ipl-logo

Gov.uscourts.mnd.174320.236.0

.pdf
School
Indiana Wesleyan University, Marion**We aren't endorsed by this school
Course
ACCT 590
Subject
Accounting
Date
Dec 19, 2024
Pages
34
Uploaded by MegaNightingale4735
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA In re Pork Antitrust Litigation This Document Relates To: Commercial and Institutional Indirect Purchaser Plaintiff Actions and Consumer Indirect Purchaser Plaintiff Actions Case No. 18-cv-01776-JRT-HB REPLY MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS’ JOINT MOTION TO DISMISS THE STATE LAW CLAIMS IN THE INDIRECT PURCHASER PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINTS CASE 0:18-cv-01776-JRT-JFD Doc. 236 Filed 12/21/18 Page 1 of 34
Background image
i TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................................1I.THE COURT SHOULD DISMISS ALL OF THE INDIRECT PURCHASERS’ CLAIMS AS IMPLAUSIBLE OR TIME-BARRED. .................................................................................................................1II.THE CIPS LACK STANDING TO PURSUE A MAJORITY OF THEIR STATE LAW CLAIMS. ..............................................................................1A.The Eighth Circuit Has Held That Standing Is A Threshold Issue. ..............................................................................................................2B.The CIPs Do Not Have Standing To Pursue All Claims Asserted. ........................................................................................................2C.The Cases CIPs Cite Are Inapposite. ............................................................4III.THE STATE ANTITRUST CLAIMS FAIL AS A MATTER OF LAW. ........................................................................................................................5A.The Indirect Purchasers Do Not Plausibly Plead Their State Antitrust Claims. ...........................................................................................5B.Various State Antitrust Claims Should Also Be Dismissed For Independent, State-Specific Reasons. .....................................................51.Under Illinois Law, Indirect Purchasers Cannot Maintain A Class Action. ...................................................................52.IIPs’ Rhode Island Antitrust Claims Should Be Dismissed As To Damages Incurred Prior To July 15, 2013. ...................................................................................................63.The Court Should Dismiss The Arizona, Nevada And Utah Antitrust Claims For Failure To Provide Timely Notice To Those States’ Attorneys General.......................................7IV.THE INDIRECT PURCHASERS’ STATE CONSUMER PROTECTION CLAIMS FAIL AS A MATTER OF LAW. ..................................7CASE 0:18-cv-01776-JRT-JFD Doc. 236 Filed 12/21/18 Page 2 of 34
Background image
ii A.Rule 9(b) Applies To The Consumer Protection Claims, And Indirect Purchasers’ Consumer Protection Claims Are Not Adequately Pled. ...........................................................................................7B.Indirect Purchasers Fail To Adequately Plead Consumer Reliance Or Consumer-Directed Deceptive Conduct As Required Under The Law Of Nine States. ....................................................81.Arkansas .............................................................................................82.California ............................................................................................93.District of Columbia ...........................................................................94.Michigan .............................................................................................95.New York .........................................................................................106.North Dakota ....................................................................................107.Rhode Island .....................................................................................118.Virginia .............................................................................................119.Wisconsin .........................................................................................11C.CIPs Do Not Have Statutory Standing Under Missouri Or Rhode Island Law. .......................................................................................12D.Indirect Purchasers’ Antitrust Claims Are Not Actionable Under Six States’ Consumer Protection Statutes. .......................................12E.Indirect Purchasers Cannot Recover Monetary Damages Under The Laws of California And Minnesota. ..........................................13F.Indirect Purchasers Fail To Allege Intrastate Conspiratorial Activity Necessary Under Six States’ Laws. ..............................................14G.The Indirect Purchasers Failed To Give The Notice Required Under The Consumer Protection Statutes Of West Virginia and Hawaii. ..................................................................................................15H.Statutory Class-Action Bars Preclude Indirect Purchasers’ Claims In Arkansas, South Carolina, And Utah. ........................................15CASE 0:18-cv-01776-JRT-JFD Doc. 236 Filed 12/21/18 Page 3 of 34
Background image
iii V.THE INDIRECT PURCHASERS’ UNJUST ENRICHMENT CLAIMS FAIL AS A MATTER OF LAW. ..........................................................16A.All Of The Unjust Enrichment Claims Should Be Dismissed For Failure To Plead The Specific Elements Required In The Respective States. ........................................................................................16B.Unjust Enrichment Is Not A Standalone Claim In Four States. ..................17C.Indirect Purchasers Fail To Allege That Any Possible Benefit They Conferred On Defendants Was “Direct” And Not Merely “Incidental.” ....................................................................................17D.The Unjust Enrichment Claims In Illinois And South Carolina Fail Because The Indirect Purchasers Do Not Allege A Duty Owed By Defendants...................................................................................18E.The Unjust Enrichment Claims Of Nine States Should Be Dismissed Because Indirect Purchasers Have Adequate Legal Remedies. ....................................................................................................19CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................20CASE 0:18-cv-01776-JRT-JFD Doc. 236 Filed 12/21/18 Page 4 of 34
Background image
iv TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s) FEDERAL CASESAm. Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Lake City Indus. Prod., Inc., 2012 WL 3027953 (W.D. Mich. July 24, 2012) ............................................................6 Apex Oil Co., Inc. v. Jones Stephens Corp., 881 F.3d 658 (8th Cir. 2018) .........................................................................................8 Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982) .......................................................................................................4 Brown v. Medtronic, Inc., 628 F.3d 451 (8th Cir. 2010) .........................................................................................2 Butler v. Jimmy John’s Franchise, LLC, 331 F.Supp.3d 786 (S.D. Ill. 2018) ..............................................................................13 Carnival Corp. v. Rolls-Royce PLC, 2009 WL 3861450 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 17, 2009)..............................................................14 Chin v. General Mills, Inc., 2013 WL 2420455 (D. Minn. June 3, 2013) ..................................................................4 Cruz v. Lawson Software, Inc., 2010 WL 890038 (D. Minn. Jan. 5, 2010) ...................................................................16 Curtis v. Propel Prop. Tax Funding, LLC, 2018 WL 717006 (E.D. Va. Feb. 5, 2018) ...................................................................11 Dooner v. Yuen, 2016 WL 6080814 (D. Minn. Oct. 17, 2016) ..............................................................19 Evergreen Partnering Grp., Inc. v. Pactiv Corp., 2014 WL 304070 (D. Mass. Jan. 28, 2014) .................................................................14 Fallick v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 162 F.3d 410 (6th Cir. 1998) .........................................................................................4 Ferrari v. Best Buy Co., 2015 WL 2242128 (D. Minn. May 12, 2015) .............................................................2-3 Gregory v. Dillard’s, Inc., 565 F.3d 464 (8th Cir. 2009) .......................................................................................16 CASE 0:18-cv-01776-JRT-JFD Doc. 236 Filed 12/21/18 Page 5 of 34
