Thomas-KantianUtilitarianDemocracy-1980
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Kantian and Utilitarian Democracy Author(s): David A. Lloyd Thomas Source: Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Sep., 1980, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Sep., 1980), pp. 395-413Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/40231156JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at https://about.jstor.org/termsCambridge University Pressis collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Canadian Journal of PhilosophyThis content downloaded from 49.150.102.103 on Sun, 17 Dec 2023 11:26:01 +00:00 All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHYVolume X, Numbers, September 1980Kantian and Utilitarian DemocracyDAVID A. LLOYD THOMAS, Bedford College,University of LondonIt has been claimed that decisions reached democratically have theconsent of those subject to them. It will be shown that arguments forthis view rest on either a Kantian or a utilitarian conception of consent.When the distinct nature of these arguments is kept clearly in mind, itbecomes apparent that little remains of any of them. Nothing remains ofthe argument based on the Kantian conception, at least in so far as it isused to support the view that democratic government rests on the con-sent of the governed. Though something remains of the argumentsbased on the utilitarian conception, what remains is not what they oftenare thought to establish. The spurious plausibility of consent argumentsfor democracy is due to switches between the Kantian conception ofconsent and the utilitarian.The Kantian and the utilitarian positions each consist of three mainelements: a view of what a person is (from a standpoint relevant tomoral and political conclusions), a view about what is a person's good,and a view of what it is for people to be treated equally.395This content downloaded from 49.150.102.103 on Sun, 17 Dec 2023 11:26:01 +00:00 All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
David A. Lloyd ThomasFrom the utilitarian point of view, a person is an entity havingdesires, who seeks the satisfaction of those desires and the avoidance oftheir frustration by more or less rational means. A particular person'sgood will be some function of the satisfaction of, and/or the avoidanceof the frustration of, his desires. It is not necessary for present purposesto specify what this function is: it could be that a person's good is themaximization of desire satisfactions, or the maximization of (desiresatisfactions less desire frustrations), and so on.1 The utilitarian is not,therefore, understood as holding that any particular desire satisfactionalways does contribute to a person's good (when consequences forother desire satisfactions and frustrations are taken into account), butprima facie any desire satisfaction does, and nothing can be a con-tribution to a person's good except that which is, or is a means to, desiresatisfaction or the avoidance of desire frustration. (Only desire satisfac-tions can be intrinsically good, and only desire frustrations can be intrin-sically bad.2On the Kantian view a person is a rational agent. A person is an en-tity capable of devising certain ends of action, and of making plans tosecure those ends (all by reference to considerations of reason), and ofcarrying them through within the constraints imposed by the moral law.A person's rational nature is his capacity to determine his will in accor-dance with laws of practical reason. Now Kant says that "Rationalnature exists as an end in itself".3 As persons are possessors of rationalnature, and exist as ends in themselves, they have what he calls "ab-solute value". On this view a person's good lies in his capacity to makeplans and pursue ends within the constraints of reason: to act as arational agent.Two respects in which the utilitarian and Kantian views are in sharpcontrast may be noted. On the utilitarian view the capacity to exerciserational nature has value, but this is so only because of certain con-tingent circumstances. That capacity is necessary for people to get whatthey desire, and so it is of instrumental importance frome a utilitarianpoint of view. In addition, normal people want, as such, to exercise the1 See my "E Pluribus Unum", Canadian Journal of Philosphy, SupplementaryVolume 3 (1977), pp, 62-64.2 Though Hobbes is not conventionally thought of as a utilitarian, perhaps themost economical statement of the core of this viewpoint is in Leviathan,Chapter VI.3 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, translated by H. J. Paton as TheMoral Law, London: Hutchinson, 1956), p. 96.396This content downloaded from 49.150.102.103 on Sun, 17 Dec 2023 11:26:01 +00:00 All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Kantian and Utilitarian Democracycapacity for rational agency, that is, to make choices for themselves,and thus the satisfaction or frustration of this desire will be, in fact, ofsome importance in utilitarian calculations. On the Kantian point ofview, by contrast, the exercise of rational nature is of value as such,apart from its being of use for securing satisfactions, and apart fromwhether a particular person does in fact have a desire, as such, to exer-cise his rational nature.The other contrast concerns the view taken towards securing desiresatisfactions. On the utilitarian view the achievement of satisfied desireis, ultimately, what is of value. It is central to the utilitarian viewpointthat nothing other than the satisfaction of desire can be of value, aposition which in turn rests upon the view that nothing other than somekind of inner state can have intrinsic value. In the real world it is, ofcourse, necessary to formulate and execute plans to gain these satisfac-tions; but if, in a utilitarian paradise, all this could be dispensed with, thesatisfactions would be of no less value.4 On the Kantian view desiresatisfactions have no such exclusive importance. To be presented withsatisfactions would not at all be the same thing as securing them foroneself. For a rational agent, the attempt to secure ends for oneself is ofvalue, apart from the satisfaction in securing them, and apart fromwhether one wants to secure them for oneself.5Neither the Kantian nor the utilitarian view, as sketched so far, is in aform to provide support for democratic practice. For these positions, asthey stand at present, entail no conclusions about equal treatment: thatis to say, the desirability of treating people equally as rational agents (inthe Kantian