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Understanding Environmental Economics: Key Concepts and
Understanding Environmental Economics: Key Concepts and
School
University of Guelph
*
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Course
ECON 2100
Subject
Economics
Date
Dec 11, 2024
Pages
40
Uploaded by MinisterHippopotamusMaster1478
Econ
*
2100
Course
Outline
Assignment
Outline
Assignment
#1
15
%
October
zra
Assignment
#1
15
%
November
5th
Midterm
#1
15
%
October
17th
Midterm
#
2
15
%
November
14th
Final
Exam
40
%
6
.
Real
GDP
,
Total
PMIO
emissions
,
and
total
SO2
Emissions
in
the
USA
(1970
Present
,
indexed
1
Estimated
Concentration
of
Partic
poin
a
300
Real
GDP
ECON
*
2100
total
PMIG
250
emissions
particulation
eator
Indexed
an
ea
200
total
502
Assignment
#
emissions
158
2
.
Estimate
on
emissions
me
s
100
1978
Present
Part
A
7
.
Total
National
PMIO
emissions
from
industry
and
households
(1800
Present)
in
Canada
(1990
Present
uS
emissions
Industry
PMIO
CAN
emissions
emissions
SO2
Emissions
PMIO
,
tonnes
emissions
·
Emissions
Household
PMIG
1800
1990
Present
Fraction
of
Total
national
PMIO
emissions
by
sector
in
Canada
3
.
Estimated
%
of
Urban
population
exposed
to
air
pollution
8
.
(1990
vs
2021)
Above
EU
standards
(2000
2021)
&
Agricultu
are
%
population
a
PMIO
missions
&
...
M
4
.
Estimated
200
emissions
in
Germany
rance,
,
Italy
9
Monthly
Average
Daytime
high
temperatures
in
Toronto
for
and
the
UK
(1990
Present)
July
(1840
Present
Germany
It
France
PMOON
s
Temperatures
a
idgo
Present
1850
Present
5
.
Total
Vehicle
Miles
traveled
,
Real
GDP
,
and
colevels
in
the
10
.
Canada's
total
tree
cover
(000
Hectares)
(1992
Present
USA
(1980
Present
,
Indexec)
300
Total
Vehicle
Miles
travelled
250
Real
GDP
200
Urban
air
Indexed
value
CO
levels
in
Tree
Cover
retard
=
wood
1000
(1980
150
100
1988
Present
1992
Present
Econ
class
Notes
(rewrite)
Pre
1800s
Agriculture
based
Subsistence
economics
-
High
level
of
equality
Low
life
expectancy
(40s)
Growth
in
1800s
moved
off
subsistence
-
↑
in
inequality
-life
expectancy
4
Fossil
Fuels
exploited
Growth
begets
growth
=
exponential
process
Growth
rate
r(
%
)
per
year
suppose
v
=
5
%
Growth
Factor
(1
+
r)
Then
(1
+
r)
=
1
05
T
Question
1
,
000/capita
Growth
Summary
CAN
=
3
%
=
1
,
800
=
19
,
219
Post
18001
lots
of
growth
,
not
evenly
experienced
ARG
=
2
%
-
7
,
245
~
health
,
life
span
4
VEN
=
1
%
=
2
,
705
-
good
outweighs
the
bad
Refer
to
specific
issues
-
instead
of
ENVIRONMENT
Use
air
quality
,
Water
quality
,
StC
.
Harnessing
of
electricity
①
Human
What
are
humans
if
not
nature
?
②
Wind
,
water
,
Sun
something
special
OR
an
abomination
?
③
Fossil
Fuels
Natural
harm
vs
.
Unnatural
harms
on
what
scale
?
④
hydro
and
nuclear
Economic
growth
Pollution
are
all
linked
through
the
harnessing
of
energy
Power
mechanisms
Fuel
power
relies
on
combustion
H
+
c
+
02
=
CO2
+
H20
+
neat
BUT
-use
of
air
rather
than
Oxygen
Impurities
in
Fuel
-no
matter
now
combustion
happens
,
there
will
be
pollutants
expelled
low
income
countries
have
a
higher
level
of
pollutants
-
TSP
is
an
aggregate
measure
Air
pollution
was
U
shaped
,
does
this
still
hold
true
?
=
if
so
why
are
we
switching
to
EU's
USA
air
pollution
costly
to
make
quality
cars
(1996)
Tonnes
Ozone
levels
build
in
the
Summer
,
almost
only
on
not
days
Pollution
mainly
in
high
density
areas
30
,
000
50
,
000
Water
pollution
is
also
on
the
decline
-concerted
efforts
to
get
pollution
down
Since
the
70s-80s
-now
does
the
decline
of
land
usage
for
agriculture
increase
the
Water
quality
?
=
is
there
a
correlation
?
What
does
Ozone
depletion
look
like
post
2000
?
GLOBAL
ISSUES
=
can
almost
guarantee
its
gotten
Worse
stratosphere I
7
Basic
or
Substitutes
For
CFC's
were
patented
Troposphere
CFC's
made
form
,
refrigerants
,
coolants
I
global
warming
03
~
Global
Warming
comes
from
the
CO2
emissions
,
Rio
Conference
unsuccessfully
Earth
CFC's
destroying
a b
tried
to
stop
the
emissions
of
CO2
10km
North
America
t
,
China
↑
(CO2
emissions)
CO2
is
an
infrared
absorbing
gas
,
Which
is
the
cause
of
the
rise
in
global
temperature
SUMMARY
-
Environment
is
an
abstract
term
:
makes
more
sense
to
discuss
specifics
-Viewing
environmental
change
as
"damage"
requires
the
adoption
of
a
"human-centered"
View
point
Combustion
Of
FF
ties
economic
growth
to
air
pollution
Most
air
pollutants
don't
necessarily
↑
With
economic
growth
Stratospheric
Ozone
depletion
mainly
occurs
in
polar
regions
and
mid-latitudes
,
during
late
Winter
,
early
spring
>
HCFC
or
CFC
?
CO2
emissions
will
grow
With
Fossil
Fuel
Use
CO2
is
a
greenhouse
gas
that
has
a
gradual
Warming
effect
on
the
Climate
Models
in
economic
growth
What
do
we
mean
by
growth
?
Intensive
growth
:
Output
grows
faster
than
inputs
=
Per
capita
income
rises
=
requires
output
per
worker
to
rise
Why
did
economic
growth
start
in
Europe
?
-
rise
of
scientific
Outlook
,
rise
in
book
publishing
rise
of
trading
centers
,
accounting
at
trading
Center
adoption
of
family
law
based
on
Christian
rules
=
Promoted
monogamy
and
inheritance
,
decline
in
clan
loyalty
-
rise
of
nation
states
,
supported
by
technological
progress
in
shipping
Theories
of
growth
Mercantilist
-
Growth
comes
through
industrial
exports
,
gov't
should
promote
these
activities
Physiocrats
-Growth
derives
from
agriculture
alone
Govt
is
a
sterile
entity
in
the
economy
Smith
-
voluntary
exchange
leads
to
specialization
,
which
leads
to
growth
Pin
theory
is
the
basis
of
growth
Malthus
Population
growth
always
exceeds
agriculture
productivity
growth
starvation
and
subsistence
is
unavoidable
Population
a
IP
ent
·
ᶐ
income
always
drive
a
Per
capita
Classical
Model-based
on
Malthus
SUMMARY
or
=
F
Prior
to
Smith
,
theories
of
economic
growth
weren't
sensible
land
(Fixed)
Smith
:
specialization
&
trade
are
key
to
growth
-
diminishing
returns
to
labour
Malthus
:
Yes
,
but
doomed
to
starvation
Subsistence
output/Worker
(Y/2)
is
"g"
Classicals
:
diminishing
returns
to
labour
Wages
at
subsistence
level
,
call
it
ge
After
Smith
-Subsistence
level
of
output
=
g2
x
(
-
industrial
revolution
output
y
=
gzx
investment
Capital
formation
mattered
(v)
Pop
growt
a
1930's
Keynes
argued
that
↑
AD
and
consumption
were
necessary
to
achieve
growth
p
declines
1950's
solow
argued
that
savings
,
not
consumption
drives
growth
Leg
Labour
(1)
Basic
Set-up
re-express
in
per-worker
terms
Production
Function
I
=
A
+k
*
x
1
L
Clabour]
+
[capital]
+
(knownow]
#
Output
Lowercase
denotes
"per
worker"
*
=
Axk
*
x("-
Y
Y
=
Axk
*
+1)
Mer
-
-1
=
a
Y
=
A
xk*
+
2
a
=
Ax
E
=
A
+
(t)a
L
>
Diminishing
returns
to
Capital/Worker
Savings
&
Investment
At
each
period
,
t
,
income
is
either
used
for
consumption
or
investment
Yt
=
C
+
Lt
Ye
=
Ct
+
Lt
d
%
of
capital
disappears
due
to
depreciation
⊥
so
,
net
period
capital
is
:
K
t
+
1
=
ke
- d
+
ke
+
it
savings
is
Ct
=
Yt-Lt
,
NOTE
Ye
=
Ce
+it
So
...