Background image
v Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 ...................................................................................................................6 In re Aftermarket Filters Antitrust Litig., 2009 WL 3754041 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 5, 2009) ................................................................17 In re Aftermarket Filters Antitrust Litig., 2010 WL 1416259 (N.D. Ill Apr. 1, 2010) ..................................................................18 In re Asacol Antitrust Litig., 907 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2018) ............................................................................................4 In re Broiler Chicken Antitrust Litig., 290 F.Supp.3d 772 (N.D. Ill. 2017) ...............................................................................6 In re Cast Iron Soil Pipe & Fittings Antitrust Litig., 2015 WL 5166014 (E.D. Tenn. June 24, 2015) ...........................................................14 In re DDAVP Indirect Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 903 F.Supp.2d 198 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) ............................................................................13 In re Ditropan XL Antitrust Litig., 529 F.Supp.2d 1098 (N.D. Cal. 2007) .........................................................................13 In re Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litig., 516 F.Supp.2d 1072 (N.D. Cal. 2007) .........................................................................12 In re FlonaseAntitrust Litig., 692 F.Supp.2d 524 (E.D. Pa. 2010) .............................................................................15 In re Graphics Processing Units Antitrust Litig., 527 F.Supp.2d 1011 (N.D. Cal. 2007) .........................................................................12 In re Levaquin Products Liability Litig., 752 F.Supp.2d 1071 (D. Minn. 2010) ..........................................................................19 In re Lidoderm Antitrust Litig., 103 F.Supp.3d 1155 (N.D. Cal. 2015) .........................................................................13 In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., -- F.Supp.3d --, 2018 WL 4006752 (D.N.J. Aug. 21, 2018) ....................................7, 15 In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Exp. Antitrust Litig., 350 F.Supp.2d 160 (D. Me. 2004) .........................................................................10, 13 CASE 0:18-cv-01776-JRT-JFD Doc. 236 Filed 12/21/18 Page 6 of 34
Background image
vi In re Opana ER Antitrust Litig., 162 F.Supp.3d 704 (N.D. Ill. 2016) .......................................................................16, 17 In re Packaged Ice Antitrust Litig., 779 F.Supp.2d 642 (E.D. Mich. 2011) .........................................................................14 In re Polyurethane Foam Antitrust Litig., 799 F.Supp.2d 777 (N.D. Ohio 2011) ..........................................................................13 In re Pre-Filled Propane Tank Antitrust Litig., 2016 WL 6963059 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 13, 2016), aff’d in part, 893 F.3d 1047 (8th Cir. 2018) .......................................................................................................3 In re Processed Egg Products Antitrust Litig., 851 F.Supp.2d. 867 (E.D. Pa. 2012) ........................................................................3, 17 In re Refrigerant Compressors Antitrust Litig., 2013 WL 1431756 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 9, 2013) ..................................................15, 17-18 In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763 (8th Cir. 2017) .....................................................................................2, 4 In re Target Corp. Data Security Breach Litig., 66 F.Supp.3d 1154 (D. Minn. 2014) ..............................................................................3 In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litig., 260 F.R.D. 143 (E.D. Pa. 2009) .....................................................................................3 Insulate SB, Inc. v. Advanced Finishing Sys., Inc., 2014 WL 943224 (D. Minn. Mar. 11, 2014) .............................................................2, 3 Langan v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Cos., 897 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2018) .............................................................................................4 Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996) .......................................................................................................2 Leyse v. Clear Channel Broad., Inc., 2010 WL 2253646 (S.D. Ohio June 2, 2010) ................................................................6 Melendres v. Arpaio, 784 F.3d 1254 (9th Cir. 2015) .......................................................................................4 Olin v. Dakota Access, LLC, -- F.3d --, 2018 WL 6538242 (8th Cir. Dec. 13, 2018) ..............................................7-8 CASE 0:18-cv-01776-JRT-JFD Doc. 236 Filed 12/21/18 Page 7 of 34
Background image
vii Prado-Steiman ex rel. Prado v. Bush, 221 F.3d 1266 (11th Cir. 2000) ..................................................................................4-5 Racher v. Westlake Nursing Home Ltd. P’ship, 871 F.3d 1152 (10th Cir. 2017) .....................................................................................6 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393 (2010) ...................................................................................................5, 6 Sheet Metal Workers Local 441 Health & Welfare Plan v. GlaxoSmithKline, PLC, 737 F.Supp.2d 380 (E.D. Pa. 2010) ...............................................................................9 Siegel v. Shell Oil Co., 480 F.Supp.2d 1034 (N.D. Ill. 2007) ...........................................................................13 Spires v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 289 Fed. App’x 269 (10th Cir. 2008) ..........................................................................17 Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83 (1998) .........................................................................................................2 Streambend Props. II, LLC v. Ivy Tower Minneapolis, LLC, 781 F.3d 1003 (8th Cir. 2015) .......................................................................................8 Thunander v. Uponor, Inc., 887 F.Supp.2d 850 (D. Minn. 2012) ..............................................................................2 United States ex rel. Krahling v. Merck & Co., 44 F.Supp.3d 581 (E.D. Pa. 2014) .................................................................................3 United States v. Bame, 721 F.3d 1025 (8th Cir. 2013) .....................................................................................19 Whitlock v. FSL Mgmt., LLC, 843 F.3d 1084 (6th Cir. 2016) .......................................................................................5 Yong Ki Hong v. KBS Am., Inc., 951 F.Supp.2d 402 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) ...........................................................................10 STATE CASESEllis v. Smith Grading & Paving, Inc., 366 S.E.2d 12 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998) .......................................................................18, 19 CASE 0:18-cv-01776-JRT-JFD Doc. 236 Filed 12/21/18 Page 8 of 34