case), or the desirability of treating people equally as centresof desire (in the utilitarian case). But arguments for democracy fromthese positions cannot succeed without making the appropriate assum-ptions of equality. If some are more rational than others, then perhapsdecisions ought to be made by an elite of the most rational, rather thanby a process based on the ideal of an equal say for all. If themaximization of aggregate desire satisfaction is the objective, thenperhaps experts will know best what policies will achieve this.It may be thought that each position, even as so far developed, en-tails its own distinctive form of equal treatment. It will be shown that thisis not so, and that an independent principle concerning equal treatmenthas to be introduced in each case. When the two positions have been4 See Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974),pp. 42ff.5 Some of these considerations are discussed more fully in my "Liberalism andUtilitarianism", Ethics, forthcoming.397This content downloaded from 49.150.102.103 on Sun, 17 Dec 2023 11:26:01 +00:00 All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
David A. Lloyd Thomasconjoined with their appropriate conceptions of equal treatment each isin a form which is closer to providing grounds for democratic practice.In the case of the utilitarian conception, the point that equal treat-ment is not entailed has been made frequently,6 and is widely accep-ted. It is true that, in one respect, the utilitarian view entails that peopleare to be treated equally, for no person's desires or frustrations may bearbitrarily excluded from a utilitarian calculation. As that which hasvalue as such is the satisfaction of desire, it is indifferent which personhas any particular satisfaction of desire. Now the view that desiresatisfaction constitutes the good of any one person normally is, andperhaps necessarily has to be, developed so as to make the good of anaggregate of persons the maximization of aggregate desire satisfaction.But this does not require that persons ought to be equal with respect tothe satisfaction of desire. For, depending on contingent circumstances,it could be that that disposition of desire satisfactions which maximizesaggregate desire satisfaction is one which allocates many desire satisfac-tions to some, and few or none to others.Thus, to arrive at utilitarian equality, and a suitable basis fordemocratic practice, the utilitarian conception has to be conjoined toan independent principle of equal treatment. This is done, for example,in Ted Honderich's The Principle of Equality': "... things should be soarranged that we approach as close as we can, which may not be all thatclose, to equality in satisfaction and distress".7 This may be called autilitarian conception of equality, in that only equality of satisfactionand distress is considered. But Honderich makes it quite clear that he isintroducing an independent equalizing principle alongside his utilitarianview of what is of intrinsic value.There is a problem, of course, about how The Principle of Equality'is to be combined with the maximizing aspect of utilitarianism. From thepoint of view of The Principle of Equality' the weakest combination is Iftwo policies are equally good on the maximizing criterion, choose thatpolicy which produces greatest equality of satisfaction and distress',while the strongest combination is If two policies are indistinguishableby reference to equality of satisfaction and distress, choose that policywhich maximizes aggregate satisfaction'. Neither extreme combinationis acceptable, but ingenuity can produce numerous formulae lying inbetween. When the expression 'utilitarian equality' is used in what6 For example, by John Rawls in A Theory of Justice, (Oxford: Clarendon Press,1972), pp. 26-27.7 Ted Honderich, Three Essays on Political Violence, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,1976), p. 41.398This content downloaded from 49.150.102.103 on Sun, 17 Dec 2023 11:26:01 +00:00 All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Kantian and Utilitarian Democracyfollows it will refer to whatever formula you prefer, assuming only that itgives fairly considerable weight to The Principle of Equality'.The Kantian conception also requires the importation of an in-dependent principle of equality, but the necessity for this is less familiar.It may be thought that if we conceive of people as rational agents, andsee a person's good as lying in the exercise of rational agency, then wewill be committed to equal treatment, in the form of equal respect forany being who has a rational nature. Kant himself, in 'The Formula ofthe End in Itself", appears to suppose that it has this implication.8 Butit is not clear that this follows unless it is assumed, either that all peopleare possessors of rational nature to an equal degree, or else thatvariations in the degree of rational nature make no difference for equaltreatment above a certain minimum. Hence an independent concep-tion of equality must be added to the Kantian position also. This will be,either that people are in fact (or potentially) equal in the degree towhich they possess rational nature, or else, that differences (above acertain minimum) in the degree to which rational nature is possessedare irrelevant to equal treatment.9The two moral viewpoints have now been sketched, together withtheir appropriate, and different, conceptions of equality. From now on,when reference is made to the 'utilitarian' or the 'Kantian' grounds fordemocracy, it will be understood that the appropriate assumptions ofequality are included. We now turn to a consideration of what form ofdemocratic practice each viewpoint can support, if any. The merits ofthe viewpoints themselves will not be considered; only the connectionbetween each of them and democratic practice.Kantian DemocracyThere is at once a difficulty about establishing any connection at allbetween the Kantian viewpoint and democracy. For what is held to beof most importance about people on that viewpoint is their capacity toact as autonomous rational agents. However any decision procedure,democratic or otherwise, must place restrictions on the opportunitiespeople have to decide for themselves. If a group of people can be saidto have a common way of making decisions, whatever it might be,8 Kant, op. cit., p. 96.9 See John Rawls, op. cit., p. 5O7ff (on the notion of 'moral personality').399This content downloaded from 49.150.102.103 on Sun, 17 Dec 2023 11:26:01 +00:00 All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
