Case Study: The Denver International Airport Baggage System Disaster

The Denver International Airport Baggage System Disaster is arguably the most devastating information systems failure the state of Colorado has endured. “Twice the size of Manhattan, the Denver International Airport (DIA) at 53 square miles was designed to be the USA's largest airport.” (Montealegre, 2000). In an attempt to gain a competitive edge and increase efficiency, Denver International Airport officials elected to implement a state of the art fully automated computer-controlled baggage handling system. “BAE Automated Systems, Inc., a world leader in the design and implementation of material handling systems, was commissioned by the City of Denver to develop the system. An information system composed of 55 networked computers, 5,000 electric

We all make mistakes, even large corporations and governments are subject to these pitfalls. It often seems that the bigger the project is it becomes less likely for project planners and managers to admit failure. It would be even more beneficial to learn from the mistakes of others, rather than our own whenever possible. We can observe how different actions and decisions have influenced a situation in a specific instance. Then, once we have made our observations, we can adjust our own actions for the circumstance accordingly. If everyone did this, we would not run into as many obstacles as usual. Unfortunately, this is not the approach used by the key decision makers for the DIA baggage project. Next, we will take a deeper look into some of the reasons the people involved helped the project

If the city had simply taken the warnings they received into consideration and adjusted accordingly, we might very well have the functioning baggage system the city dreamed of.
The city should have listened to the analyst firm, the contractors submitting bids, the Munich airport and the contractor they finally got to work on their project. All of them shared similar concerns that could have been addressed in at least two different ways.
The city could have allocated more time for the project as recommended by Munich and BAE Systems. They could have also worked on a prototype system on a much smaller scale first as mentioned in the financial portion of this paper. Either of these methods could have helped spare the embarrassment of the city/airport and certainly would have reduced the cost. Remember, the airport was costing over $1 million per day during the 16-month delay for the baggage system.
In hindsight, I am sure that the decision makers for the project would make some different choices. While the project debacle certainly cost the city a fortune, it can also benefit those who learn from other’s mistakes. No project is too big to fail and realistic projections are key to a successful project being