Background image
viii Gaebler v. N.M. Potash Corp., 676 N.E. 2d 228 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) ...........................................................................13 Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 63 P.3d 937 (Cal. 2003) .........................................................................................13, 14 Laughlin v. Evanston Hosp., 550 N.E.2d 986 (Ill. 1990) ...........................................................................................13 Long v. Dell, Inc., 93 A.3d 988 (R.I. 2014) ..............................................................................................11 Martis v. Grinnell Mutual Reinsurance Co., 905 N.E. 2d 920 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) ...........................................................................18 Millennium Commc’ns & Fulfillment, Inc. v. Office of Attorney General, 761 So.2d 1256 (Fla. Dist. App. 2000) ........................................................................14 Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. DiMucci, 34 N.E.3d 1023 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015) ............................................................................18 Phila. Indem. Ins. Co. v. Pace Suburban Bus. Serv., 2016 WL 6804622 (Ill. App. Ct. Nov. 17, 2016).........................................................18 Sperry v. Crompton Corp., 810 N.Y.S.2d 498 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) ...................................................................18 State ex rel. Bryant v. R & A Inv. Co., 985 S.W.2d 299 (Ark. 1999) ........................................................................................12 State ex rel. Spitzer v. Daicel Chem. Indus., Ltd., 840 N.Y.S.2d 8 (App. Div. 2007) ................................................................................10 STATE STATUTESCalifornia Cartwright Act, Cal. Bus & Prof. Code § 1670, et seq......................................9 California Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq..............................................................................................................................9 District of Columbia Antitrust Act, D.C. Code § 28-4501, et seq......................................9 District of Columbia Consumer Protection Act, D.C. Code § 28-3901, et seq..........................................................................................9 Hawaii Revised Statute § 480-13.3(a) ...............................................................................15 CASE 0:18-cv-01776-JRT-JFD Doc. 236 Filed 12/21/18 Page 9 of 34
Background image
ix Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 93A, § 11 ..............................................................14 Michigan Consumer Protection, Act, Mich. Comp. Laws § 445.903(1)(z) ..................9, 10 Minnesota Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Minnesota Statute § 325D.43-48 ..................13 New Hampshire Consumer Protection Act, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 358-A:2 ..................14 New York General Business Law § 349 ...........................................................................14 Wisconsin Antitrust Act, Wis. Stat. § 133.03....................................................................15 Wisconsin Consumer Protection Act, Wis. Stat. § 100.18 ................................................15 CASE 0:18-cv-01776-JRT-JFD Doc. 236 Filed 12/21/18 Page 10 of 34
Background image
1 INTRODUCTION Like the Direct Purchasers’ claims, Indirect Purchasers’ claims fail because they have failed to adequately allege a supply-reduction conspiracy. See Dkt. 162. But even if the federal antitrust claims survive, many of the state claims fail. For the reasons set forth below, and discussed in Defendants’ prior briefing, the Court should dismiss Indirect Purchasers’ state law claims.1ARGUMENT I. THE COURT SHOULD DISMISS ALL OF THE INDIRECT PURCHASERS’ CLAIMS AS IMPLAUSIBLE OR TIME-BARRED. Indirect Purchasers’ state law claims should be dismissed because they are predicated on the same implausible and legally insufficient allegations that are offered in support of their federal claims. Additionally, Indirect Purchasers rely solely on their statute-of-limitations arguments in their opposition brief for the federal claims. Without additional arguments, Defendants rely on and incorporate herein their statute-of-limitations arguments in the Joint Federal Reply. Dkt. 234. II. THE CIPS LACK STANDING TO PURSUE A MAJORITY OF THEIR STATE LAW CLAIMS. The CIPs focus the standing argument on whether they have constitutional standing to bring any state claim instead of properly focusing on whether they can bring each of thestate law claims in their Complaint. The persuasive weight of authority 1Defendants cite to the internal pages in their Memorandum in Support of the Joint Motion to Dismiss the State Law Claims (Dkt. 165) as “Memo. __”; and to Indirect Purchasers’ Memorandum in Opposition (Dkt. 231) as “Opp. __,” and not to the ECF pagination. CASE 0:18-cv-01776-JRT-JFD Doc. 236 Filed 12/21/18 Page 11 of 34
Background image
2 within this District and nationally favors dismissal of claims for states in which no CIP resides or was injured, due to lack of standing. A.The Eighth Circuit Has Held That Standing Is A Threshold Issue. Indirect Purchasers ignore specific controlling guidance from the Eighth Circuit. First, the Court “must address questions of standing before addressing the merits of [the] case” where “standing is called into question.” Brown v. Medtronic, Inc., 628 F.3d 451, 455 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 93-102 (1998)).2Second, “[t]he requirements for standing do not change in the class action context.” In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763, 768 (8th Cir. 2017). Thus, to represent a class, a named plaintiff must suffer the injury giving rise to the claim. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357 (1996); Thunander v. Uponor, Inc., 887 F.Supp.2d 850, 863 (D. Minn. 2012) (“A class representative must have standing to assert claims on his or her own behalf in order to have standing to assert claims as a class representative.”). B.The CIPs Do Not Have Standing To Pursue All Claims Asserted. The weight of authority in this District and other district courts within the Eighth Circuit holds that “named plaintiffs lack standing to assert claims under the laws of the states in which they do not reside or in which they suffered no injury.” Insulate SB, Inc. v. Advanced Finishing Sys., Inc., 2014 WL 943224, at *11 (D. Minn. Mar. 11, 2014) (Montgomery, J.); Ferrari v. Best Buy Co., 2015 WL 2242128, at *9 (D. Minn. May 12, 2Standing is a threshold jurisdictional inquiry, for “[w]ithout jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause,” and may only dismiss the case. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 94. CASE 0:18-cv-01776-JRT-JFD Doc. 236 Filed 12/21/18 Page 12 of 34