David A. Lloyd Thomasmembers must generally accept, in practice, that each ought to abideby the decisions made, whatever he personally thinks of them. It is not,of course, required that in all circumstances all must obey: that all mustaccept an unconditional obligation to obey all of the decisions reached.Rather, most decisions must be obeyed by most people, and thisrequirement is simply a logical consequence of what it is for somethingto be a decision procedure. If most of the group ignore most 'decisions',then the group does not have a common decision procedure. Such aconnection is acknowledged both by those who wish to preserve, andby those who wish to destroy, an extant common decision procedure.Those who wish to preserve it will urge obedience to the decisionprocedure, even if some of its decisions should be unpalatable. Thosebent on destroying it will argue for disobedience, even to thosedecisions the content of which is acceptable.Thus any person's independence of choice must be impaired bybeing subject to a common decision procedure, whatever form thatdecision procedure might take. To be subject to a common decisionprocedure is to acknowledge the force of claims arising from thedecisions reached, though not necessarily to acknowledge them un-conditionally. These decisions may be opposed to what you yourselfwould have chosen. The Kantian viewpoint therefore appears to lead tothe rejection of all decision procedures, democracy included, as incon-sistent with the value to be placed on persons as rational agents. As R. P.Wolff says: "When I place myself in the hands of another, and permithim to determine the principles by which I shall guide my behaviour, Irepudiate the freedom and reason which give me dignity".10The best prospect for reconciling the Kantian viewpoint with subjec-tion to a common decision procedure appears to lie in the idea of avoluntary undertaking: a binding, yet freely given commitment. Instan-ces of such commitments are provided by examples of what, in politicaltheory, has been called 'express consent'. To give one's express con-sent to something is to give an undertaking to do a certain thing by wayof an act in accordance with some recognized convention; perhaps byuttering a form of words, such as 1 hereby undertake that ...', orperhaps by attaching one's signature to a statement, or by raising one'sright hand. The idea of express consent appears to reconcile the Kantianconception with being bound to do something. On the one hand, eachperson's freedom to act as a rational agent is not compromised, for eachmay choose what, if any, commitments to make. On the other hand, in10 Robert Paul Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism, (New York: Harper & Row, 1970),p. 72.400This content downloaded from 49.150.102.103 on Sun, 17 Dec 2023 11:26:01 +00:00 All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Kantian and Utilitarian Democracychoosing to make such a commitment, one binds oneself. It is a self-created obligation to act in a certain way, and others have a right to ex-pect one to act in accordance with the obligations one has undertaken,however one might feel about acting in that way later.But how exactly can the idea of express consent show that the Kan-tian viewpoint is compatible with an obligation to abide by a democraticdecision procedure? It might be suggested that if express consent cangive rise to an obligation to do what one has consented to do, and thisobligation is consistent with the Kantian viewpoint, then express consentto abide by the outcomes of a democratic decision procedure is con-sistent with that viewpoint. By 'express consent to a democraticdecision procedure' is meant joining some group which has ademocratic procedure, and in so doing giving an express undertakingthat you will abide by the outcomes of that procedure. It may beclaimed that in originally giving your express consent to this democraticprocedure you have acquired an obligation (though not an uncon-ditional obligation) to abide by each successive decision it produces, solong as you remain a member of that group. Such an obligation does notcompromise the Kantian conception, as you chose to give the under-taking in the first place. However if this argument does demonstrateconsistency between democracy and the Kantian viewpoint when aspecific undertaking has been given, unfortunately it shows a similarconsistency with any decision procedure whatsoever, provided onlythat express consent has been given. It does not show that the Kantianviewpoint provides support for democratic practice in particular.But perhaps more can be done to establish a ground for democracyif emphasis is placed on Kantian equality. In the case of some decisionprocedures, for example dictatorships, if you give your express consentto abide by them you write a blank cheque: in exercising your rationalnature to make this choice you thereby hand over to another the rightto make decisions you will be expected to abide by without your havingany right to influence those decisions. You have created a situationwhere the dictator's opportunity to exercise his rational nature throughmaking public decisions is much greater than yours. But it may be saidthat in the case of democracy you do not write a blank cheque forothers to fill in when you give an initial undertaking to abide by thedecision procedure. The democratic procedure guarantees you a right,equal with that of all others, to influence the decisions to which you willbe bound.This in fact does very little to remove the cause of concern aboutdemocracy from the Kantian point of view. If the democratic system ismajoritarian, and the electorate is large, the proportionate influence ofany particular voter on the decisions reached is very slight. Even if thescope allowed to each by the democratic system for the exercise of401This content downloaded from 49.150.102.103 on Sun, 17 Dec 2023 11:26:01 +00:00 All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