It
=
Yp
L
=
St
investment
=
savings
Capital
dynamics
Suppose
Savings
is
always
a
fraction
of
income
St
=
V
+
Ye
Capital
dynamics
equation
k
+
+
1
=
kt
d
+
kt
+
V
+
A(kt)a
Steady
State
K
stops
growing
:
investment
=
depreciation
Steady
State
Capital
stock
=
k
+
+
1
=
k
+=
Ks
Ks
=
(VA)
↓
the
4
depreciation
,
↓
the
4
savings
S
consumption
C
=
Ys-
Vis
SS
income
Y
=
A(ks)a
SS
Capital
stock
does
not
depend
on
starting
Capital
Stock
(10)
Mainly
depends
on
(v)
and
(A
,
a)
X
*
Productivity
savings
Parameters
Implications
10
doesn't
determine
outcomes
-
savings
&
productivity
are
key
to
growth
- low
income
countries
should
grow
rapidly
compared
to
high-income
countries
Countries
With
Similar
technology s
Savings
rates
Will
converge
to
similar
income
levels
Population
growth
The
Malthusian
View
Feasible
limit
grows
slowly
Malthus
did
not
foresee
advances
in
agriculture
Underestimated
Societies
capacity
to
increase
production
of
food
and
essentials
General
Patterns
-
Demographic
transition
(GR
is
growth
rate
,
DR
is
death
rate)
Initially
-
High
GR
,
low
DR
Next
-
BR
stays
high
,
DR
Falls
Next
th
BR
Falls
How
to
Fund
Welfare
of
State
With
an
inverted
population
Pyramid
Look
is
immigration
just
a
cheaper
option
to
subsidizing
women/families
to
having
more
childr
on
Overpopulation
debate
The
"Yes"
View
deforestation
of
the
Amazon
-
Slums
-
large
countries
Such
as
India
China
Can't
industrialize
because
pollution
would
explode
The
"No"
view
3"World
urbanization
takes
longer
than
the
Cities
in
the
West
-
Small
populations
can
also
overexploit
badly-managed
resources
-
As
large
countries
get
largers
More
wealthy
,
they
have
more
money
to
put
into
pollution
control
Dependency
issues
rising
around
the
World
Resource
Management
and
the
Economy
Messages
we
might
have
heard
-
We
are
consuming
all
the
world's
resources
at
an
alarming
rate
up
to
now
,
People
thought
the
world
Was
infinite
,
but
now
we
know
better
We
are
the
first
generation
to
tackle
the
Sustainability
Crisis
Principles
of
Resource
Management
Non-renewable
resources
Hotelling
rule
Renewable
resources
Forests
:
Faustmann
rule
Ideas
in
common
A
resource
is
like
an
asset
With
a
potential
dollar
value
The
crucial
decision
is
when
to
convert
it
from
a
physical
asset
to
a
financial
asset
When
to
extract
resources
?
Q
tonnes
of
one
,
could
be
sold
for
$
P/tonne
-
Once
extracted
it
is
Worth
$
PXQ
at
today's
prices
-
You
can
invest
$
PXQ
and
earn
,
say
5
%
in
the
bank
-
If
the
market
Price
of
One
goes
up
by
10
%,
You'd
have
been
better
to
leave
it
in
the
ground
Hotelling
rule
(mining)
-
If
you
expect
the
resource
value
to
go
up
faster
than
the
rate
of
return
on
financial
investments
,
SCO
DOWN
extraction
-If
you
expect
the
resource
value
to
go
up
slower
than
the
value
of
financial
investments
,
SEED
UP
extraction
Farstmann
Rule
(Forestry
-
A
forest
adds
9
%
to
its
wood
volume
each
year
-
At
first
,
9
is
very
high
,
but
as
stand
matures
,
a
drops
to
Zero
When
a
drops
to
the
market
interest
rate
,
it
is
time
to
cut
the
stand
"Proving
up"
Reserves
At
any
one
time
there
are
about
30
years
worth
of
proven
oil
reserves
In
addition
,
there
are
estimated
and
potential
reserves
in
many
regions
-
It
is
costly
to
go
into
new
regions
and
do
the
drilling
required
to
"prove
up"
reserves
Companies
only
invest
in
this
activity
up
to
the
point
Where
the
likely
Payoff
is
worth
the
cost
Suppose
we
are
running
short
-
If
the
resource
is
in
demand
and
supply
shrinks
,
the
price
Will
Start
rising
Resource
managers
Will
slow
down
extraction
and
keep
more
in
the
ground
The
upward
swing
in
prices
carses
demand
to
decline
People
curtail
their
use
as
much
as
possible
Price
We
expect
to
observe
the
price
get
higher
and
higher
As
a
result
,
quantity
demanded
gets
lower
and
lower
↑
We
never
"run
out"
,
it
just
gets
too
expensive
for
most
users
Quantity
Institutions
Matter
Washington
-
Property
rights
Forests
privately
owned
Controlling
access
-
smaller
cutblocks
,
good
roads
,
intensive
reforestation
Stable
planning
Climate
Public
Forests
in
BC
Property
rights
-
For
many
years
,
timber
harvesting
licenses
Were
5
years
or
shorter
BC
weak
reforestation
y
Companies
doing
the
cutting
had
no
financial
stake
in
the
next
generation's
Forest
-
Forests
publicly
owned
Private
Forests
in
Washington
-
large
Cutblocks
,
Poorly-drained
roads
,
-
Large
Companies
like
Weyerhauser
have
a
permanent
interest
in
maintaining
the
productivity
of
their
forest
They
benefit
from
doing
a
good
job
of
cutting
and
replanting
Property
rights
BC
,
1990s
Began
more
towards
30-year
Tree
Farm
License
With
automatic
renewals
-
The
aim
is
to
give
Forest
countries
Stable
,
long-term
interest
in
a
Forest
section
so
they
expect
to
benefit
if
they
do
careful
cutting
and
replanting
But
it
is
politically
difficult
,
and
long-term
leases
have
actually
declined
"The
tragedy
of
the
Commons"
What
if
no
one
owns
a
resource
but
everyone
can
access
it
?
This
usually
leads
to
over-exploitation
Examples
-
>
Ocean
Fisheries
Everyone
knows
that
they
are
over-exploiting
the
resource
,
but
no
one
has
the
incentive
to
stop
Each
Captain
thinks
:
If
everyone
else
keeps
harvesting
and
I
stop
,
I
lose
out
and
the
Fishery
Will
be
ruined
anyway
,
so
I
am
better
off
harvesting
-
If
everyone
else
stops
harvesting
,
my
catch
won't
matter
,
so
I
am
better
off
harvesting
-
Either
Way
,
I
am
better
off
taking
the
Catch
,
even
if
I
know
the
Fishery
Will
be
ruined
Solution
:
mechanisms
to
control
access
Access
Control
Enclosures
Movement
England
- -
1760
-
1832
Open
fields
brought
up
and
fenced
-
Peasant
Farmers
displaced
to
cities
,
landowners
began
investing
in
modern
methods
Ocean
Fisheries
200
mile
limit
imposed
,
Catch
limits
set
,
tradeable
Catch
quotas
Stable
planning
Climate
"Sovereign
risk"
The
Fear
that
once
a
resource
is
developed
,
the
govt
Will
Seize
Ownership
-
>
Mining
requires
costly
exploration
and
development
-
Equipment
is
also
very
costly
-
>
Why
bother
if
the
gov't
will
seize
or
block
your
mine
before
you
can
profit
from
it
?
SUMMARY
-
Every
decade
we
hear
warnings
of
doom
from
running
out
of
resources
-
Resources
are
managed
as
capital
assets
rate
of
extraction
is
related
to
expected
gain
From
Waiting
,
relative
to
expected
gain
from
Financial
investment
L
We
don't
run
out
,
resources
just
get
too
costly
-
Exploration
is
costly
,
so
industry
only
maintains
a
30-40
year
supply
-
Institutions
matter
:
Property
rights
,
controlled
access
,
Sovereign
Risk
Sustainability
and
Substitution
:
The
"Hartwick
Rule"
Conventional
Output
Model
Production
Function
:
Output
is
a
function
of
labour
TIMES
Capital
(not
PLUS
Capital)
X
Why
this
form
?