Background image
3 2015) (Davis, J.); In re Pre-Filled Propane Tank Antitrust Litig., 2016 WL 6963059, at *7 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 13, 2016), aff’d in part, 893 F.3d 1047 (8th Cir. 2018). The CIPs cite no Eighth Circuit authority to the contrary. Instead, they rely on the Eastern District of Pennsylvania’s decision in In re Processed Egg Products Antitrust Litigation, 851 F.Supp.2d. 867, 888 (E.D. Pa. 2012). But that case does not even represent the prevailing view in that district. SeeIn re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litig., 260 F.R.D. 143, 158 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (concluding that indirect purchasers failed to allege standing for claims under the laws of states where no named plaintiff was located);see alsoUnited States ex rel. Krahling v. Merck & Co., 44 F.Supp.3d 581, 602 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (holding after Processed Eggthat indirect purchasers “do not have standing to bring claims based on the laws of states in which they do not reside because they have not sufficiently pled injuries-in-fact in those states”). District Courts here and elsewhere in the Eighth Circuit rely on Wellbutrin and itsprogeny, not Processed Egg. See Insulate, 2014 WL 943224 at *11; Ferrari, 2015 WL 2242128 at *9; Propane, 2016 WL 6963059 at *7 (all citing Wellbutrin). As Defendants have explained, Memo. 4-6, In re Target Corp. Data Security Breach Litigation does not support a different outcome. See 66 F.Supp.3d 1154, 1159-60 (D. Minn. 2014) (distinguishing Insulate by the existence of an antitrust claim). The present case, instead, is closely analogous to Judge Montgomery’s Insulatedecision—an antitrust class action—and therefore should be treated similarly. CASE 0:18-cv-01776-JRT-JFD Doc. 236 Filed 12/21/18 Page 13 of 34
Background image
4 C.The Cases CIPs Cite Are Inapposite. Although Indirect Purchasers claim that “[c]ourts in numerous circuits have adopted” the rule they advance, Opp. 8, they ignore the controlling law from the Eighth Circuit. See SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d at 768. The cited authority is inapposite. See Opp. 6-8 & n.13. Melendres v. Arpaio, 784 F.3d 1254, 1261 (9th Cir. 2015), is a civil rights case that does not address whether a plaintiff must reside in a state to have standing to bring a claim under that state’s law. Langan v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Cos., 897 F.3d 88, 95 (2d Cir. 2018), contradicts the Eighth Circuit’s direction in SuperValuthat the requirements of standing do not change in the class action context. In re Asacol Antitrust Litigation, 907 F.3d 42, 49 (1st Cir. 2018), allowed plaintiffs to bring “parallel” claims on behalf of absent class members, but based its standing conclusion on a misapplication of Supreme Court guidance in another civil rights case that did not endorse standing for claims under the law of states where the plaintiffs were not present. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 999 (1982) (a plaintiff injured by “conduct of one kind” does not “possess by virtue of that injury the necessary stake in litigating conduct of another kind, although similar, to which he has not been subject”). Fallick v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 162 F.3d 410, 421 (6th Cir. 1998), did not consider the issue of plaintiffs bringing state-law claims for states in which they did not reside and is inconsistent with this District’s decision in Chin v. General Mills, Inc., 2013 WL 2420455, at *1 (D. Minn. June 3, 2013) (plaintiff did not have standing to pursue claims of persons who purchased different products). Finally, Prado-Steiman ex rel. Prado v. CASE 0:18-cv-01776-JRT-JFD Doc. 236 Filed 12/21/18 Page 14 of 34
Background image
5 Bush, 221 F.3d 1266, 1281 (11th Cir. 2000), concerns factual distinctions between potential class members but not the standing issue presented here. The Court should address standing now and dismiss all CIPs’ claims for the 19 jurisdictions in which no CIP representative resides. III. THE STATE ANTITRUST CLAIMS FAIL AS A MATTER OF LAW. A. The Indirect Purchasers Do Not Plausibly Plead Their State Antitrust Claims. Indirect Purchasers concede that their state antitrust claims are premised on the same conduct as their federal claims. Opp. 3. Defendants rely on the arguments made in the memoranda in support of the Defendants’ Joint Motion to Dismiss the Federal Law Claims (Dkt. 162 & 234), which compel dismissal of the federal and state antitrust claims. B. Various State Antitrust Claims Should Also Be Dismissed For Independent, State-Specific Reasons. 1. Under Illinois Law, Indirect Purchasers Cannot Maintain A Class Action. Defendants moved to dismiss class-action claims from Illinois because that state’s statutory scheme bars the claims from being brought as private class actions. In their Opposition, Indirect Purchasers argue that the class-action bar is unenforceable due to generic statements from portions of Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Insurance Co., 559 U.S. 393 (2010). See Opp. 11. But the controlling rule from Shady Groveis that stated in Justice Stevens’s concurrence, namely that, in some instances, “state procedural rules function as part of the state’s definition of substantive rights and remedies and thus must be applied in federal court.” Whitlock v. FSL Mgmt., LLC, 843 CASE 0:18-cv-01776-JRT-JFD Doc. 236 Filed 12/21/18 Page 15 of 34
Background image
6 F.3d 1084, 1091 n.2 (6th Cir. 2016); accordRacher v. Westlake Nursing Home Ltd. P’ship, 871 F.3d 1152, 1162 (10th Cir. 2017); Memo. 8-10. Indirect Purchasers cite two cases that did not enforce class-action bars, but those cases dealt with enforcing general state class-action bars against federal claims. Am. Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Lake City Indus. Prod., Inc., 2012 WL 3027953, at *2 (W.D. Mich. July 24, 2012) (state class-action bar did not apply to a federal statutory telecommunication claim); Leyse v. Clear Channel Broad., Inc., 2010 WL 2253646, at *2 (S.D. Ohio June 2, 2010) (same). Those cases don’t support Indirect Purchasers’ argument here. Post-Shady Grove, federalcourts have enforced state class-action bars against state antitrust claims. Memo. 8-10. This Court should do the same. Indirect Purchasers cite In re Broiler Chicken Antitrust Litigation, 290 F.Supp.3d 772, 817 (N.D. Ill. 2017). Opp. 12. But that decision is unpersuasive because the court provided minimal analysis on the Shady Groveissue, cited few of the cases from the eight years since Shady Grove, and never considered the argument that the class-action bars are enforceable because they are codified within the same statutory scheme giving the right to bring the claim. See id. at 817. 2. IIPs’ Rhode Island Antitrust Claims Should Be Dismissed As To Damages Incurred Prior To July 15, 2013. The IIPs concede that they cannot recover damages under Rhode Island law based on conduct preceding the effective date of the Illinois Brickrepealer statute, July 15, 2013. See Opp. 14. As a result, the Court should dismiss the IIPs’ claim to the extent that it seeks damages that predate July 15, 2013. See Memo. 10. CASE 0:18-cv-01776-JRT-JFD Doc. 236 Filed 12/21/18 Page 16 of 34
Background image