David A. Lloyd Thomasrational nature really is equal, it is so slight as to be no more than a verymarginal improvement over non-democratic systems from a Kantianpoint of view. It is like a concern for equal liberty that amounts toeveryone equally being subject to solitary confinement.11The remaining possibility for reconciling the Kantian viewpoint withdemocracy is to propose the principle of unanimity. If you give your ex-press consent to a democratic decision procedure, and the principle ofunanimity is part of that procedure, then you, like everyone else, have aveto over any decision contrary to what you would have chosen. Yousign no blank cheque: if the amount to be filled in is different from whatyou want, you can stop the cheque. This suggests that the Kantianviewpoint uniquely requires unanimous democracy with prior expressconsent, for unanimous democracy appears to be the only decisionprocedure consistent with the Kantian idea of respect for the rationalnature of every person. (It may be thought that if the principle ofunanimity is incorporated into the decision procedure, the requirementof prior express consent is redundant. But this is to suppose that to votein favour of a particular proposal is to give your 'quasi consent' to thedecision procedure as a whole, a position which shortly will be shownto be unacceptable.)Even a reconciliation of the Kantian viewpoint and democracy onthis basis could be doubted. Under the principle of unanimity, if youvote for a proposal, along with everyone else, then you are bound bythat decision until such time (if any) as it is unanimously rescinded. Thusthere is still some constraint on your future independence of choice forif, after the decision is taken, you decide that your vote in favour was amistake, you nevertheless remain bound. And it might be thought thateven this is a compromise of Kantian autonomy. If it is so regarded, itwould follow that Kantian autonomy is inconsistent with any way ofbinding oneself other than a way from which one can release oneself atany time at will. However the idea of a binding undertaking from whichone can release oneself at will would appear to be a contradiction in ter-ms. Thus the Kantian viewpoint, pressed this far, would appear to ruleout any possibility of committing oneself to future courses of action, andthis has a paradoxical air even within that viewpoint itself. For thecreation of voluntary undertakings by oneself and others is of crucialimportance from the point of view of expressing one's character as arational agent. The possibility of your making commitments to othersabout your future courses of action, and of others making commitmentsto you, makes it possible to have reasonable expectations about the1 1 See Robert Nozick, op. cit., pp. 290-292.402This content downloaded from 49.150.102.103 on Sun, 17 Dec 2023 11:26:01 +00:00 All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Kantian and Utilitarian Democracyconduct of others, and is therefore one crucial basis for being able toformulate and execute rational plans. Therefore it will be assumed,without the further argument which is necessary, that the Kantianviewpoint is not to be pressed to such extremes. It is concluded thatunanimous democracy with prior express consent is compatible with,indeed is required by, the Kantian viewpoint.Such stipulations obviously are too stringent to include more thanvery few (if any) democratic decision procedures in actual operation.Unquestionable, they are too stringent to include any democraticprocedure operating at the level of national political processes. The onlypossibility for widening the forms of democratic practice supported bythe Kantian viewpoint appears to lie in the idea of 'tacit' or 'quasi' con-sent. Peter Singer introduces his idea of 'quasi-consent' as follows... under certain circumstances, actions or failures to act may justify us inholding a person to be obliged as if he had consented, whether or not heactually has. I shall call this 'quasi-consent', the prefix indicating that it is notreal consent, but gives rise to obligations as if there were real consent.12Thus, to give one's quasi-consent to a decision procedure would be todo something, or to refrain from doing something, such that one comesto have an obligation to abide by that decision procedure as if one hadexpressly consented to it, although one has not in fact expressly consen-ted.There are two questions a quasi-consent theory must answer if it is topermit a derivation of democratic practice from the Kantian conception.(i) What specific act or failure to act is supposed to constitute thegiving of one's quasi-consent?(ii) Is it a logical possibility that any act or failure to act could giverise to quasi-consent? Could anything be an instance of quasi-consent?Clearly (i) presupposes an affirmative answer to (ii). When oneproposed answer to (i) has been shown unacceptable we will turn to (ii),and show that there could be no acceptable answer to (i).If the idea of quasi-consent is to give any assistance to democracy inparticular, the kind of act selected as that which gives rise to quasi-consent must be one which is commonly performed under a12 Peter Singer, Democracy and Disobedience, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973),p. 47.403This content downloaded from 49.150.102.103 on Sun, 17 Dec 2023 11:26:01 +00:00 All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
David A. Lloyd Thomasdemocratic decision procedure, but not under others. For example,even if it were true that simply remaining in a country gives rise to quasi-consent to that country's decision procedure, this would give nospecific support to democracy. For if it were true at all, it would be justas true of Franco's as of a Swiss Canton. Obviously the best selec-tion for a quasi-consent doctrine, if it is to support democracy, is voting,as that must be part of any process properly called 'democratic'. Thiscannot be merely the right to vote, however, because (with rare excep-tions) having that right is not dependent on your act, but on somethingwhich has been decided for you. And quasi-consent must have at leastthis much in common with express consent: you must have the choiceof whether you perform the act which gives rise to quasi-consent. Themost plausible candiate for that which gives rise to quasi-consent in ademocracy is the actual exercise of the right to vote, given that thecasting of a valid vote is not compulsory. But here two further optionspresent themselves.(i) A person gives his quasi-consent to the democratic procedure,and hence to the decisions emanating from it, just on thoseissues on which he actually votes. On issues on which he doesnot vote, he is not bound by the decisions.