Exploring Somaliland's Independence: Pros and Cons of Secession
School
Harvard University**We aren't endorsed by this school
Course
COMP 285
Subject
Management
Date
Dec 11, 2024
Pages
80
Uploaded by CoachSandpiperPerson1141
1DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025Pro...............................................................................................................................................................3Terrorism.................................................................................................................................................5China Bad.................................................................................................................................................9Foreign Investment Good......................................................................................................................14Independence Increases Foreign Investment....................................................................................15Somaliland Poverty Impacts..............................................................................................................16Abdullahi Credibility/Mandate..............................................................................................................17Democracy.............................................................................................................................................19Somalia Governance..............................................................................................................................20Answers to: Con Arguments..................................................................................................................21Answers to: Secession Bad................................................................................................................22Answers to: Not Read to be Independent.........................................................................................24Answers to: US-Somalia Relations.....................................................................................................27Answwers to: Somiland Will Fail........................................................................................................29CON...........................................................................................................................................................30Uniqueness............................................................................................................................................32Poverty..................................................................................................................................................33Brink......................................................................................................................................................34Foreign Investment Bad Links................................................................................................................35Colonialism/Imperialism........................................................................................................................36Secession Bad........................................................................................................................................37Recognition Triggers Widespread Secession.....................................................................................39Secession Impacts..............................................................................................................................41Nuclear War.......................................................................................................................................44Advantage Answers...............................................................................................................................45Answers to: Ethiopia/Somalia War....................................................................................................46Answers to: Democracy.....................................................................................................................47Answers to: Economic Development.................................................................................................48Answers to: Justification to Secede...................................................................................................50Answers to: Oppressed Ethnic Groups..............................................................................................51Answers to: Oppressed Ethnic Minorities..........................................................................................55Answers to: Colonization is Bad.........................................................................................................56Answers to: “Rights”..........................................................................................................................57
2DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025Answers to: “Freedom of Association”..............................................................................................59Answers to: Popular Democracy Permits Secession..........................................................................61Answers to: Self-Determination........................................................................................................62Answers to: Freedom of Association.................................................................................................63Answers to: Right to Secede..............................................................................................................64Answers to: Human Rights.................................................................................................................65Answers to: International Law...........................................................................................................67General......................................................................................................................................................72African Wars Impacts.............................................................................................................................73Additional Sources.....................................................................................................................................80
3DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025ProSomalia supports Houthi terrorismPrevious attempts to recognise Somaliland were effectively blocked by former US president Barak Obama who supported Somalia’s claim. President Joe Biden supported this position even though Somalia is a centre for international piracy and terrorism; US intelligence flagged possible discussions with the Houthis – who are attacking shipping in the nearby Gulf of Aden – to provide weapons to the militant al-Shabaab in Somalia.
4DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025
5DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025TerrorismRecognition means Western countries could use the port of Berbera to combat terrorism in the Red SeaDavid Maddox,Political editor, November 19, 2024, Donald Trump set to recognise African state as official country, says ex-Tory minister after holding talks, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/trump-somaliland-new-country-gavin-williamson-b2648376.htmlThere are hopes that official recognition will allow a deal for Western allies to use the Berbera port to help with operations in the Red Sea,which has become a major international flashpoint. There was disappointment before the election when David Cameron, as foreign secretary, agreed to demands fromthe Biden administration to continue to support Somalia’s claim, even though Somaliland is a stable country that runs free and fair elections.Somaliland is the Gateway to the Red SeaBasillioh Rukanga & Ibrahim Aden, 11-19, 24, BBC, Somaliland opposition leader wins presidential election, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cpvzxg3n3dmoSomaliland islocated in a strategic part of the world, and is seen as a gateway to the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. Despite its relative stability and regular democratic elections, it has not been recognised internationally.Houthis supporting terrorism in the Red Sea; US must stop it before it wears-down its forcesDaily Star, 11-30, 24, https://www.thedailystar.net/opinion/geopolitical-insights/news/geopolitical-implications-the-brewing-tension-the-red-sea-3528096, Geopolitical implications of the brewing tension in the Red SeaMore importantly, the geopolitical ripples of the Gaza war have been evident in the Red Sea since the Houthis arealready creating havoc in the Red Sea area in support of the Palestinian cause by attacking merchant ships with ballistic missiles, drones and rockets. These attacks are taking place near Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a strategic trade choke point leading into the Red Sea and further on to the Suez Canal. The leverage Tehran has over the Houthis should not be overestimated. However, Washington holds that Iran has "deep involvement" in these Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. To protect this sea lane in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, which is used for 12 percent of global maritime oil and 08 percent of LNG trade, mostly headed towards Europe, the US has formed a coalition of 20 countries and deployed aircraft carriers and conducted strikes. Unlike in 2019, Saudi Arabia and UAE have abstained from
6DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025joining the coalition, which manifests a lack of appetite for these regimes to engage in a regional conflictthat may not bode well for their image to their respective domestic audience.The American and British forces carried out strikes on at least 60 Houthi targets in Yemen. However, if the Houthis can continue with their cheap barrages of rockets, drones and anti-ship missiles on this trading route, the US-led coalition's response will become untenable due to their expensive naval missiles and fighter jets. To avert the attack, ships are now rerouting through the southern tip of Africa, which increased the lead time for the travel by nine days and the cost by a minimum of 15 per cent. Global leaders in the shippingliners industry, such as A.P. Møller-Mærsk, have joined the procession of withdrawals from the Red Sea route along with Qatar Energy, Qatar's state energy company, one of the biggest LNG exporters in the world. If such rerouting continues, this will have $200 billion in trade diversion through the Suez and putthe global chain in utter chaos. Given the ongoing global economic slowdown due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the prevailing Russia-Ukraine War, another geopolitical upheaval surrounding the Hamas-Israel war will have severe economic consequences as it tries to rebound. The US has built its Indo-Pacific narrative surrounding the protection of navigation through a "free and open Indo-Pacific." Hence,protecting the global supply chain and transporting energy and goods from and through the Middle East might become the great power's burden in an escalated regional conflict scenario. The Implications of the Israel-Hamas War for Bangladesh: An American perspectiveFurthermore, Hamas's attack on Israel destabilised the status quo in the Middle East, which was carefully crafted over the last 4 years with the signing of the Abraham Accords. The end game was eliminating the Palestinian cause as a precondition for Israel's recognition and normalisation of Tel Aviv'srelationship with the Muslim-majority Arab nations. In US foreign policy in the Middle East, both during the Trump Administration and the current Biden Administration, the normalisation of the Arab-Israel relationship continued to receive centrality in Washington's strategic vision. So much so that incentives were offered to the Arab countries in exchange for their policy change regarding Tel Aviv. For example, the UAE was offered US-built advanced multirole F-35 fighter aircraft, whereas the US was the first to recognise Morocco's annexation of Western Sahara. Sudan received $1.5 billion in loans from the US and cleared its name from Washington's list of designated terrorist states. Is there a prospect of peace under Netanyahu’s extremist government?Another geopolitical impact of this war will be the Iran-Israel rivalry for regional dominance, which can be traced back to the Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979. The historical Shia-Sunni rift gave another dimension to the Middle East geopolitics, where Iran and Israel often compete with each other in terms of the hostility that they face in their neighbourhood. Although Iran denied its involvement with Hamas' attack, the US and Israel blamed Tehran for supplying the group with arms and resources. For Tehran's sake, Hamas' attack on Israel not only temporarily ceased the normalisation of the relationship between Arabs and Israel but also stopped the further isolation of Tehran in a hostile region. Should the war escalate, pro-Iranian state or nonstate actors such as Syria, Houthis in Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon, or different Shi'a militant factions in Iraq might play an important role as Iranian proxies. Somaliland independence gives the US strong support in the Red Sea
7DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025Joshua Meservey, Former Research Fellow, Africa, May 9, 2022, Joshua Meservey, Joshua studied African geopolitics, counterterrorism, and refugee policy at The Heritage Foundation, https://www.heritage.org/africa/commentary/somalilanders-quest-independence-isnt-neocolonial-plot-its-self-determinationThe U.S. must compete in Djibouti, but a strong American presence in an independent Somaliland would be a hedge against the U.S. position continuing to deteriorate in Djibouti. Somaliland has more than 500 miles of coast on the Gulf of Aden that abuts the Indian Ocean and is directly across the water from conflict-torn Yemen, where Iranian-backed militias and an al-Qaeda affiliate operate.22Zeila in Somaliland is about 140 miles from Aden, the capital of Yemen, and about 90 miles from the nearest point on Yemen’s coast. It is approximately 85 miles in a straight line from the heart of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait as well.Its nearest point is about 70 miles from the heart of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait—through which around9 percent of the world’s maritime-borne petroleum and much of Europe–Asia sea trade transits.23This strait is also part of the quickest route for the Mediterranean-based U.S. 6th Fleet and the Indian Ocean–based 5th Fleet to rendezvous during a conflict or other crisis. Somaliland is in the East Africa region that has the continent’s second-most populous country, Ethiopia, which, along with neighboring Kenya, was among Africa’s most vibrant economies in pre-pandemic times. Djibouti and Mombasa in Kenya are the only two large, modern ports serving the region, which gives Somaliland’s Berbera port anopportunity to emerge as an economic hub.24Land-locked Ethiopia owns a 19 percent stake in Berbera as it seeks to diversify away from Djibouti, through which virtually all its trade currently passes. However, a recent report claimed that Ethiopia missed a deadline for buying a share in the Berbera port, so the fate of the deal is unclear. A United ArabEmirates’ company, DP World, is expanding and renovating the Berbera port. Somaliland’s Zeila port is also known as Saylac. The harbor there currently cannot accommodate modern cargo vessels because it is filled with silt, and port infrastructure is virtually nonexistent. According to a senior Somaliland official,however, it would be possible to clean and deepen the harbor and add a breakwater to enable it to receive modern cargo vessels. Beyond shoring up its position that Beijing is undercutting in an important region, recognizing Somaliland would help the U.S. in other ways as well. Hargeisa and Taipei established close informal relations in 2020, and subsequently exchanged representatives. An independent Somaliland would give Taiwan another country willing to have such ties with it, thereby boosting a territory that the U.S. also supports. By serving as a maritime gateway for East Africa not under Chinese influence, Somaliland could also complicate the continuity of the Belt and Road infrastructure that Beijing is building in the region.25At a time when illiberal governance is advancing in parts of Africa, American recognition of Somaliland would be a way to help a prominent experiment in democracy address its shortcomings, something Washington cannot currently do fully because of constraints imposed by Mogadishu. Problems with Somaliland’s democracy have included deadly—though limited—post-election clashes and elite power struggles that have twice necessitated years-long extensions of the president’s term. Although the
8DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025territory’s most recent vote was hailed as free and fair, it was 16 years overdue because of wrangling among Somaliland’s political parties.26The elections have also frequently included accusations by one contesting party or another of irregularities that required resolution in court. However, the fact that these disputes proceeded througha judicial process (the outcome of which was respected by the litigants), testifies to the strength of Somaliland’s institutions that are necessary to safeguard and deepen any country’s democratic system. For documentation of some of Somaliland’s democratic challenges, see Shukri, “Unrecognized Vote: Somaliland’s Democratic Journey.”
9DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025China BadLack of recognition means no western investment, giving China an opportunity for influenceISP Online, November 25, 2024, https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/somaliland-a-change-of-leadership-in-the-context-of-regional-developments-and-its-quest-for-recognition-192234, Somaliland: A Change of Leadership in the Context of Regional Developments and its Quest for RecognitionWith respect to Somaliland’s economic woes, Abdirahman will continue to face the problem of attracting foreign investment and economic assistance for development beyond the Somaliland diaspora, something that is made difficult precisely by the lack of international recognition. Here, Somaliland’s commitment to the West, and especially Taiwan, may come under strain due to China’s likely renewed attempt to woo Somaliland with economic and financial rewards in exchange for subscribing to its “one China” policy, earlier rejected during the Abdi presidency. This is because of Abdirahman’s previously expressed interest in establishing relations with Beijing, instead of Taipei, and China’s determination to undercut the incoming Trump administration in the geopolitically and strategically crucial Red Sea/Gulf of Aden neighborhood, where Beijing established its first overseas military base in 2017, in Djibouti.Abdirahman = President of SomalilandIndependence means stronger ties with the US to fight China’s influenceJoshua Meservey, Former Research Fellow, Africa, May 9, 2022, Joshua Meservey, Joshua studied African geopolitics, counterterrorism, and refugee policy at The Heritage Foundation, https://www.heritage.org/africa/commentary/somalilanders-quest-independence-isnt-neocolonial-plot-its-self-determinationThe U.S. should recognize Somaliland as an independent country. In practice, the territory is not now, nor is likely to be, a part of Somalia. Acknowledging that reality would allow Washington to create more effective policy in an important and contested region. A strong relationship with an independent Somaliland would hedge against the U.S. position further deteriorating in Djibouti, which is increasingly under Chinese sway. It would demonstrate the benefits Washington confers on those who embrace representative government and would allow the U.S. to better support the territory’s tenacious, but still-consolidating, democracy. An independent Somaliland would be a stable partner that has little risk of experiencing the tumult that frustrates American interests elsewhere in the volatile region. Somalilanders deserve the justice of having their decades-long practice of independence recognized andshould be allowed to disassociate from the dysfunction of southern Somalia that hinders their development.China’s influence is increasing in Somalia
10DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025Joshua Meservey, Former Research Fellow, Africa, May 9, 2022, Joshua Meservey, Joshua studied African geopolitics, counterterrorism, and refugee policy at The Heritage Foundation, https://www.heritage.org/africa/commentary/somalilanders-quest-independence-isnt-neocolonial-plot-its-self-determinationThe autonomous territory of Somaliland sits in one of Earth’s most strategically important areas. Yet the influence Beijing has built, particularly in Djibouti, threatens the U.S.’s ability to defend its interests there. Recognizing Somaliland would let the U.S. build a partnership with the territory that would give Washington a hedge against further deterioration of its position in Djibouti. Hargeisa (the capital and largest city of Somaliland), almost alone in Africa, has already demonstrated its willingness to defy Beijing when it established what is, after Eswatini, Taiwan’s most advanced diplomatic relationship in AfricaUS losging ifluence in the region due to ChinaJoshua Meservey, Former Research Fellow, Africa, May 9, 2022, Joshua Meservey, Joshua studied African geopolitics, counterterrorism, and refugee policy at The Heritage Foundation, https://www.heritage.org/africa/commentary/somalilanders-quest-independence-isnt-neocolonial-plot-its-self-determinationThe region in which Djibouti and Somaliland lie is among Earth’s most strategically important. In recognition of that fact, the U.S. placed its only permanent military base in Africa in Djibouti.13This small country the size of New Hampshire hosts Chinese, French, German, and Japanese military bases as well. The port is critical to U.S. military operations in Africa, as 90 percent of the logistics and materiel U.S. Africa Command uses in its East Africa operations flow through Djibouti port. See Thomas D. Waldhauser, “Statement of General Thomas D. Waldhauser, United States Marine Corps Commander,United States Africa Command, Before the Senate Committee on Armed Services,” February 7, 2019, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, https://www.africom.mil/document/31480/u-s-africa-command-2019-posture-statement (accessed August 6, 2021).Yet despite the U.S. presence, few other countries in the world are so under Chinese sway as Djibouti.Beijing recently built in Djibouti its only overseas military base, a hardened encampment whose quay can support a Chinese aircraft carrier.14The Chinese government considers Djibouti an “overseas strategic strongpoint,” which scholars have defined as “foreign ports with special strategic and economic value that host terminals and commercial zones operated by Chinese firms.” Peter A. Dutton, Isaac B. Kardon, and Conor M. Kennedy, “Djibouti: China’s First Overseas Strategic Strongpoint,” China Maritime Studies Institute China Maritime Report No. 6, April 2020, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1005&context=cmsi-maritime-reports (accessed August 6, 2021).Beijing’s lavish financing of Djiboutian infrastructure has made Djibouti at high risk of debt distress,15 and China is by far Djibouti’s largest trading partner.16In 2019, trade between Djibouti and China was worth $2.2 billion. T
11DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025The Chinese government financed—and Chinese companies built—sensitive Djiboutian buildings such as the foreign ministry headquarters and the People’s Palace.17State-controlled China Merchants Port Holdings manages three of Djibouti Port’s terminals.18In addition to being legally required, as are all Chinese companies, to cooperate with the Chinese government on sensitive activities such as intelligence collection, China Merchants Port Holdings is majority owned by China Merchants Group, a state-owned enterprise. For a description of China Merchants’ control of the Djibouti port’s terminalsIt and four other Chinese companies are involved in various ways in the ownership, construction, and operation of what will be Africa’s largest free trade zone, the Djibouti International Free Trade Zone.19Dutton, Kardon, and Kennedy, “China Maritime Report No. 6: Djibouti: China’s First Overseas Strategic Strongpoint,” and Thierry Pairault, “The China Merchants in Djibouti: From the Maritime to the Digital Silk Roads,” Africanews, September 12, 2019, https://www.africanews.com/2019/03/12/the-china-merchants-in-djibouti-from-the-maritime-to-the-digital-silk-roads-by-thierry-pairault// (accessed August6, 2021).Beijing’s unparalleled influence in the country has already impeded American operations20In 2018, military-grade lasers fired from the Chinese base targeted U.S. military aircraft an unspecified number of times, in one instance causing minor injuries to two U.S. airmen. The U.S. also accused China of using drones to interfere with American planes and of trying to restrict American use of international air space in the area. The U.S. must compete in Djibouti, but a strong American presence in an independent Somaliland wouldbe a hedge against the U.S. position continuing to deteriorate in Djibouti. Somaliland has more than 500 miles of coast on the Gulf of Aden that abuts the Indian Ocean and is directly across the water from conflict-torn Yemen, where Iranian-backed militias and an al-Qaeda affiliate operate.22Zeila in Somaliland is about 140 miles from Aden, the capital of Yemen, and about 90 miles from the nearest point on Yemen’s coast. It is approximately 85 miles in a straight line from the heart of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait as well.Its nearest point is about 70 miles from the heart of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait—through which around 9percent of the world’s maritime-borne petroleum and much of Europe–Asia sea trade transits.23U.S. Energy Information Administration, “The Bab el-Mandeb Strait Is a Strategic Route for Oil and Natural Gas Shipments,” August 27, 2019, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=41073 (accessed August 6, 2021). The Strait is likely to only grow in importance because Saudi Arabia has been increasing its capacity to ship oil from its Red Sea terminals to diversify away from the Strait of Hormuz. “Yanbu South Terminal Export Capacity,” Saudi Aramco, October 17, 2018, https://www.aramco.com/en/news-media/news/2018/yanbu-south-terminal-export-capacity (accessed August 6, 2021).
12DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025This strait is also part of the quickest route for the Mediterranean-based U.S. 6th Fleet and the Indian Ocean–based 5th Fleet to rendezvous during a conflict or other crisis. Somaliland is in the East Africa region that has the continent’s second-most populous country, Ethiopia, which, along with neighboring Kenya, was among Africa’s most vibrant economies in pre-pandemic times. Djibouti and Mombasa in Kenya are the only two large, modern ports serving the region, which gives Somaliland’s Berbera port anopportunity to emerge as an economic hub.24Land-locked Ethiopia owns a 19 percent stake in Berbera as it seeks to diversify away from Djibouti, through which virtually all its trade currently passes. However, a recent report claimed that Ethiopia missed a deadline for buying a share in the Berbera port, so the fate of the deal is unclear. A United ArabEmirates’ company, DP World, is expanding and renovating the Berbera port. Somaliland’s Zeila port is also known as Saylac. The harbor there currently cannot accommodate modern cargo vessels because it is filled with silt, and port infrastructure is virtually nonexistent. According to a senior Somaliland official,however, it would be possible to clean and deepen the harbor and add a breakwater to enable it to receive modern cargo vessels. Zeila is Somaliland’s closest port to EthiopiaBeyond shoring up its position that Beijing is undercutting in an important region, recognizing Somaliland would help the U.S. in other ways as well. Hargeisa and Taipei established close informal relations in 2020, and subsequently exchanged representatives. An independent Somaliland would give Taiwan another country willing to have such ties with it, thereby boosting a territory that the U.S. also supports. By serving as a maritime gateway for East Africa not under Chinese influence, Somaliland could also complicate the continuity of the Belt and Road infrastructure that Beijing is building in the region.25At a time when illiberal governance is advancing in parts of Africa, American recognition of Somaliland would be a way to help a prominent experiment in democracy address its shortcomings, something Washington cannot currently do fully because of constraints imposed by Mogadishu. Problems with Somaliland’s democracy have included deadly—though limited—post-election clashes and elite power struggles that have twice necessitated years-long extensions of the president’s term. Although the territory’s most recent vote was hailed as free and fair, it was 16 years overdue because of wrangling among Somaliland’s political parties.26The elections have also frequently included accusations by one contesting party or another of irregularities that required resolution in court. However, the fact that these disputes proceeded througha judicial process (the outcome of which was respected by the litigants), testifies to the strength of Somaliland’s institutions that are necessary to safeguard and deepen any country’s democratic system. For documentation of some of Somaliland’s democratic challenges, see Shukri, “Unrecognized Vote: Somaliland’s Democratic Journey.”The government also arrested five opposition candidates prior to the election.27
13DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025Other countries declaring independence did not set off massive secessionJoshua Meservey, Former Research Fellow, Africa, May 9, 2022, Joshua Meservey, Joshua studied African geopolitics, counterterrorism, and refugee policy at The Heritage Foundation, https://www.heritage.org/africa/commentary/somalilanders-quest-independence-isnt-neocolonial-plot-its-self-determinationA common objection to recognizing Somaliland’s statehood is that it would set off a brushfire of secession in Africa. Yet Eritrean and South Sudanese independence did not. Somaliland is also unique in Africa because it has successfully operated autonomously for 30 years, has a critical mass of the attributes of statehood, was once independent, and wishes to revert to that status within colonial-era borders, the standard the African Union uses to determine statehood.1The AU’s precursor, the Organisation of Africa Unity, declared in 1964 that the assembled heads of state and government “[s]olemnly declare[] that all Member States pledge themselves to respect the borders existing on their achievement of national independence.” This should not be a bar to Somaliland independence since Hargeisa wishes to revert to the borders it had when it received independence fromBritain. There is also an irony in using the Organization of African Unity declaration as justification for denying Somaliland independence because the summit that produced the pledge was held in Cairo—then part of the United Arab Republic after Egypt and Syria voluntarily united in 1958. That union was dissolved in 1961 after Syria declared its independence, and African states today recognize Syria’s sovereignty. They also recognize that of the Sudanese Republic (today known as Mali) and Senegal, conjoined in the Mali Federation that became independent in 1960 but voluntarily dissolved several months later. For the OAU declaration, see Organization of African Unity, “Resolutions Adopted by the First Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government Held in Cairo, UAR, from 17 to 21 July 1964,” July 1964, https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/9514-1964_ahg_res_1-24_i_e.pdf (accessed August 6, 2021). Recognition of its independence would delegitimize other secessionist movements’ claims by establishing a difficult standard for achieving sovereignty.
14DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025Foreign Investment Good
15DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025Independence Increases Foreign InvestmentAction Aid UK, August 1, 2024, https://www.actionaid.org.uk/about-us/where-we-work/somaliland/somalia-somaliland-differences-explained, Somalia/Somaliland: the differences and issues explainedISP Online, November 25, 2024, https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/somaliland-a-change-of-leadership-in-the-context-of-regional-developments-and-its-quest-for-recognition-192234, Somaliland: A Change of Leadership in the Context of Regional Developments and its Quest for RecognitionWith respect to Somaliland’s economic woes, Abdirahman will continue to face the problem of attracting foreign investment and economic assistance for development beyond the Somaliland diaspora, something that is made difficult precisely by the lack of international recognitionJoshua Meservey, Former Research Fellow, Africa, Heritage Foundatiion, May 9, 2022, Somalilanders’ Quest for Independence Isn’t “Neocolonial” Plot. It’s Self-Determination, https://www.heritage.org/africa/commentary/somalilanders-quest-independence-isnt-neocolonial-plot-its-self-determinationFinally, it would be an act of justice to recognize Somaliland. Millions of Somalilanders have repeatedly affirmed that they wish to live in their own independent state, and their government has consistently demonstrated its independence.29In 2009, The Heritage Foundation recommended that the international community recognize Somaliland’s independence “pending demonstrable actions of improved governance and order.” Twelve years later, Somaliland has met that standard. See Brett D. Schaefer, “Piracy: A Symptom of Somalia’s Deeper Problems,” Heritage Foundation Web Memo No. 2398, April 17, 2009, https://www.heritage.org/africa/report/piracy-symptom-somalias-deeper-problems#_ftnref8.The fact that the world generally views Somaliland as indistinguishable from the far more unstable and undemocratic southern Somalia denies Somaliland the benefits of the engagement it would attract on its own merits. U.S. recognition of Somalilandwould partially rectify this injustice by sending a strong signal that the territory is distinct from the rest of Somalia, thereby encouraging investment and trade from the U.S. and others.
16DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025Somaliland Poverty ImpactsWidespread poverty in Somailand nowToday, Somaliland is suffering with its extreme vulnerability to issues caused by climate change. Years ofsevere drought, famine and other disasters have pushed people to the brink of a humanitarian crisis. Communities struggling to recover from a two-year drought that ended in 2017 are now facing one of the riest rainy seasons in three decades, with the UN claiming that 2.2 million people are at risk of starvation across the Somalia/Somaliland region. And for women and girls living in Somaliland, life can be extremely difficult. It’s estimated 98% of women have undergone female genital mutilation (FGM).7 For the tens of thousands of women and girls living in camps for internally displaced people, there is a constant risk of violence.
17DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025Abdullahi Credibility/MandateAbdullahi credibility advanced by recognition; credibility key to resolve societal conflictsSheriff Bojang Jnr. November 25,2024, Abdirahman Irro: ‘Consensus-driven’ leader who offers new hope for Somaliland,. The Africa Report, https://www.theafricareport.com/369578/abdirahman-irro-consensus-driven-leader-who-offers-new-hope-for-somaliland/The opposition leader of the breakaway region of Somaliland, Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi –more popularly known as Irro – beat incumbent Muse Abdi Bihi with 64% of the vote in the 13 November polls. His victory puts the opposition party Wadani in power after 14 years of Kulmiye rule. Born in Hargeisa in the then-British Somaliland, Irro served as speaker of the House of Representatives from November 2005 to August 2017 when he contested for the presidency and lost to Bihi in November that year. Known for his measured and inclusive leadership style, Irro’s tenure as Speaker showcased his ability to build consensus and navigate complex political landscapes, says Khaalid Foodhadhi, a journalist and founder of Hargeisa-based digital KF Media TV. For many Somalilanders, it is Irro’s long career as a diplomatthat resonates with Somaliland’s search for recognition from the international community and strengthened ties with the West. In a stint that started in 1981 before Somaliland broke away from Somalia, he served in the foreign service of the Somali Democratic Republic – first as a consular in Moscow and then as acting ambassador to the Soviet Union in 1991. Irro relocated to Finland in 1996 to join his family and became a Finnish citizen. Finland, which does not recognise Somaliland, has not congratulated him. However, Suldaan Said Ahmed, the Nordic country’s first lawmaker of Somali origin, noted Irro’s victory, saying his election exemplified democracy in Somaliland. “I hope for a peaceful transfer of power and look forward to working with you, Mr. President-elect, in promoting peace and dialogue,” Ahmed, the Finnish Foreign Ministry’s Special Envoy on Peace Mediation in the Horn of Africa, posted on X. Irro’s victory signals a potential shift in Somaliland’s political direction, reflecting the public’s desire for change and reform. His leadership, according to Foodhadhi, could rejuvenate domestic and international confidence in the country’s democratic processes, further solidifying its status as a beacon of stability in the Horn of Africa. Political analyst Moustafa Ahmad tells The Africa Report there’s a window of hope in the air, citing Wadani party’s push for change rather than continuity in many of the policy issues in the country. Irro is [seen as] more conciliatory and diplomatic in his conduct of politics and opts to make decisions based on consensus. That’s a stark difference from Bihi’s style of governance, which is described by many as very centralised and pursued a zero-sum game in his domestic politics,” Ahmad says. The elections, delayed for two years, had caused widespread frustration, protests, and political gridlock. “Successfully concluding the vote, particularly with an opposition landslide, demonstrates Somaliland’s resilience and commitment to democratic processes — a rarity in the region,” says Khadar Mariano, development and policy analyst and CEO of consultancy firm Adans Consulting Group. “This is a moment of pride for Somalilanders, reinforcing their aspirations for continued stability and progress.” New president, old problems Irro inherits a government with significantchallenges. The political deadlock, especially over the delayed election, has triggered an unprecedented level of social polarisation. There are tensions and an inter-clan conflict in regions like Sool in the eastern part of Somaliland. There’s also the issue of economy and high unemployment rateespecially among the youth. Irro and his Wadani party won the election with a promise to bring the much-needed reforms. He is now expected to lead with a focus on dialogue, inclusivity, and reform, likely striking a balance between traditional governance values and modern aspirations, according to Foodhadhi. “The new administration will need to address the public’s high expectations for accountability and reform after years of perceived stagnation,” he tells The Africa Report. READ MORE Somaliland ‘deeply alarmed’ as Egypt delivers weapons to Somalia As a seasoned diplomat, says Mariano, Irro is expected to be a consensus-driven leader who values unity and collaboration. “His track record suggests he will focus on bridging divides and creating an inclusive government that reflects Somaliland’s diverse interests.” Mariano says the new administration must tackle the issues head-on, restoring public trust and addressing the socioeconomic needs of the population. “The real test lies in their ability to deliver on promises while navigating these complex problems.” Considerable sympathy in Washington Somaliland’s controversial MoU with Ethiopia over sea access increased tension in the Horn of Africa, creating a fresh feud between Ethiopia and Somalia. However, the quest for global recognition is the dominant agenda in Irro’s foreign relations checklist. He has been vocal about advancing Somaliland’s quest for international recognition. “Irro has a new and strong mandate to strengthen relations with the US and Western countries as well as
18DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025capitalise relations with the UAE. A lot is at stake in this matter, and Irro’s decisions and approaches to this complicated set of issues will be very consequential for Somaliland,” says Ahmad.
19DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025DemocracySomaliland is a strong democracyJoshua Meservey, Former Research Fellow, Africa, Heritage Foundation, May 9, 2022, Somalilanders’ Quest for Independence Isn’t “Neocolonial” Plot. It’s Self-Determination, https://www.heritage.org/africa/commentary/somalilanders-quest-independence-isnt-neocolonial-plot-its-self-determinationIn 1991, as Somalia collapsed into anarchy, Somaliland reasserted its independence. It flourished. It embraced democracy and maintained internal peace. Whereas the U.N., international donors, and the United States have given the Palestinians more money per capita than any other people, Somaliland receives close to zero. What little money the international community earmarks for Somaliland, authorities in Mogadishu embezzle.Despite getting short shrift from donors and diplomats, Somaliland thrived. It was the first country to secure voter registration with biometric iris scans. Whereas Palestinian Chairman Mahmoud Abbas is in the 20th year of his four-year term and the Hamas leadership exiled or killed its Gaza opposition, Somaliland has held eight elections, one decided by fewer than 100 votes of more than 1 million cast.
20DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025Somalia GovernanceSomaliland independence will close the issue for Somalia’s governance, allowing themto focus on governingJoshua Meservey, Former Research Fellow, Africa, Heritage Foundation, May 9, 2022, Somalilanders’ Quest for Independence Isn’t “Neocolonial” Plot. It’s Self-Determination, https://www.heritage.org/africa/commentary/somalilanders-quest-independence-isnt-neocolonial-plot-its-self-determinationFormalizing Somaliland independence might also focus the Mogadishu elites’ minds on the task of governing. Power struggles within southern Somalia’s political class have plunged the country into one crisis after another. The ongoing electoral process in the south is a dramatic regression from the previous (also deeply flawed) electoral process, in large part because of the elites’ inability to mediate their disputes. The specter of other federal states seeking greater autonomy could jolt Mogadishu’s elites from their absorption with political battles.There is, as well, a strain within Somali nationalism that seeks to reunite the predominantly ethnic Somali regions of northeast Kenya, Djibouti, and eastern Ethiopia with Somalia. It is a long-running source of tension in the region, and an independent Somaliland might undermine this destructive irredentism by making its realization even more unlikely than it already is.
21DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025Answers to: Con Arguments
22DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025Answers to: Secession Bad(1) US Supports secession in other areas;(2) This situation is different – Somalia is a failed experimentNational Security Journal, November 4, 2024, U.S. Foreign Policy Blindspot: Ignoring Somaliland and South Yemen’s Case for Independence, https://www.aei.org/op-eds/u-s-foreign-policy-blindspot-ignoring-somaliland-and-south-yemens-case-for-independence/Confederations Dissolve. Washington Errs When It Ignores Reality: Both Somaliland and South Yemen say they want independence. In both cases, their independence would benefit U.S. national security yet, in both cases, the State Department rejects recognition, essentially arguing once in a marriage a country must remain wed no matter how abuse its partner becomes. The State Department explains that it recognizes existing borders and that allowing states to fracture could set precedentsand unleash chaos. To some extent that is true, especially in states facing secession movements without precedent as independent states. Nigeria, Ethiopia, Pakistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and even Russia and China could all theoretically collapse into constituent units. The problem comes when the State Department confuses these cases with confederated states seeking to revert to their previous status. Whereas the United State once blessed their disunion tothe benefit of both freedom and security, today the State Department does the opposite, often achieving results inimical to both freedom and U.S. strategic interests. Consider the history of dissolution: In 1958, Egypt briefly united with Syria to former the UnitedArab Republic. After his successful nationalization of the Suez Canal, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser was an outsized figured in the Arab world. He had numerous supporters in Syria, a state both Nasser and the West feared could fall to communism. Syrians expected they would be equal partners in the new Republic, but Nasser had other ideas. Egypt was bigger and, in Nasser’s view, more important and so had every right to dominate the union. By 1961, the marriage was over. After a coup d’état in Syria, Syria dissolved the union. The Hashemite Arab Federation, a monarchist block that formed in reaction tothe United Arab Republic and briefly united Jordan and Iraq lasted less than six months, dissolving when revolutionaries overthrew the Iraqi monarchy in 1958. President Richard Nixon and his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger masterminded the secret diplomacy that led Washington to recognize the People’s Republic of China. While Kissinger and President Jimmy Carter may have been fine throwing Taiwan under the bus, Congress was not. Rhetoric of “One China” or not, the United States supports Taiwan and its right to exist as a separate entity outside Chinese Communist control. In Africa, colonial powers drew borders with little regard to the ethnic and linguistic topography. In December 1950, the United States supported federation between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Again, it was not a happy union and, in 1991, Eritrea regained its independence, against with U.S. support. Among the most bizarre borders in Africa are those of The Gambia, a former British colony that spans both banks of the Gambia River as it runs through the former French colony Senegal. Gambia is only 31 miles at its widest, while its Atlantic coast is 50 miles long, the third shortest in Africa. A popular but apocryphal story suggests the British marked the borders by firing cannonballs from the river, drawing the border where they landed. In reality, the British and French drew the borders at a slightly greater range in the last decade of the 19th century. The Gambia’s economy revolved around its river. What was Gambia’s gain was Senegal’s loss, though, as international borders essentially cut the country in half, handicapping cohesion and economy. In 1981, the two countries agreed to confederate, joining militaries, economy, and currency and inaugurated the Senegambia Confederation early the next year. A Senegalese would always be president, and a Gambian his vice president. In practice, it never worked. One hundred andfifty years of different colonial influences and created schisms too great to overcome. Distrust grew over economic stewardship and, in 1989, Gambia sued to dissolve the union. Facing separate tension with Mauritania, Senegalese President Abdou Diouf agreed to let Gambia revert to its former independent status. The end of the Cold War unleashed a cascade of dissolution of forced marriages. East Timor won its independence after near a quarter century in a union with Indonesia imposed at the point of the gun after Portugal abandoned its former colony. As the Soviet Union collapsed into its constituent republics, President George H.W. Bush urged Ukraine to reconsider secession in what became known as the “Chicken Kiev” speech. Ukrainians and other Soviet peoples ignored him. More people won their freedom in 1991 than in any other year, a record that will likely stand until the People’s Republic of China collapses. The United States did not stand in the way of Czechoslovakia’s divorceand established warm relations with both the Czech Republic and Slovakia. At the same time, the American military actually fought for the right of Yugoslavia’s constituent republics to regain independence. More recently, President Barack Obama disapproved of the United Kingdom’s “Brexit” vote to leave the European Union, but
23DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025neither he nor Donald Trump obstructed the British public’s democratic rights to do so. Israel makes no secret that it considers West Bank Palestinians to be outside Israel proper, rather than a federal component of a unitary state. Still, a core belief in Washington in favor of a “two-state solution” is consistent with U.S. support for unraveling ties between peoples forced together by forces beyond their control. Given its longhistory of accepting the dissolution of unhappy unions, the United States’ refusal today to recognize both Somaliland and South Yemenis an anomaly. The State Department previously recognized both countries. Secretary of State Charles Herter congratulated Somaliland upon its independence in 1960 and the State Department formally recognized South Yemen in 1967. Both countries entered unions with theirneighbors. Somaliland joined with former Italian colonial possessions to form Somalia, and North and South Yemen merged after the fall of the Soviet Union. Both were unhappy unions. Somali dictator Siad Barre waged a campaign of genocide against the Isaaqs, the predominant clan in Somaliland, and longtime Yemeni dictator Ali Abdullah Saleh sought to marginalize South Yemenis in his own quest for dominance.(3) Other countries in Africa have succeededJoshua Meservey, Former Research Fellow, Africa, Heritage Foundatiion, May 9, 2022, Somalilanders’ Quest for Independence Isn’t “Neocolonial” Plot. It’s Self-Determination, https://www.heritage.org/africa/commentary/somalilanders-quest-independence-isnt-neocolonial-plot-its-self-determinationIt is Somalilanders, and no one else, who have split themselves from Somalia, just as the Eritreans did from Ethiopia in 1991, and the South Sudanese did from Sudan in 2019. I’m sure Gaildon didn’t begrudge the Eritreans and South Sudanese their countries, or decry the U.S.’ recognition of them as a “stealth, neocolonial assault.”
24DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025Answers to: Not Read to be IndependentSomaliland has a strong economyMichael Rubin, November 26, 2024, Senior Fellow, American Enterprise Institute, https://www.aei.org/op-eds/somaliland-deserves-independence-before-palestinians/, Somaliland Deserves Independence Before PalestiniansIt hosts an international airport, its port exceeds Mombasa in capacity, and it rapidly gains on Djibouti. Once its chief exports were livestock and charcoal. Today, its tech and finance sector is worth billions of dollars. Businesses flock to Somaliland because its economy is far less corrupt and more transparent than that of any other country for 1,000 miles. The Palestinian economy, in contrast, rivals Somalia and South Sudan as the world’s most corrupt. Somaliland is also an environmental leader. It leads the largestcheetah rescue operation in Africa.Whereas Palestinians embrace terrorism, Somaliland shuts it down. Weapons smugglers avoid the country, and its coast guard has secured Somaliland’s 460-mile coast.Somaliland is ready for independence. It has a functioning economy, has government capacity, and demonstrates a multidecade commitment to democracy. It values freedom and, unlike the Palestinians, leans West. Yet the Biden administration remains inexplicably hostile to Somaliland. College students, activists, and self-described anti-racists remain silent. Perhaps behind White House and progressive rhetoric, black lives don’t matter after all?Somaliland has a strong governance systemAleksi Ylönen, Professor, United States International University, 2024, January 24, Somaliland has been pursuing independence for 33 years. Expert explains the impact of the latest deal with Ethiopia, https://theconversation.com/somaliland-has-been-pursuing-independence-for-33-years-expert-explains-the-impact-of-the-latest-deal-with-ethiopia-221502Somaliland’s political system is democratic in a neighbourhood of authoritarian states like Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia and the Sudans.Somaliland has organised successful elections and peaceful transfers of political power. Recently, however, there has been some backsliding.Its security apparatus is elaborate. With the active contribution of citizens, it has ensured a measure of internal stability and security in an otherwise troubled region.Somalia is a failed stateJoshua Meservey, Former Research Fellow, Africa, Heritage Foundatiion, May 9, 2022, Somalilanders’ Quest for Independence Isn’t “Neocolonial” Plot. It’s Self-Determination,
25DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025https://www.heritage.org/africa/commentary/somalilanders-quest-independence-isnt-neocolonial-plot-its-self-determinationJoshua studied African geopolitics, counterterrorism, and refugee policy at The Heritage Foundation.Yet, it’s a strange notion that because Somaliland has shortcomings, it should be forced to remain in a paper union with Somalia, a country so dysfunctional it was the most infamous failed state on the planetfor two decades.In fact, Freedom House in its latest 2022 report rates Somalia as “not free” with a score of 7 out of 100. That’s the 12th-worst ranking in the world, inferior to basket cases like Yemen, Belarus, and Afghanistan,and tied with Saudi Arabia. (Somalia did eke out a narrow win over North Korea, however.)Somaliland, meanwhile, was rated “partly free” with a score of 49. If Somaliland’s insufficiencies disqualify it from independence, then Somalia has much less of a case for nationhood.Somaliland is the only credible governmentJoshua Meservey, Former Research Fellow, Africa, Heritage Foundatiion, May 9, 2022, Somalilanders’ Quest for Independence Isn’t “Neocolonial” Plot. It’s Self-Determination, https://www.heritage.org/africa/commentary/somalilanders-quest-independence-isnt-neocolonial-plot-its-self-determinationFinally, while Somaliland should do what it reasonably can to assuage unionist concerns, the reality of living in a democracy is that the groups that win elections—and multiple international observer missionshave deemed Somaliland’s vote credible—get to set a country’s direction.Until unionists prevail in a vote, it’s not unfair that they are prevented from determining Hargeisa’s policy on independence.No matter what irredentists may claim, Somaliland is the only credible government authority within its borders. Those boundaries also comport with the standards for legitimate borders that African states established 60 years ago.Furthermore, it is Somalilanders and no one else who began the movement for independence decades ago and constructed a government far more democratic and effective than the one in Mogadishu.Somalia stableJoshua Meservey, Former Research Fellow, Africa, Heritage Foundatiion, May 9, 2022, Somalilanders’ Quest for Independence Isn’t “Neocolonial” Plot. It’s Self-Determination, https://www.heritage.org/africa/commentary/somalilanders-quest-independence-isnt-neocolonial-plot-its-self-determination
26DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025Despite those challenges, Somaliland is peaceful. It has largely quelled al-Shabaab, and its border dispute with Puntland, while concerning, is localized and the occasional clashes are small-scale. The territory’s stability distinguishes it in a tumultuous region. A civil war rages in Ethiopia, Sudan is undertaking a hopeful but difficult and uncertain political transition, Eritrea is an authoritarian pariah, South Sudan could return to civil war at any moment, and a contentious election looms in Kenya, which has had violent polls in the past. Amid all this instability, Washington should be seeking out areas of calm, with Somaliland being the obvious option. The danger there that U.S. efforts will be wiped away by war or unrest is lower than in arguably any country in the region.
27DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025Answers to: US-Somalia RelationsBenefits outweigh any reduction in US-Somalia relationsJoshua Meservey, Former Research Fellow, Africa, Heritage Foundation, May 9, 2022, Somalilanders’ Quest for Independence Isn’t “Neocolonial” Plot. It’s Self-Determination, https://www.heritage.org/africa/commentary/somalilanders-quest-independence-isnt-neocolonial-plot-its-self-determinationA Rupture with Mogadishu. One virtually certain consequence of Washington recognizing Somaliland is that it would damage relations with southern Somalia that would view it as dismembering the country. Yet Somaliland, in practice, is already separate from the rest of Somalia and has, for 30 years, repudiated Mogadishu’s sovereignty claims. Somaliland has taken the decision to carve itself off from the rest of the country, and American recognition of its independence would simply be acknowledging that reality.While a break with Mogadishu would be unfortunate, it would not badly harm U.S. strategic interests because Washington derives little benefit from its current relationship with the federal government. Its political elites’ power struggles obstruct the battle against al-Shabaab, and the rampant corruption siphons off American aid money and fuels further violent conflict.Despite massive military, diplomatic, and financial support, Mogadishu has made scant progress rectifying the many thorny issues facing the country.34As mentioned earlier, American recognition of Somaliland may bring a unity and seriousness of purpose to the federal government facing the prospect of other attempted defections by its federal member states.Somalia’s anger over American recognition could give China an advantage in the strategically situated country. However, Somalia badly needs American security assistance and humanitarian aid, which woulddampen an overreaction from Mogadishu and likely facilitate an eventual rapprochement. And while Beijing could replace any American aid Mogadishu rejects, it could not and would not provide the kineticcounterterrorism support that the U.S. does, and which is important to keeping al-Shabaab at bay. Beijing has made some recent investments in Somalia and publicly proclaims its interest in strong diplomatic relations, but Somalia for the foreseeable future is unlikely to achieve enough stability to be the type of partner with which Beijing can build strong ties. There are also other countries with far more influence in Somalia than China,35Turkey is probably the foreign country with the most influence in Somalia due to a long campaign by Ankara to build commercial, diplomatic, and military ties to Mogadishu, which, even if they are friendly with Beijing, would limit the gains the Chinese government would make if the U.S. was evicted from SomaliaAnother problematic country for the U.S., Turkey, might also benefit from a Washington–Mogadishu rupture by replacing some of the withdrawn American counterterrorism assistance. Ankara already
28DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025trains Somali forces and provides military materiel, and it has some experience and the willingness to engage in kinetic operations, such as in Libya. Yet while Turkey is a challenge for the U.S., it is not a strategic competitor like China or even Russia. Ankara also already enjoys a strong position in Somalia and may be unwilling to undertake significant extra effort and expense for marginal gain.
29DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025Answwers to: Somiland Will FailSomaliland will not failJoshua Meservey, Former Research Fellow, Africa, Heritage Foundation, May 9, 2022, Somalilanders’ Quest for Independence Isn’t “Neocolonial” Plot. It’s Self-Determination, https://www.heritage.org/africa/commentary/somalilanders-quest-independence-isnt-neocolonial-plot-its-self-determinationSomaliland Failure. It is possible that Somaliland could fail, as did the world’s newest country, South Sudan, and reflect poorly on Washington. However, this is a remote possibility, as the territory has proven for three decades its ability to competently govern itself and has developed a habit of democracy and the institutions that help protect it. The territory, in fact, possesses a track record far superior to South Sudan’s at independence.A greater risk is that recognition leads to a surge in development assistance that triggers elite competition and disrupts Somaliland’s tradition of independence and self-reliance that likely accounts for much of its success. The plan that the U.S. should have in place before recognition must account for this danger by ensuring that any American aid is limited, targeted, and accounted for. The focus of the U.S.’s post-recognition strategy should be on providing diplomatic support and motivating and facilitating mutually beneficial trade and private investment.
30DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025CON
31DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025
32DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025UniquenessAU supports Somalia unity nowGuudle, 11-25, 24, Dr. Mohamed Osman Guudle is a Somaliland scholar specializing in Economics, Political Science, and International Relations. He holds a PhD from Istanbul University (2019) and is a researcher based in Hargeisa, Somaliland. His focus is on the political and economic issues of the Horn ofAfrica, particularly Somaliland, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and the Red Sea region. Additionally, he serves as the president of the Somaliland Society of Political Scientists (SSPS), a nonprofit organization dedicated to advancing the study and research of political science, Somaliland and Somalia: Competing narratives in the Horn of Africa, https://globalvoices.org/2024/11/25/somaliland-and-somalia-competing-narratives-in-the-horn-of-africa/To Somalia, Somaliland's separation means a violation of its territorial integrity. The government of Somalia still considers Somaliland an “integral part of the Somali Republic” and says that recognizing Somaliland would create a dangerous precedent on the whole African continent for “separatist movements.” The government of Somalia, with support from the African Union (AU) and United Nations, prioritizes national unity to ensure regional stability. It advocates for reconciliation and peaceful conflict resolution within Somalia’s recognized borders, emphasizing cooperation against threats like al-Shabaab, piracy, and clan conflicts. The government promotes a federal system granting regional powers while rejecting any secession.No move to independence nowGuudle, 11-25, 24, Dr. Mohamed Osman Guudle is a Somaliland scholar specializing in Economics, Political Science, and International Relations. He holds a PhD from Istanbul University (2019) and is a researcher based in Hargeisa, Somaliland. His focus is on the political and economic issues of the Horn ofAfrica, particularly Somaliland, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and the Red Sea region. Additionally, he serves as the president of the Somaliland Society of Political Scientists (SSPS), a nonprofit organization dedicated to advancing the study and research of political science, Somaliland and Somalia: Competing narratives in the Horn of Africa, https://globalvoices.org/2024/11/25/somaliland-and-somalia-competing-narratives-in-the-horn-of-africa/While much of the Horn of Africa faces political and security problems, the dispute between Somalia and Somaliland still represents a fundamental divide that has not been overcome. The absence of relevant initiatives for recognition on the part of Somalia or a commitment to a reconciliation process that would take into consideration the aspirations of both regions, means the international community is unlikely to make a move in this regard.
33DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025PovertySomaliland independence would increase povertyMariel Ferragamo and Claire Klobucista, 1-25, 24, Council on Foreign Relations, Somaliland: The Horn of Africa’s Breakaway State, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/somaliland-horn-africas-breakaway-stateA weak economy and limited opportunities for foreign trade and investment have stifled the government’s capacity to provide services to its approximately four million residents. Somaliland has a gross domestic product (GDP) of about $2 billion,most of which it receives in remittances from Somalilanders working abroad. The area’s unemployment remains very high, particularly for youth, and officials worry about a potential “brain drain” phenomenon, with educated people migrating in search ofopportunities elsewhere. Its main exports are livestock and animal products, which it ships to neighboring Djibouti and Ethiopia, as well as to Gulf states, such as Saudi Arabia and Oman. Its GDP per capita, in the hundreds of dollars, is one of the lowest in the world. If it were to gain independence, Somaliland would become the eighteenth-poorest country [PDF] today. Somalia, meanwhile, is the world’s fifth-poorest.
34DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025BrinkBrink of conflict in the Horn of AfricaMariel Ferragamo and Claire Klobucista, 1-25, 24, Council on Foreign Relations, Somaliland: The Horn of Africa’s Breakaway State, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/somaliland-horn-africas-breakaway-stateToday, the Horn of Africa is still reeling from the impacts of Ethiopia’s January memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Somaliland (the unrecognized breakaway republic in northern Somalia), which granted Ethiopian naval forces access to twenty kilometers of Somaliland’s coastline. In return, according to claims by the government in Hargeisa, Ethiopia agreed to begin a process considering the recognition of Somaliland’s independence.Nine months later, the situation has been exacerbated by decisions made by countries outside of the Horn, such as Egypt’s signing of a security agreement with Somalia. The agreement includes the delivery of weapons, troops, and military hardware,the first tranche of which was sent to Somalia on August 27. The involvement of other players in the Horn of Africa’s security landscape is a prime example of how middle-power politics and diplomacy in one region could, over time, create a tinderbox of conditions: one in which even a small mistake could cause a rapid escalation.
35DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025Foreign Investment Bad LinksLack of recognition means no foreign investmentISP Online, November 25, 2024, https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/somaliland-a-change-of-leadership-in-the-context-of-regional-developments-and-its-quest-for-recognition-192234, Somaliland: A Change of Leadership in the Context of Regional Developments and its Quest for RecognitionWith respect to Somaliland’s economic woes, Abdirahman will continue to face the problem of attracting foreign investment and economic assistance for development beyond the Somaliland diaspora, something that is made difficult precisely by the lack of international recognition. Here, Somaliland’s commitment to the West, and especially Taiwan, may come under strain due to China’s likely renewed attempt to woo Somaliland with economic and financial rewards in exchange for subscribing to its “one China” policy, earlier rejected during the Abdi presidency. This is because of Abdirahman’s previously expressed interest in establishing relations with Beijing, instead of Taipei, and China’s determination to undercut the incoming Trump administration in the geopolitically and strategically crucial Red Sea/Gulf of Aden neighborhood, where Beijing established its first overseas military base in 2017, in Djibouti.
36DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025Colonialism/ImperialismSupporting Saudi secession is colonial/imperialisticGaildon, April 3, 2022, Mohamoud Gaildon is a Somali-American medical physicist. He has worked in a number of major hospitals including Memorial Sloan-Kettering, Beth Israel and Mount Sinai in New York City. He is now a senior medical physicist at St. Francis Medical Center in Peoria, Illinois, and is also the author of a novel, "The Yibir of Las Burgabo.", Why is the American right waging a stealth neocolonial assault on Somalia?, https://www.salon.com/2022/04/03/why-is-the-american-right-waging-a-stealth-neocolonial-on-somalia/Similarly, Risch's rationale for his bill stresses the importance of Somaliland's "geographic location in the Horn of Africa and next to the Gulf of Aden." So the Heritage Foundation and several U.S. senators have decided to bypass Somalia's legal authority and deal with a secessionist entity, without regard to what might follow, for what they perceive as America's strategic interests.To me, this seems a flashback to a series of decades-long events related to me, as a child, by my father and other elders of my family. I grew up in a house steeped in the history of the conflict with Britain as itbarged into our land and ruled our people. I am a great-grandson of Sultan Muhammad Mahmud Ali (nicknamed Awl), the sultan of the Warsangeli tribe, who in 1886 entered into a "protection treaty" withthe British government, one of six such treaties with Somali tribes that formed what was called the Somaliland British Protectorate, which existed until 1960.In colonial days, foreign men drew lines on paper to divide the Somali people without their knowledge. Thanks to conservatives in Washington, today it's happening again.Back then, foreign men drew lines on paper to divide Somalis without their knowledge. Today, men in Washington — and they are once again almost all men — are working to decide the fate of Somalisas one aspect of global competition with China. Those like Risch and the Heritage Foundation are throwbacks to colonial times, hellbent on reordering Africa as they see fit. For them, Somalia is fair game, a guinea pig, something to be altered with the stroke of a pen.If their intentions were sincere, they would be interested in talking to all sides of this particular conflict and they would not have so smugly ignored the government of the Federal Republic of Somalia. It is no secret that government is frail and unstable, but that is not a good reason for undermining it still further.
37DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025Secession Bad
38DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025
39DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025Recognition Triggers Widespread SecessionSomaliland recognition triggers secessionMariel Ferragamo and Claire Klobucista, 1-25, 24, Council on Foreign Relations, Somaliland: The Horn of Africa’s Breakaway State, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/somaliland-horn-africas-breakaway-stateMany countries have encouraged the breakaway state’s elections and economic development, but none have recognized Somaliland. While some experts see historical and geopolitical reasons for countries such as Ethiopia and Kenya to take this step, others say the African Union (AU) would have to be the first to do so. “The United States and the UN and all of their allies have worked hard to try to build up the AU and position it as a moral authority,” says Bruton. The bloc, however, has feared that formal recognition would embolden other secessionist movements on the continent, such as Nigeria’s Biafra or Morocco’s Western Sahara, to demand the same. Since the creation of a continental bloc in 1963, there have only been two widely recognized border changes in Africa: Eritrea’s split from Ethiopia in 1993 and South Sudan’s independence in 2011.Recognition risks secessionGuudle, 11-25, 24, Dr. Mohamed Osman Guudle is a Somaliland scholar specializing in Economics, Political Science, and International Relations. He holds a PhD from Istanbul University (2019) and is a researcher based in Hargeisa, Somaliland. His focus is on the political and economic issues of the Horn ofAfrica, particularly Somaliland, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and the Red Sea region. Additionally, he serves as the president of the Somaliland Society of Political Scientists (SSPS), a nonprofit organization dedicated to advancing the study and research of political science, Somaliland and Somalia: Competing narratives in the Horn of Africa, https://globalvoices.org/2024/11/25/somaliland-and-somalia-competing-narratives-in-the-horn-of-africa/The global community is sensitive to the explosive situation in the Horn of Africa and the growing need to find solutions to the many conflicts across the region. However, it remains divided on the issue of Somaliland's independence. While informal diplomacy by countries such as Ethiopia and Kenya has been exercised with Somaliland, supporting its autonomy in various ways, they have held back from formally recognizing it, due to apprehensions over the wider regional implications of supporting secession. It is for this reason that the AU has always stuck to the letter on the issue of territorial integrity in Africa and is apprehensive that recognizing Somaliland would promote more “fragmentation” in Africa-especially where other “secessionist” movements occur.Action Aid UK, August 1, 2024, https://www.actionaid.org.uk/about-us/where-we-work/somaliland/somalia-somaliland-differences-explained, Somalia/Somaliland: the differences and issues explained
40DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025Those in favour of Somaliland’s independence say that it has a strong claim, because the regions are culturally and ethnically distinct. Somaliland has its own currency, its own military, issues its own passports and holds its own elections, which have been observed and praised by international partners like the EU.4 It is also more stable than Somalia, and has seen little terrorist activity since 2008.5 However there are fears, particularly among the African Union, that the formal recognition of Somaliland would encourage other secessionist movements on the African continent to also seek independence.6 Somaliland secession triggers widespread secessionLeipzig, 2021, Markus Virgil Hoehne is lecturer at the Institute for Social Anthropology at the University of Leipzig. His books include Milk and peace, drought an war: Somali culture, society, and politics (London 2010) and Between Somaliland and Puntland: Marginalization, militarization and conflicting political visions (Nairobi / London 2015), Somaliland: 30 Years of De Facto Statehood, and No End In Sight, https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/somaliland-30-years-de-facto-statehood-and-no-end-sight-30363Globally, the majority of states are against recognizing Somaliland for various reasons. In the EU, Italy is clearly against secession, motivated by economic interests in southern Somalia and ex-colonial ties. Members of the older Somali elite still often have close relations to Italy. Egypt supports Somali unity to keep Ethiopia under control, with whom it is competing for the use of the Nile water. The Arab states prefer a united, strong Sunni Somalia in the Horn. The USA and most other EU countries are trying to stabilize Somalia. Recognizing Somaliland would not help.Perhaps the most important factor preventing all African countries from recognizing Somaliland is the determination by the African Union (AU) that the continent's colonial borders should not be changed. Otherwise, it is feared, it could lead to unpredictable dynamics of secession in the rest of the continent. Eritrea and South Sudan are absolute exceptions. In both cases, the legal situation was less relevant for the recognition than special political arrangements (in Eritrea the new government in Addis Ababa agreed to secession in 1991; regarding South Sudan, there was a lot of international pressure).
41DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025Secession ImpactsSecession triggered world warsRivka Weill, Visiting Law Professor, Yale Law School , 2018, Secession and the Prevalence of Both Militant Democracy and Eternity Clauses Worldwide, Cardozo Law Review, https://cardozolawreview.com/secession-prevalence-worldwide/In fact, to a great extent, secessionist struggles were the opening shot of both WWI and WWII. The immediate trigger of WWI was the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the presumptive heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, by a Serbian secessionist student in Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia. The Austro-Hungarian Empire controlled Sarajevo while secessionist forces wanted to secede and join the neighboring state of Serbia.56 The same is true with regard to WWII. Among the first major steps taken by Nazi Germany to create a Greater German Reich was to annex Austria (Anschluss). Within a month of Nazis’ annexation of Austria, the Nazis held a plebiscite that was manipulated to reflect approval by over 99% of the vote.57 Hitler next targeted the Sudetenland area of Czechoslovakia, arguing that the majority of its inhabitants were ethnic Germans who belonged with Germany.58 While the Munich Pact—signed by the leaders of Britain, France, Italy, and Germany—enabled Hitler to annex Sudetenland in exchange for peace, he did not stop there, as is well-known. Nor is the immense power of secession a matter for history alone. After Russian armed intervention in Crimea at the end of February 2014, which some regard as the end of the post-Cold War era,59 the new Crimean authorities organized a referendum in Crimea.60 The new authorities included the self-appointed Prime Minister, Mr. Sergei Aksyonov—representing the Russian Unity Party, which received 4% of the popular vote in the 2010 Crimean parliamentary elections—and some Crimean legislators who had been allowed, by “unidentified” gunmen, to enter the building of parliament.61 According to the new Crimean authorities, “83.1 percent of the eligible population voted . . . and . . . the final result was 96.77 percent in favor of joining Russia and 2.51 percent against.”62 Just like Germany, Russia argued that annexation not only reflected the inhabitants’ will but was also justified because the majority of the Crimean population is Russian.63Secession will wreck multinational statesRivka Weill, Visiting Law Professor, Yale Law School , 2018, Secession and the Prevalence of Both Militant Democracy and Eternity Clauses Worldwide, Cardozo Law Review, https://cardozolawreview.com/secession-prevalence-worldwide/The colonial powers distributed land among themselves without taking full account of the identity of thepeople inhabiting the particular territories. They thus tore nations apart. When the U.N. recognized the right to decolonization after WWII, it was granted according to pre-defined territories drawn by the colonies. Thus, it did not remedy colonial injustice. This international doctrine of uti possidetis, which means “leav[ing] the place as one received it,” underlies the mismatch between today’s boundaries and ethnic divides.70 With the rise of nationalism in the twentieth century, secessionists have sought to redraw the boundaries according to identity classifications, such as religion, ethnicity, language, culture, shared history, and the like. In fact, most modern secessionist attempts are conducted by ethnic minorities within an existing state.71 Moreover, secession is most threatening to multinational countries, where cultural-ethnic minorities reside in the same geographical area and are not disbursedthroughout the country.72Secession includes violence
42DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025Rivka Weill, Visiting Law Professor, Yale Law School , 2018, Secession and the Prevalence of Both Militant Democracy and Eternity Clauses Worldwide, Cardozo Law Review, https://cardozolawreview.com/secession-prevalence-worldwide/If there is such a strong demand for secession, why not allow it? Secessionists pose a threat simultaneously to the interests of two different groups—the majority population of the rump state who may object to the secession of one of its parts, and the minority population who will be caught in the region after it gains independence. The parent state may have legitimate objections to secession, such as its need to control the region to protect economic resources, to preserve legal and social order, to protect human rights, and to defend itself. Secession may sometimes threaten the very viability of the remaining state.95 The minority may object to secession for fear of the persecution that may follow or because it prefers to remain part of the parent state. Since secession poses a threat to crucial interests of the parent state and its citizens, it is typically accompanied by violence and even civil war.96Secession threatens global stabilityRivka Weill, Visiting Law Professor, Yale Law School , 2018, Secession and the Prevalence of Both Militant Democracy and Eternity Clauses Worldwide, Cardozo Law Review, https://cardozolawreview.com/secession-prevalence-worldwide/At the same time, the secessionists rely on the existence of the norm of territorial integrity to protect their own state once they have seceded. In fact, the very existence of the norm makes their aspirations for independence worthwhile since it increases the likelihood that they will be able to maintain their independence from external and internal attacks.107 This exposes the double standard that secessionists typically employ. For example, the Quebec government has demanded Canada’s recognition that the region enjoys the right to secede but opposes the secession of its minorities, who have expressed their will to remain part of Canada if Quebec achieves independence.108 For these reasons, secession disrupts the world order and may threaten global stability, and secessionists’ claims to legitimacy may be contentious.Allowing secession triggers violenceRivka Weill, Visiting Law Professor, Yale Law School , 2018, Secession and the Prevalence of Both Militant Democracy and Eternity Clauses Worldwide, Cardozo Law Review, https://cardozolawreview.com/secession-prevalence-worldwide/But others, like Cass Sunstein and Donald Horowitz, warn that to regulate secession is to invite a self-fulfilling prophecy, or at least strategic exploitations of threats to secede, and that such tactics can tear apart the fabric of cooperation and compromises that hold democracies together.14Secession is the primary source of violence today
43DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025Ryan D. Griffiths is an associate professor of political science at Syracuse University who studies secession movements, April 13, 2023, The Hill, Sometimes secession works: Why it won’t work for the US, https://thehill.com/opinion/campaign/3949011-sometimes-secession-works-why-it-wont-work-for-the-us/Finally, secession regularly produces violence. Political scientist Barbara Walter claimed that secessionis the chief source of violence in the world today. It is a divisive process full of uncertainty.
44DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025Nuclear WarSecessionist claims snowball and risk nuclear warChristopher Health Wellman, philosopher, St. Louis, 2015, A Theory of Succession, Kindle edition. Page number at end of card. Recognition of a right to secede is thus not likely to be the end of an old bitterness but the beginning of new bitterness. It is, of course, easy to question whether a slavish devotion to territorial integrity is still appropriate. There has been a great deal of loose talk about the allegedly artificial character of manyinternational boundaries and the part played by colonial convenience in settling them. In point of fact, even in 10 Journal of Democracy Africa, where this charge is most frequently encountered, boundaries were not settled as disrespectfully of ethnic patterns as is frequently asserted.13 In any event, patterns of settlement are such that virtually any boundaries would have a large element of arbitrariness to them. Secession would not be a way of rectifying boundaries, because there are no truly natural boundaries. If it does not solve boundary problems, secession does do something else. A secession or partition converts a domestic ethnic dispute into a more dangerous international one. And since states are able to procure arms with few of the restraints that periodically bedevil insurgents, the international dispute often involves escalating weapons and the prospect of international warfare. Consider the nuclear armaments possessed by India and Pakistan and the recurrent warfare between those states. One reason for the greater danger that often follows secession is the activation of irredentist claims. For reasons I have explicated elsewhere,14 the serious pursuit of irredentas—;. Either the rump state or the secessionist state will desire to retrieve minorities stranded on the wrong side of the border. There are examples readily at hand: Kashmir, Serb claims in Bosnia and in the Krajina region of Croatia, warfare between Ethiopia and Eritrea. And when irredentism gets going, it usually involves ethnic cleansing, so as to eliminate troublesome minorities in the region to be retrieved. A recent quantitative study of the effects of partition finds that partition does not prevent further warfare between ethnic antagonists, and it has only a negligible (and easily reversed) positive effect on low-grade violence short of war.15 The recurrent temptation to create a multitude of homogeneous ministates, even if it could be realized, might well increase the sum total of warfare, rather than reduce it. The right direction for international boundaries is upward, not downward, so that states are so heterogeneous that no one group can plausibly dominate others.16 Although this degree of benign ethnic complexity is exceedingly difficult to achieve, it is still true that India, with its many groups, is a better model than Kosovo or Rwanda, with just two or three.
45DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025Advantage Answers
46DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025Answers to: Ethiopia/Somalia WarNo Ethiopia/Somalia warNicolas Fischer, 11-12, 24, Somaliland: What elections mean for regional power dynamics, https://www.dw.com/en/somaliland-what-elections-mean-for-regional-power-dynamics/a-70766007According to the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), a Berlin-based think tank,it is unlikely that a serious armed conflict will break out between Ethiopia and Somalia. That is partly due to the military balance of power — Ethiopia is one of the largest military powers in the region and far superior to Somalia — and partly because both states have a common interest in fighting the Al-Shabaab militias in southern Somalia, which want to establish an Islamic state in the Horn of Africa. According to the SWP, Ethiopia is currently deploying around 10,000 soldiers in Somalia, only one-third of whom are part of the AMISOM and ATMIS peacekeeping missions of the African Union (AU). The rest of the Ethiopian contingent are to contain the capabilities of Al-Shabaab in the neighboring country, maintain a buffer zone and thus prevent their attacks in Ethiopia itself. Somalia and Somaliland: Here arethe differences and issues
47DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025Answers to: DemocracySomaliland is not democraticWilson, 2-12, 24, Eliot Wilson is a freelance writer on politics and international affairs. He was senior official in the U.K. House of Commons from 2005 to 2016, including serving as a clerk of the Defence Committee and secretary of the U.K. delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. The Hill, https://thehill.com/opinion/international/4463184-recognize-somaliland-as-an-independent-nation/Somaliland still faces challenges of corruption, economic and political marginalization, and violence against women. But over the same 33-year period, Somalia, which asserts its sovereignty, has been in freefall, beset by internal violence and weak political institutions. Freedom House, which produces an annual assessment of political freedoms and civil liberties, last year rated Somaliland as “partly free” with a score of 44 out of 100. Somalia was declared “unfree” with just 8 of 100. For context, the United States only managed 76 of 100.Somaliland democracy decliningMariel Ferragamo and Claire Klobucista, 1-25, 24, Council on Foreign Relations, Somaliland: The Horn of Africa’s Breakaway State, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/somaliland-horn-africas-breakaway-stateThe territory has widely been seen as an “oasis” for stability in a turbulent region. “From the Somalilanders’ perspective, they have a completely reasonable argument,” Bronwyn Bruton, democracy and governance expert, said in 2018. “Somaliland is trying to break off from Somalia, which hasn’t been a functioning country in decades.” Democracy and civil liberties watchdog Freedom House rates Somaliland’s freedom index at “partly free,” scoring a forty-four out of one hundred in 2023, while Somalia got only eight in the same year—an unequivocally “not free” status, and the fourteenth-lowest worldwide However, Somaliland’s score has declined in recent years following crackdowns on opposition protestors when its parliament postponed the 2022 presidential election.
48DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025Answers to: Economic DevelopmentCan support Somaliland economic development without independenceMariel Ferragamo and Claire Klobucista, 1-25, 24, Council on Foreign Relations, Somaliland: The Horn of Africa’s Breakaway State, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/somaliland-horn-africas-breakaway-stateSomaliland has nonetheless negotiated its own foreign investment deals despite opposition from the federal government in Mogadishu. In 2016, it struck a landmark deal with DP World of Dubai, part of the UAE, to develop and manage the Port of Berbera, a joint venture expected to produce millions of dollars of income a year for Somaliland. Landlocked Ethiopia joined the port development project two years later, aiming to expand its access to the sea In January 2024, Somaliland sparked another diplomatic row with Somalia when it agreed to lease Ethiopia rights to twelve kilometers (twenty miles) of coastline and access to Berbera for commercial and military purposes for fifty years in exchange for itsformal recognition and part ownership of Ethiopia Airlines, the national carrier.Foreign investment high nowLeipzig, 2021, Markus Virgil Hoehne is lecturer at the Institute for Social Anthropology at the University of Leipzig. His books include Milk and peace, drought an war: Somali culture, society, and politics (London 2010) and Between Somaliland and Puntland: Marginalization, militarization and conflicting political visions (Nairobi / London 2015), Somaliland: 30 Years of De Facto Statehood, and No End In Sight, https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/somaliland-30-years-de-facto-statehood-and-no-end-sight-30363Today, the overwhelming majority of people in the center and the west of Somaliland are in favor of independence. Here, the country has developed impressively regarding infrastructure, private businesses and in the educational sector over the last 15 years. Consequently, international aid organizations and state agencies for development cooperation increasingly engaged – short of international recognition. Hargeysa developed into a real capital, at eye-level with major east African cities.Somaliland can secede without further supportLeipzig, 2021, Markus Virgil Hoehne is lecturer at the Institute for Social Anthropology at the University of Leipzig. His books include Milk and peace, drought an war: Somali culture, society, and politics (London 2010) and Between Somaliland and Puntland: Marginalization, militarization and conflicting political visions (Nairobi / London 2015), Somaliland: 30 Years of De Facto Statehood, and No End In Sight, https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/somaliland-30-years-de-facto-statehood-and-no-end-sight-30363Thirty years after its declaration of independence, Somaliland is still at the margins of the international political system, despite considerable successes in terms of peace and state building and its huge and
49DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025very effective diaspora investments. Non-recognition in itself would be less of a problem, as Somaliland shows that political order, democratic process, and a certain degree of development can be achieved without much international assistance.
50DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025Answers to: Justification to SecedeA justification to secede does not create a right to secedeStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, February 7, 2003, Secession, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/secession/The distinction between establishing that a group is morally justified in unilaterally seceding (in the sense of having a liberty-right) and establishing that the group has a moral claim-right to unilaterally secede is crucial, though it is rarely explicitly drawn by philosophers writing about secession. Having the liberty-right does not imply having the claim-right: a group might be morally justified in seceding and yet it might not be the case thatothers (including the state from which the group is seceding) are obligated to refrain from interfering with the group’s attempt to secede.Therefore, an argument that suffices to establish that a group is justified in seceding under such and such conditions may not suffice to establish that the group has a (claim-) right to secede under those conditions. Yet when philosophers attempt to develop a moral theory of secession by appealing to intuitions about hypothetical examples of secession, it is often unclear whether the intuition elicited isabout the moral justifiability of the secession (the mere permissibility) or about the existence of a moral claim-right.
51DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025Answers to: Oppressed Ethnic GroupsSecession doesn’t solve oppression of ethnic groups and just makes violence against them more likelyHorowitz, 2003, Donald L. Horowitz, James B. Duke Professor of Law and Political Science Emeritus at Duke University, recently became a senior fellow at the International Forum for Democratic Studies. Professor Horowitz is the author of numerous books and articles, including the seminal volume Ethnic Groups in Conflict (2000) and, most recently, Constitutional Change and Democracy in Indonesia (2013), Horowitz, Donald. “The Cracked Foundations of the Right to Secede”. Journal of Democracy, vol. 14, no. 2, Apr. 2003, pp. 5-17., https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/the-cracked-foundations-of-the-right-to-secede/Reinterpreting the principle of self-determination, some theorists have proposed that victimized ethnic groups ought to have a right to secede from states in which they are located. Proponents of such a right assert that, by separating antagonistic groups, secession can alleviate ethnic conflict. Secession, however, does not create homogeneous successor states or assure protection of remaining minorities, and its converts domestic ethnic conflict into more dangerous international conflict. Recognition of a right to secede would dampen attempts to adopt conciliatory policies in the undivided state, and would likely increase ultimately fruitless secessionist warfare. The best hope for severely divided societies lies not in encouraging secession or partition but in devising institutions to increase the satisfaction of minorities in existing states.Better to improve situations for ethnic groups within statesHorowitz, 2003, Donald L. Horowitz, James B. Duke Professor of Law and Political Science Emeritus at Duke University, recently became a senior fellow at the International Forum for Democratic Studies. Professor Horowitz is the author of numerous books and articles, including the seminal volume Ethnic Groups in Conflict (2000) and, most recently, Constitutional Change and Democracy in Indonesia (2013), Horowitz, Donald. “The Cracked Foundations of the Right to Secede”. Journal of Democracy, vol. 14, no. 2, Apr. 2003, pp. 5-17., https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/the-cracked-foundations-of-the-right-to-secede/Guarantees of minority protection in secessionist regions are likely to be illusory; indeed, many secessionist movements have as one of their aims the expulsion or subordination of minorities in the secessionist regions. The very existence of a right to secede, moreover, is likely to dampen efforts at coexistence in the undivided state, including the adoption of federalism or regional autonomy, which might alleviate some of the grievances of putatively secessionist minorities. Since most secessionist movements will be resisted by central governments and most secessionists receive insufficient foreign military assistance to succeed, propounding a right to secede, without the means to success, is likely to increase ultimately fruitless secessionist warfare, at the expense of internal efforts at political accommodation and at the cost of increased human suffering. Efforts to improve the condition of minorities ought to be directed at devising institutions to increase their satisfaction in existing states,
52DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025rather than encouraging them to think in terms of exit options. In those rare cases in which separation of antagonists is, at the end of the day, the best course, partition can be accomplished reluctantly, as a matter of prudence, without recognizing a right to secede. But neither partition nor secession should be viewed as generally desirable solutions to the problems of ethnic conflict.Neither secession nor international law protect minority rightsHorowitz, 2003, Donald L. Horowitz, James B. Duke Professor of Law and Political Science Emeritus at Duke University, recently became a senior fellow at the International Forum for Democratic Studies. Professor Horowitz is the author of numerous books and articles, including the seminal volume Ethnic Groups in Conflict (2000) and, most recently, Constitutional Change and Democracy in Indonesia (2013), Horowitz, Donald. “The Cracked Foundations of the Right to Secede”. Journal of Democracy, vol. 14, no. 2, Apr. 2003, pp. 5-17., https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/the-cracked-foundations-of-the-right-to-secede/There are always ethnic minorities in secessionist regions. There were Efik and Ijaw, among others, in Biafra; there are Hindus in Kashmir, Muslims in Tamil areas of Sri Lanka, Javanese in Aceh and Irian Jaya, Serbs and Roma in Kosovo; and there are minorities in all the rump states as well. As a matter of fact, it is often the desire of regional majorities to deal with minorities—and not to deal with them in a democratic way—that motivates or contributes to the secessionist movement in the first instance. Proponents of rights to secession assure us that minority rights must be guaranteed in secessionist states and that secession should Donald L. Horowitz 9 be less favored if minority rights are unlikely to berespected,11 but the verbal facility of this formulation masks the difficulty of achieving any such results. If, after all, conditions on the exercise of an international law right to secede can be enforced, why not enforce those conditions in the undivided state so as to forestall the need to secede? International law has been notoriously ineffective in assuring longstanding, internationally recognized minority rights, and proponents of secession have no new ideas to offer on this matter. If the failure to respect minority rights in the undivided state induced a regional group to consider secession, why should anyone assume that the situation will be different when that group, a minority in the undivided state, comprises a majority in the secessionist state? If anything, the treatment of minorities in smaller states is less visible to outsiders.The more circumscribed the asserted right to secede, ironically enough, the more dangerous conditions may become for minorities in the secessionist region. By the time it is concluded that the majority in the undivided state is unalterably hostile to minority interests, thus in some formulations permitting the minority to secede, that group may have accumulated so many grudges that, in their turn, minorities in the secessionist region may be particularly vulnerable to the expression of violent hostility or the settlement of old scores. There are many examples: the fate of Serbs and Roma in Kosovo, of Biharis in Bangladesh, of Sikhs and Hindus in Pakistan at the time of partition, and of Muslims in India at the same time. If the problem of minorities is that they do not enjoy “meaningful political participation”12 in the undivided state, there is no reason to think that minorities will enjoy it in the secessionist state either. Secession merely proliferates the arenas in which the problem of intergroup political accommodation must be faced—and often more starkly. Contrast Yugoslavia, with six or seven groups and the complex
53DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025alignments they created with Bosnia, in which three groups confront each other. Secession can hardly be said to solve the problem of intergroup accommodation, except, of course, insofar as it enables the former minority, now a new majority, to cleanse the secessionist state of its minorities—which it could not do previously—and induces the rump state to do the same with members of the secessionist group who find themselves left on the wrong side of a new international boundary.Right to secede makes it less likely states will accommodate ethnic groupsHorowitz, 2003, Donald L. Horowitz, James B. Duke Professor of Law and Political Science Emeritus at Duke University, recently became a senior fellow at the International Forum for Democratic Studies. Professor Horowitz is the author of numerous books and articles, including the seminal volume Ethnic Groups in Conflict (2000) and, most recently, Constitutional Change and Democracy in Indonesia (2013), Horowitz, Donald. “The Cracked Foundations of the Right to Secede”. Journal of Democracy, vol. 14, no. 2, Apr. 2003, pp. 5-17., https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/the-cracked-foundations-of-the-right-to-secede/Articulating a right to secede will undermine attempts to achieve interethnic accommodation within states. As things now stand, the principal reason that states are reluctant to devolve power to territorially concentrated minorities, either by means of regional autonomy or federalism, is their fear that it will lead to secession. That fear is usually unfounded, unless the conflict has already dragged on for a long time and the central government has been utterly ungenerous. Nevertheless, central governments are risk averse about devolution. The best way to dry up devolution as a tool of interethnicaccommodation—and a promising tool it is—is to establish a right, recognized in international law, for territorially concentrated minorities to secede. If there is a well-recognized right to secede, the first stirrings of territorially based ethnic discontent will be likely to be met with repression. The possibility that federalism or regional autonomy can lawfully ripen into secession will make any such experiment too costly to entertain. It has been difficult to persuade central decision makers in Indonesia and Sri Lanka to devolve power to regions. A right to secession would easily dissuade them. One reason central governments are so reluctant to countenance the possibility of secession, even for troublesome regions that some central decision makers might wish to be free of, is that the secession of one region upsets ethnic balances and forces groups in other regions to think afresh about whether they wish to remain in the truncated state with its new ethnic balances. This was clearly visible in Yugoslavia after theSlovene and Croat decisions to secede, when others had to decide in turn whether the relative expansion in Serb power in the rump state was in their interest. Yoruba narrowly decided to stay in Nigeria, despite the relative increase in Hausa power when Ibo decided to leave the state in 1967, and the departure of East Bengal (Bangladesh) from Pakistan destabilized relations among the groups that remained in the rump state. Quite often the fears of central authorities about secession are derided as unsubstantiated apprehensions of domino effects. But domino effects are usually conceived as action based merely on a successful example in another location, whereas what is involved in the first secession is action that affects directly, rather than just by example, the relative positions of other groups remaining in the state. The creation of a right to secede could not be more untimely. More and more states have been designing internal political arrangements, including devolution, to reduce the incidence of ethnic conflict. That is where the emphasis needs to be, not on making exit strategies more plausible. More about this shortly. A right to secede effectively advantages militant members of ethnic
54DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025groups at the expense of conciliators. Since most central governments will not recognize the right to secede, those who wish to pursue such a course will need to resort to arms. Those who are willing to resort to arms are by no means simply latter-day versions of the politicians of their own group whom they seek to displace. Contrast Hashim Thaci of the Kosovo Liberation Army with the Kosovar political leader Ibrahim Rugova; Prabhakaran of the Tamil Tigers with Amirthalingham of the Tamil United Liberation Front, whom he had assassinated; the Southern People’s Liberation Army in the Sudan with the old Liberal Party that preceded it. Violence disproportionately attracts people with 12 Journal of Democracy an interest in aggression. The people willing to take up arms for secession are those who are willing to be brutal with their ethnic enemies and with their own rivals as well. As their advantage grows, new bouts of ethnic cleansing can be expected. In some formulations, secession is said to be an “exceptional” right that “comes into play if” it “is the only way that a defined population can exercise its right of internal self-determination.”17 But the facts do not support the assumption that secession is ever “the only way.” Are the Kurds in Iraq secessionist or autonomist? They have gone back and forth. Are Philippine Muslims? They, too, have gone back and forth. Ibo tried unsuccessfully to secede and then reintegrated into Nigerian politics. In such cases, it looks to outsiders at any given moment as if secession is “the only way” minorities can participate in determining their own future, but there is more fluidity to ethnic politics than those who write about populations that are “unalterably hostile”18 to each other have sensed. Moreover, the seemingly moderate position of some proponents of a right to secession that secession is justified only if others are unalterably opposed or minorities have been victimized is not likely to work out moderately in practice, for it is an incentive to ethnic polarization. If independence can only be won legitimately after matters have been carried to extremes, then, by all means, there are people willing to carry them to extremes. In the 1980s and early 1990s, Sikh separatists in the Indian Punjab were willing to attack Hindus in order to precipitate attacks on Sikhs elsewhere in India. There is no shortage of methods to satisfy tough standards of victimization or oppression. A right to secede could indeed contribute to the sense that secession is the only way. There may be times when it is felt best to part peoples. The British believed such a time had come in India in 1947, and the United Nations believed such a time had come a year later in Palestine. When it is prudent, parting can be done by consent, as in the former Soviet Union and in Czechoslovakia, or occasionally by international action. To do this requires the creation of no rights. Consider the perniciouseffect on the balance of intragroup opinion of a right to secede in a concrete case: Sri Lanka. Will the Sri Lankan Tamils return as readily as they would otherwise to a thoroughly reconstructed but undivided SriLanka if they discover that the secession to which they turned so reluctantly was merely an exercise of their rights under international law? It is always hard for antagonistic groups to accommodate each other in a single state. A right to secede will make it harder
55DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025Answers to: Oppressed Ethnic MinoritiesMinorities can’t stop two countries from joining, so there is no reason they should be entitled to splittingChristopher Health Wellman, philosopher, St. Louis, 2015, A Theory of Succession, Kindle edition. Page number at end of card. Clearly, this is too strict a requirement. Against this, one might suggest that, unlike secessions, political mergers are permissible in the absence of unanimity because they add to the territory over which one’s federal government presides, whereas state breaking restricts one’s government’s area of jurisdiction. This qualification helps some, but it remains too restrictive because it would also prohibit mutual divisions. What if 90 percent of the Norwegians and 90 percent of the Swedes had favored political divorce, for instance?[25] Or imagine that the vast majority of Germans later decided that the merger was a mistake and 90 percent of them voted to divide once again into East and West Germany. Would we object to either of these divisions on the grounds that a 10 percent minority would be forced to belong to smaller states? Presumably not. And if a minority does not have a right to block either politicalmergers or mutual divisions, it is not clear why they should have a right to contest unilateral divisions. Wellman, Christopher Heath. A Theory of Secession (p. 62). Cambridge University Press. Kindle Edition.
56DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025Answers to: Colonization is BadColonization is wrong but that doesn’t mean succession is rightChristopher Health Wellman, philosopher, St. Louis, 2015, A Theory of Succession, Kindle edition. Page number at end of card. In conclusion, the value of group autonomy is an admittedly substantial assumption necessary for the argument in favor of secessionist rights, but it is an assumption that can be denied only by those willing to concede that we do no necessary injustice to groups of people when we colonize them, annex their legitimate states, or dismantle their legitimate democracies. Of course, virtually everyone now acknowledges the injustice of colonizing a foreign population, but the pivotal lesson of this chapter is that one cannot consistently invoke group autonomy to explain the impermissibility of colonization without also acknowledging the legitimacy of the secessionist claims to self-determination. Charles Beitz is no staunch supporter of self-determination, but even he appreciates that “it is not clear why the groups eligible to claim a right of self-determination should be limited to those, like colonial populations,that are already recognized as territorially distinct.”[18] Put simply, if I am right about the implications for state breaking that follow from properly valuing group autonomy, then the only way to question the primary right to secede defended here is to deny (1) that there are nonconsequential reasons against forcibly colonizing others, (2) that legitimate states are entitled to an appropriate degree of sovereignty, and (3) that there are deontologicalWellman, Christopher Heath. A Theory of Secession (p. 55). Cambridge U niversity Press. Kindle Edition.
57DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025Answers to: “Rights”Protection of rights requires strong states to protect people from violenceChristopher Health Wellman, philosopher, St. Louis, 2015, A Theory of Succession, Kindle edition. Page number at end of card. To appreciate fully this analogy between a citizen and Antonio, we must understand why political states offer the only hope of escaping the state of nature. A stateless environment would be an insecure place in which peace would be unavailable and moral rights would be disrespected because, among other things, there will always be people unwilling to honor the moral rights of others if violating them has no legal repercussions. Moral rights will be respected and peace will be ensured only if police effectively protect individuals and recognized judges impartially adjudicate conflicts according to established rules.[14] But even if one acknowledges the value of peace and security, one might deny the necessity of territorially defined states. If the primary function of a political state is to protect rights and secure peace, then why could these same benefits not be supplied by private protection agencies or via some other arrangement? Why not sort people into protective agencies according to religion, eye color, preference for a particular set of rules, or by consent? Most importantly, how can we justify coercing people into territorially defined political units when the benefits of these states might be achieved through less coercive or even consensual means? The proper response is that political coercion is permissible because (and only when) no other arrangement is feasible. It is no mere historical accident that states are territorially defined; they are territorial because this is the only way for them to perform their functions.[15] Peace would be unavailable in the absence of a decisive and accepted method of enforcing common rules and adjudicating conflicts. Because conflicts typically occur between parties in spatial proximity (since conflicts require interactions, and we most often interact with those nearby), and because a judge can peacefully and decisively settle conflicts only if she has authority over both parties, a judge must have power over all those who share spatial proximity.[16] Thus, since conflicts willproliferate and escalate if those around us follow different rules and appeal to competing authorities, we cannot politically sort ourselves according to religious affiliation, sexual preference, or eye color as long as we live among people of varying religions, sexual preferences, and eye colors. I will return to the necessity of political society later, but hopefully this quick sketch explains why states must be territorially defined.[17] Given that states must be territorial, it is easy to see why the consent of their constituents is a luxury they can ill afford. The benefits of political society accrue only if all those in close proximity are similarly bound, so a state must insist that residents either play by the promulgated rules or leave. If each citizen were at liberty to secede (as opposed to emigrate) and citizenship were established consensually, the numerically diminished and spatially disparate remaining people could notperform the functions of securing peace and protecting rights.[18] Indeed, the fact that emigration does not threaten a state’s capacity to secure peace and protect rights confirms that states must be territorial. Whereas unlimited secession precludes a country from uniformly coercing all those in spatial proximity, emigration does not lead to conflicts between parties who play by different rules and appeal to different authorities. Thus, the fact that emigration is not as disruptive as secession is further
58DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025evidence for the link between states being territorial and their being capable of performing their political functions.[19] Wellman, Christopher Heath. A Theory of Secession (pp. 15-16). Cambridge University Press. Kindle Edition.
59DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025Answers to: “Freedom of Association”Freedom of association is incompatible with political stabilityChristopher Health Wellman, philosopher, St. Louis, 2015, A Theory of Succession, Kindle edition. Page number at end of card. In short, freedom of political association is incompatible with political stability, and samaritanism is an ineliminable ingredient of political legitimacy, because people cannot enjoy the benefits of political stability without uniformly restricting the political liberty of those around them. To emphasize: emphasize: The reason that I have no moral right to be free from political coercion (i.e., to secede) is that, even if I would rather forego the benefits of political society, my state may permissibly coerce me in order to secure political stability for my fellow citizens. To return to the analogy, the justification for my state’s coercive presence stems from the same samaritan source as Antonio’s duty to Bathsheba. The only normative difference between Antonio and me is a Hohfeldian one: Samaritanism gives Antonio a duty (correlative to Bathsheba’s claim-right) where ordinarily he would have a liberty-right, and it leaves me with no moral claim (correlative to the state’s liberty-right) where ordinarily I would have a claim-right.[20] In less Hohfeldian terms, this difference is merely that samaritanism requires Antonio to do something (escort Bathsheba safely from Pleasantville) that he would not ordinarily have to do, and it leaves me morally liable to an imposition (the state’s coercion) that I would ordinarily not be required to endure. Once one recognizes the two facts (1) that a political state is necessary to avoid the hazards of the state of nature and (2) that a government can successfully eliminate these dangers only if it is territorially defined, one appreciates why political legitimacy has the same grounds as Antonio’s samaritan duty to Bathsheba. Wellman, Christopher Heath. A Theory of Secession (pp. 16-17). Cambridge University Press. Kindle Edition.No absolute right to freedom of associationChristopher Health Wellman, philosopher, St. Louis, 2015, A Theory of Succession, Kindle edition. Page number at end of card. If it were true either that we had consented to be governed or that very few of us would elect to secede if given the opportunity, then freedom of association would not be incompatible with statism. However, because it is historically inaccurate to posit widespread consent and unrealistically optimistic to predict that most of us would not secede a territorial monopoly of power that cannot be achieved if everyone’sconsent is required. No private agency would be selected by all, and competing agencies would clash in a manner that undermines peace. I must confess, though, that if someone could generate conclusive evidence that a just and secure peace could be established in the state of nature, I would embrace anarchism rather than statism. In the absence of such evidence, however, there is no reason to jettison the descriptive premise upon which the samaritan theory of political legitimacy relies. Conclusion If it were true either that we had consented to be governed or that very few of us would elect to secede if
60DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025given the opportunity, then freedom of association would not be incompatible with statism. However, because it is historically inaccurate to posit widespread consent and unrealistically optimistic to predict that most of us would not secede if given the opportunity, we must choose between denying the legitimacy of existing states and qualifying freedom of association. The samaritan account of political legitimacy explains why states may permissibly coerce citizens without their consent and, in so doing, explains why we do not have a perfectly general and absolute right to freedom of association. Without denying the importance of being able to choose one’s associates, we must acknowledge that this discretion may permissibly be restricted in the political context, because (unlike the case of choosing a marital partner or a religious community) its costs in the political arena are prohibitive. In the end, we are forced to choose between statism and unrestricted freedom of association, and the samaritan account makes plain why we must give up the latter and its permissive implications for secession. Thus we must confess that, while there may be unilateral rights to secede even from just states, these rights cannot be established merely by a straightforward appeal to the value of freedom of association. Wellman, Christopher Heath. A Theory of Secession (pp. 32-33). Cambridge University Press. Kindle Edition.
61DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025Answers to: Popular Democracy Permits SecessionMany popular democratic interests against secessionOberman, 2017, Kieran Oberman is a Lecturer in Political Theory at the University of Edinburgh., Does Catalonia have a right to secede?, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/does-catalonia-have-right-to-secede/First, democracy. This is the ‘go to’ argument of many Catalan secessionists. According to Catalan President, Carles Puigdemont, a vote on independence is simply an “expression of a free democracy”. In this view, Catalans have a right to decide whether Catalonia is independent just as they have a right to decide on any other issue affecting them. The problem with this argument is that it assumes what is precisely at issue: that Catalonia represents the appropriate constituency to make this decision. Another plausible constituency would be Spain itself. For it is not just Catalonia that is affected by the issue of independence. Catalan independence would have significant repercussions for Spain’s economy and identity. It would also have ripple effects on other regions, including the Basque countrywhich has only recently escaped the violence of its own secessionist conflict. short, the democracy argument fails to overcome what we might term the ‘symmetry problem’. Democracy can be advanced both as an argument for secession and an argument against it. To justify secession, we needto justify ‘asymmetry’: to explain why it is Catalonia, not Spain as a whole, that has a right to decide.
62DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025Answers to: Self-DeterminationMuch opposition to self-determinationOberman, 2017, Kieran Oberman is a Lecturer in Political Theory at the University of Edinburgh., Does Catalonia have a right to secede?, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/does-catalonia-have-right-to-secede/Democracy is not the only argument that suffers from the symmetry problem. Another is national self-determination. The idea that a nation has a right to determine its own future is fine as far as it goes. The problem arises when there is more than one nation in play. Catalan national self-determination butts up against Spanish national self-determination. One cannot give full expression to the one without limiting the other. Some will stamp their feet at this and proclaim that “Catalonia is not Spain”. If there were twodiscreet nations then Spain would be other-determining not self-determining when it takes part in Catalan affairs. But the very fact people proclaim this slogan demonstrates how controversial it is. National identity is not physics. Nations exist, split or overlap depending on inter-subjective beliefs. As long as there are people inside Catalonia and the rest of Spain who believe in an over-arching Spanish nation, the concept of national self-determination can be invoked by both sides. It offers no firm ground for secession.
63DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025Answers to: Freedom of AssociationGovernments are not clubsOberman, 2017, Kieran Oberman is a Lecturer in Political Theory at the University of Edinburgh., Does Catalonia have a right to secede?, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/does-catalonia-have-right-to-secede/The other argument that avoids the symmetry argument is freedom of association. This the kind of argument that it takes a philosopher to come up with. The argument likens states to clubs. Just as you and your friends don’t need anyone’s approval to set up a new club or split from an old one, so regions don’t need their state’s approval to secede. The problem with the argument is quite simple: the analogy fails. States are not like clubs. People do not voluntarily join states for the sake of their hobby or passion; they are forced into states for the sake of justice and peace. States set the background rules; clubs and other associations offer people the opportunity to pursue particular interests.If Catalans want to form associations, they can do so. Catalonia already has all kinds of clubs and associations, including many operating across the region (the Catalan Football Federation, the Catalan Association for Science Communication and so on and so forth). They don’t need a state to be their club,nor should they want it to be. A state that tries to be a club is like a parent who tries to be a friend. We need states. We need parents. But if we are to maintain our individual autonomy, these unchosen authorities in our lives must assume their proper roles and not pretend to be something they are not.
64DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025Answers to: Right to SecedeSecession is a weak right that is outweighed by counteveiling needsNeera Chandhoke, 2012, Contextualizing the Right of Secession, https://academic.oup.com/book/2356/chapter-abstract/142523329?login=false&redirectedFrom=fulltextThe argument holds that secession is a contingent right, which can be invoked only when certain circumstances prevail, such as institutionalized violations of fundamental rights and/or violations of contractual obligations. Whereas secession is clearly a right that supervenes upon groups in undemocratic states if they have been subjected to irrevocable and institutionalised injustice, the right isa weak one in formal democracies, even if these democracies are imperfectly just and inadequately democratic. A weak right is one that can be overridden by moral considerations that have a bearing upon the right. The first set of such considerations relates to the immediate fall out of secession: (a) minority rights, (b) third-party interventions, and (c) the violent nature of the struggle. The second set ofmoral considerations have to do with the ultimate objective of normative political theory: what kind of asociety provides the best context for human beings to live out their lives.Must consider all consequences before saying there is a right to secedeNeera Chandhoke, 2012, Contextualizing the Right of Secession, https://academic.oup.com/book/2356/chapter-abstract/142523329?login=false&redirectedFrom=fulltextIf it is true that a range of legitimate interests is relevant to determining the nature of the moral right to secede, and if the extent that these interests are impacted by secession depends on the existing institutional resources, including not just those of the remainder state and the new state, but also those of regional and international organizations, then it follows that a theory of the moral right to secede must take into account existing institutional realities at all levels. Buchanan’s latest work on secession delves into just this—he argues that the moral right to secede is institution-dependent in the sense that whether a group has the moral right to secede depends on the nature of existing institutions and whether or not they can adequately mitigate the risks that secession would pose to various morally important interests. This means that properly theorizing the right to secede requires empirically-backed premises that characterize a) the range of morally significant interests at risk in various cases of secession and b) the ability or inability of existing institutions to mitigate those risks. If this is true, then it seems that both remedial right only and primary right views are incomplete, as neither provide these important empirical premises.
65DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025Answers to: Human RightsHuman rights pushes secessionismRivka Weill, Visiting Law Professor, Yale Law School , 2018, Secession and the Prevalence of Both Militant Democracy and Eternity Clauses Worldwide, Cardozo Law Review, https://cardozolawreview.com/secession-prevalence-worldwide/Third, secessionists feel that they can exploit the language of human rights to promote their agenda. After WWI, President Wilson promoted the idea of a nation’s right to self-determination to promote world peace. U.S. presidents emphasized this self-determination principle in international treaties following WWII in the context of decolonization.76 The United Nations Charter explicitly includes decolonization as part of the U.N. agenda.77 In 1960, the U.N. General Assembly adopted Resolution 1514 titled the “Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.”78 The“external” right to self-determination in the form of statehood exists in cases of colonial or alien occupation.79 At the same time, international bodies promoted the imperatives of social and cultural rights, devolution, and autonomy arrangements within existing states to protect minority rights. This is amanifestation of the “internal” right to self-determination within democratic states.80 Secessionists have used the international community’s prioritization of both self-determination and group/minorityrights to push these agendas even further. Secession is thus demanded even outside of decolonizationprocesses and even when the parent state makes every effort to accommodate group rights, as was evident in Quebec.81Secession crushes the human rights of others in new territoriesRivka Weill, Visiting Law Professor, Yale Law School , 2018, Secession and the Prevalence of Both Militant Democracy and Eternity Clauses Worldwide, Cardozo Law Review, https://cardozolawreview.com/secession-prevalence-worldwide/Moreover, while secessionists often promote their cause in the name of their right to ethnic-national–self-determination, the resulting new state’s boundaries are usually not drawn according to the traits of the populace. Instead, they are usually drawn according to earlier sub-national administrative borders.97 Thus, ironically, ethnic groups may become new minorities in the newly created state.98 The legitimacy for secession is thus weakened. Secessionism may, in fact, become an ongoing process where countries liberated through secession become subject to secessionist demands as well.99Thus, for example, Bangladesh seceded in 1971 from Pakistan—which itself had won independence in 1947 after being ruled by Britain.100 East Timor seceded from Indonesia in 2002, which itself had been a Dutch colony until WWII.101 This potentially endless process of secession may threaten the idea of self-determination and statehood.102People can vote
66DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025Rivka Weill, Visiting Law Professor, Yale Law School , 2018, Secession and the Prevalence of Both Militant Democracy and Eternity Clauses Worldwide, Cardozo Law Review, https://cardozolawreview.com/secession-prevalence-worldwide/For democracies, one of the most important sources of legitimacy is majority rule, by which every adult citizen has one vote, and by and large, the majority determines election results. If citizens wish to change the governing law, they are expected to use political means, rather than resort to violence. Citizens may petition their representatives, hold public demonstrations, or even run for office to change the governing law from within.
67DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025Answers to: International LawSecession is part of domestic law, not international lawRivka Weill, Visiting Law Professor, Yale Law School , 2018, Secession and the Prevalence of Both Militant Democracy and Eternity Clauses Worldwide, Cardozo Law Review, https://cardozolawreview.com/secession-prevalence-worldwide/How does the law deal with secession? Secession is traditionally thought to be regulated solely under international law. But, in fact, it lies at the intersection between the constitutional law of a given country and international law. Secession remains part of the “internal affairs” of the state so long as the state does not abrogate its duties under international law to properly treat the minority wishing to secede. But, if the state mishandles the affair, the situation might deteriorate into a conflict that places it in the province of international law. A great conflict of wills between the state and the secessionists regarding the application of international law is implied in secession. While those wishing to secede may seek external intervention and the world’s recognition that a change in the boundaries ofan existing state is warranted, the parent state may ferociously defend its territorial integrity.109Secession only recognized in international law in limited circumstancesRivka Weill, Visiting Law Professor, Yale Law School , 2018, Secession and the Prevalence of Both Militant Democracy and Eternity Clauses Worldwide, Cardozo Law Review, https://cardozolawreview.com/secession-prevalence-worldwide/Given that national boundaries are at stake, it may be surprising that international law is vague on when secession is justified and how the international community should view “newly” self-declared states. Internationallaw clearly legitimizes secession only in the case of decolonization or alien domination.110 It is not even clear whether international law recognizes a remedial right to secede when the parent state persecutes minorities or seriously abuses their human rights.111 In 2009, Serbia led the General Assembly to ask for an advisory opinion of the ICJ regarding the question: “Is the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in accordance with international law?”112 The ICJ distinguished the issue before it from that decided by the Canadian Supreme Court in the Quebec case. The Canadian case dealt with the question of whether there is a right under international law to unilaterally secede.113 The ICJ defined the issue before it as whether Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence violated international law.114 Nor did it discuss the legal consequences of the unilateral declaration of independence.115 The ICJ did state that “[d]uring the second half of the twentieth century, the international law of self-determination developed in such a way as to create a right to independence for the peoples of non-self-governing territories and peoples subject to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation.”116 This language is identical to article 1 of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Article 1 states, “The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and isan impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation.”117 This language is thus open to
68DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025conflicting interpretations. One possible interpretation is that when people do not have a right to vote for the governing institutions, they are subject to alien domination and are entitled to an external right to self-determination.International law protects minorities to avoid secessionRivka Weill, Visiting Law Professor, Yale Law School , 2018, Secession and the Prevalence of Both Militant Democracy and Eternity Clauses Worldwide, Cardozo Law Review, https://cardozolawreview.com/secession-prevalence-worldwide/Rather than recognizing a remedial right to secede, international law is geared toward establishing internal protections for minorities as a way to avoid secession. International law defines what countries should do, rather than the consequences of failing to do what they should.122 International law thus forces democracies to face an untenable dilemma. If they fail to accommodate group rights of minorities, they may face charges that they are violating human rights—which in turn may lead to secessionist claims for remedial secession to end the injustices inflicted by the parent state. On the other hand, if democracies foster minorities’ separate identities by promoting group rights, including an official recognition of the minorities’ language, culture, religion, etc., they may actively support the separation of these minorities from the existing state. Democracies may find themselves providing the very resources and fostering the separate identities that allow minorities to embark on secession. For example, ironically, in Eastern Europe, secessionist movements arose when the protection of rights improved.123 This is a lose-lose situation for the states, and the solution requires a delicate, almost unachievable, balance: states must enable group identity to be formed without enabling minorities to overreach their status or undermine the unity of the state.124 This may partly explain this Article’s findings that even consociationalist and consensus democracies ban secession.125 It is also unclear under international law which groups should be “entitled” to secede in non-decolonization contexts.126 Should the right to secede be limited to groups sharing ascriptive characteristics (that is, characteristics of “being” rather than those of “achieving,” such as ethnicity),127 or should the right be widened to include majorities that share only the will to secede?128 International law fails to define what “people” are entitled to self-determination.129The international law claim is narrow at bestStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, February 7, 2003, Secession, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/secession/There is yet another desideratum for a theory of secession: As suggested earlier, the implications of each type of theory for international law regarding secession should be explained. And presumably an account of the morality of secession should provide some guidance for determining what the posture of international law should be regarding secession. In the next section, we explore briefly the relationship between views about the moral (claim-)right to unilateral secession and the question of what position international law should take on unilateral secession.
69DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025The deficiencies of existing international law regarding secession motivate the project of developing principled proposals for reform. At present international law recognizes only a very narrow set of circumstances under which the unilateral right to secede exists as an international legal right, namely, when a group is subject to colonial domination or is the victim of an unlawful occupation by a foreign entity or is subjected to an Apartheid-like regime. The difficulty with this conception of the international legal right to unilateral secession is that, while clearly embodying the idea that serious and persistent injustices can generate a right to unilateral secession, it arbitrarily restricts the injustices that generate the right.International law does not support secessionHorowitz, 2003, Donald L. Horowitz, James B. Duke Professor of Law and Political Science Emeritus at Duke University, recently became a senior fellow at the International Forum for Democratic Studies. Professor Horowitz is the author of numerous books and articles, including the seminal volume Ethnic Groups in Conflict (2000) and, most recently, Constitutional Change and Democracy in Indonesia (2013), Horowitz, Donald. “The Cracked Foundations of the Right to Secede”. Journal of Democracy, vol. 14, no. 2, Apr. 2003, pp. 5-17., https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/the-cracked-foundations-of-the-right-to-secede/The so-called right to secede has its origins in the principle of national self-determination. As is well known, that principle formed an integral part of Woodrow Wilson’s plans for post-World War I Europe. The establishment of, for example, Rumania as a state for Rumanians certainly exemplified application of the self-determination principle, but, even apart from the presence of minorities in such new states, the Wilsonian policy fell far short of according national or ethnic groups their own states. Indeed, Wilsonmay well have envisioned autonomy rather than independence, and he did not necessarily think in terms of an ethnic fulfillment for the right to self-determination. Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, for example, were multinational states, and Wilson’s proposal that a right of self-determination be incorporated in the Covenant of the League of Nations was rejected. By the time of the Atlantic Charter in 1941, self-determination was to be limited to peoples living under foreign domination.1 Decolonization was thus an exercise of selfdetermination, and it was soon made clear by the United Nations (in 1960) and the Organization of African Unity (in 1964), among others, that secessionist threats to the territorial integrity of states would not be regarded as further exercises of self-determinationInternational law ignores the practical failures of secessionHorowitz, 2003, Donald L. Horowitz, James B. Duke Professor of Law and Political Science Emeritus at Duke University, recently became a senior fellow at the International Forum for Democratic Studies. Professor Horowitz is the author of numerous books and articles, including the seminal volume Ethnic Groups in Conflict (2000) and, most recently, Constitutional Change and Democracy in Indonesia (2013), Horowitz, Donald. “The Cracked Foundations of the Right to Secede”. Journal of Democracy, vol. 14, no.
70DebateUS! Somaliland January 20252, Apr. 2003, pp. 5-17., https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/the-cracked-foundations-of-the-right-to-secede/Despite important differences in scope and reasoning among these justifications for secession, there is asubstratum of assumptions in all of them. Secession, it is assumed, can produce homogeneous successorstates. In those cases in which heterogeneity remains, it is asserted, minority rights can nevertheless be guaranteed. Like the Badinter Commission, most writers advocating a right to secede make no provision for further secessions, except, of course, insofar as infinite regress of secessionist rights may be implied in their formulations. Secession will also, it is assumed, result in a diminution of conflict that produced the secessionist movement. Rarely are these assumptions discussed or even rendered explicit, but they are essential to the analysis. “If you can think about something which is attached to something else without thinking about what it is attached to, then you have what is called a legal mind.”10 So pronounced the late constitutional lawyer, Thomas Reed Powell, three-quarters of a century ago. Most theorists of a right to secession have, in this caricatured sense, legal minds. They have generally not concerned themselves with the ethnic politics that produces secessionist claims and that will be affectedby new rights to secede. It is no accident that most people who do study ethnic politics are decidedly less enthusiastic about secession than are the international lawyers and philosophers who are the main proponents of a right to secede.International law does not protect a right to secedeHorowitz, 2003, Donald L. Horowitz, James B. Duke Professor of Law and Political Science Emeritus at Duke University, recently became a senior fellow at the International Forum for Democratic Studies. Professor Horowitz is the author of numerous books and articles, including the seminal volume Ethnic Groups in Conflict (2000) and, most recently, Constitutional Change and Democracy in Indonesia (2013), Horowitz, Donald. “The Cracked Foundations of the Right to Secede”. Journal of Democracy, vol. 14, no. 2, Apr. 2003, pp. 5-17., https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/the-cracked-foundations-of-the-right-to-secede/As I indicated at the outset, rights to secession are only in some formulations grounded in the extreme oppression of minorities. In others, rights to secede derive from the alleged commitment of international law to democracy. In fact, international law has not had a particularly deep or longstanding commitment to democracy. Only in 1992 did Thomas Franck purport to discover an “emerging entitlement” to be governed democratically.19 International law has always placed great emphasis on the writings of jurists, but traditionally for their syntheses of legal rules and for their influence on state practice that could then change the law, not for the direct creation of new rights by cobbling together new formulations. Such a practice is particularly doubtful when it is recalled that international law is a field in which judicial and bureaucratic institutions far outrun representative ones. In 1998, the British jurist James Crawford produced a long and exhaustive survey of state practice and the international law pertaining to secession.20 Crawford’s conclusion was simply stated: . . . State practice since 1945 shows very clearly the extreme reluctance of States to recognize or accept unilateral secession outside the colonial context. That practice has not changed since 1989, despite the emergenceduring that period of 22 new States. On the contrary, the practice has been powerfully reinforced.21
71DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025Bangladesh, Crawford noted, was best viewed not as exemplar of a recognized right to secede but “rather as a fait accompli achieved as a result of foreign military assistance in special circumstances.”22 Other cases, such as Eritrea and the Baltic states, involved mutual consent. Where central governments oppose unilateral secession, Crawford found, the secessionists gain little or no international recognition.This certainly has been the case in northern Somalia and Transdniestria, among others. And, finally, there is “no recognition of a unilateral right to secedebased merely on a majority vote of the population of a given subdivision or territory. In principle, self-determination for peoples or groups within the State is to be achieved by participation in its constitutional system, and on the basis of respect for its territorial integrity.”23 Crawford might have, but did not, note the contrary but truly exceptional position of the government of the United Kingdom, which has stated, in ways meant to be binding, that a majority of the people of Northern Ireland might vote to dissolve their union with Britain and to join the Irish Republic instead. But this has not been the position of other states, and it is not the position of the United Kingdom with respect to Scotland or Wales. If a right to secede is a by-product of an emerging right to democratic governance, there is not much evidence of it. Subtract the Franck formulation and a somewhat earlier one by Cassese,24 and the dedication of international law to democratic governance becomes much thinner. What little there is mainly is confined to writers, rather than custom, state practice, treaties, or court decisions. Why the connection of international law to democratic governance is so thin should be very clear. However much we may favor the worldwide spread of democracy—and I have done my time trying to spread democratic institutions to reduce ethnic conflict—valorizing a right to democratic governance would imperil the universality of international law. Despite the developments of the post–Cold War period, there are almost as many authoritarian as democratic states. If international law is to enhance its influence on state behavior, which it needs to do in order to reduce and regulate interstate conflict and to facilitate interstate transactions, it cannot simultaneously undercut the governing arrangements of nearly half the states that are to be subjected to the rules laid down.25 There is, of course, an even more obvious reason why international law ought to be exceedingly restrained in its enthusiasm for secession. Secession is an anti-state movement, and an international law that forgets that states are its main subjects risks its own survival. There is always a tendency of law to preempt social complexity with rules, and there are many temptations to the promiscuous creation of rights. But law does best when it is informed by what Karl Llewellyn called “situation sense,”26 a sound idea of the type of phenomenon it seeks to govern. If self-determination is a phrase “simply loaded with dynamite,”27 in the words of Wilson’s secretary of state, there are international lawyers who are playing with this dynamite
72DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025General
73DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025African Wars ImpactsAfrican instability causes nuclear war---AND terror. Mead‘13[Walter; 12/15/13; James Clarke Chace Professor of Foreign Affairs and Humanities, Bard College; The American Interest; “Peace in The Congo? Why the World Should Care,” https://www.the-american-interest.com/2013/12/15/peace-in-the-congo-why-the-world-should-care/]One of the biggest questions of the 21st centuryis whether this destructive dynamiccan be contained, or whether the demand for ethnic, cultural and/or religious homogeneity will continue to convulse world politics, drive new generations of conflict, and create millions more victims. The Congo conflictis a disturbing piece of evidence suggesting that, in Africa at least, there is potential forthis kind of conflict. The Congo war (andthe long Hutu-Tutsi conflict in neighboring countries) is not, unfortunately alone. The secession of South Sudan from Sudan proper, the wars in what remains of that unhappy country, the secession of Eritrea from Ethiopia and the rise of Christian-Muslim tension right across Africa (wherereligious conflict often is fed by and intensifies “tribal”—in Europe we would say “ethnic” or “national”—conflicts) are strong indications that the potential for hugeand destructive conflictacross Africais very real.But one must look beyond Africa. The Middle East of course is aflame in religious and ethnic conflict. The old British Raj including India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Burma and Sri Lanka offers countless examples of ethnic and religious conflict that sometimes is contained, and sometimes boils to the surface in horrendous acts of violence.Beyond that, rival nationalisms in East and Southeast Asia are keeping the world awake at night.The Congo war should be a reminder to us all that the foundations of our world are dynamite, and that the potential for new conflicts on the scale of the horrific wars of the 20th centuryis very much with us today.The second lesson from this conflict stems from the realization of how much patience and commitment from the international community (which in this case included the Atlantic democracies and a coalition of African states working as individual countries and through various international institutions) it has taken to get this far towards peace. Particularly at a time when many Americans want the US to turn inwards, there are people who make the argument that it is really none of America’s business to invest time and energy in the often thankless task of solving these conflicts.That might be an ugly but defensible position if we didn’t live in such a tinderbox world. Someone could rationally say, yes, it’s terrible that a million plus people are being killed overseas in a horrific conflict, but the war is really very far away and America has urgent needs at home and we should husband the resources we have available for foreign policy on things that have more power to affect us directly.The problem is that these wars spread. They may start in places that we don’t care much about(most Americans didn’t give a rat’s patootie about whether Germany controlled the Sudetenland in 1938 or Danzig in 1939) but they tend to spread to places that we do care very much about. This can be because a revisionist great power like Germany in 1938-39 needs to overturn the balance of power in Europe to achieve its goals, or it can be because instability in a very remote place triggers problems in places that we care about very much. Out of Afghanistan in 2001 came both 9/11 and the waves of insurgency and instabilitythat threaten to rip nuclear-armed Pakistan apartor with triggerwider conflict India. Out of the mess in Syria a witches’ brew of terrorism and religious conflict looks set to complicate the security of our allies in Europe and the Middle East and even the security of the oil supply on which the world economy so profoundly depends.Africa, and the potential for upheaval there, is ofmore importance to American securitythan many people may understand. The line between Africa and the Middle Eastis a soft one. The weak statesthat straddle the southern approaches of the Sahara are idealpetri dishesfor Al Qaedatype groupsto form and attract local support. There are networksof funding and religious contact that give groups in these countries
74DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025potential access to funds, fighters, trainingand weaponsfrom the Middle East. A war in theeastern Congomight not directly trigger these other conflicts, but it helps to createthe swirling underworldof arms trading, money transfers, illegal commerceand the rise of a generation of young men who become experienced fighters—and know no other way to make a living. It destabilizesthe environment for neighboring states(like Uganda and Kenya) that play much more direct role in potential crises of greater concern to us.They’ll get CBRNs---extinction. Fyanka ‘20[Bernard B.; 2/7/20; Ph.D. in History and Strategic Studies from the University of Lagos, Akoka Lagos Nigeria; "Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) terrorism: Rethinking Nigeria’s counterterrorism strategy," https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10246029.2019.1698441?scroll=top&needAccess=true]The end of the Cold War might have represented the end of mutually assured destruction (MAD), but it did notnecessarily dispel the dangers of the nuclear age– in fact, to some extent the globalised proliferation of non-conventional weapons has instead escalated the possibilities for a nuclear attack being carried out. During the Cold War, the belligerents of any nuclear conflict would have been easily identifiable; however, in the post-Cold-War era, non-state actors and terroristgroups like Boko Haramhave emerged as potential players ina new variety of nuclear conflictsthat would entirely be based on terrorist models. The ominous possibilities for this new kind of warfare are indeed terrifying, and the rise in terrorist attacksaround the globe enhances the likelihood of such an occurrence. Since 9/11, the body of academic literature on the threat posed by terrorists regarding weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) devices has increased. In Gary Ackerman and Jeremy Tamsett’s edited volume, Jihadists and Weapons of Mass Destruction, there is disagreement as to whether this threat is overestimated or underestimated.1 In recent times, however, ample ideological incentive for the use of CBRNdevices has been providedby the likes of Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri – author of the ‘Global Islamic Resistance Call’ – who has stated that ‘[t]he aim of carrying out resistance missions and individual jihad terrorism “jihad al-irhabi al-fardi” is to inflict the largest human and material casualties possible on American interests and its allied countries’.2 This echoes the previous call of Grand Ayatollah Ahmad Husayni al-Baghdadi, who maintained:If the objective and subjective conditions materialize, and there are soldiers, weapons, and money – even if this means using biological, chemical, and bacterial weapons – we will conquer the world, so that ‘There is no God but Allah, and Muhammad is His Prophet’ will be triumphant over the domes of Moscow, Washington, and Paris.3For Boko Haram and othergroups, theredefinitely exists a strong motivation forthe use of WMDs, and the global reach of this thinking is not in doubt:The globalization of the jihadist struggle has also led to an increased emphasis on Islamic identity. In combination with the ideological theme of revenge, the global struggle for Islamic identity has the potential to create a new jihadist cultic worldview in which its endorsers seek out WMDs because they represent the only means to significantly transform reality.4Contextual scenarios in Nigeria strongly suggest that Boko Haram is one such groupwhich has embraced the jihadist world view that endorses the use of WMDs. In this regard, the strengthened affiliation of Boko Haram’s splinter group – the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) – with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) confirms their ideological persuasions. The motivationfor Boko Haram to use such weapons is thus grounded in the recent use of chemical weapons by ISIS in both Iraq and Syria against both militaryand civilian targets.5 If ISIS is claiming ownership of a faction of Boko Haram as its West African province, it is likely to extend its tactics to its African allies.In the light of the above, the use of WMDs by terrorists cannot be explained within the framework of orthodox terrorism theories. With this in mind, what Russell Worth Parker refers to as the ‘Islamic just war theory’ suitably anchors a discourse on terrorism and advanced weapons of war.6 Most theorists do not support a subjective theory of ‘just war’, but rather the traditional version that relies on Western ideas of morality and proportionality, as well as on motives for waging war.7 On the other hand, jihadist traditions reinterpret just war’s key tenet of proportionality to suit Islamists’ conflict rationale. According to the Western form of just war theory, wherein discrimination proves strategicallyimpossible, any response should be proportionate to the action that compels it – hence, proportionality dictates that a military operation should not cause greater harm than the act that it was designed to counter or prevent.8 This proportionality argument is exemplified in the use of nuclear weapons in the Second World War; since casualty estimates for an invasion of Japan exceeded one million Allied lives, with similar estimates for Japanese military and civilians, a nuclear attack was preferable. Eventually, the actual casualties suffered from the bombing of
75DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025Hiroshima and Nagasaki reached 200,000, which represents 10% of the casualties that would likely have been incurred if Japan had been invaded (see https://avalon.law.yale.edu/). In the light of this argument, justification for the use of WMDs by terrorist groups would rest on their interpretation of the extent of the damage caused by the military aggression and long-term imperialism of Western powers.Fighting faceless enemies in a CBRN conflict, whether in West Africa or the Middle East, is hard to imagine. Enemies who can easily blend into the crowd and take on the face of ordinary civilians represent a nightmare scenario for security strategists all around the world. The risk of WMDs falling into the hands of terrorist groupsis largely dependent on their ability to obtain weapons-grade nuclear materiallike uranium and plutonium, combined with gaining the capability to build and deploy weapons which make use of them. The global proliferationof nuclear material has made this possibletoday. Global proliferation of fissile materialThe collapse of the Soviet military-industrial complex ushered in a period of uncertainty regarding the security of nuclear material. Consequently, the risk of fissile material falling into the hands of terrorist groups – or into the hands of states that sympathise with or harbour such groups – increased considerably. Lax security at former Soviet nuclear facilities was widespread, making the theft of nuclear material possible. In the chaos that followed the Soviet collapse in the early 1990s, radioactive material was frequently stolen from poorly guarded reactors and nuclear facilities in Russia and its former satellite states. Police operations have intercepted shipments of Soviet nuclear material in cities as far away as Munich and Prague, and experts believe that large batches are still unaccounted for and most likely accessible to well-connected traders on the black market.9Over 1800 metric tons of nuclear material is still stored in facilities belonging to more than 25 countries all around the world.10 Not all of this material is located in military stockpiles – in fact, most countries maintain civil stockpilesof plutonium for use in nuclear power reactors. The civil stockpiles in the United Kingdom (UK), India, Belgium, France, Germany, Japan and Russia add up to over 230 metric tons of plutonium. In spite of these enormous quantities,the UK, India, France, Japan and Russia have not yet reduced the reprocessing of plutonium for civil use. Although civil plutonium is not weapons-grade, it remains viable as a raw material that can be transformed through an enrichment process for use in a bomb. The United States (US) on the other hand has a comparatively small amount of civil plutonium because of its 1970 policy to suspend the separation of plutonium from spent nuclear fuel.11 About 25 kg of highly enriched uranium (HEU) is required to build a bomb – an insignificant amount in comparison to the global stockpile, which is in excess of 1.6 million kg. On the other hand, about 8 kg of plutonium is needed to build a bomb – a tiny fraction of the 500,000 kg global stockpile.12 Nuclear facilities that are relics of the Cold War era, especially those located in Eastern Europe, represent a high security risk. More than 130 nuclear reactors powered by HEU are operational in over 40 countries – the fallout of an early Cold-War-era programme in which the US and the Soviet Union helped their allies to obtain nuclear technology. Several other reactors have been shut down but may still contain nuclear fuel on site. In total, the world’s research reactors contain 22 tons of HEU – enough to build hundreds of nuclear bombs. The problem is that research reactor fuel tends to be stored under notoriously light security, making it a very vulnerable target for terrorists.13In 2004, the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) published a report that details security lapses at civilian nuclear installations, citing a case in which the fences surrounding an unnamed foreign research reactor were in very poor condition and there were no guards securing the reactor building itself. In this report, Harvard expert Matthew Bunn explains that unlike the bulky and extremely radioactive fuel rods used in commercial nuclear power plants,research reactor fuel consists of small pellets that weigh only a few pounds each and moreover are easier to handle –a simple backpack can conceal several pellets.14 Naturally, civilian stockpiles are at greater risk of theft than those held in military installations. Consequently, the possibilities of such dangerous material falling into the hands of terrorists groups have become increasingly plausible. Regarding military stockpiles, Russia and the US possess the largest amounts of weapons-grade plutonium – 100 and 150 metric tons, respectively. Diplomatic attempts aimed at reducing these stockpiles have resulted in an agreement for the two countries to dispose of 34 metric tons each via the method of turning the weapons-grade plutonium into fuel for nuclear power reactors. Although this agreement has not been effected yet, it is obvious given the above that the process may expose the material to greater risk of theft rather than securing it.15 On the other hand, in 2005 the US Congress eliminated the long-standing restrictions that were placed on the exporting of HEU to other countries for the purpose of manufacturing medical isotopes, which has also created new avenues for the proliferation of nuclear material through civilian use.16Although the civilian use of nuclear material has increased the risk of its proliferation, the military facilities currently holding nuclear material around the world – especially in Russia – are also not well secured. Thousands of Cold-War-era tactical weapons are stored at very poorly guarded military installations, and most of these weapons are small and do not have electronic locks that prevent unauthorised usage.17 Since the collapse of the Soviet Union there has been no viable security strategy for securing the nuclear material contained in many of the former empire’s cities. During the Cold War era, the citizens of these cities had access to these facilities – and they still do, a problem further compounded by the fact that a strict inventory of the nuclear material contained in these facilities is not maintained.18 The likes of infamous arms dealer Leonid Minin (who was found guilty in a court of law for supplying weapons to non-state actors in African conflicts) are all too willing to do business with terrorists.19, 20 Arms dealers and smugglers all over the world are always seeking lucrative opportunities, and it is almost certain that some nuclear material has already been acquired by dangerous fanatics.Several incidents in recent decades give every reason to believe that this is the case. In 1993, Kazakhstani authorities discovered HEU capable of arming 20 bombs in a building that was poorly secured.21 In 2006, Russian citizen Oleg Khinsagov was arrested in Georgia for carrying 100 g of HEU and attempting to find a buyer for what he claimed was many additional kilograms.22 In 2011, six men with 4 g of uranium were arrested by security forces in Moldova. Upon questioning, they claimed that the 4 g represented a sample of the product they were ready to market. They claimed to possess an additional 9kg, which represents one third of the quantity needed to create a nuclear weapon. The leader of this group and the North African buyer escaped.23 Four years before this incident, gunmen raided a facility in Pelindaba, South Africa; the details of the event are still shrouded in mystery.24 Efforts by terrorist organisations to purchase and use nuclear weaponscontinueunabated. The most high profile of these known efforts is that of Osama bin Laden, who in 2001 attempted to purchase a canister of uranium in Sudan for US$1.5 million.Intelligence reports claim that he also met with two Pakistani nuclear scientists, and sketches of nuclear weapons were found at an al-Qaedatraining camp.25From the foregoing, it is clear that there exists a robust and thriving black market in fissile material that seems to be tailor-made for use by terrorists groups. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as at December 2015 had recorded in its trafficking database a total of 2889 incidents involving losses, thefts and/or attempts to traffic fissile material across international borders.26 This is an incredibly high rate of security lapses considering the security priority that nuclear facilities are supposed to possess. More pressing is the fact that the agency does not inspect every nuclear facility globally, and as such is not in a position to comprehensively enforce strict security and safety regulations. As a consequence of this, fissile material often goes missing and subsequently appears on the black market without being reported to the agency. Furthermore, several nations which maintain nuclear facilities do not possess the requisite resources to subject employees to the kind of extensive background checks that can ensure their trustworthiness for working at such high-security sites. In the absence of this screening, the likelihood of people with terrorist ties applying for jobs at nuclear facilities for the purpose of obtaining nuclear material is very high. There is mounting evidence worldwide that increasing amounts of fissile material are being stolen and traded. Although the Russian government refuses to admit that it has lost any nuclear weapons, at least four Russian nuclear submarines have sunk, and it is believed that the warheads on board are yet to be recovered. The US on the other hand has admitted to losing a staggering 11 nuclear weapons.27How can Boko Haram obtain nuclear material?Boko Haram is one of the deadliest terrorist groupsin the world. Since 2009, it has engaged with the Nigerian state in a lethal terrorism campaign aimed at toppling the secular structure and replacing it with an Islamist state. By May 2014 over 12,000 Nigerians had been killed in the insurgency,28 while one in five persons from Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states had been internally displaced. According to the 2017 Global Terrorism Index, Boko Haram ranks as the second deadliest terrorist group in the world, with an all-time high death toll of over 6000 in 2014 alone.29
76DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025With known ties to al-Qaeda, Boko Haram has an estimated annual income in excess of US$25 million.30 By 2017, Boko Haram had been forced to retreat from the large areas it had previously occupied in the north-east of Nigeria, driven back by thejoint international military efforts of several countries in West and Central Africa. This created the need for them to reassert themselves. The likelihood of this group re-strategising and reconsolidating is high. Consequently, their acquisition offissile material for the development and deployment of radiological ‘dirty bombs’has increasedin probability. The availability of this materialon the continent and withinNigeria itself presents ominous opportunitiesfor the group. Apart from large deposits of uranium ore found in Africa, several countries including South Africa, Morocco, Libya, Ghana, Egypt, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Nigeria itself presently possess nuclear research reactors.31 The IAEA has reported no less than 12 incidents of natural uranium smuggling between 1995 and 2005 in Africa alone. In fact, illegal uranium mining at the Shinkolobwe mine in Katanga, DRC is presently a source of great concern. More importantly, this is where the source material for the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs was obtained.32 The proliferation of fissile material across the continent heightens the possibility of non-state actors like Boko Haram gaining access to it. Although there has only been one recorded theft of eight uranium fuel rods from a Kinshasa research reactor in 1997, the disturbing fact about this is that seven of the rods were never recovered.33Within Nigeria itself, opportunities abound for terrorist groups like Boko Haram and other militant organisations to obtain fissile material for use in nuclear devices or dirty bombs. In 2004, Nigeria commissioned a 30-kW miniature neutron source reactor (NIRR-1) for the purpose of nuclear energy research.34 This nuclear facility is located at the Centre for Energy Research and Training at Ahmadu Bello University Zaria in the north of the country, where terrorist activities and Islamist extremism have been going on for centuries. The possibility of Islamist extremists infiltrating nuclear facilities and smuggling out fissile material has been an ongoing security concern for a number of years. An outright attack on a lightly secured facility is a second possibility that actually played out in 2007, when a nuclear research facility in Pelindaba, South Africa was raided by armed assailants, who breached its security perimeter and gained entry.35 Another concern is unsecured radioactive waste – namely 234 legacy sources presently located at the Ajaokuta Steel Company in Kogi State – that has not been disposed of and could easily be obtained by Boko Haram.36 To complicate matters further, the construction of a low to medium radioactive waste management facility at Nigeria’s Nuclear Technology Centre has been abandoned.37 Can Boko Haram build and use non-conventional weapons?The poor state of nuclear security combined with the tenacity of Boko Haram makes Nigeria a prime location for the advent of nuclear terrorism. Knowhow on building a nuclear device is widely available, as is the key component, HEU, which can be found all over the worldin dozens of military and civilian nuclear facilities – like the one at Ahmadu Bello University. Once Boko Haram has obtained enough HEU, a choice can be made between two types of nuclear device. The first is the gun-type mechanism, in which the HEU is smashed together to produce an explosion. The second type, which is more advanced, requires a chamber in which the HEU is compressed in a highly symmetrical manner in order to create an implosion. The gun-type mechanism is the more likely option for terrorist groups because it is simpler.38In order to use the gun-type mechanism to activate a nuclear device, Boko Haram operatives would need to assemble a crude cannon that can smash HEU together – and the more highly enriched the uranium, the less advanced the weaponry that is needed. The viability of any terrorist group accomplishing such a task has been tested by US senator Joe Biden. In 2004 he asked scientists at three national laboratories to see if they could assemble the mechanical components of a gun-type bomb with commercially available equipment alone. A few months later, they reported back that they had succeeded.39 With over US$25 million in annual income, Boko Haram has the resources to obtain both the scientific knowhow and the materials needed to build and deploy a gun-type nuclear weapon. Radiological dirty bombsThe threat of non-conventional weapons proliferation and terrorism goes beyond nuclear weapons – it also encompasses radiological dirty bombs. The raw materials used to create nuclear weapons are very dangerous; they contain highly radioactive substances that would pose a serious health hazard if dispersed in human populations using a detonation device. Plutonium and uranium could thus be weaponised in the form of a radiological dirty bomb, also known as a radiological dispersal device (RDD), which would cause widespread fatalities and cost billions of dollars in clean-up, evacuation and relocation operations.40Terrorist groups like Boko Haram could easily build and use an RDD, given the widespread proliferation of fissile material – andmore importantly given the dual-use materials that can produce the same radiological effects as fissile material from nuclear installations. Radiological dual-use materials from smoke alarms and medical services are among the most easily accessible; highly radioactive isotopes are infact used in life-saving blood transfusions and cancer treatments in hospitals all around the world, including several in Nigeria. These isotopes include cesium-137, cobalt-60 and iridium-192, which can easily be used as base materials for a bomb or an RDD.41 The challenge is that most of the medical, commercial and industrial groups that handle these materials are not adequately equipped to provide the security needed to prevent them from being stolen. On the other hand, the lack of regulatory controls in many countries has led to thousands of instances of missing or stolen radiological material that cannot be accounted for. Recently, the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies found in analarming study that 170 incidents where nuclear or radiological material was lost, stolen or outside regulatory control occurred in 2014 alone.42 RDDs are viable weapons for terrorist groups like Boko Haram to pursue – and terrorist states have also attempted to obtain them. On 28 March 2002, Abu Zubaydah – a key al-Qaeda operative – was captured in Pakistan. He is widely believed to have told US investigators that al-Qaeda was ‘interested’ in building or obtaining a dirty bomb. Further evidence emerged on 8 May 2002, when Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents arrested Abdullah al Muhajir on charges of planning a radiological attack in the US at the direction of al-Qaeda operatives.States that sponsor and support terrorist groups are likely to pass on fissile and radiological material to them. Iraq under Saddam Hussein is known to have sought radiological material for this purpose. In 1987, Iraq tested a bomb weighing 1400 kg that carried radioactive particles derived from irradiated impurities in zirconium oxide. A further 100 prototypes were designed from the casings of Muthanna-3 aerial chemical bombs, which were then modified to a 400-kg weight so that aircraft could carry more of them. It is likely that only 25 of these prototypes were destroyed, and that the other 75 were sent to the Al Qa Qaa State Establishment, a massive Iraqi weapons facility; their current status and whereabouts remain unknown.43 Chemical and biological weaponsThe most commonly used non-conventional weapons are chemical or biological in nature. The long history of chemical and biological weapons usage dates as far back as 600 BC when, during a siege, Solon of Athens poisoned the drinking water of the city of Kirrha.44 More recently – starting with the use of mustard gas during the First World War – nations have acquired chemical and biological weapons easily, deploying them against enemies and their own citizens alike. For terrorist groups like Boko Haram, chemical and biological weaponsareuniquely suited to their agenda and as such present very attractivealternatives to nuclear; they are extremely difficult to detect, cost effective and easy to deploy. Aerosols of biological agents are invisible to the naked eye, silent, odourless, tasteless and relatively easily dispersed. Most importantly they are 600 to 2000 times cheaper than other WMDs. Recent estimates
77DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025place the cost of biological weapons at about 0.05% of the cost of a conventional weapon which could produce similar numbers of mass casualties per square kilometre.45The proliferation of chemical and biological weapons has proved to be very fluid over the past century due to advancements in technology. Production is comparatively easy via the commonplace technology that is used in the manufacturing of antibiotics, vaccines, foods and beverages, while delivery systems such as spray devices deployed from airplane, boat or car are widely available. Another advantage of biological agents is the natural lead time provided by the organism’s incubation period (three to seven days in most cases), allowing the terrorists to deploy the agent and then escape before an investigation by law enforcement and intelligence agencies can even begin. Furthermore, not only would the use of an endemic infectious agent likely cause initial confusion because of the difficulty of differentiating between a biological warfare attack and a natural epidemic, but with some agents the potential also exists for secondary or tertiary transmission from person to person or via natural vectors.46 Unlike their nuclear and radiological counterparts, biological and chemical weapons have been used for terrorism by both state and non-state actors. The challenges faced in preventing the use of these weapons through international control mechanisms include the increasing availability of larger quantities of substances, ease of use and most especially advanced technological deployment facilities that portend a high risk factor to larger populations. Table 1 catalogues the use of biochemical weapons in warfare and by terrorists and other groups or individuals over the past century, offering concrete historical precedent and empirical grounds for the potential future actions of Boko Haram. The data shows consistent recourse to the use of these weapons, in spite of the chemical and biological weapons conventions outlawing them. It can be seen that from the 1970s onwards there has been an increase in the use of biochemical weapons by religious cults and terrorist groups in pursuit of their agendas. The rise of Boko Haram and its ISIS affiliation could lead to a future where the use of biochemical weapons is thenorm rather than the exception.As stated previously, the contextual scenarios in Nigeria that validate this prognosis regarding Boko Haram’s possible actions are strongly supported by their ideological persuasions. The fact that Boko Haram embraces a jihadist world view which endorses the use of WMDs is strengthened not only by its affiliation to ISIS through ISWAP but also by the similarities in its strategic modus operandi. Like ISIS, Boko Haram both believes in the slaughter of other Muslims who are deemed to be in cahoots with infidels, and advocates for the destruction of civilian populations – whether Muslim or otherwise – that are regarded as obstructing the advancement or creation of their caliphate.47This was practically demonstrated by ISIS in Syria and Iraq when they used chemical weapons against both civilian and military populations, as shown in Table 1.48Nigeria’s counterterrorism strategyThe central control measure for preventing nuclear terrorism is to ensure at the international level that nuclear material does not fall into the hands of terrorist groups like Boko Haram and other non-state actors in the first place. This is very difficult to achieve, given the lax security measures found at nuclear installations all over the world. Recognising the danger, the US under the Obama administration committed in 2010 at a nuclear security summit in Washington DC to securing all nuclear material within four years in an effort to prevent nuclear terrorism.49 Nigeria was a participant of this summit and is also committed to implementing the agreements that were reached. These attempts by the Obama administration followed up on the efforts embedded in the landmark 1987 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), which was meant to prevent nuclear material from being obtained by terrorists. The provisions of this convention were amended in 2005, and by 2010 the Washington summit had created the needed sense of urgency regarding the security of fissile material.50 Negotiations aroundthe CPPNM started in 1979,51 and over the decades the growing proliferation of fissile material has combined with the increase in global terrorism to raise the profile of the issue of fissile material security. As of 2016, a total of 93 states including Nigeria had ratified the CPPNM, resulting in tighter security around the world at nuclear installations and border controls.Nigeria has been engaged for decades in international efforts to control nuclear proliferation and terrorism. The country has ratified and acceded to over a dozen international instruments since 1963, including the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (1963), the CPPNM (1987), the Amendment to the CPPNM (2006) and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (2007).52 At the level of global collective security, Nigeria is involved in implementing the United Nations (UN) Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which was adopted unanimously by the General Assembly in Resolution 60/288.53 At the regional and subregional levels, the counterterrorism strategies of the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have been ratified and are in the process of being implemented. In pursuance of effecting these various international agreements, Nigeria has also instituted their National Counterterrorism Strategy (NACTEST), which was revised in 2016. Presently the country is also working with the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) on projects designed to build community resilience against terrorism, enhance cooperation among law enforcement agencies and strengthen judicial institutions.54Towards an integrated chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) counterterrorism protocolThe CBRN terrorism threatin Nigeria isboth real and present. The country has one of the highest rates of terrorist activities inthe world; in fact, according to the 2016 Global Terrorism Index, Nigeria ranked third among 163 countries, with a terrorism death rate of 16.8% of the global total.55 Although attacks declined in 2017, Nigeria still retained third place on the Global Terrorism Index.56 Recently, BokoHaram has initiated a comeback that has seen renewed attacks and the abduction of more girls from schools in the north-east of the country. Security forces have continued to engage the group on the frontlines in their forest bases; with the assistance of local and international joint task forces, much of the conflict has been shifted to more remote areas in the north-east. Although the government security forces have gainedthe upper hand in their frontal clashes with Boko Haram forces, by January 2018 the group had successfully carried out several brutal assaults, including one on UN and Doctors Without Borders staff, shifting their strategy back to traditional hit-and-run guerrilla tactics. During Easter of the same year, a single attack utilising 5 suicide bombers resulted in over 29 dead and 84 wounded.57The likelihood that Boko Haram may begin to use CBRN weapons is increasing, and biological and chemical terrorism is potentially more difficult to prevent than conventional terrorist attacks. Since the latter part of the twentieth century, the Internet has contributed to the spread of chemical and biological weapons knowhow, thereby increasing the likelihood of Boko Haram being able to obtain not only the ingredients needed to create biochemical weapons but also the information needed to build and successfully deploy them. Some of the base materials for such weapons even occur naturally, like castor beans, which can be processed to produce the dangerous toxin ricin and deployed against unsuspecting populations. Furthermore, live strains of very dangerous viruses like Ebola can be found in high-tech research labs, like those at the African Centre of Excellence for Genomics and Infectious Diseases (ACEGID) at the Redeemer’s University Ede in Osun State. If Boko Haram were to secure this virus and weaponise it, the age of biowarfare would arrive in Nigeria – with deadly consequences. More importantly, the materials that are needed to create most chemical weapons exist in large quantities as dual-use materials that can be purchased on the open market and ferried into the country via forged end-user certificates.The chemical and biological weapons conventions represent control structures geared towards the containment of these non-conventional weapons, and to a large extent state signatories like Nigeria have implemented a good level of the instruments contained in them; however, some nations still maintain secret stockpiles and have used them in recent conflicts, like Iraq against Iran and Kurdish dissidents in the 1980s and 1990s, and the Syrian government, which is presently using them against its civilian population.On the whole, the counterterrorism measures put in place to deal with the aftermath of a chemical or biological attack have gained more credibility in the international community. Although there is no dedicated international inter-agency mechanism for coordinating the response to terrorism involving the release of toxic chemicals or biological agents, there are mechanisms that have evolved in the context of humanitarian assistance and emergency response after natural catastrophes, such as earthquakes; these include the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN), the World Health Organization (WHO), the Global Early Warning System (GLEWS), the Global Framework for the Progressive Control of Transboundary Animal Diseases (GF-TAD) and the International Food Safety Authorities Network (INFOSAN). The primary inter-agency mechanism that coordinates responses to emergencies involving the agencies mentioned above is the UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC).58 To further strengthen inter-agency coordination in the wake of a terrorist attack of catastrophic proportions, the UN CTITF is also focusing on planning for such an eventuality.At the local level, several key aspects of Nigeria’s NACTEST are presently being utilised. The strategy is divided into five work streams:Forestall: Prevent terrorism in Nigeria by engaging the public through sustained enlightenment and sensitisation campaigns and deradicalisation programmes.Secure: Ensure the protection of life, property and key national infrastructure and public services, including Nigerian interests around the world.Identify: Ensure that all terrorist acts are properly investigated, and that terrorists and their sponsors are brought to justice.Prepare: Prepare the populace so that the consequences of terrorist incidents can be mitigated.Implement: Devise a framework to effectively mobilise and sustain a coordinated, cross-governmental, population-centred effort.59Presently, the first three aspects of these work streams are receiving full attention. However, in regard to WMDs, the counterterrorism strategy is lacking a well-integrated CBRN protocol for engaging with the work streams for preparation and implementation. Nigeria currently handles issues relating to nuclear and radiological matters through two institutions: the Nigerian Atomic Energy Agency (NAEC) and the Nigerian Nuclear Regulatory Authority
78DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025(NNRA). It is therefore expected that, given the growing CBRN threat level in the country, these agencies will collaborate with the Office of the Security Adviser to the President in order to initiate a proper CBRN counterterrorism protocol.The NACTEST does not currently include a dedicated protocol for handling CBRN threats; Nigeria is however involved in nuclear security at the international level, which has primarily provided for capacity-building and human resources development. Activities in these areas include the gradual process of converting the miniature neutron source reactor in Zaria from using HEU to low enriched uranium (LEU), partnerships for nuclear and radiological security with the US Department of Defence (DoD) and the IAEA, establishing a nuclear security support centre in the country, reviewing the 2012 design basis threat (DBT) for protecting nuclear and radiological material, the development of a programme for locating and securing orphan legacy radioactive sources, training security officers, the installation of a radiation portal monitor at the Murtala Muhammed International Airport in Lagos in 2008 andthe acquisition of three more monitors for other international airports in the country.60An integrated CBRN protocol would fall under the preparation and implementation work streams of the NACTEST. The protocol should include a strategy for detecting CBRN agents in the wake of terrorist events, followed by disaster response and countermeasure initiatives to be carried out by security, medical and disaster response teams. Given the availability of advanced technology, the integrated CBRN counterterrorism protocol should also include the deployment of handheld radiological and biochemical detectors to high-risk areas, and security forces and disaster response teams should be trained in their usage. Embedding a standard protocol in the NACTEST on how to prepare for and respond to CBRN events is essential for repositioning counterterrorist activities in the country to meet the present threat level. The US and Canada along with the UK and most other European countries facing CBRN threats have already repositioned accordingly in order to accommodate this new reality.ConclusionAny terrorist attack involving WMDs is the ultimate nightmare scenario. Fortunately, at least some of these potential attacks are preventable. If and when the nuclear security summit achieves its goals, the possibility of a nuclear terrorist attack in Nigeria will be immensely reduced. Unfortunately, the likelihood of radiological, chemical and biological attacks is more difficult to regress, making it all the more vital to integrate a CBRN protocol into Nigeria’s counterterrorism strategy.Preventing such a tragic eventfrom occurring will require very close ongoing monitoringof the strategic manoeuvrings of Boko Haram. From its inception to the present day, the organisation has depended on the looting of military armouries to source most of its heavy weapons and equipment. It has built up an impressive arsenal in this manner and there is no indication that the group will stop using this highly profitable strategy, which could be further employed to obtain advanced CBRN weaponry from facilities that are vulnerable to being raided. The civilian facilities mentioned in this paper are at high risk of being targeted in this fashion; hence, the recalibration of Nigeria’s CBRN counterterrorism protocols should include a security framework that provides military security for facilities like the ACEGID in Osun State and the Centre for Energy Research and Training at Ahmadu Bello University Zaria. Lastly, although the IAEA has assisted in the conversion of Nigeria’s reactor from HEU to LEU,61 the availability of fissile material at the facility means that the risk of radioactive dirty bombs being created from looted material is still present.African instability causes extinction – state collapse, refugees, terror.Perez ‘18 [Alexandra; 2018; Pepperdine University, School of Public Policy. Masters in Public Policy at Pepperdine. Project Manager, Health Policy at Cato Institute; "Food Security as U.S. National Security: Why Fragile States in Africa Matter." https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1169&context=ppr]The United States’ rolein foreign affairs is guided by an interest to keepthe general peacearound the world while protecting national security and economic interests. Stabilityinregions such as sub-Saharan Africa is crucial to national security, and one way to keep peace is by supplying the basic human need of food. According to the Fund for Peace, the three most fragile states in 2017 were in Africa— the Central African Republic, South Sudan, and Somalia. 1 Several other African countriesare fragile, suffering fromstandard measures of instability, such as widespread corruption, weak institutions, and resource scarcity. Together, these problems createdisplacement, human-rights violations, andpower vacuumswhere non-state actors can flourish. These issues should concern the United States not only for moral reasons, but also because they negatively affect American interests. Food aid and agricultural systems must be used as a tool to promote peace in Africa to decrease the region’s burden on the United States and to help stabilize a region that is often referred to as a lost continent. With bipartisan support, the Global Food Security Act became law in July of 2016. It requires the President and appropriate agencies—including USAID, State Department, and the Office of US Trade—to formulate a plan to address food-insecure countries and report on that plan annually.2 The bill cited the Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community (2014): “[l]ack of adequate food will be a destabilizing factor in countries important to US national security that do not have the financial or technical abilities to solve their internal food security problems.”3 Though it is uncertain whether annual reports will continue under the Trump administration, the US has demonstrated (at least through the Global Food Security Act) that it views food security as a matter of national security. According to the most recent Worldwide Threat Assessment, Africa is among the regions most susceptible to terrorism, especially in Somalia and SouthSudan.4 This paper explores the ways in which food insecurity can enable conflict, how the US can improve the ways it offers food aid, and why African food security is in America’s national security interest. Consequences of Food Insecurity Enforcing and communicating a universal conception of human rights by any party is difficult. Nevertheless, US national security strategy has placed an emphasis on human rights in recent years. The former Secretary of State under President George W. Bush, Condoleezza Rice, once remarked that: “[f]or the United States, supporting international development is a vital investment in the free, prosperous, and peaceful international order that fundamentally serves our national interest.”5 Fragile regimesin Africa cannotsuccessfully maintain themselves, let alone pose an immediate threat to the United States. However, these regimesare likely to seek alliances with adversariesthat may pose a threat, such as China, creating a region of the world adverse to American interests and values. Secondly, migrant and refugee flows are concerns for the United States due to their economic and social consequences. While many of the most serious cases ofrefugee crises today are nowhere near the US, they do affect some of the United States’ key allies around the globe. A clear example of this is Syrian migration into NATO member countries. In addition to military conflict, bipartisan research has shown that climate can also contribute to mass migrations by impacting harvest yields in regions still reliant on subsistence agriculture. For example, the famines in Somalia and Yemen have sparked emigration caused by food insecurity. Such crises may not be front page news compared to violent conflicts in surrounding states, but they present just as real a threat. The third reason why the US should care about weak states is that terrorist organizations thrive in such environments. Since September 11, 2001, US national security policy has been primarily driven by the war on terror. While the fear of a repeat attack on American soil has calmed since 2001, the threat of terrorism is still present, and the United States must be proactive to stay ahead of terrorist threats. Terrorists thrive in weak state environmentsbecause either the lack of rule of
79DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025law inhibits the host state’s ability to act against them, or because corrupt governments refuse to act, such as when Sudan provided refuge to Osama bin Laden in the 1990s.6 As a developing region, Africa is full of potential, and the United States will have to decide whether it will help it stabilize or allow it to become a refuge and breeding ground for terrorism. Africa can potentially threaten or support American interests. As stated above, food insecurity in Africa creates problems for the US. The potential to politically align with other major powers, the destabilizing effect of refugees on the US and its allies, and the propensity to breed terrorism are all reasons to take Africa seriously as a national security concern. US interests include promoting international market economies that it can easily access, so to increase economic power at home. If the US ignoresstability measures in Africa, this could negatively affect bothAmericansecurityinterests andglobal economic growth, 7 which are both American priorities. The US needs a strategy that promotes food security in fragile states to address these concerns. Food prices in Africa are expected to rise in the next few years due to famine,8 which means there is a risk thatinstability will grow, heightening the security concern to the United States. Food insecurity, like any social ailment, does not necessarily cause instability, but the two do reinforce each other. Obviously, American food assistance by itself cannot solve every problem in these fragile states. Success willultimately depend on these countries establishing and enforcing the rule of law and shoring up government legitimacy. That said, nation building is not a viable option in this region, as the US has already committed itself to this in the Middle East and largely failed. The US can, however, provide developmental aid to help promote stability and provide a foundation for future institutional growth. Therefore, it is important that the USnot only maintain food security efforts in weak states but also incentivizerecipient behavior thatwill makesuch aid more effective.
80DebateUS! Somaliland January 2025Additional Sources“Somaliland and Taiwan: Two Territories with Few Friends But Each Other,” BBC, April 13, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-56719409 (accessed August 6, 2021)