cruz heard a vehicle stop outside their home, followed by knocks on the door. Upon opening the door, San Antonio encountered Macapagal, who forcefully entered the premises while brandishing a firearm, seemingly in search of someone. Macapagal then stormed into the master bedroom where dela Cruz was located, striking the door with his gun and demanding that dela Cruz "Come out." When dela Cruz opened the door, he was met with Macapagal aiming a gun at him, prompting him to quickly shut the door. Dela Cruz subsequently armed himself with a .38 caliber revolver, reopened the door, and a struggle ensued between the two men over their firearms. Gunshots were discharged, resulting in Macapagal collapsing to the ground, having sustained four gunshot wounds, one of which was fatal, striking his heart. Dela Cruz instructed San Antonio to contact the police, who arrived shortly thereafter and took him into custody, as he asserted that he acted in self-defense. A forensic examination later determined that Macapagal's firearm was unloaded at the time of the confrontation. Dela Cruz was charged with “Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition with Homicide.”–After a trial in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cabanatuan City, Branch 27, he was found guilty and sentenced to death under Presidential Decree 1866. –Dela Cruz appealed to the Supreme Court, contesting the RTC’s findings and claiming self-defense. Issues: 1. Whether or Not the elements of self-defense were satisfactorily established by Dela Cruz? 2. Whether or Not the ruling of the RTC, particularly the imposition of the death penalty, was correct under existing laws? 3. Whether or not the use of an unlicensed firearm can be considered an aggravating circumstance and if it affects the penalty? Court’s Decision:1. Self-Defense: –The Supreme Court held that Dela Cruz failed to establish the elements of self-defense: -Unlawful Aggression: The aggression by Macapagal ceased when Dela Cruz managed to close the door. Reopening the door and presenting a firearm was considered aggressive rather than defensive. -Reasonable Necessity of Means: The four gunshot wounds, especially the fatal one, indicated an excessive response. -Lack of Sufficient Provocation:By opening the door the second time and confronting Macapagal, Dela Cruz’s actions constituted provocation -2. Correctness of Death Penalty Imposition: –The Court noted that Republic Act No. 8294 had amended Presidential Decree No. 1866 to treat the use of an unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance rather than a separate offense.\ 3. Penalty Adjustment: –Considering the aggravating circumstance of using an unlicensed firearm and the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the Court imposed a modified penalty. –The new sentence was an indeterminate penalty of nine (9) years and one (1) day as minimum to sixteen (16) years and one (1) day as maximum. –The damages awarded for loss of earning capacity were also recalculated and reduced from P2,865,600.00 to P1,432,800.00.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NICOLAS JAURIGUE and AVELINA JAURIGUE, defendants. AVELINA JAURIGUE, appellant. FACTS: On the evening of October 16, 2006, Ronald Jaurigue, accompanied by his associates BJ, Aquiles, Jojo, and others, arrived at the residence of Charles Nabaza. Aquiles confronted Charles, issuing threats of death if he did not come outside. After being repelled by a relative of Charles, the group returned, with Aquiles insisting that Charles reveal himself. When the door to Charles' unit was partially opened, Aquiles asked Ronald for a "sumpak," and they attempted to shoot Charles. Ronald discharged the sumpak, resulting in a fatal injury to Charles. Following the incident, the group fled the location. An Information was subsequently filed, charging Ronald and his accomplices with Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. Ronald and BJ were later apprehended and brought to trial. Ronald presented an alibi, claiming he was at his cousin's residence in Las Piñas during the incident. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Ronald guilty of Murder, while BJ was acquitted due to reasonable doubt. Ronald then appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed the RTC's ruling but adjusted certain penalties and damages. Issues 1. Whether or Not the CA correctly affirmed Ronald’s conviction for Murder as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the RPC. 2. Whether or Not the presence of aggravating circumstances, such as treachery or evident premeditation, was validly established. Court’s DecisionIssue 1: Conviction for Murder The Court acknowledged the positive identification of Ronald by three eyewitnesses, establishing beyond reasonable doubt that he shot and killed Charles. Accordingly, the Court found Ronald guilty of homicide, modifying the RTC and CA rulings, given the absence of aggravating circumstances to qualify the crime to Murder. Issue 2: Aggravating Circumstances Treachery: The Court found that the elements of treachery were not adequately established. The attack was neither sudden nor unexpected. Charles had been forewarned and could anticipate the aggression, thus invalidating the claim of treachery. Evident Premeditation: The records did not show sufficient evidence of evident premeditation. The Court noted the lack of a cool and deliberate plan to kill Charles, which is necessary to prove evident premeditation. Therefore, Ronald’s actions were only proven to qualify as Homicide, not Murder.