7 3. The Court Should Dismiss The Arizona, Nevada And Utah Antitrust Claims For Failure To Provide Timely Notice To Those States’ Attorneys General. Indirect Purchasers fail to present sufficient evidence that they served the relevant consolidated complaints on the state attorneys general as required by Arizona, Nevada, and Utah antitrust laws. See Memo. 11-12. Indirect Purchasers served the initial complaint in the Duryeaand Sandee’s Bakeryactions but submit no evidence that they served the significantly revised consolidated complaints, which added five new Defendants and named plaintiffs who actually lived in those states. See Duncan Decl. (Dkt. 237) ¶¶2-3, Exs. 1 & 2 (Utah requires service only when there are Utah plaintiffs). Additionally, the CIPs did not notify the Arizona attorney general until November 27, 2018, Dkt. 227, and not simultaneously with the filing as required by Arizona law. See Memo. 11-12. The Court should therefore dismiss the Arizona, Utah, and Nevada antitrust claims for failure to comply with the notice provisions, as in In re Lipitor Antitrust Litigation, -- F.Supp.3d --, 2018 WL 4006752, at *11, *14 (D.N.J. Aug. 21, 2018) (“a prerequisite to suit”). IV. THE INDIRECT PURCHASERS’ STATE CONSUMER PROTECTION CLAIMS FAIL AS A MATTER OF LAW. A. Rule 9(b) Applies To The Consumer Protection Claims, And Indirect Purchasers’ Consumer Protection Claims Are Not Adequately Pled. Rule 9(b) applies because Indirect Purchasers ground their claims in averments of fraud. Indirect Purchasers’ argument to the contrary is foreclosed by Eighth Circuit law, which focuses on the claims alleged, not the statutes invoked. SeeOlin v. Dakota Access, LLC, -- F.3d --, 2018 WL 6538242, at *2 (8th Cir. Dec. 13, 2018) (“A claim may sound CASE 0:18-cv-01776-JRT-JFD Doc. 236 Filed 12/21/18 Page 17 of 34
Background image
8 in fraud even though it is brought under a statute that also prohibits non-fraudulent conduct”);see also Streambend Props. II, LLC v. Ivy Tower Minneapolis, LLC, 781 F.3d 1003, 1013 (8th Cir. 2015), and Memo. 12-13.3To satisfy Rule 9(b), the complaint must plead the “who, what, where, when, and how” of the alleged fraud. Memo. 15. But in their Opposition, Indirect Purchasers point to only allegations that Defendants subscribed to Agri Stats, and to public statements to which the Indirect Purchasers attach the conclusory label of falsehood. Opp. 18 (quoting IIP ¶98). These allegations fail Rule 9(b). B. Indirect Purchasers Fail To Adequately Plead Consumer Reliance Or Consumer-Directed Deceptive Conduct As Required Under The Law Of Nine States. 1. Arkansas The CIPs contend “[r]eliance is not an element under the ADTPA” and cite to an unpublished 2017 case from the Eastern District of Arkansas and a 2015 case from the District of New Hampshire. Opp. 19 & n.37. But the Eighth Circuit just this year concluded: “A plaintiff must prove that it suffered damage ‘as a result of’ a violation of the [ADTPA]; in other words, the defendant’s deceptive trade practice must have caused the damage. Causation, in turn, is not possible without reliance.” Apex Oil Co., Inc. v. Jones Stephens Corp., 881 F.3d 658, 662 (8th Cir. 2018). Indirect Purchasers do not dispute that they have not (and cannot) plead reliance. The claim should be dismissed. 3If Indirect Purchasers now disavow all allegations of fraud, many of their consumer protection claims fail because fraud is an essential element. SeeMemo. 18-20. CASE 0:18-cv-01776-JRT-JFD Doc. 236 Filed 12/21/18 Page 18 of 34
Background image
9 2. California In their Complaints, Indirect Purchasers allege various grounds for their claim under the California Unfair Competition Law (UCL), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq., including violations of federal antitrust law (IIP ¶324; CIP ¶214); fraudulent and deceptive acts and practices (CIP ¶214); misrepresentations and nondisclosures (Id.); and violations of the California Cartwright Act (IIP ¶328; CIP ¶214). In their Opposition, Indirect Purchasers clarified that the only basis for their UCL claim is the violation of the Cartwright Act. Opp. 20. The other bases should therefore be dismissed and the claim collapses into, and stands or falls with, their state (Cartwright Act) antitrust claim. 3. District of Columbia For the same reasons as immediately above regarding California, IIPs’ DCCPA claim collapses into, and stands or falls with, their D.C. antitrust claim.44. Michigan Defendants moved to dismiss the IIPs’ MiCPA claim because they failed to allege reliance. Memo. 18. MiCPA has an exhaustive list of actionable misconduct. Sheet Metal Workers Local 441 Health & Welfare Plan v. GlaxoSmithKline, PLC, 737 F.Supp.2d 380, 412 (E.D. Pa. 2010). The IIPs clarified that Defendants allegedly violated MiCPA by charging consumers “a price that is grossly in excess of the price at which similar property or services are sold.” Opp. 22 (quoting Mich. Comp Laws § 445.903(1)(z)). But the IIPs (by definition) were not charged excessive prices by 4CIPs imply that they too brought a claim under the DCCPA, but the cited paragraph (¶ 189) refers to a claim under the D.C. Antitrust Act, § 28-4501, et seq.CASE 0:18-cv-01776-JRT-JFD Doc. 236 Filed 12/21/18 Page 19 of 34
Background image
10 Defendants; the direct purchasers set the prices for the indirect purchasers.See In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Exp. Antitrust Litig., 350 F.Supp.2d 160, 189 n.44 (D. Me. 2004) (“[T]he applicability of [§ 445.903(1)(z)] is questionable given that it was the dealers, and not the defendant automobile companies, who charged the plaintiffs allegedly inflated prices for motor vehicles.”). The IIPs have therefore failed to state a MiCPA claim.55. New York The CIPs’ claim fails because they do not allege deceptive conduct directed at the indirect purchasers. New York courts have consistently dismissed indirect purchasers’ claims for price fixing for such a defect. See, e.g., Yong Ki Hong v. KBS Am., Inc., 951 F.Supp.2d 402, 421 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Mere failure by the scheme’s participants to disclose the nature of the [price-fixing] arrangement is not enough—direct evidence of misleading or deceitful activity is required.”); State ex rel. Spitzer v. Daicel Chem. Indus., Ltd., 840 N.Y.S.2d 8, 12 (App. Div. 2007) (concluding that indirect purchasers’ consumer-protection claim for price fixing was too attenuated to support a claim). The CIPs’ citation to unpublished, out-of-jurisdiction cases are unpersuasive in light of New York courts’ guidance. The Court should dismiss CIPs’ claim, ¶ 222. 6. North Dakota Indirect Purchasers allege that Defendants engaged in deceptive conduct as part of their claims under North Dakota law. IIP Claim 37; CIP ¶224. Because Indirect 5In the alternative, the Court should dismiss the claim to the extent that it alleges anything other than violations of Mich. Comp. Laws § 445.903(1)(z). CASE 0:18-cv-01776-JRT-JFD Doc. 236 Filed 12/21/18 Page 20 of 34
Background image
11 Purchasers failed to allege deception directed toward Indirect Purchasers, their claims fail. Memo. 19-20. Indirect Purchasers do not address this failure. Opp. 24. The Court should dismiss the claims. 7. Rhode Island The IIPs do not dispute that claims under Rhode Island’s Deceptive Trade Practices Act require deception. See Opp. 25. They argue instead that the alleged price-fixing conspiracy satisfies the requirement. Id.The IIPs cite to Long v. Dell, Inc., which dealt with Dell’s affirmative misrepresentation to consumers that sales taxes were owed. 93 A.3d 988, 1004 (R.I. 2014). The Rhode Island Supreme Court concluded that a genuine issue of fact remained regarding whether that act was sufficiently deceptive. Id.The IIPs point to no similar affirmative misrepresentations here. The Court should dismiss the IIPs’ claim. Memo. 19. 8. Virginia The IIPs argue that their claim is based on an alleged misrepresentation that the price of pork was set competitively. Opp. 25. The IIPs, however, do not allege that they heard or relied on these misrepresentations. “Virginia courts have consistently required reliance to establish VCPA claims.” See, e.g., Curtis v. Propel Prop. Tax Funding, LLC, 2018 WL 717006, at *3 (E.D. Va. Feb. 5, 2018). Without reliance on the vaguely alleged public statements, the claim fails, and the Court should dismiss it. 9. Wisconsin Defendants moved to dismiss the CIPs’ claim because they failed to allege an affirmative misrepresentation to a third party. In their Opposition, the CIPs reference the CASE 0:18-cv-01776-JRT-JFD Doc. 236 Filed 12/21/18 Page 21 of 34
