A Virtue-Based Approach To Euthanasia

Death and Compassion: A Virtue-Based Approach to Euthanasia

Following the recent revival of virtue ethics, a number of ethicists have discussed the moral problems surrounding euthanasia by drawing on concepts such as compassion, benevolence, death with dignity, mercy, and by inquiring whether euthanasia is compatible with human flourishing. Most of these writers assert, or simply assume, that their arguments concerning the morality of euthanasia also support their views with regard to legislation. I argue, against these writers, that legislation cannot and should not be based on our moral and religious beliefs concerning whether euthanasia allows a person to die a good death. I then outline an Aristotelian approach to the role of law and government

Such shifts account for some dissatisfaction with the medical focus, since it is just that, while the patient’s wider “suffering” passes unnoticed. Virtue ethics—that is, the approach that might account for such suffering, meanwhile, has been relegated to—at best—a “place on the sideline”. In contrast to such popular, but bare and impersonal, principles as beneficence, non-maleficence, and autonomy, the author employs an Aristotelian approach to reintroduce three related virtues: compassion, benevolence, and respectfulness.

The virtue of compassion encourages an empathetic identification, and hence engagement, with the patient and his or her suffering. Benevolence encourages truly beneficent, helpful actions, which will result from this fuller understanding of the patient’s predicament. Finally, respectfulness encourages full respect for the patient as a selfrealising individual. A dialogue conducted in accordance with this virtue will result in shared decision making, as opposed to the doctor or patient-directed approaches presumed by, respectively, paternalistic and autonomy-based

To said individual, pain belongs uniquely to them in the sense that no other can experience their pain or even attempt to understand it, but also that no one pain is exactly like any pain we have felt before or are likely to ever feel again. It is for this reason that we refer to pain in the form of vague metaphors – a sharp stabbing pain, a dull ache, etc – as we lack the ability to fully share our experience of pain with those we attempt to describe it to. Considering this, could the individual who experiences this pain be the master of themselves? Could they then be permitted to choose – based upon their possession of the greatest practical wisdom on the part of their pain – their own fate, whether that be to die a natural death or to die by a purposeful method? Or perhaps, is the state of being master of their pain (if they are so), not enough to warrant a right to choose their own death?

I think I have an idea about what you're asking, but please correct me if I am wrong. I feel as if you are asking a question about subjectivity related to a final state of being, which in this case is death. Let me list off some questions I think you may be asking or need to