Y
Labour
Without
Capital
=
O
Output
Capital
Without
labour
=
0
Output
For
a
given
level
of
capital
,
there
are
diminishing
returns
to
labour
L
Whats
missing
?
Resources
,
R
,
if
R
goes
up
,
output
does
as
well
⊥
suppose
R
gets
a
10
%
Share
,
then
K
Only
gets
20
%
↑
because
the
exponents
determine
income
shares
,
and
labour
gets
about
70
%
of
national
income
What
if
R
is
non-renewable
?
How
can
an
economy
keep
growing
if
R
leps
declining
#
After
all
,
if
R
=
0
,
y
=
0
as
well
Capital
K
is
managed
optimally
⊥
cost
per
unit
,
generates
a
return
called
"marginal
revenue
product
of
Capital
"
150-quant
picture
Hartwick's
Rok
1
↑
↑
If
the
rent
from
resource
extraction
are
invested
in
Forms
of
Capital
that
Yields
the
market
rate
of
return
*
k
=
the
increase
in
1)
over
time
will
compensate
for
the
decrease
in
R
,
just
enough
to
keep
output
constant
R
Generalizing
the
concept
Non-renewable
assets
Society
has
a
portfolio
of
assets
:
One
in
the
ground
is
Worthless
if
it
is
never
extracted
⊥
Natural
,
industrial
,
institutional
,
Financial
,
human
and
non-renewable
⊥
Once
extracted
,
it
is
worth
a
certain
amount
,
say
$
x
⊥
If
we
just
spend
$
X
on
current
consumption
we
have
depleted
"Value"
of
an
asset
our
wealth
Value
is
not
the
same
as
the
cost
of
purchasing
it
⊥
If
We
invest
it
in
something
With
rising
value
,
we
can
preserve
⊥
It
means
the
capacity
to
generate
human
welfare
in
the
future
our
overall
wealth
Investment
Options
Preserving
non-renewables
is
not
necessarily
the
best
Option
for
future
generations
If
other
assets
grow
in
value
more
quickly
.
We
should
invest
in
those
⊥
What
Would
future
generations
want
us
to
invest
in
?
same
as
what
we
wanted
from
generations
earlier
to
us
:
⊥
A
portfolio
of
valuable
assets
,
not
just
one
type
SUMMARY
society
has
a
portfolio
of
valuable
assets
,
including
non-renewable
one
-
Hartwick
rule
says
if
the
rents
from
non-renewable
resource
extraction
are
invested
in
other
forms
of
productive
Capital
,
Future
Output
need
not
go
down
Economic
Efficiency
"Efficiency"
encompasses
several
concepts
:
-
making
the
best
use
of
available
resources
-
maximizing
the
value
of
productive
activity
making
the
people
in
an
economy
as
well
off
as
possible
It
does
not
guarantee
an
equitable
outcome
Microeconomics
looks
at
ways
to
achieve
efficiency
using
market
mechanisms
Imagine
a
perfect
social
planner
:
Competitive
Markets
someone
who
knows
+
sees
everything
-
many
buyers
and
sellers
someone
who
makes
decisions
in
everyones
best
interest
-
no
one
person
controls
outcome
someone
who
controls
the
outcome
and
decides
who
gets
what
-
people
make
untary
decisions
based
on
their
own
self-interest
Calls
this
the
"Planner's
outcome"
Micro
theory
:
Can
we
arrange
things
so
a
market
yields
an
outcome
as
good
as
a
planner's
outcome
?
We
ask
this
question
because
markets
exist
While
the
perfect
social
planner
doesn't
!
(Attempts
at
social
planning
have
been
disastrous
Efficient
market
outcomes
:
Marginal
benefits
=
marginal
costs
Benefits
revealed
by
Willingness
to
pay
WTP
c
g
.
apples
6-
j
$
5
00
5-
!
lig/Week
"
in
T
5
2
1-
7
$
1
50
&
ic's
5
a
io
B
quantity
Diminishing
Marginal
INTP
If
you
have
quantity
(a)
,
how
much
would
you
be
INTP
to
get
one
more
unit
?
Total
WNTP
:
total
amount
you
are
WTP
For
quantity
(a)
Marginal
(NTP
:
amount
you
are
WTP
For
one
more
Unit
$
at
Q
,
total
WTP
=
Q
+
D
Demand
b
curve
Marginal
INTP
=
P
,
Pi
A
Q
Q
Aggregate
,
or
Market
,
Demand
Curve
at
a
price
of
$
3/kg
.
One
person
is
willing
to
buy
41g
of
apples
.
Another
person
may
be
Willing
to
buy
Ikg
,
another
Tkg
,
etc
How
do
we
graph
this
?
-3
demand
curves
P
6-
146111
,
111 a
Pick
a
price
and
add
up
quantities
e
g
.
at
$
3
,
total
demand
is
2
+
4
+
7
=
13
,
at
$
5
,
1
person
Will
buy
lkg
at
$
0
,
total
demand
is
3
5
+
10
+
8
=
31
5
that
gives
us
3
points
and
we
can
connect
them
(Gray
line)
Interpreting
the
aggregate
demand
curve
Key
idea
:
add
horizontally
not
vertically
P
A
P
P
,
↓
snows
aggregate
den
is
b
C
Q
9
.
92
9
.
Q
at
a
:
Total
WTP
=
a
+
area
a
=
Consumer
surplus
Cost
=
P
,
xg
,
=
D
More
From
g
,
up
to
92
:
area
c
is
the
total
INTP
This
is
a
measure
of
the
social
benefit
of
the
increased
supply
At
91
:
P
,
is
the
measure
of
marginal
WTP
For
one
more
unit
Turning
to
costs
Opportunity
cost
=
value
of
the
best
alternative
use
of
a
resource
e
g
.
time
a
kisure
activity
Might
be
"Free"
like
Sitting
on
the
couch
Watching
TV
.
But
the
opportunity
cost
is
the
value
of
what
else
you
could
do
With
the
time
,
e
g
.
-Work
For
X
per
hour
,
read
a
book
,
do
something
else
People
Weigh
opportunity
cost
When
making
decisions
about
what
to
supply
to
the
market
cost
curves
a
ple
If
the
market
price
is
$
1
,
the
Orchard
is
Willing
to
supply
20kg
#
If
the
price
goes
up
to
$
2
,
they
Will
supply
more
:
they
now
offer
30kg
To
supply
40kg
,
the
cost
goes
up
to
$
3
,
It
·
As
the
price
rises
,
the
orchard
is
Willing
to
offer
more
is
so
so
do
so
do
The
price
must
cover
the
marginal
cost
of
additional
supply
$
the
supply
curve
shows
the
marginal
cost
of
supplying
apples
Pi
the
firm
produces
where
p
=
MC
area
under
MC
curve
a
=
Total
cost
of
production
A
at
9.
,
4
,
measures
marginal
cost
of
supplying
I
more
unit
9
.
&
Aggregate
supply
:
as
before
,
if
there
are
many
suppliers
,
add
up
the
supply
curves
horizontally
Putting
these
together
at
Q
,
MWTP
=
MC
P
MWTP
Up
to
this
point
,
the
marginal
value
of
the
next
unit
exceeds
the
Marginal
cost
to
produce
it
beyond
this
point
,
the
margin
of
value
of
the
next
unit
is
less
than
the
marginal
cost
of
producing
it
Po
Therefore
,
Q*
is
the
efficient
output
level
Q
Q
*
Efficiency
and
Optimality
at
Q9
,
MB
=
MC
,
The
value
of
the
last
unit
supplied
just
equals
Recall
the
market
diagram
snowing
MWTP
(or
MB)
and
MC
the
Marginal
cost
to
produce
it
PMWTP
MC
Po
9
Q,
we
can't
make
the
buyer
better
off
Without
making
the
seller
worse
off.
-
More
from
Q
to
9
F
Q
-
>
additional
household
benefit
=
F
,
Cost
=
F
+
g
Q
*
9
,
-
>
Extra
cost
to
produce
=max
WTP
by
Consumer
When
you
can't
rearrange
an
outcome
Without
making
at
least
One
person
worse
off
,
we
call
it
a
Pareto
Optimum
By
contrast
:
MB
MC
start
at
92
,
more
up
to
Q
Total
cost
=
F
9
Total
benefit
=
F
+
g
F
92
=
Q
*
Consumer
gets
enough
benefit
to
Fully
cover
cost
to
produce
can
be
made
better
off
Without
making
anyone
worse
off
,
therefore
ae
is
NOT
Pareto
optimal
Efficient
outcomes
are
Pareto
optimal
Company
market
equilibrium
With
efficient
outcome
MARKET
Efficient
Market
Forces
drive
buyers
and
sellers
to
point
where
(supply
I
demand)
Cast
S
=
D
,
call
this
(Qm
,
PM)
P
S
P
MC
Efficient
outcome
at
(Q
%,
PG)
PM
po
Will
it
be
the
case
that
SQ"
=
Qm)
?