G.R. Nos. L-33466-67 April 20, 1983 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MAMERTO NARVAEZ, defendant-appellant. FACTS: This case pertains to the unfortunate fatalities of Davis Q. Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia, which occurred on August 22, 1968, in South Cotabato, Philippines. The defendant, Mamerto Narvaez, was involved in a land dispute with Fleischer & Co., Inc., where both deceased individuals held prominent positions. For many years, settlers in South Cotabato, including Narvaez, challenged the land claims made by Fleischer & Co., which sought ownership through various sales applications. The situation intensified when Fleischer & Co. commenced fencing activities around a disputed parcel of land, inadvertently isolating Narvaez from his own property, which included his residence and rice mill. Upon observing the fencing and the resultant damage to his property, including the chiseling of his house's walls, Narvaez expressed his grievances, which were disregarded by Fleischer. This disregard led Narvaez to take the drastic action of shooting and killing both Fleischer and Rubia. As a result of this incident, Narvaez was convicted of murder by the Court of First Instance of South Cotabato in 1970, receiving a sentence of reclusion perpetua for each murder count, along with an order to pay compensatory and moral damages to the victims' heirs. Narvaez subsequently appealed the ruling, arguing that his actions were justified under the principles of self-defense and defense of property, which brought the case before the Philippine Supreme Court. # Issues: 1. Whether or not there was unlawful aggression by the deceased that warranted Narvaez’s response in shooting them? 2. Whether or Not The proper classification of the crime committed by Narvaez considering the circumstances of defense. 3. Whether or Not The applicability and sufficiency of the mitigating circumstances of incomplete defense of property, voluntary surrender, and passion and obfuscation in reducing Narvaez’s liability?Court’s Decision:The Philippine Supreme Court, in a landmark decision, re-evaluated the circumstances surrounding the case. The Court found: There was unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased as they damaged Narvaez’s property and posed an imminent threat to his rights over the property. This aggression, however, was directed towards his property and not his person. Considering the unlawful aggression was directed toward Narvaez’s property, his act constituted defense of property, not self-defense. However, the force used by Narvaez was found to be disproportionate. The Court recognized the presence of incomplete defense of property, changing the qualification of his act from murder to homicide. Additionally, it took into account mitigating circumstances: Narvaez’s voluntary surrender and his state of passion and obfuscation, arising from the threat to his property and livelihood. Given these considerations, the Court significantly reduced Narvaez’s sentence to four months of arresto mayor for each count of homicide and adjusted the civil liabilities towards the heirs of the deceased.
G.R. No. 168818 March 9, 2007 NILO SABANG, Petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. FACTS: On January 17, 1997, an incident transpired in Sitio Landing, Barangay Liloan, Ormoc City, during a drinking gathering involving Nilo Sabang (the petitioner), Nicanor Butad, and the spouses Cruz and Andresa Villamor, outside Melania Sombilon’s store. Nicanor Butad, a civilian agent of the Philippine National Police, allegedly threatened Randy Sabang, Nilo’s son, with the words, “I will shoot you,” while armed with a .38-caliber revolver. Following this, Butad was shot four times with his own firearm. The prosecution provided evidence and witness accounts suggesting that Butad was not holding a weapon at the time of the threat. Natividad Payud testified that Randy had just arrived and that Butad did not draw his gun when making the threat, while Andresa Villamor confirmed that Butad was holding a glass instead. It was claimed that Nilo Sabang subsequently seized Butad’s firearm and shot him multiple times while he was incapacitated. In defense, Nilo Sabang and his witnesses asserted that Butad had aimed his gun at Randy, which led Nilo to grasp Butad’s armin an attempt to protect his son, resulting in the gun discharging accidentally. Nilo later surrendered with the revolver in his possession. The trial court rendered a judgment based on significant physical evidence, including the lack of powder burns on Butad’s body, indicating that the shots were fired from a distance greater than 10 inches, along with witness testimonies, leading to Sabang’s conviction for homicide. This conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, despite Nilo Sabang’s assertion that he acted in defense of his son. Issues:** -Whether or Not Nilo Sabang acted in defense of his son and thereby qualified for the justifying circumstance under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code. -Whether or Not the trial court erred in appreciating the facts and the physical evidence presented. Court’sDecision: The Supreme Court upheld the conviction for homicide, noting the following points upon thorough evaluation: 1. Defense of Relative Insufficient: Unlawful Aggression: The court found no clear evidence of unlawful aggression by Butad. Witness testimonies from the prosecution indicated that Butad did not have his firearm drawn. Payud’s testimony suggested that Butad’s threat was not taken seriously by Nilo, undermining the claim of immediate danger to Randy. Reasonable Necessity:The multiple gunshots, excessive in nature, implied an intent to kill rather than a necessary defense action. No Provocation: The court acknowledged Nilo was not provocated but ruled his actionas homicide due to the aggressive response being unwarranted by the situation. 2. Inconsistencies and Credibility: Prosecution witnesses, particularly Payud and Andresa Villamor, were viewed as credible, their accounts aligning with physical evidence. Dr. Edilberto Calipayan’s testimony on powder burns indicated the shots were fired at adistance, opposing the defense’s claim of a close-range struggle. 3. Award of Damages: Civil indemnity awarded at P50,000.00. –P180,000.00 for loss of earning capacity due to Butad’s age and projected remaining working years. -P50,000.00 confirmed for burial expenses. -Moral damages reduced from P100,000.00 to P50,000.00. -Attorney’s fees of P40,000.00 and appearance fee of P1,000.00 per hearing upheld.