(ii) A person gives his quasi-consent to the democratic procedureon all matters decided by it, provided that he votes on someissues.13The first option has the curious consequence that anyone who ex-pects the vote on a particular issue to go against him could avoid com-mitment to the decision reached by not voting. Thus, those who wereastute at discovering which way the vote would go could always avoidcommitment to any decision they did not favour. Only the unwaryminority who voted would be in a position of having quasi-consented toa decision with which they did not agree. It is perhaps due to concernabout this implication that Singer offers a reason why one ought to par-ticipate in a democratic decision procedure, namely, that it is what hecalls a 'fair compromise'.1413 Peter Singer apparently opts for (i) in view of what seems to be presupposedin his discussion of the obligations of members of the organization 'Resist'(op. cit., p. 54).1 4 For his account of 'fair compromise', see Peter Singer, op. cit., pp. 3Off..404This content downloaded from 49.150.102.103 on Sun, 17 Dec 2023 11:26:01 +00:00 All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Kantian and Utilitarian DemocracyWithout this reason for participating, the second reason would lack grip, inthat understanding the obligation involved in participating might lead one torefuse to participate.15But even if the 'fair compromise' argument is a good reason for par-ticipating in a democratic decision procedure, to have good reason toparticipate by voting is not to have voted. To have good reason (in-cluding having an obligation) to do something that will create anobligation is not to have created an obligation. The fair compromiseargument can do nothing to show that the non-voter has quasi-consented, even if it can show that he ought to have quasi-consented.The second option scarcely deserves further consideration in view ofthe bizarre questions to which it gives rise. If you participated only oncein a certain democratic decision procedure, are you thereby committedto all other decisions made by it? If you participated only once, couldyou at some later time 'withdraw' the quasi-consent which had beengiven? How? If it is more plausible to say that one quasi-consents to thedecision procedure if one votes on a certain proportion of issues, whatproportion must that be? Why must it be that proportion?The failure of this attempt to locate that which constitutes quasi-consent to a democratic decision procedure provokes the widerquestion of whether anything could count as quasi-consent. It wouldappear not, for this reason. In the case of express consent there existconventions which link the performance of acts of a certain kind (thesaying or doing of certain things) with consenting, and hence with thecreation of obligations. In any case where there is such a commonly un-derstood convention relating an act to consent, we have express con-sent. (Express consent need not be verbal.) So it is a necessary conditionfor an act to give rise to quasi-consent that there should not be a com-monly understood convention linking that act with consent, for other-wise there will not be quasi-consent, but express consent. But if there isno such convention, who says that performing that act gives rise toquasi-consent? The claim that it does emerges as a purely arbitrary fiat,beloved of some political philosophers. Either there is a commonlyrecognized convention, in which case we have express consent, orthere is no established convention, in which case there is no kind ofconsent at all.Of course there are cases where there is uncertainty as to whether anact of the kind conventionally recognized as constituting consent hasbeen performed, and there may be cases where there is uncertainty as1 5 Peter Singer, op. cit., p. 59.405This content downloaded from 49.150.102.103 on Sun, 17 Dec 2023 11:26:01 +00:00 All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
David A. Lloyd Thomasto whether there is a commonly understood convention. Conventionscome into being and pass away. But cases of uncertainty will not helpquasi-consent theorists. For they need cases where there is noreasonable doubt that to do a certain thing is to quasi-consent, and yetwhere there is also no established convention. Thus it appears that theidea of quasi-consent fails to widen the very restricted form ofdemocratic practice sanctioned by the Kantian conception: expressconsent to a democratic practice incorporating the principle ofunanimity.Utilitarian DemocracySo far the paradigm of consent has been 'express consent'. 'Consent'has been understood as a contractual notion. But it is also possible touse the term 'consent' in a non-contractual way, when to consent is amatter of 'agreement with' or 'taking a favourable attitude towards'something. One may approve, or be favourably disposed towards thebehaviour of others, towards policies, etc., and for this reason they maybe said to have one's consent, without any question of a contractualobligation arising. A parent may wholeheartedly approve of theproposed marriage of his child, and in this sense it may be said to havehis consent, without any question of consent in the contractual sensearising, as the child is over age. Such 'favouring' or 'agreement with' or'approval of states of affairs will be called 'approbatory consent'. It iscrucial that the difference between the contractual and approbatoryconceptions of consent should be grasped clearly. Some bad argumentsabout the obligations people have under democracy begin byestablishing that approbatory consent exists, and then attempt to inferthe existence of obligations of a contractual kind. But it does not followfrom having given your approbatory consent that you have committedyourself to anything, i.e. given your consent in a way which involves theacceptance of obligations. Similarly, if one has given express consent,one has incurred obligations, even if there is no approbatory consent, asin the case of parents who formally consent to a marriage of which theydisapprove.It may be thought that 'approbatory consent is a misnomer for whatis being indicated, on the ground that to consent to anything, properlyspeaking, is always to make some kind of future commitment. If thisview is taken, then the term 'consent' may be replaced by somethingthought more suitable. The point remains that the mere approving ofsome state of affairs is not entering into a contractual obligation, and406This content downloaded from 49.150.102.103 on Sun, 17 Dec 2023 11:26:01 +00:00 All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Kantian and Utilitarian Democracymaking a contractual obligation is independent of approving of the stateof affairs it is expected to produce. But can we not mislead others byapproving of something, and then later acting in ways that are 'inap-propriate' to such approval? In general, is this not something that oughtnot to be