Background image
12 allegation, “Defendants affirmatively misrepresented to all purchasers during the Class Period that Defendants’ pork at Issue [sic] prices were competitive and fair.” CIP ¶230; Opp. 26. This allegation is insufficient. First it utterly fails to satisfy Rule 9(b). See Memo. 15-17. Second, the allegation isn’t even plausible: how would the Defendants who (by definition) do not sell to the CIPs make any affirmative representations to them about pricing? The lack of particularity and plausibility is fatal to this claim. The Court should dismiss it. 612.CIPs Do Not Have Statutory Standing Under Missouri Or Rhode Island Law. CIPs withdrew these claims. The Court should therefore dismiss them if CIPs do not dismiss under Rule 41(a). (CIP ¶¶218, 225.) 612.Indirect Purchasers’ Antitrust Claims Are Not Actionable Under Six States’ Consumer Protection Statutes. Indirect Purchasers rely on a few out-of-jurisdiction, district court cases to contest Defendants’ arguments that price fixing is not actionable under certain states’ consumer protection statutes. But the persuasive weight of authority supports Defendants’ argument. Arkansas:“Liberal construction” of the ADTPA does not permit a claim based merely on an unfairly high price. In re Graphics Processing Units Antitrust Litig., 527 F.Supp.2d 1011, 1030 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (citing State ex rel. Bryant v. R & A Inv. Co., 985 S.W.2d 299, 302 (Ark. 1999)) (“pleading unconscionability requires something more than merely alleging that the price of a product was unfairly high”). Utah:The Utah CSPA is read to be analogous to the Federal Trade Commission Act, except for that Act’s provisions covering price fixing, so price-fixing claims are not actionable. See In re Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litig., 516 F.Supp.2d 1072, 1117 (N.D. Cal. 2007). CASE 0:18-cv-01776-JRT-JFD Doc. 236 Filed 12/21/18 Page 22 of 34
Background image
13 Minnesota and Michigan:Both states’ consumer protection laws primarily target consumer-directed or deceptive behavior and do not support standalone price-fixing claims. SeeIn re Lidoderm Antitrust Litig., 103 F.Supp.3d 1155, 1169-70 (N.D. Cal. 2015); New Motor Vehicles, 350 F.Supp.2d at 189. South Dakota:Standalone antitrust claims are not permitted under consumer protection law. SeeNew Motor Vehicles, 350 F.Supp.2d at 202. Indirect Purchasers’ proffered authority is not to the contrary. SeeIn re DDAVP Indirect Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 903 F.Supp.2d 198, 229 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (South Dakota claim could proceed because the defendants made affirmative misrepresentations to the FDA and USPTO, not because antitrust claims are encompassed by the South Dakota consumer protection statutes). Illinois: In the most recent published authority, Illinois state and federal courts held that antitrust violations are not actionable under the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act. E.g.,Butler v. Jimmy John’s Franchise, LLC, 331 F.Supp.3d 786, 798 (S.D. Ill. 2018) (dismissing antitrust claim brought under Illinois consumer protection statute); Gaebler v. N.M. Potash Corp., 676 N.E. 2d 228, 230 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (same). Further, the authority that Indirect Purchasers cite is of questionable persuasiveness. See In re Polyurethane Foam Antitrust Litig., 799 F.Supp.2d 777, 788 (N.D. Ohio 2011) (rejecting Siegel v. Shell Oil Co., 480 F.Supp.2d 1034 (N.D. Ill. 2007) because Siegelignored the explicit holding in Laughlin v. Evanston Hosp., 550 N.E.2d 986, 993 (Ill. 1990) that the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act was not an antitrust enforcement mechanism). 612.Indirect Purchasers Cannot Recover Monetary Damages Under The Laws of California And Minnesota. Indirect Purchasers concede that monetary damages are not available under the Minnesota Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Minnesota Statute § 325D.43-48, Opp. 30; therefore their claim should be dismissed to the extent that it seeks damages. Indirect Purchasers offer no persuasive support for their claims for monetary damages under the California UCL. Indirect Purchasers rely on In re Ditropan XL Antitrust Litig., 529 F.Supp.2d 1098, 1103 (N.D. Cal. 2007), but that court ignored the holdings from the California Supreme Court’s decision in Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.: “[R]estitution is limited to restoring money or property to direct victims of CASE 0:18-cv-01776-JRT-JFD Doc. 236 Filed 12/21/18 Page 23 of 34
Background image
14 an unfair practice,” and an award is not restitutionary if it does not “replace any money or property that defendants took directly from plaintiff.” 63 P.3d 937, 949 (Cal. 2003). F. Indirect Purchasers Fail To Allege Intrastate Conspiratorial Activity Necessary Under Six States’ Laws. Indirect Purchasers’ claims fail in six states because of insufficient intrastate conduct. The proper inquiry is whether the allegations show that sufficient conduct prohibited bythe states’ consumer protection laws—not antitrust laws—occurred within the state. If at most the purchase of a pork product occurred in those states, but not the alleged conspiratorial conduct, the claims fail. Florida: See Carnival Corp. v. Rolls-Royce PLC, 2009 WL 3861450, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 17, 2009) (“Plaintiffs’ claim . . . must be based entirely on actions that occurred within Florida.”); see also Millennium Commc’ns & Fulfillment, Inc. v. Office of Attorney General, 761 So.2d 1256, 1262 (Fla. Dist. App. 2000) (“As we read FDUTPA, it seeks to prohibit unfair, deceptive and/or unconscionable practices which have transpired within the territorial boundaries of this state.” (emphasis added)). Massachusetts: Indirect Purchasers fail to allege facts sufficient to show that prohibited conduct under Massachusetts’ consumer protection laws occurred “primarily and substantially within the commonwealth.” Mass. Gen. Laws Ch. 93A, §11. Indirect Purchasers have failed to allege sufficient facts to establish that the “center of gravity” of the claim lies in Massachusetts, and these claims should therefore be dismissed. E.g.,Evergreen Partnering Grp., Inc. v. Pactiv Corp., 2014 WL 304070, at *4-5 (D. Mass. Jan. 28, 2014). New Hampshire:“[M]erely selling a good in New Hampshire is not enough.” In re Cast Iron Soil Pipe & Fittings Antitrust Litig., 2015 WL 5166014, at *33 (E.D. Tenn. June 24, 2015); see also N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §358-A:2 (requiring that the prohibited conduct occur “within the state”). New York: Section 349 requires that the alleged misconduct occurred in New York. In re Packaged Ice Antitrust Litig., 779 F.Supp.2d 642, 666-67 (E.D. Mich. 2011) (“IP Plaintiffs must establish that the false or deceptive act occurred in New York and was directed at New York consumers.”). CASE 0:18-cv-01776-JRT-JFD Doc. 236 Filed 12/21/18 Page 24 of 34
Background image
15 North Carolina:Only paying higher prices is not enough. In re Refrigerant Compressors Antitrust Litig., 2013 WL 1431756, at *19 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 9, 2013). (“[Plaintiffs] claim that the alleged conspiracy caused manufacturers to pay inflated prices for compressors [in North Carolina] . . . [But] [t]he Court concludes that it is an incidental in-state injury.”).The contrary authority Indirect Purchasers cite is unpersuasive. In re FlonaseAntitrust Litigation involved defendants that not only “sold large amounts of Flonase within the state” but also “maintain[ed] two large development and production facilities in North Carolina.” 692 F.Supp.2d 524, 540-41 (E.D. Pa. 2010). Nothing similar is alleged here. Wisconsin: Indirect Purchasers incorrectly cite to the standard for intrastate commerce under the Wisconsin Antitrust Act, Wis. Stat. §133.03, but cite no authority addressing the intrastate conduct requirement under the Wisconsin Consumer Protection Act, Wis. Stat. §100.18. SeeOpp. 36-37 & n.76-77. The express terms of the Wisconsin Consumer Protection Act require that Indirect Purchasers allege that the proscribed conduct—not merely its effects—occurred in the state. Wis. Stat. §100.18 (“No person … with intent to sell … to the public … shall make … in this state… any assertion, representation or statement of fact which is untrue.” (emphasis added).) G. The Indirect Purchasers Failed To Give The Notice Required Under The Consumer Protection Statutes Of West Virginia and Hawaii. The CIPs present no evidence that they gave Defendants pre-suit notice of their West Virginia consumer protection claim. That claim therefore fails. Memo. 24-25. Similarly, the Hawaii claim fails because the IIPs fail to provide evidence that they served on the Hawaii attorney general “all relevant supporting and exculpatory materials in possession of the proposed class representative or its counsel.” Haw. Rev. Stat. § 480-13.3(a). The claims should be dismissed. See Lipitor, 2018 WL 4006752 at *14; see also Memo. at 25. H. Statutory Class-Action Bars Preclude Indirect Purchasers’ Claims In Arkansas, South Carolina, And Utah. For the same reasons discussed in Section III.B.1, the class-action bars in the Arkansas, South Carolina, and Utah consumer protection statutes should be enforced. CASE 0:18-cv-01776-JRT-JFD Doc. 236 Filed 12/21/18 Page 25 of 34
Background image
16 V. THE INDIRECT PURCHASERS’ UNJUST ENRICHMENT CLAIMS FAIL AS A MATTER OF LAW. A. All Of The Unjust Enrichment Claims Should Be Dismissed For Failure To Plead The Specific Elements Required In The Respective States. Indirect Purchasers see no fault in their failure to plead the state-specific elements of unjust enrichment with supporting factual allegations. Opp. 37-38. Indirect Purchasers rely on general case law regarding Rule 8. But Indirect Purchasers never confront directly Defendants’ argument that “material conflicts [exist] among many of the unjust enrichment laws of the various states,” Cruz v. Lawson Software, Inc., 2010 WL 890038, at *6 (D. Minn. Jan. 5, 2010), such that unjust enrichment claims may be dismissed where they rely on “bald assertion[s] that the alleged antitrust conduct violates dozens of nonantitrust laws, or the implication that there are no consequential differences between those laws.” In re Opana ER Antitrust Litig., 162 F.Supp.3d 704, 725 (N.D. Ill. 2016). Indirect Purchasers’ reliance on Gregory v. Dillard’s, Inc., 565 F.3d 464 (8th Cir. 2009), undermines their position. In Gregory, the Eighth Circuit affirmed dismissal of a complaint for failing to plead the specific elements of the claim, noting that a district court “is not ‘required to divine the litigant’s intent and create claims that are not clearly raised,’ … and it need not ‘conjure up unpled allegations’ to save a complaint.” Id.at 473. So too here. Finally, Indirect Purchasers assert that their unjust enrichment claims survive “as long as the facts support anytheory of recovery.” Opp. 38. Defendants are not aware of CASE 0:18-cv-01776-JRT-JFD Doc. 236 Filed 12/21/18 Page 26 of 34
Background image
17 any case law supporting such a position, and courts can and do dismiss inadequately alleged unjust enrichment claims even where the facts alleged support recovery under other theories. See, e.g.,Opana, 162 F.Supp.3d at 725; In re Aftermarket Filters Antitrust Litig., 2009 WL 3754041, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 5, 2009) (dismissing unjust enrichment claims because the complaint failed to plead the factual basis in each state). B. Unjust Enrichment Is Not A Standalone Claim In Four States. Unjust enrichment is a remedy and not a separate cause of action under the laws of California, Mississippi, New Hampshire, and Illinois. SeeMemo. 29. To recover unjust enrichment in those states, Indirect Purchasers must first succeed on some theory of liability.6Id.Because their other claims fail, these claims should be dismissed. C. Indirect Purchasers Fail To Allege That Any Possible Benefit They Conferred On Defendants Was “Direct” And Not Merely “Incidental.” Indirect Purchasers must allege that they conferred a “direct benefit” on Defendants to support an unjust enrichment claim for Arizona, Florida, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, North Carolina, North Dakota, Utah and West Virginia. Memo. 29-31. Indirect Purchasers claim that they conferred the required “direct benefit,” Opp. 41 (citingProcessed Egg, 851 F.Supp.2d at 928-36), but provide no explanation as to (1) what benefit they conferred upon Defendants; or (2) why that alleged benefit was not merely “incidental.” Nor have they adequately distinguished themselves from other indirect purchasers in antitrust cases who failed the direct benefit test. See, e.g., Spires v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 289 Fed. App’x 269, 273 (10th Cir. 2008); In re Refrigerant 6Indirect Purchasers concede this is the law for Illinois. See Opp. 40. CASE 0:18-cv-01776-JRT-JFD Doc. 236 Filed 12/21/18 Page 27 of 34
Background image
18 Compressors, 2013 WL 1431756, at *26; In re Aftermarket Filters, 2010 WL 1416259 at * 2-3 (N.D. Ill Apr. 1, 2010); Sperry v. Crompton Corp., 810 N.Y.S.2d 498, 499-500 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006). D. The Unjust Enrichment Claims In Illinois And South Carolina Fail Because The Indirect Purchasers Do Not Allege A Duty Owed By Defendants. Indirect Purchasers critique Defendants’ reliance on Martis v. Grinnell Mutual Reinsurance Co., 905 N.E. 2d 920, 928 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009), pointing out that there has been some debate among the courts as to whether a duty is required to support an unjust enrichment claim in Illinois. Contra,Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. DiMucci, 34 N.E.3d 1023, 1042-43 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015). But Indirect Purchasers ignore the more recent opinion by the Appellate Court of Illinois, which expressly states that “[f]or a cause of action based on a theory of unjust enrichment to exist, there must be an independent basis that establishes a duty on the part of the defendant to act and the defendant must have failed to abide by that duty.” Phila. Indem. Ins. Co. v. Pace Suburban Bus. Serv., 2016 WL 6804622, at *11 (Ill. App. Ct. Nov. 17, 2016) (citingMartis, 905 N.E.2d at 928). Indirect Purchasers rely on Ellis v. Smith Grading & Paving, Inc., 366 S.E.2d 12 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998), to refute Defendants’ argument that South Carolina law requires a duty to support an unjust enrichment claim. But Ellisdoes not support Indirect Purchasers’ position; in fact, the court in Ellisdismissed the unjust enrichment claim because the plaintiff did not allege that the defendant breached a duty to plaintiff. Id.at 475 (“Ellis has neither alleged nor proven breach by Smithof a duty giving rise to a CASE 0:18-cv-01776-JRT-JFD Doc. 236 Filed 12/21/18 Page 28 of 34
Background image
19 quasi-contractual right to restitution” (emphasis added)). Indirect Purchasers cite to two out-of-jurisdiction cases, Opp. 42 n.90, but those case are not controlling given the guidance from South Carolina courts. See Ellis, 366 S.E.2d at 475. E. The Unjust Enrichment Claims Of Nine States Should Be Dismissed Because Indirect Purchasers Have Adequate Legal Remedies. Indirect Purchasers’ unjust enrichment claims fail under the law of Arizona, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, South Dakota, Tennessee or Utah because they have not exhausted all other remedies. Indirect Purchasers do not dispute the state law. Instead, they argue the claims can proceed in the alternative under the federal rules. While this Court has found that unjust enrichment claims may proceed in the alternative, seeIn re Levaquin Products Liability Litigation, 752 F.Supp.2d 1071 (D. Minn. 2010), this Court more recently dismissed unjust enrichment claims where a plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law, even if the legal remedy is not viable. See Dooner v. Yuen, 2016 WL 6080814 (D. Minn. Oct. 17, 2016) (“Since Yuen’s breach-of-contract claim—although non-viable—provided her an adequate remedy at law, her unjust enrichment claim fails.”); United States v. Bame, 721 F.3d 1025, 1031 (8th Cir. 2013) (finding that the availability of a statutory remedy “displace[d] unjust enrichment claims,” even if recovery under the applicable statute was time-barred). Thus, Indirect Purchasers’ unjust enrichment claims should fall with their available—albeit non-viable—legal claims. CASE 0:18-cv-01776-JRT-JFD Doc. 236 Filed 12/21/18 Page 29 of 34
Background image
20 CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court should dismiss Indirect Purchasers’ state law claims. Date: December 21, 2018 Respectfully submitted, /s/ Mark L. Johnson Mark L. Johnson (#0345520) Bethany Krueger (#0306368) Virginia R. McCalmont (#0399496) GREENE ESPEL PLLP 222 South Ninth Street, Suite 2200 Minneapolis, MN 55402 (612) 373-0830 mjohnson@greeneespel.com bkrueger@greeneespel.com vmccalmont@greeneespel.com Daniel Laytin, P.C. (pro hac vice)Christa Cottrell, P.C. (pro hac vice) Christina Briesacher (pro hac vice)KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP 300 North LaSalle Chicago, IL 60654 (312) 861-2000 daniel.laytin@kirkland.com christa.cottrell@kirkland.com christina.briesacher@kirkland.com Counsel for Clemens Food Group, LLC and The Clemens Family Corporation /s/ Richard A. Duncan Richard A. Duncan (#0192983) Aaron D. Van Oort (#0315539) Craig S. Coleman (#0325491) Emily E. Chow (#0388239) Isaac B. Hall (#0395398) Bryan K. Washburn (#0397733) FAEGRE BAKER DANIELS LLP 2200 Wells Fargo Center 90 South Seventh Street Minneapolis, MN 55402-3901 (612) 766-7000 richard.duncan@faegrebd.com aaron.vanoort@faegrebd.com craig.coleman@faegrebd.com emily.chow@faegrebd.com isaac.hall@faegrebd.com bryan.washburn@faegrebd.com Counsel for Hormel Foods Corporation and Hormel Foods, LLC CASE 0:18-cv-01776-JRT-JFD Doc. 236 Filed 12/21/18 Page 30 of 34
Background image
21 /s/Jaime Stilson Jaime Stilson (#0392913) DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP 50 South Sixth Street, Suite 1500 Minneapolis, MN 55402-1498 (612) 492-6746 stilson.jaime@dorsey.com Britt M. Miller (pro hac vice) Robert E. Entwisle (pro hac vice) MAYER BROWN LLP 71 South Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606-4637 (312) 782-0600 bmiller@mayerbrown.com rentwisle@mayerbrown.com William H. Stallings (pro hac vice) MAYER BROWN LLP 1999 K Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20006-1101 (202) 263-3000 wstallings@mayerbrown.com Counsel for Indiana Packers Corporation and Mitsubishi Corporation (Americas) /s/Donald G. Heeman Donald G. Heeman (#0286023) Jessica J. Nelson (#0347358) Randi J. Winter (#0391354) Daniel R. Haller (#0396497) FELHABER LARSON220 South Sixth Street, Suite 2200 Minneapolis, MN 55402-4504 (612) 339-6321 dheeman@felhaber.com jnelson@felhaber.com rwinter@felhaber.com dhaller@felhaber.com Stephen R. Neuwirth (pro hac vice) Michael B. Carlinsky (pro hac vice) Sami H. Rashid (pro hac vice) Richard T. Vagas (pro hac vice) Robert P. Vance, Jr. (pro hac vice) QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART &SULLIVAN,LLP 51 Madison Avenue, 22nd Floor New York, NY 10010 (212) 849-7000 stephenneuwirth@quinnemanuel.commichaelcarlinsky@quinnemanuel.com samirashid@quinnemanuel.com richardvagas@quinnemanuel.com bobbyvance@quinnemanuel.comCounsel for JBS USA Food Company and JBS USA Food Company HoldingsCASE 0:18-cv-01776-JRT-JFD Doc. 236 Filed 12/21/18 Page 31 of 34
Background image
22 /s/ William L. Greene William L. Greene (#0198730) Peter J. Schwingler (#0388909) Jon M. Woodruff (#0399453) STINSON LEONARD STREET LLP 50 South Sixth Street, Suite 2600 Minneapolis, MN 55402 (612) 335-1500 william.greene@stinson.com peter.schwingler@stinson.com john.woodruff@stinson.com J. Nicci Warr (pro hac vice) STINSON LEONARD STREET LLP 7700 Forsyth Blvd., Suite 1100 St. Louis, MO 63105 (314) 863-0800 nicci.warr@stinson.com Counsel for Seaboard Foods, LLC and Seaboard Corporation /s/ John A. Cotter John A. Cotter (#0134296) John A. Kvinge (#0392303) LARKIN HOFFMAN DALY & LINDGREN LTD. 8300 Norman Center Drive, Suite 1000 Minneapolis, MN 55427-1060 (952) 835-3800 jcotter@larkinhoffman.com jkvinge@larkinhoffman.com Richard Parker (pro hac vice) Josh Lipton (pro hac vice) GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER, LLP 1050 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036-5306 (202) 955-8500 rparker@gibsondunn.com jlipton@gibsondunn.com Brian Robison (pro hac vice) GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER, LLP 2100 McKinney Avenue, Suite 1100 Dallas, TX 75201-6912 (214) 698-3370 brobison@gibsondunn.com Counsel for Smithfield Foods, Inc. CASE 0:18-cv-01776-JRT-JFD Doc. 236 Filed 12/21/18 Page 32 of 34
Background image
23 /s/ Aaron Chapin Aaron Chapin (#06292540) HUSCH BLACKWELL LLP 120 South Riverside Plaza, Suite 2200 Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 655-1500 aaron.chapin@huschblackwell.com Gene Summerlin (pro hac vice) Marnie Jensen (pro hac vice) Ryann Glenn (pro hac vice) Kamron Hasan (pro hac vice) Quinn Eaton (pro hac vice) Sierra Faler (pro hac vice) HUSCH BLACKWELL LLP 13330 California St., Suite 200 Omaha, NE 68154 (402) 964-5000 gene.summerlin@huschblackwell.com marnie.jensen@huschblackwell.com ryann.glenn@huschblackwell.com kamron.hasan@huschblackwell.com quinn.eaton@huschblackwell.com sierra.faler@huschblackwell.com Counsel for Triumph Foods, LLC /s/ David P. Graham David P. Graham (#0185462) DYKEMA GOSSETT PLLC 4000 Wells Fargo Center 90 South Seventh Street Minneapolis, MN 55402 (612) 486-1521 dgraham@dykema.com Rachel J. Adcox (pro hac vice) Tiffany Rider Rohrbaugh (pro hac vice) AXINN, VELTROP & HARKRIDER LLP 950 F Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20004 (202) 912-4700 radcox@axinn.com trider@axinn.com Counsel for Tyson Foods, Inc., Tyson Prepared Foods, Inc. and Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc. CASE 0:18-cv-01776-JRT-JFD Doc. 236 Filed 12/21/18 Page 33 of 34
Background image
24 /s/ Peter H. WalshPeter H. Walsh (#0388672) HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP 80 South Eighth Street, Suite 1225 Minneapolis, MN 55402 T. (612) 402-3000 F. (612) 402-3001 peter.walsh@hoganlovells.com William L. Monts (pro hac vice) Justin W. Bernick (pro hac vice) Jennifer A. Fleury (pro hac vice) HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP Columbia Square 555 Thirteenth Street, NW Washington, D.C. 20004 (202) 637-5600 william.monts@hoganlovells.com justin.bernick@hoganlovells.com jennifer.fleury@hoganlovells.com Counsel for Agri Stats, Inc. CASE 0:18-cv-01776-JRT-JFD Doc. 236 Filed 12/21/18 Page 34 of 34
Background image