G.R. No. 153875 August 16, 2006 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ROLANDO DAGANI y REYES and OTELLO SANTIANO Y LEONIDA, Accused-Appellants. FACTS: On September 11, 1989, at approximately 4:45 PM, Ernesto Javier, Lincoln Miran, and two other individuals were consuming alcoholic beverages at a canteen located within the Philippine National Railways (PNR) compound in Tondo, Manila. Security personnel Rolando Dagani and Otello Santiano entered the establishment. Dagani forcefully pushed Miran, resulting in Miran's fall. Subsequently, Dagani restrained Javier while Santiano discharged his firearm twice at Javier, leading to Javier's death. The accused-appellants contended that they were responding to a disturbance. They asserted that Javier attempted to shoot Dagani with a .22 caliber revolver, which initiated a struggle that compelled Santiano to fire his weapon in order to incapacitate Javier. The matter was adjudicated in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, where both appellants were found guilty of murder and each received an indeterminate prison sentence ranging from 10 to 18 years, along with various monetary compensations mandated. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the murder conviction but altered the sentence to reclusion perpetua, while also eliminating the awards for attorney’s fees and appearance fees.The case was subsequently brought before the Supreme Court for mandatory review, where the appellants reiterated the defenses they had previously presented in the CA. Issues: 1. Whether or Not the RTC and CA erred in rejecting the self-defense claim of the accused-appellants? 2. Whether or Not the RTC and CA erred in not recognizing the lawful performance of official duty as a valid defense? Court’s Decision:1. Self-defense: The Supreme Court upheld the lower courts’ conclusion. The factual findings indicated the absence of unlawful aggression from Javier. The Court emphasized that self-defense requires clear proof of imminent threat, which was not present, as Javier had been restrained and was off-balance. 2. Performance of Official Duty: The Court found that the defendants failed to prove they were on official duty. The absence of their time records and conflicting testimony regarding shifts weighed against this claim. Moreover, the shooting was unnecessary given the circumstances, and thus, could not be deemed a lawful exercise of their duties. 3. Conspiracy: The Supreme Court disagreed with the lower courts on conspiracy. The evidence did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that appellants acted with a shared intent to kill Javier. The actions appeared more spontaneous than premeditated, and the consequences of conspiracy were not sufficiently demonstrated. 4. Murder Conviction: The Supreme Court modified the conviction. Given the failure to establish treachery and conspiracy, the appropriate conviction was for homicide, not murder. The penalty was recalculated under the applicable laws, factoring in the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of official position.
G.R. No. 165483 September 12, 2006 RUJJERIC Z. PALAGANAS,1 petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. FACTS: Facts: On January 16, 1998, at approximately 8:00 PM, brothers Servillano, Michael, and Melton Ferrer were engaged in a drinking session at their residence. At around 9:45 PM, the brothers opted to extend their drinking at Tidbits Videoke bar, situated in Poblacion, Manaoag, Pangasinan. At about 10:30 PM, Jaime Palaganas arrived at the videoke bar accompanied by Ferdinand Palaganas and Virgilio Bautista, with the Ferrer brothers being the only other patrons present. Jaime began to sing, prompting the Ferrer brothers to join in. This led to Jaime feeling aggrieved, resulting in him striking Servillano Ferrer on the head with a microphone, which escalated into a physical confrontation. Virgilio Bautista exited the bar, while Ferdinand left shortly after, with Michael briefly pursuing him. Edith Palaganas, Jaime’s sister and the owner of the bar, arrived and successfully de-escalated the situation. The Ferrer brothers then went outside, where they encountered Ferdinand and petitioner Rujjeric Z. Palaganas. Ferdinand directed Rujjeric to “shoot them,” pointing at the Ferrer brothers, which led to Rujjeric firing at Servillano, Michael, and Melton Ferrer. Servillano sustained a gunshot wound to the abdomen, Michael was shot in the right shoulder, and Melton suffered a fatal gunshot wound to the head. Following the incident, a police investigation ensued, resulting in the Ferrer brothers being transported to the hospital for medical attention. The Regional Trial Court found Rujjeric guilty of Homicide concerning Melton’s death and Frustrated Homicide regarding the injuries sustained by Servillano and Michael, while Ferdinand was acquitted. Rujjeric and Ferdinand faced multiple charges, including Frustrated Murder, Murder, and a violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 2958. During their arraignment, both defendants pleaded not guilty; Ferdinand succeeded in consolidating their case in the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan. The RTC convicted Rujjeric of Homicide and Frustrated Homicide but acquitted him of the COMELEC-related charge. Ferdinand was acquitted of all charges. Issues: 1. Whether or not the elements of self-defense were present to absolve Rujjeric of criminal liability? Court’s Decision:1. Self-defense: The Court held that the claim of self-defense failed the requisites. There was no unlawful aggression from the Ferrer brothers, hence no actual or imminent danger necessitating the use of a gun. The means employed by Rujjeric were deemed unreasonable, and his act of shooting was disproportionate to the threat posed by stones thrown by the Ferrer brothers. 2. Frustrated Homicide vs. Attempted Homicide* (Criminal Case No. U-9609): The Court found the injuries inflicted on Michael Ferrer non-fatal. Thus, Rujjeric was guilty not of Frustrated Homicide but Attempted Homicide for Michael’s injury.