D
MB
Only
if
S
=
MC
2p
P
=
Pm)
QM
Q
Q
Q
D
=
MB
Note
that
S
is
based
on
Private
Marginal
cost
and
D
is
based
on
private
MB
But
efficient
outcome
is
based
on
social
marginal
cost
and
social
marginal
benefit
-
What's
the
difference
?
Private
marginal
cost
:
costs
incurred
by
Producer
to
bring
goods
to
market
social
marginal
cost
:
total
cost
to
society
to
bring
goods
to
market
SMC
=
PMC
+
"external
costs"
Sometimes
Private
actions
generate
public
costs
.
Examples
:
Pollution
Control
,
damage
to
land
,
creating
an
eyesore
,
road
Congestion
Example
:
Road
Congestion
Each
driver
considers
time
he
or
she
will
take
on
the
road
-
But
,
the
more
cars
on
the
road
,
the
longer
each
driver
takes
,
on
average
Suppose
there
are
100
cars
on
road
in
a
town
and
each
driver
spends
5
minutes
getting
through
a
busy
area
⊥
now
the
181*
driver
comes
along
and
the
average
trip
time
goes
up
to
5%
minutes
due
to
the
extra
car
Private
time
cost
:
5
minutes
Social
time
cost
:
5
minutes
&
new
driver
2
x
100
minutes
E
extra
time
for
others
=
55
minutes
(External
cost)
Ind
example
:
Cottages
4
cottages
on
a
lake
Each
draws
Water
and
Purifies
it
at
a
cost
of
$
10
,
000/year
.
⊥
Now
,
a
new
cottage
appears
and
because
of
its
septic
system
,
the
cost
of
water
purification
rises
to
$
12
,
000/
Cottage
Private
cost
=
$
12
,
000
External
cost
=
$
2
,
000
x4
=
$
20
,
000
extra
costs
for
others
MSC
P
Due
to
external
costs
,
the
market
outcome
involves
MPC
Pa
①
MEC
too
much
production
and
too
low
a
price
Pm
O
MWTP
Q
Q
QM
MINTD
:
Marginal
Willingness
to
pay
(QM
,
Pm)
-
market
outcome
MEC
:
marginal
external
cost
(Q9
,
p
P
)
=
Optimal
outcome
MPC
:
marginal
private
cost
MSC
:
Marginal
Social
cost
=
MPC
+
MEC
There
can
be
Marginal
External
Benefits
too
E
g
.
Cruise
line
docking
in
a
small
coastal
town
brings
torrists
who
benefit
the
town
shops
+
restaurant
Relative
concept
:
Public
goods
Some
goods
are
subject
to
non-exclusion
and
non-rivalry
Example
:
National
defense
,
Police
,
Fire
National
defense
:
When
its
provided
everyone
derives
an
equal
benefit
,
one
person's
benefit
doesn't
diminish
others'
⊥
Police
protection
is
similar
although
there
is
some
rivalrous
aspect
because
if
Police
are
out
on
call
they
can't
respond
to
another
⊥
reduction
of
crime
in
general
is
a
public
good
Optimal
public
goods
provision
:
add
up
MINTP
Vertically
-
Example
:
dam
up
river
to
Control
flooding
Would
cost
$
100k
to
build
,
would
provide
flood
control
and
recication
,
20
homes
down
river
Each
household
WTP
$
10
,
000
for
dam
No
one
Willing
to
build
it
because
cost
=
Private
benefit
,
but
everyone
would
benefit
if
Person
World
build
it
Social
value
=
20
x
$
10
,
000
=
$
200
,
000
Since
social
value
-
cost
it
should
be
built
P
-
Social
demand
a
supply
curve
Given
supply
curve
,
no
individual
would
pay
for
public
good
,
Q
=
But
Social
MINTP
is
high
enough
that
Q
is
optimum
-
individua
a
⊥
this
requires
a
policy
Mechanism
to
Coordinate
In
Presence
of
external
costs
and
public
goods
("market
Failures")
the
equilibrium
in
the
market
Will
Q
not
be
efficient
.
Need
policy
Mechanisms
to
correct
this
.
Q
Optimal
Pollution
Control
What
is
the
optimal
level
of
pollution
?
not
the
unregulated
level
7
not
zero
either
jually
Past
examples
-
SO2
,
nearly
eliminated
Not
,
reduced
but
still
emitted
-
CO2
,
still
growing
Why
the
differences
?
⊥
go
back
a
step
Why
is
there
pollution
in
the
first
place
?
Think
of
it
this
way
:
How
clean
is
your
kitchen
When
you
use
your
kitchen
,
the
activity
yields
benefits
(meals)
,
and
costs
(dirty
dises
,
spills
,
greaze
,
garbage
Benefits
Slope
of
TB
Total
cost
E
cost
·
Ne
Total
benefits
Benefits
:
of
activity
that
creates
the
mess
(Meal
prep)
not
the
mess
itself
Costs
:
in
terms
of
smell
,
appearance
,
inconvenience
vslope
of
Th
Mess
in
Intuitive
answer
:
aim
for
level
of
mess
that
maximizes
Net
benefit
,
TB-TC
Ma
the
Kitchen
NB
maximized
:
Where
slope
of
TB
=
slope
of
↑
Marginal
benefit
=
marginal
cost
Pollution
Case
I
Activity
that
causes
emissions
+
yields
benefits
Activities
:
snown
in
the
charts
by
emissions
by
source
Total
-
transportation
,
industry
,
agriculture
,
Mining
,
etc
TB
Emissions
$
/
Marginal
Benefits
TB
Emissions
MB
/C
MACMAC
At
2
,
8
,
1
*
E
=
c
,
9
+
c
P2
X
Da
MAC
,
=
PB
=
MAC
P
T
This
is
a
cost
efficient
outcome
where
MAC
,
=
MAC
"equi
marginal
rule"
most
cost-efficient
way
to
reduce
emissions
is
to
go
to
a
point
Where
:
E
MAC's
of
all
emitters
are
equal
.
e
2
C
,
22
Economic
instruments
:
taxe
+
tradeable
permits
leads
to
equi
Marginal
rule
#Marginal
costs
of
emission
$
TC
Assume
it
goe
up
at
an
increasing
rate
(usually
E
$
/2
MC
=
Slope
of
TC
Call
it
"Marginal
damages
E
$
12
MD
at
E
,
MD
=
P
,
=
Marginal
cost
of
increasing
emissions
OR
=
benefits
of
reducing
P
,
IIIII
Between
ECE
,,
Shaded
area
=
TD
of
↑
emissions
from
E
,
Up
to
E
Es
MD
endogenous
to
a
supply
curve
Optimum
How
to
measure
damages
?