done? If it is true that it ought not to be done, this is notbecause mere approving can generate an obligation, in the way inwhich mere promising can, but because of a general requirement thatone ought to have regard to the possibly harmful consequences toothers of one's actions, including the expectations raised in others byone's approving of certain things. The basis of such an obligation is thepossible future consequences of one's actions, whereas the basis of acontractual obligation is something one has done in the past.We now turn to an argument for democracy based on the notion ofapprobatory consent. The main idea behind this argument is that undera democratic system the electorate makes choices between the publicpolicies on offer. Sometimes this choice is direct, as in a referendum.More commonly it is indirect: you vote for a representative who youhope will further the public policies you want when they are decidedupon in an assembly. The electorate is regarded as a consumer of publicpolicies. Hopefully, a democratic system will ensure, or will go furtherthan non-democratic systems towards ensuring, that the majority getthe public policies they want. 'Approbatory consent" is a utilitariannotion of consent. An attempt is being made to justify democracy not onthe basis of some kind of contract to abide by the democratic system,but on the ground that the democratic system does better than others insatisfying consumer demand for public policies. In consideringarguments based on approbatory consent we have turned from a neo-Kantian justification of democracy to an attempt at a utilitarianjustification.It will help to fix the distinction between the Kantian and theutilitarian grounds for democracy if it is applied to a particular issuearising out of attempts to 'define' democratic practice. Is a decisionprocedure nearer to 'ideal' democratic practice the closer it approachestowards the principle of unanimity? We can order practices on a scaleaccording to what proportion of the whole group must vote in favour ofa proposal for it to become the decision of the group. At one end of thescale we will have 'pure dictatorship': the practice under which theagreement of one particular person to a proposal counts as a decision ofthe group. The scale passes through simple majority, over-all majority,two-thirds majority and so on, to unanimity at the other extreme. Doesa practice become more democratic (in one respect) as we move alongthis scale, with unanimity as the 'ideal' for democratic practice?Unanimity is often thought to be a requirement of 'ideal' democraticpractice, to be departed from, if departed from at all, because the ideal407This content downloaded from 49.150.102.103 on Sun, 17 Dec 2023 11:26:01 +00:00 All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
David A. Lloyd Thomasmust be modified in order to be 'practical'. But there is an argument forthe view that a practice incorporating the principle of unanimity wouldnot be at all the ideal for democracy.16 Consider pure dictatorship. Thissystem, at any given point in time, will have an accumulation of pastdecisions. In a state, this will be the accumulation of past legislation.Under pure dictatorship, a change in the existing set of laws (i.e., enac-ting a new law, or repealing an old one) can be made by the decision ofa particular person. If we compare the weight of the dictator's influenceon decisions with that of everyone else, it could be said that his influen-ce is as great a departure from equality of influence as is possible. Thedictator's view counts for everything: everyone else's view counts fornothing. (The most dictatorial of actual political systems may never havebeen quite like this, but we are discussing the limit case in a model.)Let us now turn to a system in which the requirement for a validdecision is unanimity, and consider a case in which everyone, bar one,wants a change in the existing set of laws. Under the rule of unanimitythe single dissenter can, in effect, veto a change everyone else wants. Itmight be said that the weight of the single dissenter's vote, when itcomes to thwarting change in the system with unanimity, is just as grossa departure from equality as the weight of the dictator's opinion when itcomes to initiating change. Under dictatorship, the dictator can bringabout a change nobody else wants. Under unanimity, a single dissentercan thwart a change everyone else wants. The symmetry between thedictator and the sole dissenter is not exact, because under unanimityeveryone is equal in that anyone can occupy the role of dissenter,whereas only one person occupies the role of dictator. Nevertheless theargument suggests that we should not see the scale from pure dictator-ship to unanimity as a continuous progress towards more perfectdemocracy. Rather we should see the progress along the scale frompure dictatorship towards majoritarianism as one towards more perfectdemocracy. As we then move on from majoritarianism towardsunanimity the system becomes an increasingly less perfect democracyagain.What you accept as the right answer to this problem depends uponwhether you see support for democracy resting on the Kantian or theutilitarian viewpoint. From the utilitarian point of view the argument forthe 'perfection' of majoritarianism is conclusive. For if we requireanything more than a simple majority, more desires for public policieswill be frustrated than will be satisfied. Unanimity is far from satisfactory16 This argument is suggested by Jack Lively in Democracy, (Oxford: BasilBlackwell, 1975),pp. 17ff..408This content downloaded from 49.150.102.103 on Sun, 17 Dec 2023 11:26:01 +00:00 All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Kantian and Utilitarian Democracyfrom the utilitarian point of view because everyone but one person'sdesire for change can be frustrated by that one person's desire for thestatus quo. From the point of view of giving people the public policiesthey want nothing can be better, as a decision procedure, thanmajoritarianism. If you require more than a majority for change(perhaps out of a concern that those who do not want change shouldnot have their wants frustrated), then you frustrate the desires of thelarger number who do want change.It might be thought that it is better, from a utilitarian point of view, ifall decisions are unanimous. For if people are unanimously for a change(or unanimously against it), then everyone's desire for (or against) apublic policy is satisfied and no one's desire is frustrated. But this is toconfuse the