G.R. No. 227421 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee vs. RODOLFO OLARBE y BALIHANGO, Accused-Appellant FACTS: On May 7, 2006, shortly after midnight, Romeo Arca, appearing to be under the influence, unlawfully entered the residence of Rodolfo Olarbe in Sitio Pananim, Luisiana, Laguna, armed with a rifle modified to a .22 caliber and a bolo knife. Arca discharged the rifle while hurling insults and threats at Olarbe and his wife, who were awakened by the disturbance. In the ensuing confrontation, Olarbe managed to wrest the rifle from Arca and shot him in the head. Despite sustaining the gunshot wound, Arca brandished his bolo, leading to a physical struggle that extended outside the home. Olarbe ultimately gained control of the bolo and fatally struck Arca, resulting in his death. Following the incident, Olarbe promptly surrendered to the local authorities, reported the event, and was subsequently detained. The death certificate of Arca listed gunshot wounds and multiple hacking injuries as the causes of death. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santa Cruz, Laguna (Branch 27) found Olarbe guilty of murder, dismissing his claims of self-defense and defense of a stranger. He was sentenced to a term of 20 years and one day to reclusion perpetua and was ordered to compensate Arca’s heirs. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) upheld the RTC’s ruling with a slight modification, mandating Olarbe to pay temperate damages and imposing interest on the civil indemnity, as well as moral and exemplary damages. Following the CA's affirmation, Olarbe sought further recourse from the Supreme Court, contending that the rejection of his self-defense and defense of stranger arguments was incorrect. Issues: 1. Whether or not the RTC and CA erred in rejecting Rodolfo Olarbe’s pleas of self-defense and defense of a stranger? 2. Whether or not the elements of self-defense and defense of stranger were sufficiently proven by Olarbe? 3. Whether or not the inflicted wounds indicated a reasonable necessity for the means employed to repel the unlawful aggression? Court’s Decision:The Supreme Court found merit in Olarbe’s appeal.On Self-Defense and Defense of Stranger: 1. Unlawful Aggression: –It was determined that Romeo Arca’s actions constituted continuous and persistent unlawful aggression. Arca’s aggressive conduct—from forcibly entering Olarbe’s home with a gun, firing it, and issuing death threats, to later charging at Olarbe’s wife with a bolo—presented a clear and imminent danger to Olarbe and his spouse. The Court found it implausible and speculative for the lower courts to assume that Arca was too weak to continue his aggression after being shot in the head, citing the natural adrenaline and persistence in such attackers. Reasonable Necessity of Means: –The court articulated that “reasonable necessity” does not imply a perfect or least aggressive counterattack but rather a rational equivalence considering the imminent danger. The gunshot wound and multiple lacerations indicated an intense and persistent conflict which justified Olarbe’s defensive actions. The extent and nature of the wounds did not convincingly demonstrate an excessive response by Olarbe given the immediate peril he faced. Lack of Sufficient Provocation: –The evidence showed that Arca’s aggression was unprovoked by Olarbe, who was defending against a forcible, armed intrusion into his home. Acquittal: –Taking into account Olarbe’s immediate surrender to authorities post-incident, which indicated a consciousness of having acted within justifiable bounds, the Supreme Court acquitted Olarbe.The Supreme Court emphasized the context of the situation, recognizing that Olarbe acted in earnest belief of threat to life and in defense of his spouse.
G.R. Nos. L-30527-28 March 29, 1974 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PIO RICOHERMOSO, SEVERO PADERNAL, JUAN PADERNAL, ROSENDO PERPEÑAN, MACARIO MONTEREY and RITO MONTEREY, defendants, JUAN PADERNAL and SEVERO PADERNAL, defendants-appellants. FACTS: On January 30, 1965, an event occurred in Barrio Tagbacan Silangan, Catanauan, Quezon, involving Geminiano de Leon, his common-law spouse Fabiana Rosales, their son Marianito de Leon, and Rizal Rosales. The conflict arose from a disagreement concerning the distribution of the palay (rice) harvest from Geminiano's land, which was being cultivated by Pio Ricohermoso. In the morning, Geminiano sought a portion of the harvest, and although Ricohermoso consented, he indicated that Geminiano should retrieve it later. Later that afternoon, as Geminiano sat with Fabiana and Marianito stood nearby armed with a rifle, Ricohermoso confronted him aggressively, refusing to provide any palay. The confrontation escalated when Ricohermoso attacked Geminiano with a bolo, while Severo Padernal, Ricohermoso’s father-in-law, struck him with an axe. Juan Padernal, Severo’s son, intervened to restrain Marianito, preventing him from taking any defensive action. Geminiano ultimately succumbed to his injuries shortly thereafter. Severo and Juan Padernal, along with others, faced charges of murder and additional offenses. The trial court found Severo and Juan Padernal guilty of murder and lesiones leves, imposing a sentence of reclusion perpetua. Severo Padernal later withdrew his appeal, thereby reinforcing the prosecution's position. Issues: 1. Whether or not Juan Padernal’s act of restraining Marianito can be justified as an avoidance of greater evil.? Court’s Decision:The Court found that Juan conspired with Ricohermoso and Severo Padernal. Juan’s action of restraining Marianito directly facilitated the murder by preventing any potential defensive actions, showing coordination and unity in the criminal act. The Court held that treachery (alevosia) was present, as the attack on Geminiano was sudden and executed without risk to the assailants, which ensured their safety in carrying out the murder. Geminiano’s raised hands and pleas for mercy further underscored the treacherous nature of the act. The Court rejected Juan’s reliance on the justifying circumstance of avoidance of greater evil. Since Juan’s actions were to guarantee the killing of Geminiano without risk, this did not fall under the justification of preventing a greater harm but was instead part of the murderous plan.