MD
more
difficult
than
MAC
various
techniques
like
surveys
,
property
values
,
biological
modeling
Da
Aim
:
identify
what
people
would
be
Willing
to
pay
to
get
reduction
in
emissions
MAC
E
*
E
Optimal
Pollution
Control
part
11
Putting
these
together
:
A
MD
curve
*
b
MAC
curve
Me
MD
C
unregulated
emissions
d
Crossing
Point
where
MD
=
MAC
C
Optimal
emissions
quantity
d
F
Optimal
emissions
price
gp
*
i
9
TAC
of
reducing
emissions
From
E to
E
*
n
+
i
TD
of
increasing
emissions
from
EP
to
E
jn
C
i
Net
benefit
of
reducing
emissions
from
Eto
E
*
Est
E
E
j
TD
at
E
*
2
firms
-MAC
MAC
MD
E
unregulated
total
emissions
At
this
outcome
we
have
:
En
Optimal
total
emissions
optimal
emissions
:
MD
=
MAC
Po
eg
,
22
Optimal
allocation
of
emissions
cost-efficient
reductions
:
MAC
,
=
MAC
**
Es
E
po
Optimal
emissions
price
Numerical
example
MD
=
ZE
Optimal
emissions
level
:
1200
MAC
=
1200
-
E
Unregulated
emissions
level
:
Vertical
intercept
:
Set
E
=
0
Set
MAC
=
MD
800
Solve
MAC
=
O
MAC
=
1200
0
1200
-
E
=
ZE
1200
E
=
0
=
1200
=
E
=
1200
1200
=
2E
+
E
=
3E
400
1200/3
=
E
*
=
400
MD
at
optimum
:
plug
E*
into
MD
Check
MAC"
=
1200
E
*
TAC
at
E
*
=
area
under
MAC
#
MD
*
=
2
x
400
=
800
=
1200
400
=
800
=
x
(1200
400)x000
=
X800
x
800
TD
at
E*
=
area
under
MD
up
to
E
*
MD
=
YE
MAC
=
1000 -
ZE
=
320
,
000
=
X
400
+
800
=
160
,
000
find
:
unregulated
emissions
I
①
Solve
MAC
=
O
to
get
E
Answers
:
0
E
=
500
Optimal
emissions
&
②
solve
MD
=
MAC
to
get
E
=
②
E
*
=
400
MD
at
Optimum
③
③
Plug
E*
into
MD
Check
by
③
MD
"
=
200
Plugging
into
MAC
as
well
TAC
at
Optimum
④
①
calculate
area
of
triangle
end
a
④
TAC
*
=
19
,
000
TD
at
Optimum
⑤
⑤
calculate
area
of
triangle
Uns
a
⑤
TD
*
=
40
,
000
Suppose
MAC
,
=
500 - e
,
MAC
=
500
te
Find
the
aggregate
MAC
compute
C
,
+
e
<
for
each
price
level
/E
-
>
MAC
,
-
>
MAC2
add
up
horizontally
500
1000
,
+
E
Need
to
invert
MAC's
MAC
=
500
-
te
now
Set
MAC
,
=
MAC
=
M
E
:
Set
M
=
MAC
,
=
500
e
,
=
=
500
MAC
2
,
=
500
M
E
=
1500
2
=
1000
2M
=
e
,
=
500
-
MAC
,
22
=
1000
2
MAC
,
E
=
C
,
+
e
=
1500
3M
Suppose
MAC
,
=
500-e
.
we
observe
:
=
50
↓
Suppose
We
cap
each
firms
emissions
at
250
.
MAC
,
=
500 -
tes
is
this
cost
efficient
?
Need
to
check
if
MAC
,
=
MAC
If
We
keep
total
emissions
at
E
=
500
What
Would
MAC
,
=
500
-
250
=
2507
be
cost-efficient
emission
levels
?
MAC
=
500
-
250)
=
315/
no
.
Suppose
MAC
,
=
1000
-
Ze
,
Find
E
,,
E2
①
Solve
for
aggregate
MAC
MAC
=
500
es
②
Solve
it
for
value
of
M
Where
E
=
250
③
Plug
that
value
of
M
into
individual
emission
Functions
Suppose
We
limit
emissions
to
2
,
=
300
,
=
=
325
①
2
,
=
500
M
①
Is
this
cost-efficient
?
2
= =
1000
-
IM
②
If
not
,
find
an
allocation
of
emissions
that
keeps
total
E
=
625
but
equates
MAC's
E
=
1500
3M
now
set
E
=
500
①
MAC
,
=
1000
Ze
,
②
MAC
,
=
500
es
MACEMAC
>
500
=
1500
3M
=
1000
600
=
500
325
not
cost-efficient
3M
=
1000/3
=
400
=
175
M
=
333
Check
[
,
+=
=
500-
2
,
=
500
,
2
=
=
500
625
=
1000
EM
2
=
500
-
M
=
500
125
=
375
2
=
=
500
-
333%
2
,
=
500
-
M
M
=
1000
-
625
2
=
500
250
=
250
=
1667
2
=
500
M
M
=
2
+
375
625r
2
=
=
1000
2x333'
E
=
1000
EM
=
750
=
333
%
=
258
Suppose
MAC
,
=
10
e
,
MAC
=
30-3e
,
1
Compute
unregulated
total
emissions
2
Suppose
regulator
wants
to
reduce
total
emissions
in
half
.
How
much
should
each
Firm
Cut
?
1
C
,
:
10
MAC
,
32
=
30
MAC
2
Set
MAC
,
=
MAC
=
M
,
=
10
22
=
10
-
MAC
2
,
=
10
M
[2
=
18
2
=
10
M
E
=
E
,
+
Iz
=
20
2
,
+
2
=
20
-
M
target
E
=
10
10
=
20
M
M
=
10
H
=
3
=
7
5
2
,
%
=
10-7
5
=
2
5
22
=
10
5 (7
5)
=
7
5
Benefit
Cost
Analysis
1
Consider
the
following
diagram
FLAI
:
assumes
pollutes
are
behaving
irrationally
but
NOT
emitting
at
the
optimal
rate
$
/E
MD
$
Es
Ex
unregulation
n
TB
of
emitting
Pollution
MAC
"McKinsey
Curve"
E
E
⊥
What
is
the
Flaw
in
this
argument
/E
MAC
=
Marginal
Benefit
of
emitting
Activity
MAC
=
Slope
of
TB
line
E
E
⑧
/E
Estimat
a
If
firms
have
the
most
knowledge
of
their
own
operations
,
the
MAC
is
likely
the
correct
MAC
curve
E
!
E
n
MAC
,
2
Suppose
MAC
=
2000
4E
(a)
What
is
unregulated
emissions
level
?
(b)
Suppose
Govt
taxes
emissions
E
=
500
at
=
$
20
.
How
much
do
emissions
Fall
?
OR
MAC
=
2000
-
4E
Firms
will
chose
to
emit
When
MAC
=
tax
rate
4E
=
2000
-
MAC
E
=
500
MA
Set
MAC
=
E
=
2000
MAC
=
500
4
&
=
495
~
C)
Suppose
someone
Argues
:
Emissions
only
Fall
by
1
%.
Clearly
tax
doesn't
work
and
needs
to
be
supplemented
With
regulates
till
we
get
emissions
down
further
in
this
correct
?
No
.
the
tax
"worked"
by
assumption
and
the
demand
for
emissions
is
moderated
2000
MAC
=
2000
-
4E
800
A
+ +
=
20
,
E
=
495
if
we
want
to
get
to
lower
emissions
the
MAC
will
be
higher
T
=
20
Er
a
-
E
If
we
Want
Ex
=
300
,
MAC
=
4000
4x300
,
=
4000
-
1200
,
=
800
Suppose
MD
=
E
,
What
is
the
optimal
emissions
level
?
MD
=
MAC
LE
=
2000
-
4E
,
5E
=
2000
,
E
P
=
400
If
we
have
a
tax
,
what
is
the
tax
bill
?
2000
MD
Sub
EP
=
400
into
MD
curve
tax
bill
=
+*
x E
?
+
O
=
MD
=
E
=
400
+
400
IIIIXM
T
+
8
=
400
-
=
$
160
,
000
Total
damages
at
optimum
?
(Area
under
MD
curve)
2000
MD
TD
=
E
bXh
=
*
x
400
x
400
=
$
80
,
000
.
I/III"
Total
abatement
costs
at
the
Optimum
?
TM
TAC
=
bxn
=
2
x
100
x
400
=
$
20
,
000
Suppose
firms
argued
the
Following
:
This
policy
costs
us
$
20
,
000
in
TAC
and
$
10
,
000
in
taxes
for
$
180
,
000
total
BUT
,
according
to
your
data
there
should
Only
be
total
damages
of
$
80
,
000
.
Therefore
,
We
are
being
overcharged
and
the
tax
rate
should
be
cut
Is
this
correct
?
The
numbers
are
correct
but
the
conclusion
is
not
.
/E
MD
XMAC
Total
Compliance
cost
=
b
+
c
+
d
=
C
Question
is
,
What
is
the
optimal
tax
rate
?
a
Firms
argue
taxes
should
be
reduced
because
⊥
When
MAC
=
MD
,
at
400
t
F
could
↓
b
BUT
,
that
is
true
at
any
tax
rate
give
Firms
C
d
((
be)
400
500
E
Suppose
MD
=
"50/tonne
Policies
acting
-
>
o
x
including
all
other
Does
this
imply
We
should
only
implement
policies
that
cost
$
50/
tonne
(of
abatement)
charged
X
carbon
⊥
yes
MD
=
50
↑
What
gou
says
Will
⊥
MAC
=
MD
,
and
that
=
$
50
be
charged
ED
E
So
,
We
want
emission
reduction
at
marginal
cost
up
to
$
50/tonne
Criteria
for
Evaluating
Policy
What
do
we
mean
by
"Policy"
⊥
At
the
gov't
level
legislation
=
creates
laws
With
legal
Force
⊥
also
leaves
some
issues
to
discretion
of
Minister
or
Ministry
-regulations
-
Can
be
imposed
or
adjusted
more
easily
Legislation
needs
an
act
of
Parliament
slow
process
,
requires
broad
public
support
Regulations
-
needs
to
follow
process
↑
-
announce
intent
to
regulate
easier
and
-
take
comments
,
vewrite
if
necessary
quicker
-
enter
into
Force
Either
way
we
face
question
:
What
makes
a
good
policy
?
