Understanding Defamation and Due Process in Legal Cases
School
Bridgewater State University**We aren't endorsed by this school
Course
ACFI 305
Subject
Law
Date
Dec 12, 2024
Pages
3
Uploaded by MateToadMaster102
ACFI 305 MidtermProf. Joe RizzoSkylar Tran1.In an action brought by D'Angelo Bailey alleging that Eminem's lyrics in his song "Brain Damage" were untrue and slanderous depictions of his character, Bailey was unsuccessful. Subsequently, Bailey requested an appeal, which aims to determine whether the trial court committed prejudicial error. For Bailey to successfully appeal a trial court decision, he must demonstrate that defamation occurred, constituting a tort involving false communication that injures a person’s reputation. Such a communication receives limited constitutional protection under the First Amendment,which protects most speech by using a strict scrutiny standard. In Snyder v. Phelps, the Court differentiated between speech addressing "matters of public concern" and "matters of purely private significance"; it argued that the "content, form and context"of the speech need to be examined to determine whether it deals with "matters of public concern" and therefore, needs to be protected.However, in this case, Eminem referenced the name of the individual in his lyrics,subjecting it to matters of private concerns. Bailey approached this case with the assertion that Eminem's lyrics were "untrue and slanderous", yet Bailey failed to provideevidence to refute any of Eminem's claims in his disposition. Had Bailey provided evidence that contradicted Eminem's claims, it would hold Eminem responsible for defamation. The lack of evidence on behalf of Bailey is not a result of the exclusion of evidence, which would present as an error of law, but due to lack thereof. Therefore, a request for an appeal brought by Bailey against Eminem for defamation, Bailey will not be successful, nor will he be subjected to the $1 million. The lawsuit is not warranted, aligning with Judge Servitto's ruling.2.In Jordan Airlines, Inc. v. Orion (Case Problem 4, Chapter 4), the issue of conflicting federal and state laws parallels Dr. Pierce’s lawsuit against the City of Taunton. Under the U.S. Constitution’s Supremacy Clause, federal law takes precedence, requiring state law to yield in case of conflict. Pierce's lawsuit argues that Taunton's ordinance on unmanned aircraft conflicts with the Federal Aviation Act. Given this, Dr. Pierce is likely to succeed, as the Federal Aviation Act, upheld by the Supremacy Clause, would override the conflicting state ordinance.3.Bridgewater's impending action to euthanize Dr.Harper's dog constitute a violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, which prohibits the federal and state governments from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Due process requires that individuals be given noticeand an opportunity to be heard. In this case, Dr. Alan Harper is being deprived of his property, his dog, on the basis of the Mass. General Laws stating, "after quarantine, the dog is to be euthanized without regard to the circumstances of the event." This state statute violates the individual rights guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' due process clauses. This case can be distinguished from the case of Allen v. Erehwon, Case Problem 1, Chapter 4, as Dr. Harper was given notice about the automatic euthanasia of his dog, but not the opportunity to be heard.
Therefore, Dr. Harper's pursuit of legal action against the town of Bridgewater and its Animal Control Officer is not justified due to the infringement upon his constitutional rights.4.In the lawsuit initiated by Elisabeth Scotland against Fenway Sports Group and Atlantic Elevator Company, Scotland will succeed in her claim for negligence. Under tort law principles, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant owed a dutyof care, breached that duty, and that the breach directly caused the plaintiff's injuries. Fenway Sports Group,as the owner of Fenway Park, had a duty to maintain safety of the premises for visitors, while Atlantic Elevator Company, responsible for elevator maintenance, owed a duty to ensure the proper functioning of the elevator. In this case, the accident occurred due to the elevator door unexpectedly swinging open, causing Scotland to fall into the shaft. Fenway Sports Group and Atlantic Elevator Company may be liable for negligence if any faults can be identified within the elevator that were overlooked and left unaddressed, with great consideration of Atlantic Elevator Company's failure to send a mechanic for assistance requested by the Boston Fire Department. This case can be distinguished from the case of Hawkins v. H.E. Butt Grocery Store, Case Problem 13, Chapter 8, because Elisabeth Scotland's conduct was not contributorily negligence, as she did not have a full appreciation of the danger since there was no sign warning leaning or pushing against the elevator door could promptly and unexpectedly cause it to open. Hence, contributory negligence is notfactored when Scotland jumped up and hugged her father and landed against the elevator door with an indiscernible amount of force. Elisabeth Scotland's father must demonstrate that he endured emotional distress as a result of witnessing his daughter's injuries, as well as, the lack of response by the Atlantic Elevator Company.Therefore, Elisabeth Scotland will succeed in her negligence claim against Fenway Sports Group and Atlantic Elevator Company due to their potential breach of duty in maintaining safe premises and elevator operation. Furthermore, Mr. Scotland's emotional distress claim is justified as it was directly caused by the defendants' dismissive care.5.The use of the evidence discovered by the Boston Police in Carey Grant's car constitutes a violation of the Fourth Amendment, “no warrant, no search” and it cannot be justified. This Amendment protects individuals against unreasonable searches. Warrantless searches and seizures are permitted based on probable cause that a crime exists. A search incident to an arrest is an exception to a warrantless search, aiming to protect the arrestee, the arresting officer, and the public from potential harm, including the presence of a weapon, and to search foranything else within the officer's “wingspan”. Otherwise, law enforcement officialsmust obtain a warrant specifying the object of the search. To successfully obtain a warrant, the Boston Police must demonstrate to a magistrate that there is probable cause to believe the search will reveal evidence of criminal activity. Evidence obtained outside these conditions is subject to the Exclusionary Rule upon plaintiff's, Grant's, request to Motion to Suppress.In this case, the Boston Police can only act within the parameters of the outstanding warrant for Grant's arrest for driving with a suspended license. Yet, they proceeded to search Grant's car without a warrant specifically authorizing the search for
drugs or weapons, indicating an illegal search. Even if they requested a search warrant,it would have been denied given the basis for Grant's presumed criminality in illegal possession of drugs based on an anonymous tip, which lacks credibility. Although warrantless searches are permissible when Grant was lawfully arrested, officers are restricted to searching the arrestee and the area within their "wingspan". No weapon is on his person, but rather inaccessible in the owner's car, fulfilling the safety requirements for everyone at the scene. This case can be compared to the case of Lowhand v. Police, Case Problem 1 of "Recent Developments: cellphone searches, roommates, "tips””, as no evidence was discovered on Grant's person; instead, it was later found in his car through an illegal search.Therefore, the warrantless search cannot be justified as a search incident to an arrest, as the Boston Police neglected to obtain a search warrant before searching Grant's car. Consequently, the gun and bag of cocaine found in Grant's car will not be admissible as evidence in trial.6.In the Class Action Complaint initiated by Lynn Diesel against the Bridgewater Police Department, Diesel's objection is justified. Massachusetts law does not explicitly prohibit the act of flashing headlights to warn other motorists of an approaching speed trap. Officer Barney Fife's decision to pull over Diesel on this rationale infringes upon her right to freedom of speech.However, the instant case can be distinguished from the case of Central Electric Corporation of State X v. Public Service Commission of State X, Case Problem 5, Chapter 4. In that case, the deprivation of freedom of speech stemmed from an unjustified law. In contrast, Diesel's citation occurred without a specific statute prohibiting her behavior.Therefore, Diesel's use of her headlights to communicate is protected under the First Amendment as an exercise of her freedom of expression. Consequently, her citation should be dismissed. The Bridgewater Police Department should reevaluate its compliance with the law and refrain from infringing individuals' rights.