FACTS: Vivencio Lascano and Maria Norma Hernandez were in a romantic relationship, during which they discussed the prospect of marriage. Vivencio's parents visited Norma's home to conduct a traditional engagement ceremony, bringing along chickens and goats as part of the customs. The wedding was scheduled for March 19, 1955. Despite the preparations, Norma did not appear on the wedding day, resulting in significant shame and humiliation for Vivencio and his family. Norma later revealed that she did not genuinely love Vivencio and had accepted the marriage proposal under pressure from her parents. To avoid the marriage, she chose to leave her home as a final measure. Norma's parents supported her account. Consequently, the Regional Trial Court found her guilty of serious slander by deed for intentionally fleeing to obstruct the marriage ceremony. She subsequently filed an appeal. ISSUE: Whether or Not the Regional Trial Court erred in Holding Ma. Norma Hernandez guilty of Slander by Deed? COURT DECISION: NO, SC reversed the RTC judgment and acquitted the appellant. A party to an agreement to marry who backs out cannot be held liable for the crime of slander by deed , for then that would be an inherent way of compelling said party to go into a marriage without his or her free consent, and this would contravene the principle in law that what could not be done directly could not be done indirectly; and said party has the right to avoid to himself or herself the evil of going through a loveless marriage pursuant to Article 11, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code. One of the essential requisites of slander hasn’t been proven. There is no malice in the act of the appellant changing her mind. She was merely exercising her right not to give her consent to the marriage after mature consideration. Appellant had the right to avoid to herself the evil of going through a loveless marriage. Justifying Circumstances (Art. 11 par.4, RPC) Any person who, in order to avoid an evil or injury, does not act which causes damage to another, provided that the following requisites are present; First. That the evil sought to be avoided actually exists; Second. That the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it; Third. That there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it.
G.R. No. L-18660 December 22, 1922 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FELIPE DELIMA, defendant-appellant. FACTS: Lorenzo Napilon was an inmate who had escaped from prison while serving his sentence. A few days following his escape, Officer Felipe Delima discovered Napilon at the residence of Jorge Alegria. Upon locating Napilon, Delima found him armed with a sharpened piece of bamboo, which he had fashioned into a lance. Delima ordered Napilon to surrender; however, Napilon reacted by attacking the officer with his weapon. Delima managed to evade the assault and, in an attempt to establish control over the situation, discharged his firearm. The initial shot missed its target, prompting Napilon to flee while still armed. Delima continued his pursuit and fired a subsequent shot, which struck Napilon and resulted in his death. As a result, Delima faced charges of homicide, was convicted, and received a sentence of reclusion temporal along with additional penalties. He subsequently appealed the conviction, contending that the shooting occurred in the course of his duties as a law enforcement officer. Issues: 1. Whether or Not the killing of Lorenzo Napilon by Felipe Delima constitutes homicide or an act performed in the lawful fulfillment of duty? 2. Whether the use of deadly force by the policeman was justified under the circumstances detailed in the case? Court’s Decision:The Supreme Court of the Philippines reversed the lower court’s conviction of Felipe Delima for homicide.Issue of Lawful Fulfillment of Duty: –The court examined whether the killing occurred in the valid execution of Delima’s official duties. It was determined that Napilon, having evaded his jail sentence and attacked a law enforcement officer while armed, had no legal right to refuse surrender or commit an assault. –Article 8, No. 11, of the Penal Code was considered. This article concerns lawful acts performed in the execution of duties. The Court found that given Napilon’s aggressive actions and the necessity for Delima to impose his authority, the use of lethal force was justified and within the boundaries of his duties as a policeman. Issue of Justification of Deadly Force: –The Court held that the outcome, though fatal, was compelled by Napilon’s conduct and resistance to lawful arrest. The necessity to protect oneself from imminent harm while performing a legal duty justified the use of deadly force in this context. –The court recognized that Delima had no alternative means to subdue an armed and attacking fugitive, thereby affirming his actions as necessary and legally permissible.
G.R. Nos. L-1940-42 March 24, 1949 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. IGNACIO LAGATA, defendant-appellant FACTS: On October 3, 1946, in Samar, six inmates, including Ceferino Tipace and Eusebio Abria, were assigned to work outside the provincial jail under the supervision of guard Ignacio Lagata. Their task involved gathering gabi at the capitol plaza and a nearby nursery. During this operation, one of the prisoners, Epifanio Labong, successfully escaped. In response, Lagata instructed the remaining five prisoners to search for Labong. While traversing a camote plantation, Abria discovered footprints and alerted Lagata. Shortly thereafter, Lagata discharged his firearm, resulting in injuries to Abria and the death of Tipace. As a consequence of the injury, Abria later underwent an amputation of his left arm. Witnesses for the prosecution testified that the prisoners were neither attempting to flee nor engaging in any disruptive behavior at the time Lagata fired his weapon. They fled in fear following the initial shot. Lagata, however, asserted that the prisoners were attempting to escape, and he fired his weapon in an effort to thwart any further attempts, claiming he was acting within the scope of his official duties. Issues: 1. Whether or Not Lagata was guilty of murder for the death of Ceferino Tipace? 2. Whether or Not Lagata was guilty of causing serious physical injuries to Eusebio Abria? 3. Whether or Not Lagata was negligent in allowing the prisoner Epifanio Labong to escape? Court’s Decision:Murder Charge: –The Supreme Court held Lagata guilty of homicide (modified from murder). It was determined that Tipace was not attempting to escape but was instead shot while obeying Lagata’s orders. Lagata misinterpreted the prisoners’ movements out of fear of them escaping, which did not justify using lethal force. Thus, the conviction was modified from murder to homicide, considering incomplete justifying circumstances. Serious Physical Injuries: –Lagata was held guilty of serious physical injuries. Abria was found to have been shot without attempting to escape. Lagata’s action was deemed unnecessary and excessive given that Abria was not a threat. The appellate decision also considered Lagata’s belief, though misguided, that he was performing hisduty, modifying the sentence in light of this context. Evasion through Negligence –Lagata was found guilty of negligence. The trial court’s finding that Lagata allowed the prisoners to go to a potentially dangerous, concealed area without authorization, and then failed to properly monitor them, led to Labong’s escape. The Supreme Court upheld this finding, confirming the penalty imposed by the lower court.
G.R. No. 149152 February 2, 2007 RUFINO S. MAMANGUN, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. FACTS: On July 31, 1992, in Meycauayan, Bulacan, Gener Contreras was shot and killed by police officer Rufino Mamangun. The incident was triggered when Liberty Contreras yelled “Magnanakaw,” prompting local residents to pursue a suspect into the yard and onto the rooftop of Antonio Abacan. The Meycauayan police dispatched two patrol vehicles to the location, which included Mamangun and other officers. While on the rooftop, Mamangun discharged his weapon at Contreras, who was reportedly unarmed and pleading, “Hindi ako.” Contreras succumbed to his injuries from the gunfire. The prosecution called upon eyewitness Crisanto Ayson and Medico-Legal Officer Dr. Benito Caballero to provide testimony. Ayson recounted that Mamangun shot Contreras as he was exclaiming “Hindi ako.” Dr. Caballero provided a detailed account of the gunshot wounds sustained by Contreras. The defense contended that Contreras had attacked Mamangun with a steel pipe, which they claimed justified the shooting. The Sandiganbayan found Mamangun guilty of Homicide, citing insufficient justification for his actions as a police officer and acknowledging his voluntary surrender. Mamangun subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court, asserting that the shooting was warranted as an act of self-defense and in the execution of his duties. Issues: 1. Whether or Not the accused is liable for murder or homicide even though the killing was done in the fulfillment of his duty as a policeman? Court’s Decision:The Supreme Court upheld Sandiganbayan’s decision, ruling:Mamangun’s actions did not constitute a necessary consequence of duty. Self-defense was not applicable as no unlawful aggression was evident from Contreras. Prosecution’s version, particularly the eyewitness testimony, was credible, whereas the defense’s narrative was foundinconsistent and self-serving. Incomplete justifying circumstance was properly applied, recognizing Mamangun was performing his duty but without necessity for lethal force. Voluntary surrender was acknowledged, resulting in mitigated penalty.
G.R. No. 153875 August 16, 2006 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ROLANDO DAGANI y REYES and OTELLO SANTIANO Y LEONIDA, Accused-Appellants. Facts: On September 11, 1989, at approximately 4:45 PM, Ernesto Javier, Lincoln Miran, and two other individuals were consuming alcoholic beverages at a canteen located within the Philippine National Railways (PNR) compound in Tondo, Manila. Security personnel Rolando Dagani and Otello Santiano entered the establishment. Dagani forcefully pushed Miran, causing him to fall. Subsequently, Dagani restrained Javier while Santiano discharged his firearm twice, resulting in Javier's death. The accused-appellants contended that they were responding to a disturbance. They asserted that Javier attempted to shoot Dagani with a .22 caliber revolver, which led to a confrontation during which Santiano fired his weapon in an effort to incapacitate Javier. Procedural Posture: The matter was adjudicated in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, where both appellants were found guilty of murder and each received an indeterminate prison sentence ranging from 10 to 18 years, along with various monetary compensations mandated. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the murder conviction but altered the sentence to reclusion perpetua, while also eliminating the awards for attorney’s fees and appearance fees.The case was subsequently brought before the Supreme Court for mandatory review, where the appellants reiterated the defenses they had previously presented to the CA. Issue Whether or not there is an complete self-defense. Ruling The defense was unable to prove that there was unlawful aggression on the part of Javier. They were unable to present evidence that the victim actually fired his gun. No spent shells from the .22 caliber pistol were found and no bullets were recovered from the scene of the incident. Javier also tested negative for gunpowder residue. In sum, the defense presented a bare claim of self-defense without any proof of the existence of its requisites.
G.R. No. L-4445 February 28, 1955 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MANUEL BERONILLA, FILIPINO VELASCO, POLICARPIO PACULDO, and JACINTO ADRIATICO, defendants- FACTS: rsenio Borjal, who was elected as the mayor of La Paz, Abra, at the onset of World War II, maintained his position during the Japanese occupation until an assassination attempt forced him to flee to Bangued on March 10, 1943. In December 1944, Lt. Col. R. H. Arnold of the 15th Infantry appointed Manuel Beronilla as Military Mayor. Beronilla was tasked with investigating and prosecuting government officials in Northern Luzon, specifically naming Borjal in the orders. In March 1945, Borjal returned to La Paz and was taken into custody. He faced charges of espionage, collaboration with the enemy, and abuse of power. A jury of twelve bolomen, selected by Beronilla, found Borjal guilty on all charges and sentenced him to death. On April 18, 1945, Lt. Col. Arnold reviewed the case records and returned them to Beronilla, granting him the authority to decide Borjal's fate. That same evening, Borjal was executed under Beronilla’s directive.Years later, Beronilla, Paculdo, Velasco, and Adriatico were charged with murder, accused of conspiring in Borjal’s execution. They sought amnesty under a proclamation from President Manuel A. Roxas, but their request was denied, leading to a trial. The Court of First Instance of Abra convicted Beronilla, Paculdo, Velasco, and Adriatico, while the jury and the gravedigger were acquitted due to insufficient evidence of involvement. Issues: 1. Whether or not the accused received and disregarded a directive from Colonel Volckmann declaring the illegality of Borjal’s execution? 2. Whether or not the accused acted within the bounds of military orders without criminal intent? Court’s Decision:Directive Knowledge: The Supreme Court found no satisfactory proof that Beronilla received or read Col. Volckmann’s directive. Witness testimonies failed to establish this conclusively, and Beronilla’s conduct post-execution did not imply disobedience of superior orders. Acting Within Military Orders: The Court concluded that the accused acted upon express orders from superior military commands. The entire procedure, from arrest to execution, followed prescribed instructions. Thus, their actions lacked criminal intent (mens rea). The Court emphasized the absence of malice and recognized the good faith belief in the legality of their actions.
[ G.R. No. 103501-03, February 17, 1997 ] LUIS A. TABUENA, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS. FACTS: Luis A. Tabuena and Adolfo M. Peralta were implicated in the misappropriation of P55 million from the funds of the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA). The case arose when then-President Ferdinand Marcos issued a verbal directive to Tabuena to settle the debts owed by MIAA to the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), a directive that was subsequently formalized in a memorandum dated January 8, 1986. Tabuena, assisted by Peralta and another associate, orchestrated the withdrawal of the funds on three distinct occasions in January 1986, with all amounts being delivered in cash to Marcos' office via his private secretary. These transactions were characterized by a lack of the customary documentation and did not adhere to the established operational procedures for disbursements. Upon discovery, three criminal cases were filed against Tabuena, Peralta, and another individual for malversation under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. The Sandiganbayan convicted Tabuena and Peralta, sentencing them to imprisonment and ordering them to reimburse the malversed amount, among other penalties. Their appeals to the Supreme Court centered on claims of following a lawful order in good faith and alleged procedural and substantial errors by the Sandiganbayan. Issues: 1. Whether or Not the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting the petitioners for a crime not charged in the amended informations? 2. Whether or Not the petitioners acted in good faith, believing they were complying with a lawful order? Court’s Decision:The Supreme Court acquitted Tabuena and Peralta, holding that they acted under the belief they were following a lawful order from the President, thereby negating criminal intent. The Court deemed the Sandiganbayan’s active participation in the examination of witnesses and the petitioners as prejudicial, thus violating their right to due process.
G.R. No. L-24002 January 21, 1974 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRANCISCO DIAZ and GERARDO DIAZ, defendants-appellants FACTS: While gathering camotes on a farm, Remegia Carasaos and Anita Pacaira were confronted by Francisco Diaz, who, against Remegia's will, embraced her from behind and groped her. As she knelt to collect the camotes, Remegia cried out for assistance, exclaiming, "Anita (Aning), help me because I am being embraced." In response to her distress, Anita wielded a bolo and struck Francisco on the head and hands, prompting him to release Remegia and flee the scene, sustaining injuries from the blows. The two young women then left the camote farm and hurried to their grandfather, Quintin Tadia (Tadya), in Sitio Ilawod, where they reported the incident of Francisco's assault on Remegia. Tadia promptly informed the barrio lieutenant, who provided him with a note to present to the municipal authorities for filing a formal complaint against Francisco Diaz. The following morning, September 5th, Tadia, accompanied by his granddaughters Remegia and Anita, set out for the poblacion of Sta. Margarita to lodge the complaint, unarmed and walking ahead of the two girls. As they ascended a hill in Sitio Ilawod, Francisco Diaz and his younger brother Gerardo (Adong), aged twenty-one, appeared at the top. Gerardo, armed with a locally made shotgun known as a bardog, fired at Tadia from a distance of approximately four meters, striking him in the neck and causing him to fall. Tadia rolled down the cliff near Alao Creek, lying flat on his back. The brothers then descended the cliff, with Gerardo instructing Francisco, "Go ahead, Francisco, stab that fellow." Francisco complied, placing his foot on Tadia's prostrate body and repeatedly stabbing him with a bolo, commonly referred to as itak, which is typically used for gathering firewood. On September 6, 1963, Gerardo Diaz was apprehended in Barrio Perito. Issue: Whether or not the killing of Tadia constitute an aggravating circumstance of disregard of his age? Ruling: NO, The circumstance of old age cannot be considered aggravating. There was no evidence that the accused deliberately intended to offend or insult the age of the victim. That circumstance may be absorbed in treachery Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court should be modified. Francisco Diaz is sentenced to reclusion perpetuawith its accessory penalties. The appellants are ordered to pay solidarily to the heirs of Quintin Tadia the sum of P12,000 as indemnity (Art. 110, Revised Penal Code). In other respects, the trial court's judgment is affirmed with costs against the appellants.
G.R. Nos. 135051-52 December 14, 2000 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CLARITO ARIZOBAL (at large), ERLY LIGNES and TWO (2) JOHN DOES, accused-appellants. FACTS: On March 24, 1994, Clementina Gimdenez and her husband Laurencio, and a grandchild were peacefully asleep in their residence located in Tuybo, Cataingan, Masbate. At approximately 9:30 PM, Laurencio awakened her, urging her to open the door due to the presence of individuals outside. In the darkness, she lit a kerosene lamp and rose to answer the door, only to be met by three armed men who aimed their firearms at her. She recognized two of the assailants as Clarito Arizobal and Erly Lignes, although she could not identify the third man, who was wearing a mask. She was familiar with Clarito from her frequent passes by his residence in San Rafael, and Erly was a known figure as a regular visitor to the local flea market. While the masked individual stood guard at the entrance, Clarito and Lignes forced their way into the master bedroom and began to ransack the aparador. The frightened couple felt powerless to resist and could only submit to the whims of their attackers. The intruders rummaged through their belongings, scattering items across the floor until they discovered ₱8,000 hidden among some papers. Before departing with their stolen goods, they instructed Laurencio to accompany them to Jimmy's house, stating, "we have something to talk about." Reluctantly, Laurencio complied. Clementina later recalled hearing a series of gunshots shortly after the group left. Her grandchild, sensing the impending tragedy, could only whisper in fear, "Lolo is already dead!" Erlinda Gimenez, the wife of Jimmy Gimenez, recounted that on the same evening, after she and her son had finished dinner, her husband Jimmy arrived with one Francisco Gimenez. Jimmy informed Erlinda that they had successfully purchased a carabao. After handing her the certificate for the large cattle, and while he was preparing to skin a chicken for their meal, three men suddenly appeared and commanded them to lie face down. One of the assailants forcefully pushed. Issue Whether or Not the robbery with killing isconsidered aggravated by dwelling because the robbery was committed with violence against or intimidation of persons, and because the crime began in the dwelling? COURT DECISION: No, because this special complex crime is primarily classified in this jurisdiction as a crime against property, and not against persons, homicide being merely an incident of robbery with the latter being the main purpose and object of the criminals.
G.R. No. L-40330 November 20, 1978 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AMADO DANIEL alias "AMADO ATO", accused-appellant. FACTS: The individual aggrieved in this matter is Margarita Paleng, born on November 20, 1952. At the time of the incident on September 20, 1965, the complainant was temporarily residing at a house situated in Pinsao Guisad, Baguio City. On that day, around three o'clock in the afternoon, she had just arrived in the city via a Dangwa bus from Tublay when the accused approached her, initiating unwanted contact by asking for her name and attempting to seize her bag. Despite his efforts, she resisted his attempt to take her bag and alerted the bus driver and conductor to the accused's behavior; however, they appeared to be intimidated by him. Undeterred by the rain, she exited the bus and boarded a jeep, with the accused closely trailing her. Once the jeep commenced its journey, the accused also entered and took a seat beside her. Upon reaching Guisad, she disembarked but still had to traverse a distance of approximately ten meters. The accused followed her once more and attempted to take her bag again. Although she refused to let him carry it, he persisted in his pursuit. Upon arriving at her boarding house, she opened the door and was in the process of closing it when the accused rushed in and shut the door behind him. After she entered her room, the accused followed her inside, brandishing an eight-inch dagger and threatening her with the words, "If you will talk, I will kill you." Overcome with fear, Margarita was rendered speechless. The accused then seized her hair with his left hand, compelling her to lie down on the bed. He placed a handkerchief in her mouth with his left hand while simultaneously holding the dagger against her neck with his right hand. She was forcibly made to lie down, during which the accused unbuttoned his pants. He set the dagger down on the bed and, using his thigh, attempted to separate her legs. Although he struggled to remove her panty, he ultimately guided his penis and forcibly penetrated her vagina after manipulating the fabric covering her. Issue: WHETGER OR NOT the dwelling of the victim aggravating the crime although the victim is only temporarily boarding? COURT DECISION: Yes, to conclude, the crime committed by the appellant is rape with the use of a deadly weapon with the aggravating circumstance of having been committed in the dwelling of the offended party. Although Margarita was merely renting a bedspace in a boarding house, her room constituted for all intents and purposes a "dwelling" as the term is used in Article 14(3), Revised Penal Code. It is not necessary, under the law, that the victim owns the place where he lives or dwells. Be he a lessee, a boarder, or a bed-spacer, the place is his home the sanctity of which the law seeks to protect and uphold.
G.R. No. L-19491 August 30, 1968 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. APOLONIO APDUHAN, JR. alias JUNIOR, ET AL., defendants, APOLONIO APDUHAN, JR. alias JUNIOR, defendant-appellant. FACTS: The Provincial Fiscal charges Apolonio Apduhan, Jr., also known as Junior, along with Rodulfo Huiso and Felipe Quimson, with the offense of Robbery with Homicide, as detailed below: On or about May 23, 1961, at approximately 7:00 PM, in the Municipality of Mabini, Province of Bohol, Philippines, Apolonio Apduhan, Jr. and five other individuals, all armed with various unlicensed firearms, knives, and other lethal weapons, conspired and collaborated with one another, intending to gain unlawfully. They forcibly entered the residence of spouses Honorato Miano and Antonia Miano. Once inside, Apolonio Apduhan, Jr. and his five accomplices assaulted, hacked, and shot Geronimo Miano and another individual named Norberto Aton, who was also present in the dwelling. This violent act resulted in physical injuries that led to the deaths of both victims. Subsequently, the accused and their five accomplices unlawfully took cash amounting to Three Hundred Twenty-two Pesos (P322.00) from the residence. Issue: Is the robbery with killing considered aggravated by dwelling because the robbery was committed with violence against or intimidation of persons, and because the crime began in the dwelling? COURT DECISION: Yes, the settled rule is that dwelling is aggravating in robbery with violence or intimidation of persons, like the offense at bar. The rationale behind this pronouncement is that this class of robbery could be committed without the necessity of transgressing the sanctity of the home. Morada is inherent only in crimes which could be committed in no other place than in the house of another, such as trespass and robbery in an inhabited house. ruled that the "circumstances (of dwelling and scaling) were certainly not inherent in the crime committed, because, the crime being robbery with violence or intimidation against persons (specifically, robbery with homicide) the authors thereof could have committed it without the necessity of violating or scaling the domicile of their victim." Cuello Calon opines that the commission of the crime in another's dwelling shows greater perversity in the accused and produces greater alarm.