Exploring the Mind-Body Problem: Dualism, Materialism, and Beyond
School
Florida State University**We aren't endorsed by this school
Course
PHI 2010
Subject
Philosophy
Date
Dec 11, 2024
Pages
3
Uploaded by ProfJellyfishPerson2696
The Mind-Body problem is two metaphysical questions:(a) How to explain the nature of minds?(b) Which is more fundamental, minds or bodies? Or are they equally fundamental?Dualism holds that minds and bodies are equally fundamental. Minds are non-physical entities.Main objection to dualism: the problem of mental causation (beliefs and desires)Materialismholds that the mental just is the physical, otherwise described.So mental causation is just physical causation (whatever that is!).Two forms of materialism1. Behaviorisma. Radical: a metaphysical thesisb. Logical: a semantic thesis2. Identity Theory (physicalism)a. type-identityb. token-identityRadical behaviorism holds that minds simply do not exist- that psychology need posit only stimuli and responses. But as Fodor notes, “psychology has not turned out this way” (p. 452).Logical behaviorism holds that talk of minds is talk of behvaioral hypotheticals.A semantic view, not pure metaphysics.Logical behaviorism would, if true, solve partof the problem of mental causation: Mental causation would be what happens when (a) the subject satisfies a behavioral hypothetical and
(b) the if-clause is true. But what of other kinds of mental causation – e.g. when one mental event causes another?Type physicalism: Being in mental state-type M = being in brain state-type BToken physicalism: Being in a particular mental state m = being in a particular brain state B.The problem with type physicalism is that it doesn’t allow for the multiple realization of mental state-types. Token physicalism does allow this.Functionalism is compatible with token physicalism.We can view functionalism as a way of embracing identity theory while acknowledging that the behaviorist is right about the relational character of the mental. How does the functionalist differ from the logical behaviorist? By including mental states, not mere behavior, within the relation. Mental states are defined by their relations both to behavior and to other mental states.Take the belief that it’s raining. For the behaviorist, that mental state is just the disposition to respond by grabbing your umbrella (etc.) upon being ‘stimulated’ by certain information. For the functionalist, it’s the disposition to form or revise other beliefs(etc.), as well as to grab your umbrella (etc.), upon receiving this ‘stimulus.’ How do we define these other beliefs? In the exact same way.Functionalism views mental states as defined in the way that the states of a digital computer are defined: Each state is a rule for moving from prior states (inputs) into new states (or outputs)Fodor acknowledges that functionalism can’t easily explain feeling stated, like seeing x as red, or y’s tasting bitter.
The puzzle of the inverted spectrum: say adam sees as green everything that eve sees as red. His feeling of green plays the same functional role as her feeling of red. So the states must be the same. But they aren’t!