decision procedure that is best from the utilitarian point ofview with what the utilitarian would most like to see happen when votesare taken. If there are any changes which will in fact win unanimous ap-proval (or will in fact be unanimously rejected), then so much the betterfrom the utilitarian point of view. But usually no proposals will be in thishappy position. Some will be for them and others against. And thenwhat decision procedure will be ideal from the utilitarian point of view?That decisions be taken by majority vote. For in that way you get thegreatest satisfaction and the least frustration of desires for public policiesallowed for by a divided electorate.When we turn to Kantian equality, however, unanimity would seemto be the required principle. From the Kantian point of view the satisfac-tion of desires for public policies is not the main recommendation fordemocratic practice. What is important is that the autonomy of eachrational agent involved in the decision making process should not becompromised. And arguably the only way of ensuring this is to see thatnobody is called upon to act in a way to which he has not voluntarilycommitted himself.Returning from this digression, let us now consider how successful isthe utilitarian, that is, the approbatory consent argument, fordemocracy. The argument will be considered only in relation to directdemocracy, for this is where the claim that majoritarian democracy isthe best decision procedure from a utilitarian point of view is strongest.In such a system, it would seem, a majority of consumers must alwaysget the public policies they want.171 7 Anthony Downs, in An Economic Theory of Democracy, (New York: Harper andRow, 1957), has attempted to show that this is also true, in the long run, of atwo-party representative system. He says (p. 68) "We conclude that in atwo-party democracy, government policies at root follow whatever a majoritystrongly desires, and the range of deviation from its aspirations is relatively small".409This content downloaded from 49.150.102.103 on Sun, 17 Dec 2023 11:26:01 +00:00 All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
David A. Lloyd ThomasGranting that desires concerning public policies will, over all, beleast frustrated by majoritarian democracy (and overlooking familiar dif-ficulties about intensity of desire), it is not clear why this fact should beof very great importance from the utilitarian point of view. Why shouldthe utilitarian be so very concerned about desires for public policies assuch? What is of importance from that point of view is that the desires ofall persons should be satisfied as well, and as equally, as possible (ac-cording to the formula you have chosen for combining aggregatesatisfaction and equality of satisfaction). In this the satisfaction or other-wise of direct desires for public policies may well be rather insignificant.Of much greater importance will be the effects which these policieshave on the utilitarian interests of those subject to them. Of what com-parative utilitarian significance is the frustration of a person's desire forthe policy war, if the war would have served no good purpose, andbrought him nothing but calamity?While it scarcely can be claimed that there is a necessary connectionbetween those public policies wanted by the majority and those policieswhich would be optimal in their effects from the point of view ofutilitarian equality, the following argument purports to show that it isreasonable to expect a close relationship.(1) In general, what people believe to be constitutive of theirinterests do indeed constitute their utilitarian interests. (Forexample, people generally believe good health to be part ofwhat is constitutive of their interests, and indeed it is, from autilitarian point of view.)(2) People generally make accurate assessments, in their owncase, of what effect a proposed public policy will have on thatwhich is constitutive of their interests. (This step is necessarybecause of the difference between being mistaken about whatyour interests are, and being mistaken about the effects apolicy will have upon those interests.)(3) People generally vote on the basis of whether their assessmentof the effects of a public policy on their own interests is favour-able or not.(4) Therefore, the result of the vote in direct majoritarian demo-cracy is generally a good indication of whether, on balance, apublic policy is favourable or not to most people's interests,counting the utilitarian interests of each person equally.410This content downloaded from 49.150.102.103 on Sun, 17 Dec 2023 11:26:01 +00:00 All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Kantian and Utilitarian DemocracyFamiliar doubts can be raised about this argument. In the case of (2)it may be pointed out that many people do not know what policieswould be in their own best interests because, for example, of the com-plexity of estimating their impact. Hence a vote, which at best willreflect people's beliefs about the effects of policies on their interests,may not be for those policies which are optimal from the utilitarian pointof view. In the case of (3), if there are voters who are sincerely concer-ned about what is just, even if what is just may be contrary to their owninterests to some extent, the argument is undone. This step requiresegoism, but presumably an electorate votes on the basis of some mix-ture of egoism and altruism, in unknown proportions.18 The conclusionis also problematic. The policies adopted by a majority vote will notconform to utilitarian equality unless there is some approach towardsequality of interest satisfaction, as required by the formula you havechosen. There are many ways in which the policies accepted bymajority vote might not accomplish this. For example, a satisfiedmajority might vote down policies for the improvement of an im-poverished minority although utilitarian equality required policies forimproving the position of the minority. (No matter what formula youhave chosen, utilitarian equality would require this if the rejectedpolicies both (a) led to an improvement in the 'equality index', and (b)led to an improvement in the aggregate utility index, the loss to themajority being more than outweighed by the gain to the impoverishedminority.)For these reasons, and others, attempts to show that the policiesadopted in a majoritarian direct democracy will approach very closelyto what is optimal from the utilitarian point of view are not likely to suc-ceed. But a more modest and a more plausible claim may be made by