Economics
:
①
cost-efficiency
②
Optimality
①
Achieves
outcome
at
lowest
possible
cost
②
maximizes
t
benefit
Net
benefits
:
Benefits
minus
costs
Most
policies
yield
some
benefits
⊥
do
benefits
exceed
costs
?
(including
opportunity
costs
⊥
do
MB
=
MC
?
(think
about
scale
2
insights
from
economics
1)
"Job
creation"
is
a
cost
,
not
a
benefit
⊥
#
of
workers
needed
is
comparable
to
the
amount
of
Capital
,
energy
,
materials
,
etc
.
These
are
costs
!
2)
Policies
don't
create
outcomes
,
they
create
incentives
,
incentives
create
the
Outcome
⊥
Ex
Endangered
Species
Act
,
USA
-Provision
that
if
the
habitat
of
an
endangered
species
is
discovered
on
your
land
,
restrictions
imposed
to
stop
you
from
Using
land
"Shoot
,
Shovel
+
Shot
up"
Conservation
Easement
Contaminated
Site
Recommendations
CERCLA
"Superfund"
rule
,
USA
=
Brown
Fields
,
trict
joint
+
l
liabilit
a
Ended
up
in
land
abandonment
a
new
sites
.
ever
ener
defense
responsible
Economic
considerations
①
Optimality
②
cost-efficiency
③
dynamic
efficiency
(innovation
⑦
Information
generation
⑤
Enforcability
⑥
Fairness
+
Equity
①
MD
=
MC
②
equimarginal
rule
③
Incentives
to
innovate
=
Sometimes
regulations
lead
firms
to
stop
improving
Ex
New
Source
Review
1990
Clean
Air
Act
Amendments
⊥
grandfathered
old
power
plants
under
lat
rules
⊥
executed
Strict
rules
for
new
plants
-Generators
responded
by
slowing
down
process
of
building
new
plants
,
instead
kept
old
ones
operating
longer
⊥
EPA
began
assessing
plant
upgrades
to
see
if
they
amounted
to
the
plant
becoming
a
new
One
E
"New
Source
Review"
-
firms
responded
by
Minimizing
Plant
upgrades
,
Innovation
slowed
down
considerably
/E
suppose
for
investment
X
,
firms
can
Switch
from
MAC
,
to
MAC
MALI
MAC
2
Standards
at
E
,
Initially
,
Firm
is
in
compliance
at
TAC
=
a
+
D.
C
C
D
E
If
they
switch
,
they
pay
X
and
save
a
not
gain
of
a
X
Es
El
E
⊥
If
they
expect
standards
to
Change
to
EL
=
TACz
=
b
+
Standards
create
Weak
TAC
,
=
a
+
by
gain
is
a
-c
-x
incentives
to
innovate
Taxes
/E
Under
MAC
:
MALI
Total
Compliance
cost
TCC
,
(tax
bill
+
TAC)
=
F
+
d
+
c
+
b
+
a
MAC
2
Under
MACz
:
emissions
Fall
to
Ec
=
TCC
=
F
+
C
+
D
t
f
a
E
Savings
=
a
+
d
-
net
gain
is
a
+
d
-X
,
RATHER
THAN
a
-2
*
E
,
E
Strong
incentive
to
innovate
ᶍ
Information
Standards
:
have
to
pick
a
point
E
,
/E
⊥
is
this
optimal
?
We
don't
know
Taxes
:
Suppose
we
ser
[
=
MD
,
emissions
fall
to
El
,
is
this
optimal
MD
O
⊥
YES
!
firms
go
to
Where
MAC
=
t
=
MD
--
E
E
E
Standards
:
pick
El
,
the
refinement
is
possible
$
/E
Taxes
:
pick
[
,
emissions
Fell
to
Ez
>
is
that
optimal
?
E2
·
MD
-NO
,
MD
at
Es
=
MAC
⑧
Optimal
T
Will
be
between
t
,
&,
I
t
·
MAC
⊥
adjust
I
upward
,
aim
for
where
MAC
=
T
=
MD
E
,
El
E
⑤
Enforceability
-
this
affects
all
policies
Sometimes
the
ideal
policy
can't
be
enforced
because
polluters
actions
can't
be
observed
.
e
g
.
motor
vehicle
exhaust
We
can
observe
technology
+
enforce
Catalytic
converters
Small
manufacturer
Standards
=
emissions
out
of
stacks
Sometimes
the
most
efficient
type
of
policy
Can't
be
enforced
,
so
we
use
less
efficient
policies
that
can
Self-reporting
requirements
Many
regulatory
systems
require
people
to
monitor
themselves
+
report
infractions
-
Most
ONT
pollution
regulations
include
requirements
for
record-keeping
⑥
Fairness
and
Equity
Costs
+
benefits
distributed
unevenly
⊥
Energy
is
a
larger
fraction
of
household
budgets
in
low
income
households
(
↓
Low
income
areas
may
host
more
polluting
activities
than
high
income
areas
-
Figuring
out
cause
+
effect
can
be
tricky
⑥
Cont
=
Across
countries
$
/E
MD
rich
MAC
MD
poor
Marginal
damages
.
Function
of
income
E
EP E
Es
Economics
of
pollution
Standards
IPC)
Technical
Standards
=
Prescribe
equipment
Emissions
Standards
=
Prescribe
emissions
cap
Intensity
Standards
-=
Prescribe
emissions
(output
Ambient
Standards
-
Prescribe
concentrations
Ambient
:
may
be
imposed
by
one
level
of
gov't
on
another
Example
=
USA
,
EPA
:
imposes
"attainment"
rule
on
states
Canada
:
provinces
can
set
own
ambient
standards
but
most
Follow
Canada-Wide
standards
⊥
Act
by
CCME
,
Council
of
Canadian
Ministry
of
the
Environment
Disadvantages
of
Standards
⊥
fail
to
achieve
equimarginal
outcomes
$
/E
MAC
I
MAC2
O
At
E
,
Firm
I
has
higher
MAC
than
Firm
2
O
E
,
EE
⊥
Often
targeted
at
the
wrong
thing
-
Energy
efficiency
Standards
⊥
its
concern
is
the
smoke
from
the
power
plant
(PP)
,
it
makes
sense
to
regulate
the
smoke
,
not
the
kind
of
toaster
someone
uses
100km
away
⊥
failure
to
capture
rents
/E
MAC
suppose
we
cut
emissions
From
Eto
E
*
⊥
costs
are
not
apparent
from
policy
announcement
TP
O
TAC
=
a
b
b
=
"rents
associated
with
regulation
A
E
Es
E
Don't
reveal
MAC
information
=
Weak
incentive
to
innovate
E
g
.
ONT
=
0
Reg
530/18
under
EPA
(Enviro
Protection
Act
fuel
refining
facility
can
emit
no
more
than
225kg/day
of
SO2
⊥
assuming
everyone
is
in
compliance
,
we
don't
know
if
thats
efficient
or
not
Advantages
of
Standards
①
Simple
+
easily
understandable
②
Fits
existing
legal
Framework
③
can
be
Flexible
④
Sometimes
,
the
only
Feasible
option
②
CCME
,
Provincial
enviro
protection
acts
,
Federal
Canadian
Enu
.
Protection
Act
E
Standards
,
Concentration
of
Phosphos
=
1
msk)
Lead
-
5 my//
limits
reduced
for
race
cars
or
aircrafts
Sulpher
->
12
my/1
~
$
/
MD
MAC
Sulfur
limit
is
Rmg/kg
,
but
can
be
averaged
over
a
pool
of
domestic
and
imported
MA
Fuel
at
long/kg
,
With
no
batch
exceeding
80mg/kg
·
r
Mars
&
E
Ambient
Air
Quality
Criteria
PM2
5
=
Zing/m3
-3-year
average
of
goth
percentile
readings
of
daily
24hr
average
concentration
8
O
,
ng/m2
-
3-year
average
of
daily
concentrations
Ozone
=
Glppb
23
year
average
of
annual
4th-highest
daily
maximum
O-hour
average
Summer
Gasoline
=
0
Reg
271/91
Summer
=
May
16
to
Sep
157
During
the
summer
,
gasoline
gold
in
ONT
must
have
vapour
pressure
below
d
2
kilopacials
Northern
Summer
>
June
1
to
Aug
21
VOC's
=
Ozone
Formation
Late
Summer
--
June
1
to
Sep
15
Summer
Gasoline
/E
MD
summer
MD
Winter
E
Technical
Standards
ONT
=
0
Reg
102/73
=
Small
scale
breweries
⊥
must
use
a
dust
collector
when
Milling
grain
.
Heat
from
Kettles
most
be
recovered
by
a
condenser
Air
flow
rate
of
process
equipment
exhaust
11
8
Cubic
meters/second
at
10
%
C
+
pressure
of
101
3
kilopascals
Fermentation
Vendors
must
into
a
water
trap
Midterm
material
Auto
Spray
bottles
for
refinishing
Week
4
Today
HVLP
Sprayer
w/minimum
efficiency
of
65
%
⊥
exhaust
stack
must
be
50
%
taller
than
the
roof
Emission
Taxes
Basic
idea
:
instead
of
prescribing
quantity
,
impose
a
price
per
unit
of
emissions
and
let
the
polluters
choose
quantity
2
g
ONT
0
Reg
530/0
SO
,
emissions
lapped
at
225kg/day
,
Per
Facility
)
=
82
125
tonnes
per
year)
What
if
we
charge
a
tax
of
$
300/tonne/year
instead
?
/E
Would
emissions
go
up
or
down
?
I
MAC
,
Advantage
to
emissions
tax
:
every
emitter
would
go
to
the
Point
Where
MACi
=
T
,
i
=
1
,
.,
N
MMAC
,
=
T
,
MAC
=
Ti
MAC
=
T
MACs
50
225
375E
E
MAC's
all
equal
,
cost-efficiency
IF
T
=
MD
then
it
is
also
optimal
outcome
.
Question
:
How
should
we
set
the
level
of
tax
?
It
is
important
to
have
reasonable
estimates
of
MD
-
regardless
of
whether
we
are
using
taxes
or
standards
MD
is
a
measure
of
social
cost
that
Market
Fails
to
price
in
⊥
All
other
costs
of
production
get
priced
in
:
labour
,
energy
,
materials
,
Capital
-
also
Waste
disposal
⊥
Firms
have
to
pay
for
each
of
these
Disposal
of
SO2
in
boiler
exhaust
is
a
service
provided
by
society
at
large
in
the
form
of
putting
Up
With
lower
air
quality
Just
as
people
put
up
With
loss
of
leisure
time
,
in
exchange
for
pay
,
People
are
willing
to
"supply"
air
quality
for
a
price
,
except
there
is
no
market
mechanism
"Supply
air-quality"
=
Put
up
wa
reduction
in
air
quality
An
emissions
tax
provides
a
pseudo-market
Mechanism
Ideal
Form
:
T
=
MD
/E
MD(S)
MA((D)
po
Firms
typically
Prefer
standards
because
compliance
costs
are
lower
E
①
Example
:
Sawmill
normally
buys
100
logs/week
&
200
each
from
timber
company
Suppose
:
gout
says
We'll
give
you
go
free
logs/week
but
thats
your
cap
Choice
:
①
missions
cap
of
90
tonnes/year
②
emissions
tax
of
$
200/tonne
and
emits
100
tonnes
From
Societys/Policy
Makers
POU
:
tax
Dill
is
a
transfer
not
a
cost
"Lost"
DINL
or
a
resource
cost
⊥
actual
disappearance
of
wealth
What
should
we
do
with
money
?
Best
Cowerother
tatto
reduce
DL
ecwhr
nat
are
currently
to
costly
for
Firms
to
adopt
Ginny
is
this
the
worst
?
Tax
prompts
firm
to
rank
abatement
options
and
implement
cheap
Ones
(on
list
#1)
and
Reject
costly
ones
(list
#2)
⊥
-
Thats
what
we
want
them
to
do
Subsidizing
list
#2
destroys
the
efficiency
of
the
policy
3"Option
:
tax
threshold
/E
Total
compliance
Costs
=
(t
+
25
x
200)
+
b
TCC
=
a
+
d
=
2500
+
b
=
1500
+
200
x
225
200
Y
Y
b
=
47
,
500
200
eio
E
Suppose
gov't
says
you
can
emit
200
tonnes
Free
,
then
pay
$
200
/one
after
that
Do
emissions
change
?
No
,
Firms
still
emit
at
E
=
225
.
But
tax
bill
drops
tax
bill
now
=
25
x
200
=
5
,
000
Example
:
Output-based
pricing
system
(OBPS)
Federal
Carbon
Tax
on
industry
$
/E
Industry
,
i:
Firm
in
industry
:
denoted
by
;
Eij
is
determined
as
follows
:
YjxGi
=
Eij
F
Firm
thresholds
T
(total
emissions
in
industryi)
Parameter
=
Oi
=
(total
output
in
industry
i)
X0
9
Egoes
down
overtime
E
Only
applies
to
energy
intensive
E
trade
exposed
industries
Eij
Ej
E
Targeting
:
Efficiency
requires
tax
to
be
targeted
correctly
(i
e
on
emissions
themselves)
"Gas
guzzler
tax"
>
extra
charge
on
cars
w/large
engines
Garbage
Dag
Fees
-
does
not
affect
driving
choices
once
the
car
is
purchased
-
leads
to
bag
stuffing
slows
down
turnover
of
Vehicle
fleet
-
leads
to
littering
MAC
Incentives
to
innovate
Information
production
taxes
Work
better
[
Funds
Fairness
:
tax
revenu
can
be
used
to
compensate
low-income
households
E
.
EE
Incentives
to
innovat
tates
work
t
is
MD
=
ZE
Compute
E
,
EP
,
t
*
TAC
,
TC
MAC
=
100
1
E
E
:
MAC
=
O
=
100
-
E
=
@
,
200
=
E
/E
MD
EP
:
MAC
=
MD
=
=
100
-
E
=
IE
,
100
:
IE
,
E
=
40
100
MAL
TP
:
MD
=
*
2x40
=
80
80
=
T
*
TAC
=
x
160
x
80
=
6400
TAx
TAC
TCC
:
TAC
+
tax
bill
=
6400
+
40x80
,
6400
+
3200
=
9600
BILL
E
E
*
200
no
PRACTICE
Q
#1
MD
=
EE
,
MAL
=
600
E
VeriFY
=
E
=
600
,
E
*
=
240
,
[
*
=
360
,
TAC
=
64
,
000
,
TCC
=
151
,
200
MAC
,
=
100
-
ic
MAC
=
300
:
2
Find
E
and
tax
to
reduce
total
emissions
to
240
.
-Set
MAC
,
=
MAC
,
=
M
$
/E
Invert
:
MAC
,
=
100-Ec
,
=
Ge
,
=
100
M
,
De
,
=
200
2m]
300
MAI
=
300 - 22
==
2
=
300
M
,
=
200 - Em
+
4
=
400
25M
100
If
M
=
0
,
E
=
400
T
60
Need
to
Set
c
,
+
2
=
240
240
:
400
25M
=
M
=
160
=
M
=
54160
=
10
E
80
160
200
Plug
m
=
60
into
02
c
,
=
200
2x60
=
807
2
=
200
360
=
160/240
PRACTICE
Q
2
MAC
=
250 - 2
,
Find
E
i
Find
a
tax
to
reduce
emissions
by
50
%
from
unregulated
level
MAC
=
250
-
Verify
E
=
750 i
T
=
$
125
Tradable
emission
permits
-
Like
Standards
but
tradable
-
Involves
an
overall
cap
and
the
regulated
Firms
can
trade
allowances
"Cap
+
trade"
/E
MAC
Would
they
trade
?
Yes
they
World
trade
because
MAC
,
MAL
MAC
,
O
P2
Pi
O
E
C
,
Example
MAC
,
=
120
Be
,
Find
E
MAC
,
=
400
5e
,
suppose
we
cap
total
&
80
,
give
30
permits
to
Firm
1
and
50
to
firm
2
.
O
Do
they
trad
?
O
MAC
,
=
120 - 3x30
=
30
②
If
so
how
many
are
exchanged
?
MAC
=
400
-
5550
=
150
③
What
is
equilibrium
price
!
yes
they
trade
,
MAC
,
=MAC
②
Set
MAC
,
=
MAC
=
M
0
+
02
=
40
-
m)
MAC
,
=
120 - 3e
,
=
3e,
=
120
-
M
2
=
po
-
m
E
=
120
Em
c
,
=
40
EmD
MAC
=
400
52c
=
Jee
=
400 - M
-
2
=
PO-Em
②
2
3
=
40
-
m
=
40
25
=
15)
=
80
③
E
=
80
⊥
=
po
=M
=
po
15
=
65/
80
=
120
M
Em
=
40
=
=
m
=
40x
=
75 E
Pug
into
02 G
Firm
1
started
w/30
,
ended
With
15
>
equilibrium
price
=
$
75
Firm
I
Started
W/50
,
ended
With
65
PRACTICE
Q
#3
MAL
,
=
1000
-
1
,
Cut
(missions
From
E
to
1400
,
give
700
to
each
firm
MAC
=
000-te
①
Do
they
trade
?
②
Who
buys
,
who
sells
?
=
VERIFY
③
What
is
equilibrium
price
?
Issues
With
Implementation
Phaseout
of
CFC's
in
USA
Main
Issues
#
Of
Initial
allocation
permits
-
Trading
Rules
-
Hot
spots
-
Market
Power
o
time
Initial
Allocation
Rules
For
initial
allocation
:
action
or
give
away
?
Usually
based
on
historical
output
or
emissions
level
⊥
If
give
away
,
how
much
to
each
?
equilibrium
is
not
affected
by
the
initial
allocation
-
If
permits
are
auctioned
then
gov't
collects
revenue
As
With
taxes
there
are
good
+
bad
options
for
what
to
do
With
the
revenue
Hotspots
If
permits
are
given
away
the
value
of
the
quotas
accives
to
the
initial
owner
Value
of
the
quotas
is
an
asset
for
the
recipient
firms
on
OP
0
Trading
Rules
A
=
southern
Call
)
-
If
Certification
requirements
are
to
onerous
,
the
market
may
not
function
B
=
Midwest
⊥
US
SO2
allowance
Market
,
brokerage
Firms
allowed
to
oversee
C
=
Ohio
Valley
/
Potential
hotspot
Prom
s
-
firms
had
to
"prove
up"
holdings
-
Once
per
year
Auctions
once
per
year
⊥
anyone
could
purchase
permits
Market
Power
What
if
there
is
I
big
firm
and
lots
of
small
firms
This
may
thwart
efficiency
Initial
allocation
needs
to
Favor
Small
Firms
Incentives
For
innovation
$
/E
Firms
can
innovate
from
Switching
from
MAC
,
to
MAC
MAC
,
MACz
⑧
o
-
Net
P
Suppose
Firm
holds
E
,
Permits
,
Price
=
P
=
assume
price
P
doesn't
change
F
d
benefit
At
E
.:
TAC
=
a
+
b
El
E
.
E
Switch
to
MAC
>
emissions
now
at
EL
TAC
=
b
+
d
;
also
can
sell
(E
,
-Es)
permits
,
earn
(c
+
a)
Net
TAC
=
(b
+
d)
(c
+
d)
=
(b
-
C)
Change
in
TAC
=
(a
+
b)
(b
c)
=
a
+
C
See
Book
2
For
Thurs
Lecture
same
as
emissions
taxes
Climate
Change
Lectures
Slogan
vs
.
Evidence
There
are
a
few
areas
of
public
policy
where
the
reliance
on
slogans
instead
of
real
evidence
has
become
very
evident
-
the
Worse
perpetrators
are
often
public
officials
who
should
have
special
expertise
or
decision-making
power
According
to
gov't
experts
no
discernible
changes
in
rates
or
flooding
,
drought
,
etc
.
What
do
we
mean
by
global
warming
?
⊥
The
Greenhouse
Effect
Sun
sends
energy
to
earth
,
earth
sends
it
all
back
to
space
⊥
convection
radiation
-
causes
"Weather"
The
problem
:
Radiation
has
non-linear
trends
Greenhouse
effect
implies
warming
⊥
doubling
CO2
only
raises
temp
by
10C
.
=
Feedback
processes
drives
warming
High
degree
of
consensus
?
Journalism
about
Climate
change
is
Misleading
and
there
is
genuine
disagreement
What
have
people
agreed
on
?
Disagreements
:
CO2
is
a
greenhouse
gas
(infrared
absorbing
feedbacks
and
amplification
techniques
CO
,
concentration
has
gone
up
due
to
Fossil
fulls
-
weather
natural
variability
explains
some
or
most
of
the
modern
climate
changes
World
has
warmed
Since
the
1800s
.
is
it
harmful
or
not
?
Long-term
scale/context
-
Climate
naturally
varies
on
short
long
time
scales
-
CO2
levels
vary
too
Modern
Warming
in
Context
As
both
poles
are
glacialized
were
still
in
an
ice
age
Water
Vapor
injected
into
the
atmosphere
is
a
leading
cause
of
warming
Is
there
a
problem
?
Changes
and
increased
human
activity
have
caused
temp
to
increase
Amplification
Mechanisms
-
Water
Vapor
Feedback
->
More
vapor
more
heat
,
4
in
temp
Ice-albedo
Feedback
>
less
ice
,
Ocean
absorbs
more
heat
,
↑
in
temp
Feedback-driven
warming
Most
rapid
Warming
is
expected
:
-
tropical
troposphere
Polar
surfaces
IPCC
projects
1
5
4
50
Warming
Feedbacks
a
minor
change
may
cause
big
issues
(model-run
simulations
Tropical
Troposphere
-basically
covered
in
Water
not
much
warming
there
despite
Co
,
rising
18
%
Since
Ta
ECS
(equilibrium
climate
sensitivity)
-
amount
of
warming
after
doubling
CO2
emissions
and
running
until
new
equilibrium
is
reached
-
Empirical
ECS
estimates
are
lower
Model
range
(of
Warming)
:
1
5-4
50
w/much
higher
top
end
Conclusions
-
Wide
scientific
agreement
that
humans
can
,
and
likely
do
,
influence
the
Climate
system
by
raising
the
atmospheric
CO2
Fraction
⊥
Whether
this
will
be
a
problem
depends
on
Feedbacks
,
Which
are
studied
using
computer
models
of
the
Climate
system
-
A
lot
of
credible
scientists
believe
the
Feedbacks
are
large
enough
to
pose
problems
in
the
years
ahead
Discrepancies
between
models
&
Observations
Suggest
Feedbacks
may
be
overstated
in
the
models
This
debate
has
large
policy
implications
and
needs
to
be
resolved
Economic
aspects
The
Climate
change
issue
seems
to
have
been
stalled
for
decades
⊥
VERY
difficult
to
get
past
slogans
to
Understand
What
the
REAL
policy
Challenges
are
What
makes
this
so
difficult
?
①
Unlike
other
pollutants
,
CO2
emissions
mix
globally
,
so
unilateral
action
is
useless
Free
rider
Kakage
problems
②
CO2
concentrations
only
change
very
slowly
in
response
to
emissions
cuts
,
so
benefits
are
small
Far
in
the
future
③
CO2
emissions
are
closely
tied
to
Fossil
Fuel
use
which
is
essential
for
econ
growth
development
④
Abatement
options
are
very
limited
⑤
Damages
are
highly
uncertain
may
not
appear
for
decades
①
Everyone
(Country)
is
responsible
for
a
bit
/Of
emissions)
"Tragedy
of
the
Commons"
Example
:
Carbon
Leakage
Key
Problems
ᶓ
ᶏ
Policies
need
to
be
implemented
on
a
massive
scale
Both
emit
100
units
,
area
A
cots
emissions
,
corps
in
area
A
more
to
area
B
,
Policies
have
been
too
small
to
have
an
effect
and
cutting
emissions
in
A
but
subsequently
raising
B
.
too
costly
to
implement
↑
the
scale
of
policies
Pushes
the
costs
up
Faster
than
the
benefits
③
Emissions
are
tied
to
income
the
highest
emission
growth
Path
Solves
EVERY
development
problem
known
to
humanity
,
but
also
involves
warming
④
Abatement
either
VERY
expensive
or
NOT
POSSIBLE
SO2
>
could
use
scrubbers
or
Switch
to
a
cleaner
version
for
a
low
cost
-CO2
-
Would
have
to
switch
to
an
alternate
fuel
or
reduce
consumption
at
a
very
high
cost
⑤
CO2
is
NOT
a
regular
air
pollutant
⊥
Natural
Pt
of
atmosphere
respiration
⊥
good
for
plants
⊥
not
reg
before
now
Concern
now
is
effect
on
Climate
⊥
However
"Climate"
is
a
catch-all
term
⊥
PPI
try
to
link
ANY
Dad
Weather
event
to
CO2
emissions
Small
UNCERTAIN
benefits
(of
reducing)
and
high
and
visible
costs
(that
are
apparent
today)
Combined
Make
it
VERY
difficult
to
motivate
incurring
costs
to
reduce
CO
missions
Integrated
Assessment
Model
(IAM)
combines
estimated
damages
(due
to
Warming) s
Costs
of
abatement
Common)
Result
:
CO2
imposes
economic
costs
,
but
not
much
abatement
can
be
justified
Best
Strategy
:
Adapt
is
adjust
to
the
changes
Keep
emitting