autilitarian supporter of majoritarian democracy. Although policies adop-ted under democracy may fall very far short of what is optimal from theutilitarian point of view, the policies adopted under non-democraticdecision procedures can be expected, in the long run, to fall even fur-ther short. Democracy is at least a protection against a minority gover-ning in its own, or its class interest. The argument then is not thatdemocracy can be expected to approach very close to utilitarianequality, but that other decision procedures can be expected to falleven further short. This suggests that the four step argument justcriticized should be re-cast in 'negative' form, aiming at the conclusionthat policies very much contrary to the interests of the majority will not18 See R. P. Wolff, The Poverty of Liberalism, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968),p. 35 (footnote).411This content downloaded from 49.150.102.103 on Sun, 17 Dec 2023 11:26:01 +00:00 All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
David A. Lloyd Thomasbe accepted in a democracy. If (after Downs) one thinks of a represen-tative system as government by elective political elites, again the casewould not be that the elite in power will propose policies close to whatis optimal in utilitarian terms, but rather than any elective elite is likelyto propose policies less bad than those which could be expected froman elite emerging from some non-democratic process.We have, then, an argument that majoritarian democracy rests onapprobatory consent, which though modest in its claims, may never-theless be powerful, considering the disasters that many non-democratic systems have proved to be from the utilitarian point of view.The argument depends on the claim that, in a somewhat minimal sense,the policies adopted under democracy are likely to have the ap-probatory consent of the majority of those subject to them. There is aquite distinct argument (not infrequently confused with it) that thedecision procedure itself, under democracy, has the approbatory con-sent of those subject to it.Any decision procedure, of whatever type, can be converted into adecision procedure of a different type by processes which are validwithin the decision procedure of the first type. For example, a dictator-ship can be changed into a democracy by processes which are validwithin the dictatorial system. Similarly, a democracy can be changed in-to some form of non-democratic system by processes which are validwithin the terms of the democratic system. However in the case of anydecision procedure other than democracy there will be no formalmechanism by which it can be ascertained whether that decisionprocedure has the approbatory consent of those subject to it. (Of coursethere may be other signs of approbatory consent or the lack of it.) Nor,in a non-democratic system, is there any formal mechanism by which amajority preference for some other kind of decision procedure can leadto its being adopted. But if, under democracy, a majority stronglypreferred some alternative to democracy, they could, by processes validwithin the democratic system, convert the decision procedure into onewhich was non-democratic. Thus any extant democracy may be said tohave the continuing approbatory consent of those subject to it, whileother decision procedures may not be able to claim this.This argument is sound so long as a rather weak understanding ofwhat it is for a majority to give its approbatory consent is allowed. Suchconsent is given so long as the majority is not strongly dissatisfied, thatis, so long as dissatisfaction with the democratic decision procedure isnot so strong as to make the majority think it worth its time to organizeand vote for a party advocating an end to democracy. The success ofthis argument also requires that the democratic decision procedure forwhich such consent is claimed does not make illegal or otherwise hin-der the activities of non-democratic parties. The permitting of non-412This content downloaded from 49.150.102.103 on Sun, 17 Dec 2023 11:26:01 +00:00 All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Kantian and Utilitarian Democracydemocratic opinion, far from being paradoxical in a democracy, isrequired if this argument is to be available to the democrat.Of these two arguments, both of which base democracy on ap-probatory consent, the former, concerned with democratic policies, isapparently more important from the utilitarian point of view than thelatter, concerned with the democratic decision procedure itself. The lat-ter is not so weighty for a utilitarian unless it is assumed that people havevery strong preferences for their chosen decision procedure as such.The policies likely to be produced by various kinds of decisionprocedure, and the effects those policies will have on the utilitarian in-terests of most people will be of much more weight. However aspurious importance may be attached to the latter argument if we con-fuse the fact that under democracy the decision procedure has the ap-probatory consent of the majority with the claim that it has themajority's contractual consent.Democracy has been thought to secure the nation state from anar-chistic doubts about its pretensions to authority. Even if there is no suc-cessful argument for the authority of the state simpliciter, there is anargument, so it may be thought, for the authority of the democraticstate. No grounds for this claim have been found in this discussion. TheKantian viewpoint, while it can offer support for the authority of certainvoluntary democratic associations, can offer none for the authority of anon-voluntary association, such as the state. While there are two suc-cessful utilitarian arguments for democratic decision procedures instates, these cannot establish anything about the authority of the state.Utilitarian arguments cannot establish authority, but at best theusefulness of a belief in authority. For claims to authority must rest onpast-regarding considerations, while utilitarian arguments essentiallylook to future-regarding considerations. Current proposals for the im-provement of democratic practice such as greater participation, a moredirect influence by the electors on the holders of political power, andthe decentralization of decision making, while they may indeed makethe system more democratic, can do nothing for the moral authority ofthe democratic state.December 1978413This content downloaded from 49.150.102.103 on Sun, 17 Dec 2023 11:26:01 +00:00 All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms